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ABSTRACT 
Since the end of the Cold War, the relationship between international and domestic 
law has become one of the most pressing conundrums in legal theory and practice. 
But this is an old problem of politics, society and law within and between states. 
Despite the current urgency, no comprehensive historical study of the concepts of 
‘domestic’ and ‘international’ has been produced. This thesis fills one part of this 
significant gap. It examines how and why these ideas, as linked terms, emerged in 
the works of jurists writing in the British Isles. That development is most clearly 
understood as a product, response and justification of projects of empire and the 
kinds of legal subjecthood that empire required. This history is presented in four 
parts. Chapter One contends that the ‘domestic’ emerged from sixteenth and 
seventeenth century efforts to channel natural law and imperial jurisdiction into 
territorial authority for the early English imperial state. Chapter Two argues that 
the ‘international’ appeared in the late eighteenth century to demand the rational 
reorganisation of the domestic laws of all states, to further commerce, check 
revolution, and articulate national independence. Chapter Three shows how the 
domestic and international became entwined in a variety of Victorian-era projects 
tied to the independence of absolute imperial sovereignty and the interdependence 
of the globalising world. Chapter Four argues that in the interwar years the 
domestic and international became central to juristic attempts to transform the 
collapsing British Empire and wider international order, culminating with general 
theories of the rule of law within and between states that underpinned the post-
1945 settlement. This history reveals a much more diverse set of roles and projects 
for the domestic and international than is imagined in current theorising. The 
contingency of these past meanings forms one pathway for unsettling and 
remaking them for today’s projects.  
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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This thesis grew from interests, questions and concerns about the nature of law 
and legal systems, and especially their histories, that refuse to go away. My own 
dim political consciousness started to form in the shadows of the wars in the 
former Yugoslavia, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Kosovo and East Timor 
interventions, culminating with the American wars on Afghanistan and Iraq. The 
attempts to justify these conflicts and the decisions to intervene (or not), seemed 
to trade increasingly lazily on the humanitarian intervention mythos, which, after 
the supposed rupture of September 11, seemed to be subsumed into the inevitable 
unleashing of unbridled destruction and vengeance, with the much older paradox 
of doing violence for justice.  
What also linked all these events was a narrative of changing laws. Bad internal 
laws, wrong constitutions, and international pariahs created these problems, never 
the international system, its laws, or the constitutions of intervening states. It was 
for the ‘international community’ to fix them, partly by doing things only 
internationality could claim to do: act for humanity, or democracy. After the 
righteousness of this kind of force had been justified, the next legal narrative was 
about the quotidian mission of building a legal system in places said to have none. 
At first this prompted the interesting and difficult philosophical question that sits 
below much of what I have been interested in for some time: how, exactly, do legal 
systems develop and generate good authority, produce justice, represent people, 
particularly in the spectre of injustice, violence and disorder?  
These wars and their narratives, international and domestic, so often reveal what 
has always been problematic about progress, liberalism and civilizational 
missions. The forms of authority that underpin states engaged in these things is 
always far from the good or the just. The international legal order is the most 
complicated juridical space in which these questions can be explored. But its 
complexity is always already a function of the domestic legal orders that create it. 
Its power relations, material injustices, and pathologies reflect theirs. In exploring 
them both, together, I think something profound about the nature of law can be 
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found, or at least gestured at. The missions of the 1990s and 2000s both burn on. 
But any number of other global crises that partly sprang from them and their 
worldviews have attained still greater urgency: climate and environmental 
collapses, global structural inequality, resurgent authoritarianism — all linked to 
each other, and the last three decades. The power and laws that might hold some 
part of their resolution will, I think, inevitably call for some new bridging or 
collapsing or dismemberment of the division of domestic and international in its 
current form. This project is an attempt to understand one small part of how those 
concepts, the projects they supported, and the worlds in which they were formed, 
arrived at this point.  
For the last four years and this work I am greatly indebted to a number of people 
and institutions. 
As always, material first. The Rosalyn Higgins Trust and the Law Department of 
the London School of Economics and Political Science generously granted me 
funding to cover the United Kingdom’s considerable international research student 
fees and a very comfortable stipend that, as far as I know, is the most generous in 
UK law PhD funding. I would not be here and this would not have been done 
without it. Many other research students here make it through on far less, and with 
far more precarity, than I had to endure. They should not have to do so. The Judge 
Rosalyn Higgins Scholarship also gave me the great privilege of meeting and 
corresponding with Judge Higgins, whose wisdom and enthusiasm for the project 
and much else besides was a great privilege. The Law Department and the School 
also provided generous conference funding for each year of the program, which 
allowed me to apply for and attend events knowing I would receive financial 
support for at least a few trips per year. Each was always immensely useful for 
meeting new and old friends, presenting these ideas in their still worse forms, and 
always left me rejuvenated, excited, and aware of the great privileges of academic 
work. As with scholarship funding, attending these meetings without undue 
concern over money was a privilege that must be extended to all scholars. The 
Modern Law Review granted me one of their scholarships for the final two years, 
and for that extra support and strong encouragement, I will always be humbled 
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and grateful. Finally, I must once again acknowledge the support of the Australian 
Research Council, who funded the MPhil that made this new direction in the PhD 
project possible. 
Second, intellectual support. My primary supervisor Gerry Simpson’s guidance 
has been a constant source of useful critiques, suggestions, permissions, wry 
wisdom, and most importantly an incitement to be more creative and more 
ambitious in scope and frame. Moments of quiet confidence, which he likely does 
not recall, broke up longer stretches of critical demands, and were always there to 
reassure me that this was going somewhere. Tom Poole as secondary supervisor 
provided invaluable guidance and reassurance for working through such a big 
range of figures and texts (on many of whom he always had wise points to make), 
and in the broader problem of trying to balance legal theory, history, and empire. 
I must also thank Devika Hovell, my initial supporting supervisor, for her 
extremely useful guidance in the early months, and especially her final suggestion. 
I owe still greater and longer held debts back to Australia: first and foremost, as 
always to Anne Orford for her guidance and friendship in my MPhil and many 
things besides, and to the rest of the Melbourne Law School faculty, especially 
Carolyn Evans (now at Griffith) Kirsty Gover, Shaun McVeigh, Sundhya Pahuja, 
Ann Genovese, Di Otto, Adrienne Stone, Cheryl Saunders, Mark McMillan (now 
at RMIT), Lulu Weis, Chantal Morton, Julian Sempill, Katy Barnett, Brad Jessup 
and Jeremy Gans. I also am very grateful to Megan Donaldson for her extremely 
useful advice on applications and the framing of the project in its early stages. 
A long list of conferences and workshops helped me to air and develop the ideas 
in this thesis and meet and make new friends, thanked here and below. The 
European Society of International Law Research Forum in April 2016 allowed me 
to try out some thoughts on global aspects of historiography and international law, 
with special thanks to Thomas Skouteris, Isobel Roele and Yannis Kalpouzos. The 
Lauterpacht Centre’s ‘Law in International Orders — Past and Present’ workshop 
in May 2016 gave me an unexpected chance to present a four-month old ‘two 
minute’ version of this project, which prompted invaluable early encouragement 
from Nehal Bhuta, David Armitage (encouraging the gender angle), Jennifer Pitts, 
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and finally Lauren Benton’s sage advice to ‘just do one thing’, to which I 
acquiesced about a year later. A wonderful 2016 book launch of the Oxford 
Handbook of the Theory of International Law with Anne Orford allowed me to 
make some esoteric points about Richard Zouche, cosmography and theory that 
prompted useful feedback and encouragement from Mónica García-Salmones and 
Geoff Gordon (Martti Koskenniemi mostly looked at me with bewilderment 
during the talk, so I suppose that was useful feedback too). An April 2017 
workshop of the International Law and Municipal Law Interest Group of the 
Italian Society for International and EU Law in Pisa was a lovely opportunity to 
receive some very useful feedback and constructive comments from Stefano 
Saluzzo on Gentili, with special thanks to Daniele Amoroso for inviting me on the 
back of a special issue rejection and to Francesca Capone, Andrea Spagnolo, and 
Giovanni Zarra. The Inaugural meeting of the Liverpool Constitutional Theory 
group in July 2017 allowed me to try out some brief thoughts about Dicey and 
Westlake and the modern implications of the project, and to get detailed comments 
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with special thanks to Ben Murphy and Katy Sowery. A strange and special 
workshop celebrating Philip Allott’s work and utopianism with other young 
scholars in Kiel in 2017 came with a very helpful injunction from Allott to really 
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expansively about legal visions and utopian schemes and the recurrence of 
domestic and international interactions in them, with special thanks to Jens 
Theilen, Isabelle Haßfurther, and Wiebke Staff. The ESIL Annual Conference in 
Naples 2017 helped me to air further thoughts on historiography and method, later 
published in the Leiden Journal of International Law, that allowed me to cordon 
some of the wider questions about historiography and method that I was tempted 
to explore in more detail here; Gerry Simpson provided useful comments at that 
forum, and I thank Thomas Skouteris once again, as well as Matilda Arvidsson 
and Miriam Bak McKenna, as well as Anne van Aaken, Jean D’Aspremont and 
Carlos Esposito who provided useful feedback encouragement as Judges for the 
ESIL Young Scholar Prize. The Cold War V Workshop allowed me to revisit and 
extend some of these ideas about historiography and begin thinking about the 
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INTRODUCTION: BELIEVING TOGETHER 
 
What happens when men believe something together, or try to believe it? What do they 
have to expel in order to stake territory, claim a history and form a shared identity? 
— Anne Enright1 
This thesis is about men trying to believe things together. It examines not a single 
object of belief, but rather two ideas thought together: the systems of national law 
on the one hand, and the systems of international public law on the other, or, in 
the neat contemporary dichotomy, the ‘domestic’ and ‘international’. Since the 
end of the Cold War, the relationship between international and domestic law has 
become one of the most pressing conundrums in legal theory and practice. But the 
tensions are not new. They are old problems of politics, society and law within 
and between states. Despite the current urgency, no comprehensive study of the 
emergence and development of the domestic and international has yet been 
produced. This thesis fills one part of this significant gap. It examines how and 
why the relationship between domestic and international public law emerged in 
the works of jurists writing in the British Isles. That development is most clearly 
understood as products, responses and justifications of projects of empire and the 
kinds of legal subjecthood that empire required.  
This thesis argues that British juristic visions of the international and domestic 
were primarily motivated by empire and the kinds of legal subjecthood that empire 
demanded. They emerged, developed and changed in the descriptions, 
justifications and legal claims of empire. Empire is the polity without limit, driven 
by expansion and subjugation, justified by improvement, progress, safety and 
protection. Subjecthood marks the belonging and status within a polity of an 
individual, group, or dependent semi-sovereign; of who and what is the human 
being that forms part of the family, the people, the state and the empire. Far from 
just an interplay between constitution, statute and treaty within imperial 
 
1   Anne Enright, ‘Diary’ (2017) 39(18) London Review of Books 33, 35. 
 Introduction: Believing Together 13 
expansions and contractions, the domestic and international were framed for their 
opposites. Domesticity was not only about Britain’s internal order but the orders 
of other states. Internationality was not only about the relations between states but 
the ability to act within them. Ideas of domestic law not only justified the British 
state to its subjects, but was used to critique the domestic orders of antagonistic 
European states, and to deny the validity of non-European empires and political 
groups. Ideas of international law were the means for Britain to express its 
imperial, absolute sovereignty, and to criticise and check the imperial ambitions 
of other sovereigns. The domestic and international acted as mediators between 
legal questions raised by the biggest, unbounded legal entity of the Empire and the 
smallest units of its cognisance in its individual subjects, from monarchs to 
ministers to absorbed rightless subjects. Together, they formed a means of 
critiquing and denying encroachments from laws beyond Britain, from natural 
laws of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to the rival imperial claims of 
other powers in the eighteenth and nineteenth, ending with the collapse of the 
Empire in the mid-twentieth century. 
This introduction lays out contemporary academic work on the domestic and 
international, arguing that there is a distinct lack of any history of these concepts 
and their interaction. It then explores the methodological questions raised by such 
a history, before outlining the argument of the thesis, its structure, and the value 
of its contribution.  
I CONTEMPORARY VISIONS 
Contemporary international and public law scholarship on the domestic and 
international in the fields of international and public law in the Global North form 
three major phases that roughly map onto the last three decades. From 1989 to 
2001, jurists fixed on the questions of interaction in the newly globalised liberal-
democratic world, where the relationship fixed on the expansion of international 
institutions and the joint globalisation of liberal international law and liberal-
14 Contemporary Visions  
democratic constitutional ordering.2 These studies examined constitutional 
barriers to implementing new multilateral treaties in adherence to human rights or 
neoliberal trade requirements, humanitarian interventions in service of markets or 
democratisation,3 the incursion of global problems into local courts,4 and, at the 
more abstract level, questions about the endurance or transformation of concepts 
of ‘sovereignty’, ‘self-determination’ and ‘state’ in the globalised world,5 the 
spread of constitutional ideas from the Global North throughout the world,6 and 
the ‘spectres’ of the failed socialist international,7 or possibilities of a renewed 
Third World project.8 From 9/11 and the Iraq War, these questions shifted to focus 
on more egregious forms of violence: the expansion or control of executive powers 
to combat terrorism and ‘failed states’ and the curtailing of human rights in favour 
of security,9 to the implementation of trade sanctions, to new conceptual fixations 
on global public or administrative law,10 legitimacy,11 and constitutionalism 
 
2   Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’ (1995) 6 EJIL 503; 
David Kennedy, ‘A New World Order: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow’ (1994) 4 
Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 329. 
3   Anne Orford, ‘Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions after the Cold 
War’ (1997) 38 Harvard International Law Journal 443. 
4   Karen Knop, ‘Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts’ (1999) 32 NYU Journal 
of International Law and Politics 501. 
5   Neil MacCormick, ‘Beyond the Sovereign State’ (1993) 56 MLR 1; Karen Knop, Diversity 
and Self-Determination in International Law (CUP, 2002); Neil Walker (ed), Sovereignty in 
Transition (Hart, 2003). 
6   Vladlen Vereshchetin, ‘New Constitutions and the Old Problem of the Relationship between 
International Law and National Law’ (1996) 7 EJIL 29. 
7   Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New 
International (Routledge, 1994); Susan Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions: International 
Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology (OUP, 2000). 
8   BS Chimni, International Law and World Order: A Critique of Contemporary Approaches 
(Sage, 1993); Antony Anghie, ‘Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International 
Financial Institutions, and the Third World’ (1999) 32 NYU Journal of International Law and 
Politics 243; Peter Fitzpatrick, ‘“The New Constitutionalism”: The Global, the Postcolonial 
and the Constitution of Nations’ (2006) 8 Law, Democracy and Development 1. 
9   Jack Goldsmith and Daryl Levinson, ‘Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, 
Public Law’ (2009) 122 Harvard Law Review 1791. 
10   Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch and Richard B Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law’ (2005) 68(3 and 4) Law and Contemporary Problems 15. 
11   Mattias Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of 
Analysis’ (2004) 15 EJIL 907. 
 Introduction: Believing Together 15 
unmoored from territorial states,12 and new appraisals of the imperial histories of 
international law in that violent moment.13 Since the 2007 Global Financial Crisis 
and the resurgent ‘populism’ and ‘anti-globalism’ ten years hence, the domestic 
and international again formed spectres for each other: nationalist  visions that 
invoke sovereignty to threaten and retreat from the liberal international order with 
strains of protectionism, chauvinism and isolationism,14 to renewed attempts to 
transform and reshape global neoliberal capitalism to reassert the rights of states 
against multinational corporations and their parent states, particularly in the 
Global South.15  
A range of visions of the relationship of domestic and international law exist today. 
Their variety and vagueness reflect the many uses to which the relationship has 
been put. We read of tensions, clashes, fragmentation, and splits in the violent 
categorisations, where the laws, rules, principles and ideals of each sphere jostle 
with those of the other for supremacy.16 We see the imagery of divisions, barriers, 
gaps, and boundaries in the geographical or quasi-natural accounts, which might 
either suggest the specificity of different legal cultures that cannot or should not 
 
12   Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (OUP, 2010); T 
Kleinlein, ‘On Holism, Pluralism, and Democracy: Approaches to Constitutionalism beyond 
the State’ (2010) 21 EJIL 1075. 
13   Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International 
Legal Order (CUP, 2004); Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of 
International Law (CUP, 2005). 
14   James Crawford, ‘The Current Political Discourse Concerning International Law’ (2018) 81 
MLR 1; David Singh Grewal, ‘Three Theses on the Current Crisis of International Liberalism’ 
(2018) 25 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 595; Hannah Woolaver, ‘From Joining to 
Leaving: Domestic Law’s Role in the International Legal Validity of Treaty Withdrawal’ 
(2019) 30 EJIL 73; Martti Koskenniemi, International Law and the Far Right: Reflections on 
Law and Cynicism (Asser, 2019). 
15   John Linarelli, Margot Salomon and M Sornarajah, The Misery of International Law: 
Confrontations with Injustice in the Global Economy (OUP, 2017). 
16   See, eg, Orford, ‘Locating the International’ (n 3); Mattias Kumm, ‘Democratic 
Constitutionalism Encounters International Law: Terms of Engagement’ in Sujit Choudhry 
(ed), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (CUP, 2011) 256. 
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be bridged,17 or the fluid state,18 or conversely projects of ‘global’ or 
‘transnational law’ that displace the domestic–international dichotomy and flatten 
legal cultures,19 or the barriers around institutions and lives in the public and 
private.20 In healing or therapeutic accounts, we are urged to seek out dialogue, 
translation, balance, fertilisation, symbiosis, convergence, integration, mutuality, 
unity or harmony between the spheres.21 And still others offer pathways of 
dissolution, decolonisation or indigenisation of both domestic and international 
laws, in projects for radically reshaping both categories.22 The purposes to which 
these images can be put are also varied. They can fit interventionist projects, like 
the invocation of the responsibility to protect or democratic legitimacy to peel back 
sovereignty or justify the replacement of a domestic constitutional order entirely, 
or where the laws of intellectual property and contract interpose themselves in the 
public laws of developing states.23 They can support projects of reshaping, as 
when principles plucked from domestic constitutions are said to inform or limit or 
require the reform of international legal structures and processes.24 They can also 
 
17   See, eg, Anthea Roberts, Is International Law International? (OUP, 2017); Joseph HH 
Weiler, ‘The Geology of International Law — Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy’ 
(2004) 64 ZaöRV 547; Helmut Philipp Aust and Georg Nolte (eds), The Interpretation of 
International Law by Domestic Courts: Uniformity, Diversity, Convergence (OUP, 2016). 
18   Hilary Charlesworth et al (eds), The Fluid State: International Law and National Legal 
Systems (Federation, 2005). 
19   See Karen Knop, ‘Elegance in Global Law: Reading Neil Walker, Intimations of Global Law’ 
(2017) 8 Transnational Legal Theory 330; Mattias Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in 
Constitutionalism: An Integrated Conception of Public Law’ (2013) 20 Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 605. 
20   A Claire Cutler, ‘Artifice, Ideology and Paradox: The Public/Private Distinction in 
International Law’ (1997) 4 Review of International Political Economy 261; Kim Rubenstein 
and Katharine G Young (eds), The Public Law of Gender: From the Local to the Global (CUP, 
2016) 
21   See, eg, Kumm, ‘Cosmopolitan Turn’ (n 19); Eyal Benvenisti and Alon Harel, ‘Embracing 
the Tension between National and International Human Rights Law: The Case for Discordant 
Parity’ (2017) 15 ICON 36. 
22   Peter Fitzpatrick, ‘Ultimate Plurality: International Law and the Possibilities of Resistance’ 
(2016) 1 Inter Gentes 5; Irene Watson, ‘First Nations and the Colonial Project’ (2016) 1 Inter 
Gentes 30, and, with a more doctrinal focus, Roberts (n 17). 
23   Anne Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (CUP, 2011); Sundhya 
Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth, and the Politics 
of Universality (CUP, 2011). 
24   Devika Hovell, ‘Due Process in the United Nations’ (2016) 110 AJIL 9. 
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sometimes serve no explicit project, but instead reflect a kind of background 
chauvinist obliviousness, in the many instances where principles accepted as the 
centre of one system — due process, sovereignty, the rule of law; all manner of 
highly contested but purportedly simple and clear ideas — are claimed to be 
lacking in another state, and then insisted upon.  
While questions of the domestic and international are everywhere for public and 
international lawyers and jurists alike, no comprehensive account of the 
emergence and development of the relationship between them has yet been 
produced. Instead, scattered studies have examined select aspects, places and 
timelines in which the domestic and international were debated. Many works have 
focused on the well-known continental debates of the 1920s and 1930s in Germany 
and Austria.25 Some studies ‘revisited’ the origins of theories of the relationship 
told through histories of case law.26 Other works looked to historical antecedents 
to deepen understandings of present dilemmas, particularly to understand those 
general systems by analogy to earlier state systems.27 Still other studies place the 
interaction at a more everyday, administrative level of colonial laws and their 
‘hybrid’ international character, external to the imperial state,28 or the imperial 
uses of public law ideas and doctrines.29 Perhaps the most promising perspectives 
 
25   See, eg, Hauke Brunkhorst, ‘Critique of Dualism: Hans Kelsen and the Twentieth Century 
Revolution in International Law’ (2011) 18 Constellations 496; Richard Collins, 
‘Constitutionalism as Liberal-Juridical Consciousness: Echoes from International Law’s Past’ 
(2009) 22 LJIL 251. 
26   See especially Roger O’Keefe, ‘The Doctrine of Incorporation Revisited’ (2009) 79 BYIL 7; 
Earlier studies combine judicial and theoretical examinations: Joseph Gabriel Starke, 
‘Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law’ (1936) 17 BYIL 66; Edwin D 
Dickinson, ‘Changing Concepts and the Doctrine of Incorporation’ (1932) 26 AJIL 239; H 
Lauterpacht, ‘Is International Law a Part of the Law of England?’ (1939) 25 Transactions of 
the Grotius Society 51. 
27   Marlene Wind, ‘The European Union as a Polycentric Polity: Returning to a Neo-Medieval 
Europe?’ in JHH Weiler and Marlene Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism beyond the 
State (CUP, 2003) 103; Andrew Arato, The Adventures of the Constituent Power: Beyond 
Revolutions? (CUP, 2017). 
28   See Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Colonial Laws; Sources, Strategies and Lessons’ (2016) 18 JHIL 
248; Lauren A Benton and Lisa Ford, Rage for Order: The British Empire and the Origins of 
International Law, 1800-1850 (HUP, 2016). 
29   Thomas Poole, Reason of State: Law, Prerogative and Empire (CUP, 2015); Dylan Lino, ‘The 
Rule of Law and the Rule of Empire: AV Dicey in Imperial Context’ (2018) 81 MLR 739. 
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have come from historians with new interests in the international and global forms 
of law and political thought, in recent work that has dealt with international 
political thought,30 and neoliberal projects to dissolve the legal barriers within and 
between states for homogenised global capitalism,31 where law and legal thought 
are important, but not necessarily the central story.  
Perhaps the most profound image of the domestic and international that reflects 
both its contemporary importance and the problems of exploring the depths of its 
history is Philip Allott’s characterisation of it as a ‘crude split’. Allott mused that 
there must have been a ‘tragic day in the history of humanity when the subtle and 
complex concept of law was crudely split into two — national law and the law 
between nations.’32 Had this tragedy not occurred, thought Allott, international 
law could have been made ‘to play the wonderfully creative functions of law in 
the self-constituting of all forms of society … serving the common interest of all-
humanity’.33 This is a mythic history, in the deep time of law, that cannot be 
clearly glimpsed because of the entrenchment of the split in our training, minds, 
and lives. The problems of the late twentieth century showed that this division 
must have been made somewhere in law’s labyrinthine histories, too murky to 
discern and yet in evidence everywhere. In the meantime, any creative or 
constitutive role for law remains unfilled and marred by the divide between 
nations.  
Despite the poetry of Allott’s vision, this thesis shows that while the split might 
seem inevitably crude, it can be explored. Given the clear gap in historical 
inquiries into the origins of these ideas, it must be. It did not crack on a single day. 
It was not the product of a single mind. Nor was it only a split — it was also a 
shaping, an ordering, a moulding, an expulsion. In the long process of events and 
 
30   Jennifer Pitts, Boundaries of the International: Law and Empire (HUP, 2018); David 
Armitage, Foundations of Modern International Thought (CUP, 2012). 
31   Quinn Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism (HUP, 2018). 
32   Philip Allott, ‘The Concept of International Law’ in The Health of Nations: Society and Law 
Beyond the State (CUP, 2002) 289. 
33   Ibid. 
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juristic writings, what really emerges is a long, complex fissure that twisted over 
time, serving a range of purposes for different writers that were, most often, 
intimately connected with debates over empire, and used different ideas of state, 
people, community, authority, power and law itself to respond to those past world 
events that touched on the domestic and international forms of law. 
II METHODS: TERMS, TEXTS, THOUGHT, TAXONOMY 
The contemporary visions of the domestic and international examined above, 
combined with Allott’s crude split, provide a starting point for the taxonomy of 
the motifs of interactions, purposes and projects for the domestic and international 
used in this thesis, as well as its broader considerations around method: its 
approach to legal texts, jurists, ‘legal thought’ and the category of ‘British’. While 
each of these elements are specific to this thesis, they also relate to wider concerns 
in the historiography of international and public law.34 This part explores the 
methodological questions first, before outlining the taxonomy of motifs. 
A first methodological problem is how to approach the terms ‘domestic’ and 
‘international’. This project looks for them and especially the links between them 
as wide, messy ideas used with a range of meanings and connotations, within 
different contexts, and serving different projects. This is not a narrow history of, 
say, differing accounts of the doctrine of incorporation, which would mainly 
reflect the language and decisions of courts, and fix a thin idea of interaction 
between domestic and international laws as primarily institutional, about 
incorporation in legislation. While that is an important story, it is only part of it, 
and confining the focus to this doctrine would presume sizable limits to these 
ideas. Rather, ‘messiness’ points to juristic thinking about the domestic and 
international that involves looking for analogies, links, mirroring and rhetoric that 
might not necessarily involve these words, but reflects the kind of internal and 
external spaces and movements of law and legal ideas that is constant. This project 
 
34   See further Martin Clark, ‘Ambivalence, Anxieties / Adaptations, Advances: Conceptual 
History and International Law’ (2018) 31 LJIL 747; Maks Del Mar and Michael Lobban (eds), 
Law, Theory and History: New Essays on a Neglected Dialogue (Hart, 2016). 
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sometimes takes the ‘domestic’ very literally in legal texts, as invocations of the 
relation of the family and patriarchal authority, or the spread of families, that are 
then related to images of the state, the imagined state of nature, the legitimacy of 
the sovereign or the international community. These literal domestics can be 
analogies, or histories, or justifications. But in other works, particularly more 
sophisticated legal doctrinal treatments, terms like ‘civil law’, ‘internal law’, 
‘municipal law’, and ‘national law’ are used to describe what today would be 
called domestic. Where those usages appear, the question becomes why those 
terms, in this scheme, at this time? Similarly, the international can take many 
forms. Legally, it appears in terms like the law of nations, the law between nations, 
or in vaguer and more contested terms that are linked but distinguished — to 
different extents by different jurists — like divine, natural or universal law, jus 
gentium, or the common law of mankind. The international also holds wider senses 
linked to law, but resting more essentially in politics or economics or philosophy, 
looking to the morals or principles of cosmopolitanism, humanity, civilisation, 
liberty, commerce or progress. And finally, it can be ‘translated’ back into the past, 
as when ‘international’ was used in the early twentieth century translations of the 
Latin texts of Gentili and Zouche, originally written long before its invention. 
This approach to terms leads to the wider question of archive and what counts as 
a juristic text. The main archive for this history is the written, printed, publicised, 
circulated, read and used works of British legal thought. Some of these works are 
artefacts of cloistered thought, addressed only to other jurists or small circles of 
private readers. Others are polemical, addressed to wide public audiences and 
dealing with law’s place in the most pertinent issues of the day. This thesis uses 
these texts and the projects of their authors as the material for guiding a history of 
the domestic and international. That requires highlighting their links, 
commonalities, disagreements, and divergences, while also retaining parts of their 
messiness, incoherence and the fact that they frequently do not speak to each other. 
There is a risk of imposing too much coherence. The silences, gaps and missed 
connections, and the unclarity in their works should be retained, to resist the urge 
to cover the gaps and elisions in their theories, to preserve the partiality and 
inconclusiveness of these texts, and the ways in which their central ideas might 
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not seem convincing, or do not seem to clearly link themselves to the contexts in 
which they were written and to which they respond. That, in turn, is an aspect of 
this project’s resistance against evaluating any of these ideas, in the sense of 
contending which is a ‘correct’ or persuasive concept of domestic or international, 
and indeed resisting the common path of identifying the ‘pivotal’ thinkers or 
moments that forged the path to the supposed wisdom of any particular present 
conception.  
This leads to the next issue of what, precisely ‘legal thought’ is, and the 
methodological questions raised by focusing on it. Cognisant of recent suggestions 
that international and public law history is too fixated on ideas,35 or too resistant 
to the need to contextualise and avoid anachronism,36 or too overtly political,37 
this thesis takes up a specific mode of engaging with ideas and legal thought that 
focuses on the jurist38 and juridical thought.39 Legal concepts are not approached 
here as engines of change, or as significant or influential ideas that shaped the 
world, though they may well have that effect. Rather this project seeks to 
reconstruct, arrange and contextualise the legal theories of a range of jurists that 
engaged with ideas of the domestic and international to see how they used them in 
their projects and visions for the world and its laws. While some jurists selected 
here have long been ‘influential’ or ‘significant’, chosen time and again as central 
characters in the pantheon of Western legal thought, others are more obscure, or 
rarely read as relevant to public or international law. Either way, they appear here 
because they illustrate the different uses and content that ideas of the domestic and 
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international could have for their visions, projects and worlds. Legal thought is 
interesting because it purports to describe present laws accurately, to sometimes 
provide visions of how they ought to be understood or reformed, and often to relate 
these descriptions and aspirations to conditions of politics, society and economics. 
With their minutiae, weight, tediousness, and polemics, juristic works are carefully 
planned ruminations. What they argue, and what they elide, is important. Each text 
marks a point at which the projects and worlds of these writers made their way 
into the intellectual traditions of public and international law.  
Projects and worlds lead to the confinement to ‘British’ legal thought. This thesis 
works with a tradition of legal thought that is recognisably ‘British’ and yet still 
complex, contested and largely resistant to clear definitions. Britishness is 
suggestive of several shared characteristics and experiences: a shared history, 
particular legal training and cultures both for public and international law in their 
theories and practices, and certain images of government, state, constitution and 
law.40 Yet some of these characteristics pose challenges for this project. First, 
‘British’ is an amorphous category in geographic, temporal and juristic terms: it 
risks anachronism (not least that there was no polity of ‘Great Britain’ before 
1707) and vagueness, in that it has always been an essentially contested idea. 
Second, British approaches to law and legal thought supposedly rest on an aversion 
to systematicity and theory itself. The law is the product of parliament and the 
courts, not the writings of any non-official person or body, regardless of how 
convincing or reasonable those writings are. British — and especially English — 
legal philosophy typically focuses on defining and understanding the content of 
core concepts like law itself, the rule of law, or the nature of sovereignty, 
approached as an analysis of the meaning of words at the level of language alone, 
 
40   See, eg, DHN Johnson, ‘The English Tradition in International Law’ (1962) 11 ICLQ 416; 
Janet McLean, Searching for the State in British Legal Thought: Competing Conceptions of 
the Public Sphere (CUP, 2012); Shaunnagh Dorsett and Ian Hunter, Law and Politics in 
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rather than their social, political or economic contexts.41 The strength of this 
refusal is a reminder that the writings of jurists, within or about the law and 
government of any state or empire are always already political. The claimed 
aversion to theory rests on cardinal principles that are themselves up for debate. 
Third, and finally, Britishness raises a seemingly basic contradiction for this study 
in the risk of parochialism. How could the international be illuminated by the work 
of scholars from one national group? How could the domestic, in these writers, be 
anything other than parochial?  
One remedy for each of these problems is the focus on empire. Britain as an 
imperial polity has long been constructed as both a domestic and international 
thing; the binding and rebinding of several nations, alternating between violence 
and then political–legal settlements that formed its constitutional accretions. This 
constitutional story is marked by treaties of union and contested principles of inter-
governmental interaction. Its foundations lie in a range of legislative texts, shaped 
by principles, doctrines and rules that are never fixed. There are some profound 
but little noted parallels between the fields examined here. British 
constitutionalism closely maps the growth and nature of the system of 
international law. Both have core texts, principles and doctrines, inescapably 
indeterminate, that emerged from a long historical struggle between polities and 
peoples, with philosophical roots in the transformations of natural law, the influx 
of scientific positivism, and the political philosophies of liberalism and welfarism, 
among others.42 Constitutional and international law have always formed a 
twinned problem for Britain, paradoxically always present in legal principles, 
opinions, morality and always said to be respected and adhered to, but also 
simultaneously incapable of being seen clearly, fixed into accepted definitions, 
based always in custom and power expressed in the language of laws. But most 
 
41   See, eg, Neil Duxbury, ‘English Jurisprudence between Austin and Hart’ (2005) 91 Virginia 
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importantly the empire has always been a place where many kinds of laws moved 
and met.43 The ebb and flow of Britain’s reach as a global power came with a 
complicated export of ideas about government and law through force, 
colonisation, and trade, to the extent that polemical histories could call the high 
point of British imperial power in the late nineteenth century the ‘age’ of British 
international law.44 Britishness and empire in a sense must be the focus of a study 
of the domestic and international, because it is inevitably at the centre of internal 
and external forms of power and hence law. It also joins the separate trends in the 
‘turn to empire’ in international legal history45 and, more recently, in histories of 
British public law,46 together insisting that all concepts in public law and 
international law ought to be treated historically.  
Despite this attention to methodological problems, this thesis nonetheless employs 
a largely conservative frame. It fixes on the published texts of male legal scholars, 
usually themselves elites or servants of elites, working in and thinking about one 
of the world’s most powerful, long-lived imperial polities, whose projects 
frequently coincide with their own. But in going back to these texts and figures 
with the insights of critical legal historiography in mind, we can see anew just how 
and where the assumptions about justice, the self, family, community, race, power 
and authority came to be entwined in the legal ideas of domestic and international. 
While the question of judging figures of the past has excited plenty of 
contemporary debate,47 for the purposes of this project it is somewhat beside the 
point. Legal and historical analysis cannot withhold judgment on the figures of the 
 
43   Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900 
(CUP, 2001). 
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past, because we know that the structures they helped build were and remain 
frequently, deeply unjust, even by the standards of their day. But any judgment 
ought to take place with self-criticism in mind; that understanding their projects, 
well-intended or not, is really a guide to how we can and should understand today’s 
world, and to better guide our own projects and attempts to work against legal and 
political structures that make the world a worse place. Moral judgments may or 
may not be useful for that aim.  
More importantly, there is a sense in which we cannot be done with these figures 
because they are not done with us. We cannot will a different canon into existence. 
Instead, we can unpack and critique that canon, asking how and why it was 
constructed in the way it appears now, to whose benefit, and how it might be re-
examined, as the means to creating a different canon, and thereby dismantling this 
one. Their lives and works are not so much opportunities for judgment as prompts 
to ask how and why we ended up with them still with us; to ask how the ideas 
abhorred today were moved into, and remain unexcavated, from the sediment of 
public and international legal thought.  
In her project on the ‘uses of use’, a project of ‘following words around’,48 Sara 
Ahmed makes the point that in writing of utilitarianism and the inescapability of 
dealing with dead white male authors, she does not write ‘to’ them but rather ‘of 
them’, in that what she is following is what ‘leads to who, to who has been deemed 
to come up with something’.49 This project follows similar leads, to who we would 
deem to have come up with these ideas. It is not written ‘to’ them to insist on their 
authority, or as the genealogical font of these ideas — the ‘fathers’ of international 
or public law — but instead ‘of’ them, because they persist, inescapably for the 
moment, in our juridical present like spectres of long dead, adopted and imagined 
family members. While this risks reinscribing their presence deeper still, the risk 
is worth taking and lessened, provided that it is motivated by some material, 
 
48   Sara Ahmed, What’s the Use? On the Uses of Use (Duke UP, 2019) 13, see also 3ff. 
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contextual grounding; of asking and exploring why, and at what costs these ideas 
took these shapes in their writings. What kinds of conditions produced these 
jurists, and led them to think the way they did? What kinds of lives did their works 
pre-suppose, idealise, require and make necessary? And, to return to Anne Enright, 
what did they believe together, expel, claim and form in writing the domestic and 
international into law and our own shared lives? 
These general points about method and methodology all filter into a specific set of 
ways of thinking about the relationship between domestic and international law 
that is used throughout this thesis. This project uses a rough taxonomy of motifs 
to unify these disparate eras and projects, each of which points to kinds as well as 
purposes of interaction between the domestic and international. The ‘roughness’ 
of this taxonomy emphasises that this is not a rigid categorisation into which all 
instances of theorising the domestic and international fit (or rather must be fitted). 
Indeed, its elements might be better thought of as a grammar, a rubric, a map, a 
set of cardinal points, or a field guide to seeing the connections and differences 
between these juristic works. Four useful motifs that recur throughout these works 
are allegory, analogy, order and exclusion. 
Allegory points to the metaphors, images or similes that liken the domestic to the 
international, or vice versa. Most commonly, allegory uses an everyday idea to 
suggest the operations of law; the use of general social or political meanings that 
we might call ‘domesticity’ or ‘internationality’ to provide content or illustrations 
for law and legal ideas. Perhaps the most powerful image of domesticity is the 
patriarchal family, used consistently as a measure and model for state power, 
colonial expansion, and international subjecthood. This image appears in other 
guises like the nineteenth century bourgeois social club as an allegory for the 
‘family’ of nations, or the imagined primitive or ‘state of nature’ community as a 
mirror of legal development for domestic and international societies alike. 
Internationality, likewise, appears in the use of cosmopolitan sentiments, imperial 
protection and guidance, or ‘world courts’, idealised or real, as allegories to guide 
the development of domestic laws.  
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Analogy is a more technical, legalistic form of argument that is similar to allegory; 
the drawing of comparisons or contrasts between rules, principles, ideas or 
institutions of domestic law and those of international law, and vice versa. Given 
the professed ‘common law’ or ‘pragmatic’ bent of much of British legal theory, 
it is perhaps unsurprising that almost every jurist examined here uses analogy in 
some form, and many use it frequently, but it is also a hallmark of civil and natural 
law methods. These are technical legal arguments, the everyday work of juristic 
texts, showing similarities and distinctions, to try to draw out the essential 
commonalities between domestic and international law, or to illustrate where and 
why they are fundamentally different.  
Order takes many forms, but it is a more systematic expression of hierarchy and 
disciplining. It includes the creation of architectures, schemas or hierarchies on 
how to sort the rules of international and domestic law, which might rest on the 
basis of wider principles, political considerations, or a more technical juridical 
arranging that weights and sorts different rules, principles and ideas into an ornate 
taxonomy of interactions. Ordering draws connections and conjunctions between 
laws and jurisdictions to make them seamless or overlapping. It might use the 
tensions of encounters as the basis for a call to similarity or congruence. It might 
serve unification by linking different spheres of law, insisting on convergence, 
similarity or harmonies between different meanings, as in the insistence that 
international law is simply, naturally, part of the law of the land. The more 
disciplinary side of ordering involves some resistance to unification, and moving 
something down the order to make it subordinate to another principle, as where 
the domestic is used to reject an intrusion by a supposed rule of international law, 
or the international is invoked to override the domestic; usually of another state or 
people. 
Exclusion is the more destructive, nakedly powerful and chauvinist form of 
ordering; the denial and rejection of another legal order, sometimes to the point of 
denying its lawfulness at all. It proceeds from encounters between different legal 
systems or ideas, where they are seen as conflicting or in tension or rivalry. This 
is a wide and important category that takes on a range of forms, especially so given 
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the context of empire. It looks to tensions, clashes, impositions, adaptations and 
spreading of domestic ideas that might be resolved, pressed or mediated through 
claims about international law. It also touches on the critiques of the internal laws 
of other nations or peoples that follow internationalised ‘universal’ or 
‘civilisational’ principles. It covers the gradual demand that non-European 
systems must conform and measure up to European — or often specifically British 
— ideas about government and law, usually coming with demands about reforms 
or foreign controls. Exclusion involves the expulsion, rejection or removal of 
things from an order, the harshest form of disciplining. It points to ideas that are 
‘foreign’ or beyond the pale, and part of neither domestic nor ‘true’ international 
law. And it covers those imperial forms of domestic and international law that 
allow or demand the reorganisation of the internal orders of others, alongside their 
subjugation into subjects of empire. This is perhaps the most important purpose, 
because it is most plainly at work where jurists use law to stake territories, claim 
histories and form shared identities. 
III STRUCTURE, ARGUMENT, CONTRIBUTION 
How, then, does this history of the concepts of domestic and international unfold? 
Chapter One contends that early uses of ‘domestic’ emerged to discipline and 
channel rival universal ideas in natural law to establish the authority of the English 
imperial state, inside and outside the British Isles. It shows how the domestic was 
at the foundation of new accounts of sovereign authority in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. This forms the ‘legal theology’ of the domestic; its reaction 
to, incorporation and secularisation of universalising religious and quasi-religious 
argumentation in the laws of nature and nations, adapting those into discourses of 
commonwealth and empire. What precedes the later term of ‘international’ is 
universal forms of law that are grounded in and emanate from the domestic 
sovereign: ideas of commonwealth that justify and order legal power beyond the 
territorial confines of the British Isles.  
Part One argues that Alberico Gentili presented the first thorough account of the 
interactions of domestic and international laws as part of his project of describing 
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Protestant humanist commonwealths for the Elizabethan Empire. Gentili arranged 
the domestic and international to aim at commonwealth, amity and the unity of 
humanity in works on ambassadors, wars and empire, using analogies and 
allegories to order and unify the world and its polities. Part Two contends that in 
the English Civil Wars and Cromwell’s Commonwealth and its aftermath, the 
domestic fulfilled a range of wider uses in the works of five jurists, and firmly 
emerged by the end of the seventeenth century. This emergence began with 
Richard Zouche’s pivotal shift from the law of nations to the laws between 
peoples, which was built from detailed domestic analogies. John Selden’s works 
sought to ground imperial jurisdiction in the genealogies of nations dating back to 
biblical families. Thomas Hobbes explored analogies to leagues within and 
between families and nations to understand the spread of empire as the propagation 
of the Commonwealth’s children. James Harrington considered empire as based 
on the division of ‘foreign and domestic’, which underpinned a messianic mission 
to spread British laws over the world. Finally, in John Locke’s post-1688 
federative power, parliament is tied to the law of the land and the executive to the 
law of nations, inaugurating the basis of the ‘modern’ understanding of the 
relationship of domestic and international law.  
Chapter Two argues that the ‘international’ appeared in the late eighteenth century 
as part of projects of sentiment and political economy that demanded the rational 
reorganisation of the domestic laws of all states to further commerce, check 
revolution, and finally articulate national independence. Part One shows how 
Jeremy Bentham’s first writings rejected William Blackstone’s Lockean split of 
‘imaginary’ law from ‘real’ municipal law, grounding Bentham’s early works on 
systems of morals and legislation that led to his coining of the term ‘international’. 
This distinguished laws between states from those within them, leading Bentham 
to express early hopes that these projects would counteract national prejudice and 
serve peace. Meanwhile, Adam Smith’s parallel account of the international, based 
on domestic sentiment, reoriented it towards the science of political economy that 
formed a new set of ‘natural’ laws, and like Bentham urged the reorganisation of 
internal government.  
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Part Two then explores three legacies of Bentham and Smith’s visions of the 
international, which, following the loss of the American colonies and the French 
Revolution, became intensely fixed on internal constitutions. First, Edmund 
Burke’s reactions to the French Revolution used a ‘law of civil vicinage’ to support 
interventions to contain the revolutionary–imperial project and its corruption of 
natural laws. Secondly, Bentham’s later works similarly critiqued the natural law 
arguments of the revolution, but prompted his turn away from international law to 
the reform and rationalisation of constitutional systems that culminated in his 
1820s attempts in the constitutional code to extend duties of good government to 
all nations. Finally, while John Austin’s account of international law being not 
strictly ‘law’ that rested on centring the domestic commanding sovereign would 
prove pivotal, it is in the works of Travers Twiss that the Benthamite and Smithian 
themes of sentiment, utility, and political economy are used to ground a theory of 
international law build on national independence.  
Chapter Three shows how the height of the Victorian empire prompted the 
entwining of the domestic and international in a variety of doctrinal projects tied 
to independence and interdependence. Part One examines ideas of ‘independence’ 
tied to Parliament’s position as the focus of imperial and international law 
enactment. Far from insular, A V Dicey’s theories of absolute parliamentary 
sovereignty were significantly inflected by ideas of internationality. Wider debates 
over the juridical nature of the empire in its domestic, British Isles form, and its 
international reach turned frequently to local self-government and imperial 
restrictions on international personality. Finally, international lawyers like John 
Westlake used domestic law as a new source of analogies to expand the reach of 
international law to support imperial claims in the 1890s by undermining or 
rejecting the reality of non-European domestic laws.  
Part Two then examines four rival uses of the tensions between the domestic and 
international in projects grouped around interdependence; the use of international 
law to reorder and coordinate systems of domestic law throughout the world. 
James Lorimer used interdependence as a basis for his project of racialised 
‘relative equality’ that rejected any strong distinction between domestic and 
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international law, and used domestic systems as a basis for international legal 
subjectivity. Meanwhile liberal imperial jurists, including Dicey and Westlake, 
used interdependence to rethink the concerns of domestic law, to emphasise states 
as aggregates of their ‘men’, which, in Lassa Oppenheim’s influential doctrinal 
move, grounded a sharp distinction between domestic and international legal 
subjecthood that insisted only states were the real subjects of international law. 
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’ more juridical texts marked socialist reactions to 
liberal ascendancy, epitomised in their vision of ‘the [First] International’ that 
sought to join the class orders of states across borders, criticised the capitalist 
underpinnings of domestic and foreign policy alike, and sought to build 
international solidarity by political capture of the institutions of each state. Finally, 
the military confrontation that loomed over these projects by the early twentieth 
century provoked new attempts to coordinate domestic and international law in 
peace plans that would culminate in the framework of the League of Nations and 
its aims of developing international law to guide states and reorganise empire.  
Chapter Four argues that in the interwar years the domestic and international 
became central to juristic attempts to transform the collapsing British Empire and 
wider international order, culminating with general theories of the rule of law 
within and between states that underpinned the post-1945 settlement. It focuses on 
the parallel lives and works of two foundational figures in modern public and 
international law, Ivor Jennings and Hersch Lauterpacht, examining how each 
used the domestic and international to understand these transformations.  
Part One begins with transformations of empire. Jennings’ first works consistently 
argued that the international status of dominions was a question of imperial not 
international law, and maintained the absolute powers of the Crown over colonies 
and mandates, even where those grants stemmed from the League. Meanwhile, 
Lauterpacht analysed the constitutionalization of the international legal 
community that he initially saw as demonstrating the misguidedness of 
analogising domestic and international law, which maintained the errors of 
personified states that stood in the way of genuine international community.  
32 Structure, Argument, Contribution  
Part Two examines their joint turn towards the rule of law in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Jennings argued that imperial administration had changed domestic public law, 
and that Parliament was practically constrained by the system of international law, 
giving rise to his account of the rule of law in its internal and international forms, 
the latter of which demanded re-establishing the post-1945 world along the lines 
of British liberalism. Lauterpacht expanded his idea of the functions of 
international law to reject its supposed inadequacy and insist that domestic and 
international laws must both serve the same purposes which limited the internal 
absolutism of the state and made adjudication necessary.  
Part Three considers their post-war projects amidst the collapse of the Empire and 
new ideas of commonwealth. Jennings’ plan for a European federation modelled 
its international connections on Britain’s imperial-constitutional law, while 
Lauterpacht’s proposal for an International Bill of the Rights of Man drew on the 
British constitutional tradition to propose the reorganisation of the domestic laws 
of all nations around human rights; a new commonwealth of all humanity. 
Recapitulating the arguments of these chapters, the Conclusion shows how the 
domestic and international played diverse roles in service of many different 
projects of empire. It argues that recognising the diversity and contingency of these 
ideas and their imperial imbrications can serve as one path towards new projects 
of rethinking international and constitutional law alike, in Britain and beyond, in 
which dissolving or reworking the distinction away from its earlier forms becomes 
both necessary and achievable. 
What, finally, is the contribution of this thesis? It makes a first attempt at 
understanding the emergence, development and change in two central and 
inextricable concepts of today’s legal thought and practice. It ranges over a great 
many texts and thinkers to reconstruct their arguments, place them in context and 
conversation with each other, and to describe and explore the many uses to which 
they put the domestic and international. It not only lays the ground for further work 
to understand the domestic and international for theorists in other juristic 
traditions, but — more ambitiously — it clarifies that both categories and their 
relation are fluid and contingent; that they can be rearranged, reformed or 
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potentially dissolved. This history reveals a much more diverse set of roles and 
projects for the domestic and international than is imagined in our current 
theorising and understanding of the development of these ideas. The contingency 
of their past meanings provides one path for unsettling, remaking or dissolving the 
distinction. That project is one part of reshaping law amidst present global 
discontents; of dealing with and redressing the imperial, extractive past with which 
the relationship between domestic and international is intimately bound; of 
believing something different together.  
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COMMONWEALTH AND EMPIRE: LEGAL THEOLOGIES 
OF THE DOMESTIC, 1585–1690 
I INTRODUCTION: PRE-HISTORY AND LEGAL THEOLOGY  
This chapter examines the ‘pre-history’ of the domestic and international in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. British jurists used the domestic and 
international to describe and justify the internal ordering of the early English state 
and Empire, most importantly in relation to legal claims, problems and projects 
external to it. Throughout this time, the forms of legal authority recognisable today 
as ‘domestic law’ were in the process of coalescing around the growing institutions 
of sovereign, parliament, and courts, becoming attached to ideas of territory, 
jurisdiction, commonwealth and empire. By the end of this development, the 
domestic began to resemble its contemporary meanings of common and statute 
law, tied closely to an idea of jurisdiction that was predominantly based in territory 
and property; the ‘law of the land’, pronounced, supervised, and changed by 
Parliament alone. Bentham’s 1780s neologism ‘international’ is of course absent 
from the English texts examined here. But it does appear in the early twentieth 
century anachronistic translations of the Latin works of Gentili and Zouche. This 
chapter uses the term ‘international’ to point to its predecessors in this period, the 
precursors to the later coinage: forms of morality, politics and law that moved 
beyond single jurisdictions, especially inter-sovereign, universal and natural laws. 
Clarifying exactly what kind of law this was, and using it to understand, justify or 
limit the power of sovereigns, foreign and domestic, formed important projects for 
these jurists, pursued as part of the coalescing of domestic law. 
In exploring this pre-history, this chapter uses a frame of ‘legal theology’. Just as 
political theology examines the secularisation of religious ideas into civic and 
political discourse,1 legal theology, as it is used here,2 points to the importance of 
 
1   See, eg, ‘Editors’ Introduction’ in Carl Schmitt, Political Theology II (Polity, 2008) 5–6. 
2   Others have used the phrase too: see, eg, Peter Fitzpatrick, ‘Legal Theology: Law, Modernity 
and the Sacred’ (2008) 32 Seattle University Law Review 321. 
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religious debates and ideas in providing the prompts and foundations for 
secularised juridical thinking.3 These jurists engaged in a process of establishing 
the nature and limits of forms of authority that would today be termed domestic 
and international, and like their successors, employed these concepts to understand 
imperial ideologies, civil wars, interventions, and the legitimacy and authority of 
sovereigns and states, foreign and domestic. In this foundational moment, jurists 
used the ‘domestic’ in a range of moral and political meanings, most significantly 
as analogy or allegory for explaining the origins, nature and authority of 
sovereigns to their people and each other. One particularly significant, frequently 
recurring allegory involves the domestic as paternal power, which included ideas 
about the household, patriarchal authority, family genealogies, enslavement, 
guardianship and marriage, with examples drawn from Roman and Christian 
religious–legal discourses. Traditions like humanism and the civil law, and 
contested ideas like sovereignty, authority and jurisdiction formed a secular 
grammar with which jurists articulated a domestic sphere of law. In various ways, 
they broadened it out to ideas of commonwealth and empire, placing it in 
conversation with or reaction to universal natural law, papal jurisdiction, biblical 
allegories, and sectarian conflicts in Europe and England.  
Part One examines Gentili’s works, which used extensive analogies between civil 
law and the law of nature and nations to begin laying the foundations of a domestic 
legal sphere, dealing with issues of ambassadors, war, and empire as part of his 
project of building a Protestant humanist commonwealth. Part Two turns to five 
juristic attempts to understand the domestic during the Civil Wars and Cromwell’s 
Commonwealth, which culminated in the emergence of the basis of the ‘modern’ 
division of domestic and international law in Locke’s work. 
 
3   This is not an uncommon emphasis, particularly in public law histories: see, eg, Martin 
Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (OUP, 2010); Eugene H Kantorowicz, The King’s Two 
Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton UP, 1957). 
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II GENTILI’S PROTESTANT HUMANIST COMMONWEALTHS, 1585–1608 
A Introduction 
Henry VIII’s split from the Catholic Church in 1533 was a domestic and 
international legal event: a dispute over the legality of the annulment of a marriage 
that ended with Henry’s declaration that the Pope no longer held supranational 
jurisdiction over England’s spiritual affairs.4 The Elizabethan Settlement re-
established that status, confirming Elizabeth I as the Supreme Governor of the 
Church of England. Edward VI’s minority reign between those of Henry and 
Elizabeth afforded court counsellors the opportunity to begin to reorient the 
monarchy away from prerogative and towards parliament, a project they 
consolidated in the early decades of Elizabeth’s reign to lay the basis for English 
imperial ambitions.5  
As a jurist and occasional advisor to Elizabeth during this imperial expansion, 
Alberico Gentili (1552–1608) used a variety of domestic analogies and allegories 
to begin to order the encounters between multiple legal systems. Exploring the 
conflicts and tensions between domestic and international rights and duties, 
Gentili dealt with a range of legal orders — the historically-persistent Roman civil 
law, the law of nature and nations, religious laws and other moral and political 
ideas about diplomacy, sovereignty, government and war — that had not yet been 
collapsed, as they would be in the late eighteenth century, into solely ‘internal’ 
and ‘international’ laws. What links this development together is Gentili’s project 
of humanist commonwealth, set against religious universalised hegemony in ideas 
of supreme jurisdiction, unlimited by law, typified in the spectre of the Pope. His 
legal theology was of turning religious and universalising conflicts into ones 
 
4   GW Bernard, The King’s Reformation: Henry VIII and the Remaking of the English Church 
(YUP, 2005). 
5   See further Stephen Alford, Kingship and Politics in the Reign of Edward VI (CUP, 2002); 
John F McDiarmid (ed), The Monarchical Republic of Early Modern England (Routledge, 
2016); AN McLaren, Political Culture in the Reign of Elizabeth I (CUP, 1999); K MacMillan, 
Sovereignty and Possession in the English New World (CUP, 2006). 
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arrangeable, understandable and resolvable through the language of laws, rights 
and duties; ultimately, in the mould of a Protestant humanist commonwealth. 
B Ambassador and Sovereign, Unity and Discord 
Counsel lay at the foundations of Gentili’s first consideration of the problems of 
the domestic and international raised by ambassadors. As counsellors on the 
external affairs of states and conduits between sovereigns, ambassadors began to 
proliferate throughout Europe in the early sixteenth century. With the foreign 
affairs projects of Henry VII and a range of popes for peace plans, alliances and 
strengthening imperial hierarchies, these temporary envoys and diplomatic 
missions led to the development of the embassy as a permanent institution, and 
with it the possibility of near-constant diplomatic communication between polities 
throughout Europe.6 While undoubtedly an old institution, ambassadors and 
permanent embassies became the primary movers of treaty negotiations and 
representatives of the wills of foreign sovereigns, and took on a new legal 
importance as the conduit through which sovereigns — and their jurisdiction and 
authority — now met and communicated constantly. The connection of legal 
systems was not, however, always confined to sovereign relations. Ambassadors, 
who were often merchants, frequently pursued their own private interests, with or 
without the permission of their sovereign. Their immunity from certain domestic 
laws of their receiving countries, derived from their status as sovereign 
representative, sometimes led to contract and property disputes, and these 
activities — again, sanctioned by their sovereign or not — could run against the 
public powers of their receiving sovereigns.7 One such episode, not around trade 
but treason, prompted Gentili’s first consideration of the domestic and 
international. 
In 1580, Gentili and his family fled his native Perugia, where in 1571 he had 
obtained his doctorate in civil law and was a judge and scholar, to escape religious 
 
6   See generally Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (Houghton Mifflin, 1955). 
7   See further Dante Fedele, ‘The Renewal of Early-Modern Scholarship on the Ambassador: 
Pierre Ayrault on Diplomatic Immunity’ (2016) 18 JHIL 449. 
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persecution for their Protestant faith. Moving through the Holy Roman Empire, 
staying briefly in Tübingen and later Heidelberg (where Gentili briefly held a chair 
in law), the Gentilis arrived in England in August 1580. Falling in with some of 
Elizabeth’s late-reign counsellors, among them the poet-ambassador Sir Philip 
Sidney, Gentili became Reader and then Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford. 
In 1584, Gentili provided legal counsel to Elizabeth on the Mendoza affair, 
convincing the Queen that she could expel, but not execute, the Spanish 
ambassador for his involvement in a treasonous plot to replace her on the throne 
with Mary. Building on his consideration of this dispute, the following year Gentili 
published his first major work, De Legationibus, on the rights and duties of 
ambassadorial legations.8 
In his consideration of the Mendoza case, Gentili began by noting that 
ambassadors are to remain safe at the court of another, even an enemy. Sovereigns 
can expel them at their whim and should ‘use every means of anticipating the 
ambassadors, if they should plan any mischief’, but may not allow anyone to do 
them physical harm.9 As the ambassador’s status is given by the law of nations, 
he can only be tried under that body of law, and not under the civil law of any 
particular state. While much of this immunity covers an ambassador’s protection 
from civil suits (particularly contract disputes), for Gentili’s purposes the major, 
difficult question was an ambassador’s involvement in conspiracy against the 
sovereign. Gentili conceived of this as both a civil and international law crime, but 
on different grounds: ‘To plan and plot the death of a sovereign is a heinous crime 
in civil law; it is a crime under international law also, but not on the same 
 
8   On Gentili’s early life, see Thomas Erskine Holland, An Inaugural Lecture on Albericus 
Gentilis (MacMillan, 1874); Peter Haggenmacher, ‘Grotius and Gentili: A Reassessment of 
Thomas E Holland’s Inaugural Lecture’ in Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam 
Roberts (eds), Hugo Grotius and International Relations (OUP, 1992) 133. On Gentili’s 
humanism see Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace (OUP, 1999) chs 1–2. On Gentili 
and Sidney, see especially Christopher N Warren, ‘From Epic to Public International Law: 
Philip Sidney, Alberico Gentili, and “Intercourse among Enemies”’ in Literature and the Law 
of Nations, 1580–1680 (OUP, 2015). 
9   Alberico Gentili, De Legationibus Libri Tres, tr Gordon J Laing (OUP, 1924) 96. 
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grounds’.10 Without articulating the precise difference, Gentili turned to 
differences in procedural requirements under civil and international law for 
witnessing contracts, then promising to clarify it in the passages to come.11 
The difference between civil and international law begins to emerge in Gentili’s 
use of general ideas about sovereign equality, self-defence, and the preservation 
of unity over discord. Sovereigns are entitled to ‘repel violence’ against them, but 
that right has its limits, and contravening them involves a grave offense against 
international law. In this instance, because a sovereign can order an ambassador’s 
departure, that option becomes the appropriate limit, and the sovereign cannot put 
the ambassador to death. In explaining this reasoning, Gentili analogised 
sovereign–sovereign interactions to those between private individuals: ‘The 
principle of international law holds equally for all, and the principle which controls 
the relation of private individual to private individual is unquestionably the same 
as that which controls the relation of public personage to public personage, and of 
ambassador to king, because an ambassador also is the personal representative of 
a sovereign.’12 And yet the power remains with the receiving sovereign to exercise 
alone, rather than in a civil suit between sovereigns (impossible for lack of an 
authoritative judge), or even by diplomatic negotiation: the sending sovereign 
need not be consulted about the offence, and an ambassador may be dismissed for 
a wide range of lesser offences or slights, such as insulting the receiving sovereign. 
The distinctions rested on the purpose of these prohibitions. Treason and lèse-
majesté alike are wrong at the international level because they offend the purposes 
of the law of nations, namely by going against its aims of ‘bring[ing] men together’ 
and dissuading ‘the promotion of dissension and discord’.13 It is this promotion of 
unity, and avoidance of discord, at which ambassadors, sovereigns, and the laws 
within and beyond states and empires ought to always aim. 
 
10   Ibid 97. 
11   Ibid 98. 
12   Ibid 112. 
13   Ibid 118. 
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While the Mendoza problem provides the clearest example of international laws 
limiting a sovereign’s domestic powers, much of the general theorising in De 
Legationibus also examines the tensions between the domestic and international: 
the origins of embassies; the devolution of sovereign power to ambassadors; the 
restrictions on embassies of subjects; and the kinds of constitutional orders that 
can send ambassadors. The remainder of this part explores these in turn. 
Gentili’s origin stories about the meanings and purposes of ambassadors provide 
a first, strong link of domestic and international in the importance of ambassadorial 
rituals of sovereign authorisation, and the ambassador as the figure that goes 
beyond the collected families of the nation in order to constitute it, and give it its 
international personality. Gentili first looked to the office of ambassador in Roman 
law meanings of ‘legate’; a person representing or assuming a superior’s function, 
either military or civilian (from the staff of a magistrate), or to state a sovereign’s 
position on a particular question.14 This delegation of the powers of an office to 
another for the purposes of communication stems from legal ritual, conducted 
within the sending state, where the sovereign consented to delegate to the 
ambassador the power to represent the people of Rome.15 Only ‘fetial priests’ 
could be ambassadors; a family-like college formed on patriarchal lines, headed 
by the pater patratus, with extensive rituals, ceremonial insignia and attire, all of 
which Gentili described in detail. Fetial priests took up special ambassadorial 
functions of forming alliances, declaring war, seeking redress, ordering a person 
to leave a place, or surrendering a person, and treaties made without the presence 
of two fetial priests were ‘wholly invalid’.16 Gentili endorsed the poet Catullus’s 
line that ‘the land which is without thy sacred rites cannot give guardians to its 
boundaries’.17 Without the ritual of sovereign investiture, and the fetial college, 
Rome could not hold authentic borders. Telling the second, biblical story more 
 
14   Ibid 3. 
15   Ibid 6–7. 
16   Ibid 28ff. 
17   Ibid 28, and see 28–48. 
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briefly, Gentili saw Moses’ sending of ambassadors as the point at which ‘a state 
had developed from the family’ of the Hebrews.18  
But Gentili moved beyond the particularities of either Rome or the Bible, 
promising that his multiple historical examples would ‘show that the institution of 
embassies, with their maintenance, rights, and dignity, has existed among all 
nations’ including, explicitly, barbarian states.19 In this general history, Gentili 
located the origins of ambassadors in the division of humanity into states, and the 
necessity of their jurisdictional interactions. As an institution, the embassy arose 
with human progress out of the ‘state of nature’, following ‘the separation of the 
nations, the foundation of the kingdoms, the partition of dominions, and the 
establishment of commerce’.20 An ambassador or embassy could have no meaning 
or use in the state of nature, but only after the formation of polities with 
‘contiguous territory’.21 That proximity led naturally to the making treaties to 
promote friendship and prevent violence between them, and with this 
neighbouring communities gained the capacity to ‘respect … the common good 
[and] adopt customs or laws of a reciprocal nature’; that is, to coordinate, where 
possible, their local laws in service of a wider common good.22 In each of these 
origin stories, the ambassador is the figure that both constituted the nation, and 
allowed it to represent itself as a polity beyond and above its constituent families.23  
These origin stories supported Gentili’s more general definitions of the 
ambassador, embassy and sovereign that emphasised the devolution of sovereign 
power to a subject through law, which moved those domestic powers into the 
 
18   Ibid 51. 
19   Ibid 50. 
20   Ibid 49–51. Gentili’s ‘state of nature’ is that ‘depicted by Lucretius in his incomparable 
poem’: see further Titus Lucretius Carus, On the Nature of Things, tr Martin Ferguson Smith 
(Hackett, 2001). 
21   Gentili, De Legationibus (n 9) 51. 
22   Ibid. 
23   Ibid. On Gentili’s origins story here as an Epicurean addition to Roman law, read through the 
city, see Annabel S Brett, Changes of State: Nature and the Limits of the City in Early Modern 
Natural Law (Princeton UP, 2011) 189–90. 
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international realm. At the outset of De Legationibus, Gentili defined ambassadors 
in religious terms, as ‘one who in the name of the state or of a person still more 
sacred has been sent without the right of supreme command to a state or person 
still more sacred to say or do something in the interest of the state or sacred person 
by whom he has been sent’.24 Ambassadors are endowed with limited powers, sent 
to a polity of similar rank, to act for particular purposes and in the interests of the 
sending sovereign. But they also filled a special position in the legal order of the 
receiving sovereign. Ambassadors are a class of foreigner not subject to their 
receiving sovereign, and these immunities kept the ‘distinction of sovereignties’ 
intact: ‘For if he who represents a prince is a subject of the sovereign to whom he 
is accredited, the prince himself is a subject in the person of his representative’.25 
Gentili’s account of internal embassies served to bolster this sacredness of the 
state’s domestic order on the international stage, leading to extended arguments 
examining and denying the legitimacy of embassies sent from subjects to 
sovereigns to remedy domestic issues. Groups of subjects do not hold a right of 
embassy to their prince, or to the prince of any other nation. The fundamental 
reason for this was the inequality of princes and subjects, and the position of true 
ambassadors as sovereign representatives not bound by the domestic laws of other 
states: ‘That subjects have no right of embassy with their ruler is evident from the 
fact that we cannot be on an equality with potentates and rulers’.26 Subjects are 
bound by the laws of the state, while an ambassador ‘assumes equality with the 
sovereign to whom he is accredited’ and is not bound by that state’s regulations or 
ordinances.27 For subjects to gain ambassadorial powers, they must contest the 
constitutional order. A faction in a civil war must make a claim ‘by word and deed’ 
to the ‘whole organisation of the state, or half of it’ to gain the right of embassy, 
as holding now between two equal combatants who claim to be sovereign.28 
 
24   Gentili, De Legationibus (n 9) 7. 
25   Ibid 51. 
26   Ibid 85. 
27   Ibid 84–5. 
28   Ibid 82. 
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Embassy rights hold between mere enemies in warfare, so ‘still more’ should they 
hold where the objective of each faction is not to destroy the state but control it: 
‘Such men are merely adversaries’ and their civil war is not an annulment of the 
‘civil code of nations’ but rather the ‘confusion’ of domestic law.29  
Gentili also explicitly denied the right of colonists to send embassies to an imperial 
sovereign. Gentili saw ‘very clear evidence’ of a prohibition on internal colonial 
embassies in Livy’s account of the Roman Senate’s refusal to receive or grant the 
usual diplomatic protections to embassies from the colonies, as these rights are 
‘framed for foreigners, not citizens’.30 Yet Gentili carved out an exception for 
private citizens carrying on their own private business with foreign sovereigns. 
Subjects might be in contact with foreign rulers, but only to exercise their private 
powers in private negotiations.31 These commercial embassies do not gain 
immunity from the ‘civil ordinances’ of their receiving states: they are not full 
representatives of their sovereign (unless, Gentili again notes, the business also 
involves ‘state rights’),32 but rather private citizens of the world.  
Embassies could also play domestic roles, although only when sent from sovereign 
to subjects. Domestic embassies were a tool of communicating the commands of 
a sovereign to subjects, whether they are populations, officers or subject princes: 
‘A prince, if confronted by a serious situation in regard to which he desires his 
subject to be advised, will send ambassadors to him’.33 Ambassadors did not just 
communicate a sovereign’s wishes, they also had the ‘power to command’, and 
ambassadorial ‘service’ is more like an imperial or military assignment: ‘service 
on an embassy sent by subjects is either imposed upon certain persons as a duty to 
the fatherland, or assigned to volunteers’.34 Embassies thus served a unifying 
 
29   Ibid 83. 
30   Ibid 85. 
31   Ibid 86. 
32   Ibid 88. 
33   Ibid 12. 
34   Ibid 13. 
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purpose: to bolster the constitutional order of the state by precluding internal 
embassies from subjects, and by allowing the sovereign to speak to subjects.  
Empire motivated a qualification to the general prohibition on embassies sent by 
subjects, and the status of rebels. While Gentili had explicitly denied the rights of 
colonists to send internal embassies, he allowed subjugated or defeated states the 
right of embassy. This exception is set on the basis of a kind of dormant or 
temporarily subdued but enduring domestic legal order in subject states. 
Generally, Gentili contended that a polity’s power to send and receive embassies 
is not hampered by its dependence on another polity,35 made especially clear in 
the instances of dependencies of trading republics like Venice,36 the Irish 
embassies to Queen Elizabeth, and popular embassies to the King of Scotland.37 
The only instance in which internal embassies might be sent to the subject’s own 
sovereign is where rebellious groups latch on to a formerly independent polity now 
dependent, conquered or subjugated. The prohibition on rebel embassies does not 
apply to peoples ‘who have abandoned an alliance, a treaty or even a friendly 
vassalage’, with Gentili asking ‘[h]ow often did the Volscians, the Latins, the 
Spaniards and innumerable others rebel against the Romans?’38 Intra-imperial 
revolts revive a right of embassy held prior to their revolt and lying in abeyance, 
reviving the formerly independent polity and returning to equal juridical status 
with their former imperial sovereign.  
Keeping with his inclusion of non-European systems in the international order, 
Gentili contended that the power to send ambassadors does not hinge on particular 
kinds of internal religious or political organisation. Gentili’s explanation for the 
universality of this power reveals his rejection of looking behind the state to the 
form of its constitutional order, confessional status, or any other characteristics 
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that might be used to deny a polity the international right of legation. The power 
to send ambassadors depends not on the justice of a regime, but on the actual 
possession of effective force controlling subjects; thus tyrants hold equal powers 
to just rulers.39 Turks, Persians and other non-Christians, as well as 
excommunicated polities or princes, hold equal rights to send and receive 
embassies. Gentili justified this by stating that religion, as a ‘science of divine 
worship and habits of observance’, is a law subsisting between man and God, not 
man and man as the law of nations is (a view consistent with his Protestantism).40 
Finally, barbarians and polities with minimal or no domestic legal ordering can 
send embassies, though Gentili merely cited a range of examples without drawing 
a general rule from them. Any group lacking statehood — brigands, pirates, and 
others — cannot hold rights of embassy. They had ‘utterly spurned all intercourse 
with their fellowmen’ and ‘endeavour[ed] to drag back the world to … savagery’ 
and the state of nature of individual interests alone.41 Consequently, they cannot 
claim the rights of embassy that exist to serve the unity, intercourse and connection 
of humanity. Gentili’s view of embassy rights thus rested on the refusal to consider 
the justice or legitimacy of domestic constitutional orders relevant to sovereign 
status, revealing a wider purpose of embassy rights as serving the communication 
and unity of mankind through the law of nations. 
As the central text of the first, orthodox Renaissance humanist phase of Gentili’s 
work, largely modelled on Cicero,42 De Legationibus conceptualised the 
ambassador as an office that concentrates and holds a quasi-sovereign power of 
communication as a portion of the power and authority of the sending sovereign, 
and acts as the sovereign’s representative in another polity. Disputes like the 
Mendoza affair showed that ambassadors could be the source of transgressions not 
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just against the ordinary laws of the realm, but of foreign interventions against a 
constitutional order. Gentili’s ideas about the domestic and international began in 
the house of the ambassador. But Gentili’s wider project of clarifying the office, 
rights and duties of ambassadors was also about the laws governing the internal 
and external actions of polities. It raised a range of questions about domestic and 
international laws, and formed a first articulation of Gentili’s ideas of a 
communicative, humanist global order. The question of when a sovereign may 
breach ambassadorial protections, and on the basis of which laws, was the crucial 
issue in De Legationibus. In dealing with it, Gentili used international law to 
discipline and limit domestic sovereign power. This limitation served his wider 
project of drawing the domestic and international together, to unify them in service 
of a world commonwealth.  
C Humanist Commonwealths and the Rights of War and Intervention 
By the time the Spanish Armada had failed to invade England in 1588, Gentili had 
published the first book of his masterwork, the De Iure Belli; ‘On the Laws of 
War’. After publishing the second and third books in 1589, Gentili thoroughly 
revised and extended the text, publishing the three new books together in 1599, 
before producing his 1599 consideration of Roman imperialism, his 1605 
discourses on absolute kingship, the union of British Crowns and civil life under 
tyrants, and his account of his own arguments before English admiralty courts 
from 1600 until his death in 1608 (unpublished in Gentili’s lifetime). Each 
grappled with sovereignty, law and empire within the wider universal ideals of 
commonwealth and human unity. Intellectually, Gentili’s later works moved from 
the Ciceronian humanism of De Legationibus to a Machiavellian republican 
absolutism, in which ‘natural jurisprudence’ as the science of politics and morality 
was set over and above scholastic or civil law thinking, and where the law of 
nations came from practice, experience and the principles of civic humanism, 
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which he now saw as a guide to government within states.43 Together this would 
form a different path to the same ideals of pan-human commonwealth.  
This section and the next examines how Gentili’s later works used the domestic 
and international to articulate his vision of this commonwealth. Whereas De 
Legationibus dealt with problems of the interaction of domestic and international, 
it is in DIB that Gentili articulates a much clearer system of the interaction of legal 
orders, and, most importantly, becomes the first British jurist to theorise natural 
law and the law of nations as overlapping and the same. This meant polities and 
sovereigns could, by analogy, be bound by the same laws that governed 
individuals prior to the founding of the civil state.44 Relying heavily on analogy 
and allegory, Gentili’s unification of the law of nature and nations led him to a 
series of questions about its relationship to civil and religious laws, also tied to a 
set of moral injunctions towards peace, harmony, good government and trade. His 
late works moved from considerations of private and public disputes and wars, to 
sovereign rights to change internal laws, to imperial expansions.  
Gentili began DIB with an account of the nature of disputes within and between 
polities that relied on a close connection between private disputes under civil law 
and those between sovereigns, used to illustrate the limits to the rights and powers 
of citizens and sovereigns alike. While wars resemble disputes between private 
citizens, they must be public and official — between two sovereigns — and 
necessary. Not only will sovereigns refuse to acknowledge an ‘earthly judge’ or 
superior over them, such submission would make them no longer sovereign.45 But 
war is not a simple right of sovereigns. It can only follow attempts to settle disputes 
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peacefully and through legal argument, and these closely map the resolution of 
civil disputes.  
Gentili saw argument and force as merely two ‘modes of contention’, and while 
the law directs citizens never to use force, for sovereigns the exhaustion of legal 
argument is necessary before force may be used.46 In explaining this, Gentili drew 
an analogy between private and inter-sovereign disputes, asking why should 
disputes between citizens be settled by arbitration, but not those of sovereigns, 
especially ‘when the former are often greater than these public ones, or at any rate 
much less clear’?47 Indeed, judging sovereigns is arguably easier: the most 
experienced judges would be arbitrators, and hear and decide these cases with ‘the 
whole world … for witnesses and spectators’.48 Arguing that it is ‘absurd’ to 
suggest that inter-sovereign disputes cannot be decided by the ‘subtleties and 
fictions’ of the civil law but must be based on the law of nations only, Gentili 
stated that the civil law applies to sovereigns too: ‘[T]he law which is written in 
those books of Justinian is not merely that of the state, but also that of the nations 
and of nature’. Consequently, ‘[t]his law therefore holds for sovereigns also, 
although it was established by Justinian for private individuals … Does it then 
cease to be the law of nations and of nature because it has been posted up for the 
citizens to read?’.49 Here, Gentili drew a strong connection between the civil law 
and the law of nature and nations, arguing that while they are not identical, the 
civil law is ‘not wholly unlike’ the law of nature and nations.50 The civil law 
differs in some states, but the parts that are similar throughout the world can form 
part of the law of nature and nations. This echoes Gentili’s earlier point on custom 
that linked domestic and international authority; that just as the rules and laws of 
a state are made by the majority of its citizens ‘just so is the rule of the world in 
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the hands of the aggregation of the greater part of the world’.51 But differences 
may be appropriate to the different spheres, and there must be limits of which 
disputes, domestic or international, can give rise to legal or military actions.52 
Having linked the civil law to the law of nature and nations on reasons for war, 
Gentili returned to the rights of war to outline a clearer hierarchy of the kinds of 
legal and moral concerns that ought to order bodies of law in general. Considering 
whether the actions of citizens can ever found a sovereign’s right to war, Gentili 
argued that while offences by individuals cannot be ascribed to their communities, 
they can nonetheless harm another community. Dealing specifically with whether 
merchants providing munitions to Spain against England’s interests might 
constitute that kind of harm, Gentili drew a distinction between the law of nations 
and of nature. The traders’ right to profit is based in the law of nations and 
concerns ‘private citizens’, while the English desire to maintain their safety is a 
law of nature that concerns ‘kingdoms’. Maintaining safety trumps the right to 
trade, and this flows through each element of the dispute: ‘Let trade therefore give 
way to the kingdom, man to nature, money to life’.53 Gentili then expounded a 
detailed hierarchy of which things should take preference in deciding legal 
disputes, privileging the sacred over profane, public over private, and safety over 
wealth, all linked explicitly to the idea of commonwealth, and shifting into the 
language of community rather than that of sovereign.54 
Following Cicero, Gentili argued this ‘public part of the world’ involved the 
collective restriction of individual freedoms to avoid harms and injustices to both 
the commonwealth and private citizens, subjects and foreigners alike.55 Private 
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citizens are part of both the international and domestic forms of this wider human 
commonwealth. Gentili thought the traders in this case ought to have ‘restrained’ 
themselves or be restrained by their fellow citizens, even if the English did not 
take any actions against them, and moreover should be ‘pleased’ at these 
restrictions because they benefit the world by avoiding war.56 Finally, Gentili 
linked these private actions to the nature of the ‘public’, which he saw as the 
actions of a legitimate assembly, taken by the greater part of the community, rather 
than the disorganised actions of individuals, who the community is obliged to 
restrain.57 Sovereigns, by implication, remain only able to pursue disputes and 
wars, and cannot assemble to agree to a set of norms about conduct; it is the 
community that restrains its citizens, as domestic or international actors alike.58 
This treatment of reasons for war led to Gentili’s use of the domestic and 
international to explain the relationships between subjects and sovereigns in 
instances of changing internal laws, particularly following conquests, in support 
of interventions, or under peace treaties. Here, Gentili drew a range of analogies 
and connections to explore which civil law rules endured, and which became 
subject to the principles of the law of nature and nations.  
Gentili argued for strict limitations on the right of sovereigns to change the 
religions or internal laws of other polities. Religious difference was never a 
sufficient motive to make war necessary because religious laws are between ‘men 
and god’ not ‘men and men’, and consequently, no individual can claim their rights 
are violated or interests harmed by others’ religious differences.59 Moreover, 
religion is necessarily part of all states, and even those following ‘evil religions’, 
think themselves to be following the good.60 Gentili extended this reasoning to the 
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internal arrangements of foreign polities, distinguishing between internal civil 
enemies (who the sovereign must fight) and those abroad with different internal 
laws. As with religion, citizens of other states who live under different laws do not 
do one’s own state any harm or actionable injury, and as they are not subjects, a 
sovereign cannot wage war against them on the basis of difference.61  
These moves towards a humanistic restriction on religious wars becomes clearer 
still in Gentili’s extensive examination of interventions to support civil wars 
against foreign sovereigns. Here, Gentili articulated a vision of a legitimate 
commonwealth and rights of resistance grounded in a globalised union of 
humanity, rejecting the analogy of disputes between private subjects and 
sovereigns on the basis of this union of humanity, which restricted the power of 
sovereigns against their subjects: ‘the subjects of others do not seem to me to be 
outside of that kinship of nature and the society formed by the whole world … if 
you abolish that society, you will also destroy the union of the human race, by 
which life is supported, as Seneca nobly says.’62 Ensuring that sovereigns are not 
‘exempt from the law’ or ‘bound by no statutes and no precedents’ requires 
‘someone to remind them of their duty and hold them in restraint’.63 But Gentili 
explicitly rejected any supervising higher sovereign, again on the basis of the 
difficulties of resolving inter-sovereign disputes, because the ‘generally 
recognized kinship of all men with their fellows’ applies to the similar status of 
different sovereigns.64 This kinship is essentially the same as the ‘supervision’ or 
arbitration involved in wars between sovereigns, and while it would be wrong for 
a foreign sovereign to settle a dispute between private citizens, and although 
magistrates can resolve disputes between subjects and their sovereign, where ‘a 
dispute arises regarding the commonwealth, there are no competent judges in the 
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state, nor can there be any’.65 Disputes about the commonwealth itself requires a 
genuine civil war, in which foreign sovereigns may intervene on the basis of 
humanity. 
In dealing with the legal effects of such civil wars, Gentili first reiterated that the 
law of nations does not apply to citizens: again, wars exist between sovereigns 
alone. But Gentili does offer a detailed account of how resistant citizens can 
achieve international status through mimicking and challenging a state’s domestic 
law. Dissidents must achieve the institutions of state — a senate, treasury, and a 
body of ‘united and harmonious citizens’ — to gain the rights of either making a 
peace treaty with the sovereign or taking over the state.66 This establishment of a 
‘rival’ commonwealth evidences its power and makes the insurrection ‘public’, 
which makes the sovereign’s war against the rival necessary, and then puts the 
rival ‘on an equality’ with the sovereign which, as in an inter-sovereign war, is a 
juridical equality that depends on the ability to resist violence, even where there is 
a great disparity in power.67  
But these contests lead Gentili to articulate a wider, common law of mankind that 
supervenes over the rights of sovereigns and the duties ordinarily owed to them, 
equally binding subjects and sovereigns alike in all wars and supporting 
interventions, epitomised in Gentili’s extended quotation from Seneca: 
Add besides the golden words of Seneca: ‘Whatever the bond of affection by which 
any one was united to me, his violation of the common law of mankind has brought it 
to naught. If such a man does not attack my country, but is troublesome to his own 
land, and although remote from my nation harasses his own, yet that depravity of mind 
cuts him off from me none the less, and makes him, if not my enemy, at least hateful 
to me. And in my eyes a consideration of the duty which I owe to the human race is 
prior and superior to that which I owe to any individual’. This is surely true, or else we 
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put sovereigns on a different plane from all other men, if we decide that they have the 
right to act according to their whim and caprice.68 
These sentiments on the common law of mankind and duties to humanity are 
superior to those owed to any person or sovereign and thus limits the domestic 
authority of all sovereigns. To expand on where such interventions might be 
justified, Gentili drew an allegory with the restraint of family relations: ‘We 
defend sons against fathers who are unjust’, and slaves against cruel masters, and 
in all these cases the right is of protecting subjects against the inhumanity of bad 
masters.69 Turning then to defend English interventions in the Low Countries, 
Gentili raised an analogy with private law, likening the rights of private citizens 
to use their property for their advantage as the basis of a sovereign right to support 
others who are their friendly, common relations.70 
Finally, in dealing with peace and occupation, Gentili again employed a variety of 
analogies that linked the civil law and the law of nature and nations. In exploring 
the relations between sovereigns and non-subjects, Gentili drew an analogy with 
civil law agreements to outline a hierarchy of duties under natural law, the law of 
nations and the civil law: ‘A prince who makes a contract with his subjects is 
bound to them by natural law, by the law of nations, and by the civil law. 
Agreements which are informed with natural justice and equity must be kept by 
the very greatest ruler, even when made with his own subjects. … Surely if the 
prince were not bound to others, others would not be bound to him; this is 
demanded by the law of mutual relations.’71 Here the general principles of keeping 
agreements extended to constitutional settlements and peace treaties alike, 
ultimately rooted in a natural law of mutual obligation.  
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Gentili’s treatment of the limits to an occupying sovereign’s rights to change 
internal laws shows another side of this link. Peace treaties aimed at establishing 
equal rights between polities and hence friendship,72 usually allowing each party 
to live according to its own laws, as part of the friendly preservation of mutual 
dignity.73 Accordingly, sovereigns had no right to modify the religious and civil 
laws of conquered peoples, not on the basis of mutual obligation but rather ideas 
of harmony and natural change. While a conqueror can force the vanquished to 
adopt its government, it can only force its religion on them if their customs are 
‘alien to humanity and to all religion’.74 Gentili saw religious worship as an 
‘indissoluble bond’ that is stronger than ties of ‘kinship’ or ‘mutual good will’, 
and its source in nature means its many forms should be tolerated, and only 
curtailed where contrary to nature, namely atheism or agnosticism.75 But natural 
law also permits sovereigns to gradually change religious customs and laws, and 
gradually change uncivilised peoples in the customs ‘demanded by the laws of 
nature, of nations, and of the state’.76 Gentili thus supported a wide right to change 
the civil laws and social customs of others.77 But the guiding principle remained 
harmony. Diversities in languages and manners of life go against harmony, but 
harmony must be gradually cultivated rather than ordered by the conqueror. This, 
explicitly, is a movement from natural law into the civil laws of a conquered state: 
the ‘victor should impose nothing upon the vanquished which is contrary to the 
law and design of nature … And what is a part of the law of nations and of nature 
must also be a part of the civil law’.78 
Gentili’s analysis of warfare and disputes thus employed a range of analogies 
between civil law, the law of nature and the law of nations, in which he explored 
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the connections and unities between these spheres, and announced his theory of 
the overlap of the law of nature and nations. Private legal disputes formed the basis 
for Gentili’s account of legal recourse to warfare. Civil war contestations of the 
constitution itself could give rise to sovereign rights to intervene. Finally, 
sovereigns remained limited in the kinds of changes to the domestic laws, religions 
and customs of conquered foes. All relied on careful, extensive links between civil, 
natural and international law. 
D Imperial Sovereigns 
Gentili’s most innovative uses of the domestic and international appeared in his 
treatment of empire and imperial–colonial relations. Gentili used a series of 
analogies to domestic public law to justify the Roman spread of the civil law 
throughout its empire to make those principles universal. He also examined the 
hierarchies of empires in dependent sovereigns, which he likened to sovereign–
subject relations. But the most significant analogy was Gentili’s right under the 
law of nations to trade and commerce, which he used to understand and defend 
imperial claims to territory in the New World, and then to articulate James I/VI’s 
protective jurisdiction extending beyond Britain’s shores.  
In his 1599 Wars of the Romans, Gentili used the relationship of domestic and 
international, and a series of domestic allegories, to defend the spread of Roman 
civil law by empire. In this dialogue, Gentili’s imperial defender praises the spread 
of Roman law by allegories of domestic families. Rome was the ‘[p]arent of arms 
and laws’, in that spreading its empire by force also ‘offered the cradle of the 
beginnings of law’ to conquered and incorporated peoples.79 Their lives were 
improved by the civil law; they were ‘brought over by our laws to a more 
cultivated way of life’.80 Gentili’s defender uses a maternal allegory to illustrate 
Rome’s spreading of law through force as aimed at peace and unity: ‘She [Rome] 
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is the only one who has received the defeated to her bosom. And she has protected 
the human race with a shared name in the manner of a mother, not a ruler; and she 
has called citizens those whom she has subdued, and has bound together far distant 
regions with a bond of duty. To her peaceful ways we all owe it that the traveller 
makes use of regions as though they are his ancestral lands, that we are all now 
one people.’81 This peace is a product of conquest and the civil law, which remains 
one of the only persistent, live remnants of the empire, which, owing to its 
rationality, has spread even beyond Rome’s original conquests.82  
But Gentili’s imperial defender also argued that the fall of the Empire was the 
source of divergence in laws which led, inevitably, to wars between peoples. With 
divergences in the formerly unified civil law, the laws between cities ‘burst 
asunder’ leading to ‘the wars of all, of all peoples among themselves’. He ended 
the dialogue with an attempted haunting denunciation of differences in laws and a 
panegyric to the solidity of empire: 
And are you laughing here, Picenus? Is the world laughing? And do you still laugh 
when the world’s peoples differ in customs, laws, languages, sacred rites, and 
thoughts? But if the look of the globe and the faces of all mortal men are saying 
anything to me, then we have triumphed over you, and all lament the now sundered 
unity of hearts and sigh for Roman piety, liberality, trustworthiness, magnanimity, 
peace, security, justice—and for the Roman Empire, from which, in all of its justice, 
fairness, and goodness, they lament that they have been withdrawn.83 
Similarly in DIB Gentili noted that the Roman Empire’s civil law, codified by 
Justinian, gained a universality that could be resurrected. Its universality was such 
that ‘if the empire were destroyed, the law itself, although long buried, would yet 
rise again and diffuse itself among all the nations of mankind’.84 The resurrection 
of Roman civil law, then, could be the basis of returning to unity between polities, 
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partly by its universality and hence incorporation into the law of nature and 
nations. This was not just a defence of Rome but also a guide for Elizabethan 
English imperial projects to unify the world through their laws.85 
If Rome furnished the possibilities of peace through unified civil laws, the Roman 
conception of the powers of the emperor also formed the basis for Gentili’s 
understanding of the interlocking sovereignties of contemporary empires 
addressed in DIB and the 1605 Three Royal Discourses. In DIB, Gentili made 
several remarks on empire that illuminate parts of his views on dependency and 
inter-sovereign connections, and the nature of legitimate rule. Though he 
frequently discussed both the Roman and Holy Roman Empires, Gentili was 
preoccupied more with feudal subjugation, imperfect sovereignty, and histories of 
imperial wars and diplomacy, than with empire as a general concept, or as a 
specific kind of polity different from ordinary sovereigns. This relates to his 
general points about the status of hierarchies of sovereigns. Dependent and feudal 
princes, despite their title of ‘prince’, do not hold real sovereignty or genuine 
jurisdiction, because they acknowledge a higher sovereign.86  
But Gentili’s most sustained discussion of empire and sovereignty relates to the 
change from the Roman Empire into the Holy Roman Empire, as bestowed by the 
Pope on Charles. Here Gentili again conceived of the relations of sovereign and 
subject as a kind of mutuality, illustrated by an analogy between feudal lord–
subject relations that Gentili applied to imperial hierarchies: ‘the relations of the 
sovereign and his subjects are mutual; they are bound to defend him, and he them. 
The lord and the vassal are mutually dependent, the prince and his subjects; as the 
latter are bound to render loyal obedience, so the lord is expected to rule justly’.87 
Subjection imposes an ‘equal obligation’ on the superior, which Gentili analogised 
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to mutual faith between debtors and within monastic orders.88 These oaths of 
fidelity prevent either from severing the tie and bind each to good faith. Similarly, 
‘the people’ are limited in their ability to transfer absolute power. Applying this to 
the Pope’s power to grant imperial rule to Charles, Gentili insisted ‘we mean that 
the Pope and people together transfer the power’ and likened this to Roman 
transfers of imperial power, noting that when Rome ‘granted, bestowed, and 
handed over all its sovereignty and power, even over itself, to the emperor, the 
emperor was not … looked upon as a kind of commissioner, and the people did 
not retain any rights in the government’.89 Here, again, Gentili brought the legacies 
of Rome and its legal forms into the present day to argue that empires endure in 
ways that other polities may not; they endure even if a small part remains, and 
need not maintain the same languages, institutions or laws to remain continuous: 
‘Such features may change the form of an empire, but not the empire itself’.90 
This endurance is used to read the international spread of Rome into the domestic 
constitutional laws of Britain and the Crown in Three Royal Discourses.91 In his 
tracts on absolute kingship and the Anglo-Scottish union of crowns, Gentili 
conceived of internal and external sovereignty in absolute, Bodinian terms.92 The 
emperor holds absolute legislative power, committed to him by the people, and is 
thus not bound by the existing civil laws, holding absolute power to change them 
at will.93 ‘The civil law says that the princeps is unbound by the laws and that law 
is whatever pleases the princeps’, and, coming from Roman law, it is not foreign 
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but incorporated into the basis of English law.94 Noting that sovereigns hold 
greater authority than that of fathers over sons or masters over slaves, Gentili 
conceived this authority as residing within the interstices between international 
and domestic law: sovereigns are bound by divine law, the laws of nature and the 
law of nations, but are superior to their own domestic laws, and, as in the 
discussion of disputes in DIB, this supremacy over the domestic makes sovereign 
submission to adjudication impossible.95 Gentili’s argument here relied on taking 
‘sovereignty as popular consent’ in Roman constitutional law, reading it into the 
position of James I/VI as the King of England and Scotland, and then generalising 
it to all sovereign princes.96  
Gentili’s other significant imperial use of the domestic and international was to 
conceptualise the acquisitions in the ‘New World’ and justifications for war there, 
affording Indigenous peoples some legal autonomy in resisting the encounter with 
the Spanish.97 Gentili argued that commerce and free trade can justify wars of 
imperial expansion. Spanish conquest would be justified if the inhabitants 
prohibited commerce, because commerce is justified by the law of nations, and 
that law cannot be changed by Indigenous opposition to it. But Gentili argued that 
this was not the Spanish justification, as they aimed not at free commerce or 
spreading Christianity to a resistant population,98 but complete dominion over the 
lands of the Americas. The Spanish ‘regarded it as beyond dispute that it was 
lawful to take possession of those lands which were not previously known to us; 
just as if to be known to none of us were the same thing as to be possessed by no 
one’, invoking both the Roman private law principle of res nullius and the Pope’s 
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grant of dominion in the New World in the Papal Bull Inter Caetera.99 But Gentili 
also argued that Indigenous resistance to commerce does not necessarily justify 
war. Resistance to strangers is common to all ‘uncivilized peoples’ and it only 
stops ‘one phase’ of commerce; commerce is only properly prohibited when all 
trade is prohibited.100 The laws of nature privilege trade and commerce over 
sovereign claims to territory, and discipline the international rights of sovereigns 
to expand their empires. 
This position became clearer in Gentili’s wider treatment of the sea in DIB. 
Gentili’s views of sovereign authority over the sea rested on the sea’s 
representation as a place that holds both a privileged status governed by natural 
law, and also where the laws of various sovereigns thrust and conflict.101 Starting 
from the premise that seas are open to all, and their use common to all, Gentili 
insisted that seas and their shores and rivers cannot be shut off by any one.102 He 
rejected the argument that seas and rivers can be possessed to exclude others, 
calling that a ‘vain circumlocution’ that violates natural law.103 But polities can 
hold jurisdiction, dominions, and protectorates over parts of the sea near their 
shores. Here, Gentili drew a public distinction and outlined which rights belong to 
no one and which to the sovereign. Just as things that are ‘common to all’ to use 
are the property of no one, all public things, including things privately owned but 
meant for public use, are under the jurisdiction and protection of the sovereign.104  
This international jurisdiction is not like its domestic exclusive form. As the sea is 
open by nature it can be closed to no one.105 Nor is the ‘public’ here a sovereign’s 
own population, but the whole of humanity. When the sovereign closes the sea to 
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others, he refuses them a ‘privilege of nature’ and gives foreign sovereigns a cause 
for war.106 Instead, sovereigns as protectors act as magistrates of the law of 
nations: ‘[t]here is jurisdiction even over the deep; otherwise no magistrate will 
punish crimes committed at sea … Such a magistracy belongs to the law of nations 
and its jurisdiction also; therefore [it] must necessarily be everywhere where they 
are needed. … very many things are put in the hands of the sovereign on the sea 
as well as on the land; and these no one who sails the seas will evade.’107 Here, 
Gentili made the sea a res communis that is open to all mankind, with jurisdiction 
over the coasts aimed at ensuring openness and preventing piracy, ultimately 
enforced by sovereigns on the sea. Gentili’s position here rests on essentially 
theological and moral arguments that reflected his projects of describing a modern 
cosmopolis of unified humanity.108 Commerce is morally excellent because there 
is a natural right to the universal enjoyment of the goods of nature. Divine wisdom 
in distributing these various good things of life throughout the world made 
commerce necessary. It also created the conditions through which the common 
bonds of humanity can be maximised.109  
In his final work, the Spanish Advocations, Gentili came to see this protective sea 
jurisdiction as a compound of domestic and international legal rights and duties 
that extended the sovereign’s power vastly further than the shore. In ‘Of the 
Protection of Sea-Territory’, Gentili framed James’s control over the sea in 
unlimited, imperial terms based on a mix of sovereign edict and treaty obligation 
under James’s peace with Spain.  
Gentili began by arguing that territory applied equally to land and water. 
Endorsing the historical claims of the Venetians, Genoese and Pisans, he 
contended that holding a port grants a state jurisdiction over the sea that extends 
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from the port, up to the borders of another state. As applied to England, the ‘sway 
of our King [James I/VI] extends far toward the south, the north, and the west’; 
control of land in Ireland extends control of the sea westwards to Spain’s ‘Indian 
realms’, and southwards towards Spain itself. The basis of this claim is a mix of 
James’s domestic sovereign edict powers combined with the enactment of a treaty 
obligation: ‘[I]mmeasurable is the broad jurisdiction of our King upon the sea. Nor 
is this jurisdiction maintained by the enforcement of a certain royal edict in which 
certain boundaries are laid down, beyond which the King refuses to have his 
territorial power extended in connection with these acts of war between the 
Spaniards and the Dutch.’110  
Instead, the peace treaty between Spain and England, under which each was bound 
to protect the other’s subjects ‘throughout that far-extending jurisdiction’, formed 
a second basis for the claim, and limited that jurisdiction according to ‘right’ rather 
than ‘convention’: ‘Nor is this declaration of the King’s rights (and thus to be 
accepted the more readily) made in an edict, but it is an entirely new arrangement, 
and law. For a declaration introduces nothing new and changes nothing; but this 
edict does change much, if the territorial power of the king really extends much 
beyond those boundaries as now fixed.’111  
Gentili then rejected the suggestion that the obligation to afford protection to the 
Spanish would be limited to ‘a curtailed territory within which alone our King 
were able to afford protection to Spaniards’.112 Responding to the claim that the 
edict had long fixed the boundaries — as a kind of self-declaration of the limits of 
James’s realm on the sea — Gentili offered an argument that bolstered English 
law’s ‘specialness’, contending that for these purposes the specifics of the edict or 
its usages within England are not relevant to the law of nations: ‘What has our 
own peculiar English law to do with foreigners? Likewise, as the proverb has it, 
there is much English law locked up in the breasts of our judges, but foreign kings 
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will not suffer themselves to be confined there.’113 The Spanish would not consent 
to be bound by the usages of English law unknown to them, and so those points 
are irrelevant.114 Gentili concluded by reiterating that the defined limits on the sea 
are provided by the law of nations, eminent domain and jurisdiction: ‘Let them 
remember that other things, once undefined, are defined today’.115 In a later 
argument, Gentili made protection a duty coming from both the peace treaty with 
Spain as well as a general common law obligation to keep the King’s peace: both 
the common law and the special rights of the treaty compelled the King to punish 
Dutch nationals for ‘roughly handling’ Spaniards within the realm.116  
The provenance of the Spanish Advocations and these arguments provides a 
suitable conclusion to Gentili’s final years and views on the domestic and 
international. In 1600 Gentili had left Oxford to practise at Gray’s Inn, transferring 
his teaching duties to his deputy. With James’s ascension following Elizabeth’s 
death in 1603, England made peace with Spain, and in 1605 James granted Gentili 
permission to act as counsel to the Spanish Embassy on admiralty cases brought 
in England against the Netherlands following Dutch attacks on Spanish vessels. 
After he died in London in 1608, Gentili’s reflections on these cases and 
arguments were edited by his brother and published in 1613. Consequently, these 
are not works of systematic theory or necessarily reflections of Gentili’s genuinely 
held views, but rather the arrangements of what Gentili saw as the strongest 
arguments made in local courts on behalf of foreign sovereigns. They suggest 
Gentili’s efforts to implement some of his ideas about universal commonwealth in 
advocacy. His arguments deftly used analogies and principles drawn from a range 
of jurisdictions, from Roman civil law to the law of nature and nations to various 
national laws. There are glints in this text of Gentili’s practical attempts to unify 
humanity through law in domestic courts and the adjudication of disputes between 
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sovereigns and their private citizens according to the law of nations. The 
Advocations reflect the application of Gentili’s approach to the domestic and 
international that he had expounded in his more systematic juristic texts.117  
E Conclusion 
Gentili’s works explored a range of areas in which international considerations 
limited the sovereign’s powers, using analogies, allegories and ordering. His 
treatment of ambassadors engaged in treason dealt with this question directly, and 
his more general theorisation of the nature of embassies shows their close 
relationship to founding and allowing the state to have real international 
personality. Gentili’s mature works explored a range of problems of the 
relationship — from inter-sovereign disputes to civil wars to occupations to 
empire to sea jurisdiction — dealing with questions of law’s internal and external 
forms to pursue projects of humanist Commonwealths in Protestant theological 
terms. He offered a clear legal theology of which laws beyond the state’s control 
might bind and restrict it. Each of these interactions always in service not of a 
superior sovereign like the Pope, but rather the ideals of humanism and a unifying 
commonwealth among the polities of the world. Gentili began to use the universal 
ideas of Roman civil law and the law of nature and nations to move towards a 
genuine ‘international’ system of laws: that states might begin to agree between 
each other to create new international laws, to restrict their domestic sovereignty 
in concert and in service of this humanist commonwealth. But this possibility of 
international justice nonetheless came from the rightly ordered domestic state. 
III CITIZEN, SOVEREIGN, NATION, SYSTEM, 1640–90 
A Introduction 
Whereas Gentili sought to unify the world through various forms of humanism 
and used the law of nature and nations and Roman civil law to articulate that 
expansive vision, British jurists writing through the English Civil Wars, 
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Cromwell’s Commonwealth, and after instead looked to external laws for 
restraints, pacification and a model for the state that could ground an idea of 
domestic law as primarily national.118 This part presents five portraits of jurists 
who illustrate this emergence. Gentili’s successor Richard Zouche introduced the 
idea of laws between peoples that emphasised the connections and similarities 
between internal civil law and his new systematic account of the law of nations, 
drawing detailed analogies between these levels to shift both towards a primitive 
positivism, where all laws were changeable by peoples and sovereigns. John 
Selden likewise used the language of laws between peoples, theorising a taxonomy 
of levels of legal ordering that included the ‘domestic civil law’, and was grounded 
on biblical genealogical allegories that were part of his wider project of making 
national, imperial law predominant. Thomas Hobbes’ well-known account of 
international and domestic power included an overlooked but significant emphasis 
on analogies between different kinds of leagues within and between families and 
nations, which Hobbes used to link the absolute power of the household to 
sovereign power and then to colonial expansions, as part of his conjoining of the 
law of nature and nations and its close relation to civil law. James Harrington’s 
account of empire split it into ‘foreign and domestic’ that made the justice and 
ordering of each sphere dependent on the opposition of control over land and laws 
that Harrington ultimately used to articulate a messianic imperial mission for 
Britain to spread its laws throughout the world. But it is with John Locke’s post-
1688 account of the federative power that the beginnings of the ‘modern’ account 
of the domestic emerged, in which parliament is responsible for the laws of the 
land, the executive for the powers of the law of nations, and where conflicts and 
tensions between domestic and international laws are to be resolved by 
constitutional convention and prudence.  
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B Laws between Peoples: Richard Zouche’s System 
Gentili’s main legacy within Britain lay in the works of Richard Zouche (1590–
1661), who, like Gentili, was Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford from 1620. 
Zouche continued Gentili’s approach of dealing with the problems around 
domestic and international law by attempting to order them through drawing 
analogies between them. What Zouche’s main work managed to achieve was a 
clearer systematisation of them as spheres of law, based on a strong emphasis on 
divisions between nations which necessitated rules for their interaction and — 
most importantly and innovatively — the development of international law 
through agreements between polities, epitomised in Zouche’s introduction of the 
term ‘jus inter gentes’ — law between peoples — as the more accurate description 
that emphasised the ability of polities to agree to new laws between them. To T E 
Holland, who revived Gentili and Zouche’s legacies in the late nineteenth century, 
Zouche stood as the intellectual forebear of Bentham’s ‘international’, as the 
‘founder’ of positivism in international law, and the author of the first ‘proper’ 
international law treatise, in that his Exposition dealt with international law as a 
system or sphere of law, rather than focusing on a specific topic like war, peace or 
diplomacy.119 
System is central for understanding Zouche’s outlining of a clear ordering of 
domestic and international laws. Zouche’s systematising project began with his 
first major work, the 1629 Elementa Jurisprudentiae, the first English work of 
general jurisprudence that outlined a complete system of laws. Addressed to ‘the 
studious youth of Great Britain’, and guiding them in working towards mastering 
the ius commune,120 the Elementa covered general principles, procedure, the rules 
of private law, public law (the law ‘between private persons and princes’121), and 
then feudal, ecclesiastical, maritime, military and ‘fecial’ — international — 
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law.122 Zouche’s project for the next decades was to gradually fill each of these 
mapped spheres with a dedicated treatise. Zouche’s aspiration to system runs not 
just through his major work of international law, the Exposition, but through his 
earlier work as well. In a juvenile poem, The Dove; or, Passages of a 
Cosmography, Zouche mapped out an epic descriptive journey through the world, 
taking the view of the dove released by Noah after the flood.123 Like the Elementa, 
the poem is a mapping exercise that emphasises sight and discerning the true state 
of things; most importantly, the geography and character of polities and peoples 
in the world of 1613. The cosmography that is explicit in the Dove — mapping 
and accounting for the relations of heaven and earth; the ideal and the real; 
morality and politics — remains implicit in the Elementa’s aim of describing law 
in its ideal and real operations. This is also the structure that Zouche’s system of 
international law, the Exposition of 1650, would pursue.  
Central to Zouche’s system and his lasting innovation in the Exposition was the 
entrenchment of the term ‘jus inter gentes’ — the law between peoples — as the 
more ‘accurate’ or ‘specific’ replacement for the jus gentium or law of peoples 
used by Gentili and all others. In addition to natural laws established among and 
‘respected by all alike’, and observable in the commonalities between domestic 
laws within different states, Zouche adds a second meaning that he ‘choose[s] to 
describe as “Jus inter Gentes” or Law between Nations’: the law ‘observed in 
common between princes or peoples of different nations’.124 This meaning is 
founded in the division between nations. It springs from and exists because of 
those divisions. Division leads first to intercourse and inevitably to wars, 
epitomised in Zouche’s echo of the language of the Digest: ‘by this law … nations 
are separated, kingdoms founded, commerce instituted, and lastly, wars 
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introduced’.125 The very existence of different nations means that law must exist 
between them in some form.  
Zouche’s new jus inter gentes incorporated a range of sources from both domestic 
civil and international laws. The various compacts, conventions and treaties 
concluded by single nations is one source of the law between nations: ‘the solemn 
promise of a state establishes law, and whole peoples, no less than single persons, 
are bound by their own consent’.126 This kind of international law can exist only 
between nations or peoples holding sovereign power, as well as those holding a 
‘universal and supreme power of deciding questions concerning the community 
between nations both in peace and in war’ — namely, Emperor and Pope.127 
Whereas the jus gentium — the law common to all peoples — consisted of shared 
categories of private law that were found in the domestic laws of various nations 
(property, status, contract) that reflected the divisions of Roman private law, the 
new jus inter gentes were the laws made between polities that took their authority 
from that agreement, rather than just the fact of similarity or common heritage. 
This more specific sphere of law existed only between states in their relations with 
each other: it is confined to their agreements and consent, demonstrated by what 
they actually do when invoking law or right. 
Zouche’s emphasis on the law between peoples was built on new ideas of 
sovereignty and peaceful ordering, and it is here that he began to use domestic 
analogies and allegories to articulate international legal order. Drawing on Jean 
Bodin’s De Republica and Hobbes’ De Cive,128 Zouche conceptualised 
sovereignty as a kind of binding together of citizens, families and nations ‘so that 
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all are deemed to will and to act together’.129 By binding their internal populations 
together to will and act singularly, nations may then bind each other to legal 
obligations. But sovereignty and international subjecthood lies only in these kinds 
of bonds, and not all polities are bound appropriately. The ‘majority of men’ lay 
‘outside Sovereignty’: they have their own will, and ‘act not as a people but as 
single persons, so that there are as many actions as there are persons, and if one in 
the number has not consented to or assisted in an act he is not deemed to have done 
it’.130  
Zouche’s account of ordering, peace and justice deepened this vision of law 
between states through domestic analogies, specifically through a comparison of 
internal, constitutional order with external international order. Zouche initially 
defined peace as a specifically ‘legal concord’ between princes and peoples, living 
‘one with another in security’ through observance of the law between them.131 
Building on St Augustine’s image of ‘ordered concord’ as peace based on justice, 
Zouche explored two meanings of peace. The first is ‘moral peace’, analogous to 
patriarchal family home life: ‘when a man’s affections agree with his domestic 
duties, or when the members of a family agree with the head or father of a 
family’.132 This forms a model for a wider ‘civil peace’, where subjects agree with 
the prince. Building on these internal forms of peace are several different forms 
existing between superiors and equals on the international stage: ‘the concord of 
neighbour with neighbour, state with state, kingdom with kingdom’.133 Peace 
results only when princes and peoples have ‘united in a concord agreeing with 
justice’, and discord flows from ‘depraved reason and corrupted customs’ leading 
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in turn to ‘ill-affected[ness]’ between those who ‘recognize no superior [and] have 
none to restrain them’.134  
But it is the alignment of familial (moral), state (civil) and international peace that 
guarantees ordered concord based in justice; a linking of constitutional order to 
international order. Order requires peace within the state, indicated by the presence 
of a civil government, ‘which may be Paternal, Royal, or Popular’ and conditions 
of friendship or alliance with other states: ‘To community between nations belongs 
first the status or condition of peoples among themselves, which depends on their 
organization and rule, and in so far as it is voluntary and acceptable to its subjects 
may be called “civil government.”’.135 Zouche’s original source of civil 
government and later international order is thus domestic and patriarchal. 
Government emerges first in parents and the household, with absolute power in 
the paterfamilias, and it is only with the ‘propagation of numerous descendants’ 
that national power comes to belong to chiefs, which Zouche notes were, in sacred 
terms, ‘patriarchs’.136  
With this theoretical exposition about the nature of peace, order, government and 
justice in place, the remainder of the Exposition explored ‘questions’ about the 
precise nature of these legal relations between nations at peace and war. These 
questions touch frequently on the problems of the interaction of internal and 
international legal ordering. As a set of civil law disputations, Zouche offers the 
strongest arguments for each side of a question, rather than arguing for one 
conclusion or other. The relationship of domestic to international law appears here 
as a tension or set of possibilities, rather than a doctrinal account dictating which 
laws take precedence.  
Among Zouche’s treatment of domestic and international questions in these 
discussions, three themes emerge. The first concerns how changes in internal 
 
134  Ibid 3. 
135  Ibid 4. 
136  Ibid. 
 Commonwealth and Empire: Legal Theologies of the Domestic, 1585–1690 71 
government affect the international legal order, arising when the ‘condition of a 
prince, or people, or their subject … is changed, or lost’.137 These are often 
imperial questions. Zouche discussed the claim of the ‘German Emperor’ to be 
Roman as well, whether ‘imperial dignity’ is granted by the Pope, whether the 
Emperor holds sovereignty over other kings and princes, and the effect of 
dependency as protection or dominion.138 Others dealt with the nature of 
constituent power and succession following a change of government, where 
Zouche considered the state as a ‘relation between the parts which govern and are 
governed’ and also as a ‘legal association’ whose obligations can endure a change 
of government.139  
The second was the encounter with other legal systems. Considering whether it 
‘detracts from the majesty of a prince of people to admit laws from other sources?’, 
Zouche noted that imposing laws on another people against their will is a ‘sign of 
subjection’, but acknowledged that foreign laws can only be taken up ‘freely and 
voluntarily’, and might be adopted only insofar as they do not conflict with local 
laws: ‘when the law of the land fails, it is right to have recourse to the laws of 
others’, namely, other written civil laws.140 Zouche ends this section citing John 
Selden’s Fleta, with the example of England’s mixed post-reformation 
jurisdictions, noting that the repudiation of papal jurisdiction meant that Canon 
Law is accepted in England only ‘in so far as it is not repugnant to the statutes of 
the royal prerogative and customs of the realm’ — a formulation prescient of the 
implied supremacy of domestic law — and that likewise Roman Civil Law is 
accepted as the basis for military and maritime law because the common law does 
not cover these areas.141 A final example of this type of encounter is Zouche’s 
brief consideration of constitutional law, in which he discusses the principle from 
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Calvin’s Case, noting that the kingdoms of England and Scotland were not 
distinct, despite their different crowns, laws and customs.142  
Third and finally, Zouche touched on the analogies of domestic and international 
laws in questions of ownership. Most significant among these is Zouche’s 
exposition on the debates between Grotius, Selden and William Welwood on 
whether the sea can be appropriated by occupation. Here, Zouche focused on the 
debate over Spanish acquisitions in America and presented only the English 
arguments (thus presumably endorsing them alone), concluding that the Pope 
could not make the Indies Spanish property as England did not recognise the 
Pope’s prerogative, ‘much less authority binding on princes who owed him no 
obedience’, to give Spain possession, and noting that ‘prescription without 
possession is of no effect’.143 Here, civil law principles on possession are used to 
international effect. 
As with Gentili’s Spanish Advocations, Zouche’s presentations of sides of 
questions and disputes makes it difficult to discern or attribute any clear doctrine 
that he endorsed. But Zouche’s Exposition makes it clear that the tensions and 
conflicts between the rules and principles of the domestic and international spheres 
of law would be pedagogically useful for training civil lawyers. His theoretical 
foundation for those explorations emphasised the importance of sovereigns and 
peoples to develop international law by binding each other through treaties and 
conventions. Zouche’s systematising and ordering of these legal spheres makes 
the need to consider conflicts between international and domestic laws an 
inevitable part of a complete legal argument. Precisely how those tensions might 
be resolved — particularly to privilege an English, nationalist conception of 
domestic law that would override or limit rival international laws — would emerge 
more clearly in the jurists that followed Zouche. 
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C ‘But Where Are All Nations?’: John Selden and the Nationalisation of the 
Law of Nature and Nations 
Despite Holland’s revival story, Zouche was not the only jurist engaged in a 
project of systematising, ordering and reconceptualising the law of nations in 
terms of positive law and laws between peoples. John Selden’s (1584–1654) 
mature works sought to do the same, but pursued a clearer project of British 
Empire, a nationalist rethinking of domestic law, which was part of another form 
of argument that emphasised laws between peoples and ultimately drew on 
Hebraic laws and history and an idea of holy commonwealth.144  
While Gentili’s and Zouche’s international fame arguably exceeded that of Selden, 
Selden was undoubtedly more prominent within England, particularly for his 
thinking on law.145 What brought Selden particular notice within and beyond 
England was his most famous work on international law, Mare Clausum, in which 
he disagreed with Gentili on the question that perhaps best illustrates the 
combination of domestic and international legal sources in the seventeenth 
century; the possession, ownership and control of the seas. Initially completed in 
1618, Mare Clausum was used in James I/VI’s negotiations with the Dutch over 
disputed fishing rights. But James blocked its publication, and it did not appear 
until Selden was urged by Charles to revise and publish it in 1635, and by then it 
also responded to Grotius’s De Iure Belli ac Pacis.146 Mare Clausum was, 
explicitly, a defence of British Empire and the right to dominate the seas, and 
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Marchamont Nedham’s translation of it during Cromwell’s Commonwealth 
showed it could be a project of commonwealth as much as monarchy.147 
Selden’s Mare Clausum sought to claim ownership of the seas around Britain for 
its monarchs, arguing that natural law and the law of nations both made national 
laws and customs central to this question, and that Britain’s domestic laws and 
customs gave it a right to the seas extending from the British Isles. This explicitly 
imperial and nationalist claim rested on a reordering of legal spheres, a greater role 
for occupation and possession, and extensive biblical allegories. Against Grotius, 
Selden contended that ownership of the sea was ‘permissive’ or ‘intervenient’, 
based on custom and usage, rather than as a necessary or universal part of the law 
of nations that could be commanded or forbidden. That custom and usage was 
proven by the ‘long and continual conjunction with the British Empire’, showing 
that the ‘enjoyment and possession, or lawful prescription’ over the seas was the 
basis of Britain’s title, dominion and ownership over them.148 Selden dubbed these 
sovereign seas royal ‘Closets’ or ‘Chambers’, rooms of the royal house, reflecting 
the language of the deeds and writs that underlay that evidence of custom and 
usage, and in these passages quoted Gentili’s account of James’s sea jurisdiction, 
and disagreed with a contemporary’s interpretation of Gentili as limiting that 
jurisdiction at all.149 
While Selden’s privileging of domestic English law as the real basis of sea 
ownership is important, what is still more revealing of his approach to the domestic 
and international is the ordering of law on which he bases these arguments. Selden 
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outlined a set of divisions in the meaning of ‘law’. The first division was around 
command. Law is either obligatory (commanding or forbidding things) or 
permissive (allowing, but neither commanding nor forbidding, such as powers of 
contract).150 The second division was in law’s application as universal or specific. 
Both obligatory and permissive laws can relate to either ‘mankind in general … 
all Nations’, which includes natural and divine law, or ‘not all’ nations. Selden 
then outlined the ways laws may evolve and change.151 While obligatory natural 
and divine laws come from ‘the father of nature’ and cannot change, Selden 
allowed for ‘Additions or Enlargements’ (though no ‘alterations’) to these 
principles for the purposes of ‘more certainty and convenience of observation’.152 
Permissive natural and divine laws, however, can be changed by sovereigns: they 
‘must needs be various and changeable, according to the judgement and pleasure 
of persons in power; and therefore subject to Repealings, Qualifications, and daily 
Alterations’.153 From both additions and alterations arises ‘Positive [or] Civil’ law, 
which might be ‘singular and peculiar’ in applying to one nation alone, or shared 
in common between nations.154 Shared positive laws might bind nations to each 
other, or they may just be accidents of history — the reception and voluntary use 
of similar laws.  
From all this, Selden arrives at his use of the ‘domestic’: 
And of this threefold kind of Positive Law, we may call the first the Law purely Civil, 
as it relates to any one particular civil society. The second the Common Law of Diverse 
Nations, so named from some common tie or obligation between them. The third the 
Law of Some or Diverse Nations, Civil and Domestic, by reason of that Domestic and 
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Civil tie only, whereby they are bound singly among themselves, without any 
obligation to each other in common.155 
Domestic laws are purely products of national agreement. They may be shared or 
similar by accident, but they gain their force internally from their constituent 
subjects, not through any obligation to another nation. Laws that cross boundaries, 
as a common law that binds different nations together, is a law of ‘mutual 
obligation’, and divides into ‘imperative’ and ‘intervenient’ laws of nations; the 
latter term very similar to Zouche’s jus inter gentes. The ‘imperial’ law of nations 
involves imperial and dependent inter-sovereign relations, with obedience and 
submission to the ‘Pope’s authority and command’ the prime example.156 The 
intervenient law of nations arises not from command but by ‘custom or compact’ 
among nations, and relates to war, embassies, leagues, covenants and commerce, 
and through their consent to make alterations or additions to the universal law of 
nations.157 Before turning to dominion and ownership, Selden clarified that law 
‘as it is received and used at home by some particular people in their Courts of 
Judicature, it is to be called the Law Civil or Domestic of diverse Nations’.158 This 
ordering schema is the basis for Selden’s argument that the sea may be possessed, 
occupied and, like land, capable of dominion; private possession is part of the 
permissive law of nations.  
Whereas Zouche would come to emphasise divisions and boundaries of nations as 
a basis for laws between them by using the language of Roman civil law added to 
elements of biblical and humanist scholarship, Selden’s emphasis drew almost 
exclusively from Hebraic legal history to ground the links of domestic and 
international laws. Selden’s argument was based on a long domestic and religious 
allegory to Noah’s division of the world and donation of command to his sons. 
Selden noted that Noah was the first man to hold ‘private Dominion’ as 
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commanded by God, ‘as if [Noah] had been absolute Lord or Arbiter of the whole 
world’, and that dividing that rule among his ‘posterity’ led each of his sons to 
settle the first nations, as linking their families and languages; ‘as private Lords, 
and appointed Bounds according to the number of their Families … throughout all 
Europe’, leading eventually to a general idea of princes representing their 
communities.159  
Like Zouche, this division into separate territories is the starting point for the 
encounters of domestic and international law. This is central to Selden’s treatment 
of the religious basis for ownership and possession. The universal natural and 
divine law did not expressly command or forbid this division, but rather permitted 
both common enjoyment and the private dominion or possession of land. The 
‘division of Bounds and Territories’ shows the consent of all mankind for 
‘quitting’ common ownership, and instead distributing them to ‘Proprietors’, 
which Selden analogised to the civil law principles that ‘Partners or Co-Heirs’ 
share between them things held in common.160 Finally, he considered ‘vacant’ 
lands, and related this back to a tension of imperial and domestic laws: 
It has been truly a custom of old, and which holds to this day in the more eminent 
Nations, that Vacancies are his who apprehends them first by occupation; as we used 
to say of those we call, no man’s Goods. This appears plain in the Imperial Law; nor 
do we know of any Nation where it is not received, save in those where by the 
[‘Municipal’] Civil Law of Some Nations, any things of this nature are appropriated to 
their Princes, that their Subjects gain not an interest by occupation: For there others 
have sufficiently disclaimed the acquiring of any title by occupation; and in the present 
case we must ever have respect unto this Qualification.161 
Rights to occupy vacant land appear in the ancient customs of eminent nations, in 
the imperative–imperial branch of laws between nations (as opposed to the 
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intervenient), and one common to all nations, except where the municipal civil 
laws of some nations have abrogated the rights of occupation entirely, with all land 
retained by the sovereign. Here ‘respect’ for that qualification involved allowing 
such a deviation in domestic law from an international norm. 
Later, this division becomes foundational for identifying a natural permissive law 
of possession that is evidenced in various domestic legal systems. Selden 
contended that every sphere of law that he has delineated permitted the private 
dominion of the sea: natural law and the universal or primitive law of nations 
permitted it because it is allowed by ‘the positive law of nations of every kind’ — 
namely, the ‘Law Civil or Domestic of Diverse Nations … the Common Law of 
Diverse Nations, whether … Intervenient or Imperative’ and specifically ‘the 
Customs of almost all and the more noble Nations that are known to us’.162 After 
discussing religious customs around sea dominion, Selden turned to human laws, 
‘matters of duty between man and man’, which he saw as evidenced in laws linked 
to national territory, expressed now in botanical terms that emphasised the 
autochthony of a nation’s domestic laws. Whatever ‘shall be permitted by the 
Laws, Placards, and received Customs of diverse Ages and Nations, both ancient 
and modern, then it may be collected what every Clime will or will not bear, by 
the diligent observation of Countries, Shrubs, Trees, Plants, and other things which 
belong to the body of Husbandry’.163 Those nations that have ‘a Law Civil or 
Domestic’ or a regional law (‘Law common to themselves and their neighbour 
Nations’) allowing sea dominion will be ‘competent Witnesses’ of a wider natural 
permissive law of sea dominion.164  
But Selden then rejected the principle in Justinian and Caius that natural reason 
can be observed in the customs of all peoples, and is also the law of nations, asking 
instead ‘But where are all Nations? It is not yet discovered how many there are, 
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much less upon what Customs they have agreed’.165 It is ‘vain’ to seek rules or 
directions in the customs of all nations throughout history — some do not have 
sea borders and thus no laws on, say, shipwrecks, and others, the ‘ancient 
inhabitants of Africa’ and the ‘Aborigines’, had no government, law, command or 
custom — and thus we should privilege the laws of the ‘civilized and eminent 
Nations of the past and present Age’, and especially the nations ‘who are 
concerned at present’ in the question of sea dominion.166 From these principles, 
Selden investigated the historical evidence of sovereignty claimed over seas, and 
contemporary legal evidence (‘Leagues and Treaties’), that he contended shows 
sea dominion is ‘agreeable to Law’.167  
What Selden does in this final theoretical step before turning to the evidence is 
attenuate the scope of universal natural law to give a privileged role to domestic 
law. He does this through an appeal to the physical and legal characteristics of 
various nations. Neither the complete number of nations, nor their customs is 
known; instead we should privilege the eminent nations, and their national laws 
and customs will be shown not by natural reason, but their geographical situation, 
of what the ‘Clime will or will not bear’. In doing so, Selden gives a strong position 
to domestic law, tying it closely to nation, and allowing it a method for deviating 
from otherwise universal laws or what other jurists might contend is demanded by 
‘natural reason’. Later, he clinched this argument by rejecting Gentili’s view that 
Roman civil law was universally binding and a source and authority for the content 
of the law of nations. Selden emphasised that Roman civil law’s application had 
been broken and altered over time, and that contemporary domestic laws in 
European nations diverged heavily from it. The Holy Roman Empire has 
‘extremely altered’ the laws of Justinian’s Institutes, Spanish and French Kings 
have sometimes prohibited the use of Roman law in their courts, and some laws 
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between nations run clearly contrary to the civil law, even in nations that accept 
and incorporate it: 
there are truly some things in the very Law of the Nations of Europe (who receive those 
Books, and that upon very good ground, both into their Schools and Courts, so far as 
the particular Laws of their Kingdoms will permit) I mean in their Law Common, or 
Intervenient, which are not grounded at all upon the Law of Justinian, but have had 
their original from Customs quite contrary thereto.168 
This rejection of Gentili illustrates Selden’s different approach to unifying 
humanity; not through civil law commonalities, but by emphasising the 
distinctness of each nation’s laws, the ability to voluntarily make them common, 
the promise of progress through altering and making new laws between nations to 
clarify the natural law, and, most significantly, recognising the Hebraic origins of 
international law as the real means of unifying humanity.  
These themes of national law and Hebraic origins are part of a wider, consistent 
trend in Selden’s work.169 This began in his early work. In 1616 Selden edited a 
new edition of Sir John Fortescue’s De Laudibus Legum Angliae, adding a series 
of ‘notes’ in which he questioned the continuity and authority of Roman civil law, 
pointing out that it had not been observed during the dark ages, and was really a 
rediscovery and reconstruction of the jurists in Bologna; in reality, no nation had 
been living by it for centuries, and its new codification and universalisation went 
against Selden’s view of national, local developments of law.170 Against Roman 
law’s claims to approximate or reflect natural laws between states, Selden argued 
that national laws could attain the status of natural laws where they endured over 
a long period of time, practice and interpretation, even amidst national diversity: 
‘Diverse nations, as diverse men, have their diverse collections and inferences; 
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and so make their diverse laws to grow to what they are, out of one and the same 
root’.171 These early works laid the foundation for Selden’s split of civil, positive 
laws from the natural or divine law. Similar standards or rules of civil law 
throughout England and Europe led, for Selden, to the presumption that natural 
law was not contrary to those practices, and so while all law could be traced to a 
general, amorphous divine law, it was really these different, specific instances of 
civil law that should be of interest.172  
The connections of national to Hebraic law as a basis for ordering domestic and 
international law becomes still more clear in Selden’s last works. Less well-known 
than Mare Clausum but a more systematic treatment of its themes, the 1640 De 
Juri Naturae et Gentium (Of the Laws of Nature and Peoples) further developed 
Selden’s thinking on natural law and its relation to national and international law, 
all of which, here, were explored through and grounded on Hebrew law and 
scripture. Natural law was ‘world wide or universal’, the law of nations is part of 
it, and from this universal law grew different national legal systems. National laws 
are not objectively correct, but rather subjective expressions of common ideas and 
values, which we should want to emulate, and the true essence of the ‘law of 
nations’ remains evident in the laws of the ancient Hebrews.173 All valid national 
laws were within the ambit of ‘natural’ law as binding, authoritative agreements 
within political communities that attempted to express an idea of justice; they were 
‘legitimate extensions’ of natural law.174 In 1647 Selden printed a new edition of 
the Fleta, a medieval treatise on the common law by an unknown author, attaching 
his own dissertation, in which he placed national identity as a history of tradition 
and consent at the heart of the English constitution.175 This argument rejected the 
claims of a universal Roman law, and emphasised the British resistance to and 
expulsion of the Romans, its self-constituted republic, and the long history of 
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resisting Roman law’s incursion into English law.176 Selden’s wider work, then, 
dovetails with the project of Mare Clausum of asserting national, domestic law as 
a central part of a general concept of law and the wider system of the law of 
nations, in turn relying heavily on biblical interpretation and genealogies — 
personal or national — from Noah.  
D Leagues Private, Familial, Colonial and Foreign: Thomas Hobbes’s 
Domestics 
Throughout his life, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) served as advisor, secretary and 
tutor in the household of the immensely wealthy and influential Cavendish family, 
consistently referring to himself as a ‘domestic’.177 Significant for his clear 
distinctions between natural and positive laws that undergirded his self-professed 
‘creation’ of the ‘civil science’ of government that examined the relations of 
polities to each other, and the rights and duties of sovereigns and subjects,178 
Hobbes has long been a central figure in debates over domestic and international 
politics and authority.179 Recent work has argued that Hobbes’ connections 
between domestic and international order were a project of limiting passions 
among subjects and sovereigns that aimed to radically transform legal relations 
both within and between states.180 Others have contended that Hobbes’ place as a 
canonical theorist of the international has rested on weak foundations and a fairly 
limited theorisation of the international, based on earlier, limited appreciation of 
his nuanced points throughout the full spectrum of his works.181 This part likewise 
reads across Hobbes’ major works to offer a different emphasis, arguing that 
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Hobbes’ works used a wide range of domestic analogies and allegories in his 
descriptions of different ‘leagues’ that were central to his account of the 
relationship of domestic and international law. Family authority forms a thread 
through his works that illuminates his treatment of law within and between 
nations, providing one guide to Hobbes’s equation of the law of nature with the 
law of nations, and, in Leviathan, the law of nature and nations as being of the 
same ‘extent’ as the civil law. 
Hobbes’ earliest treatise on law, The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic, 
finished in 1640 but not officially published in Hobbes’ lifetime, dealt with the 
spheres of positive and natural law.182 Elements conceptualised the unification of 
individual wills into a body politic by contrasting ‘dominion paternal and 
domestic’, where subjects are conquered, with the artificial commonwealth, 
created by the ‘mutual agreement amongst many’ to voluntarily submit to a 
leader.183 The law of nations appeared only in the last sentence of Elements, where 
Hobbes stated it was the ‘same with the law of nature’: ‘For that which is the law 
of nature between man and man, before the constitution of the commonwealth, is 
the law of nations between sovereign and sovereign after’.184 The law of nature 
and nations were equivalent, and inter-polity law was essentially simply natural 
law. 
Hobbes’ De Cive, or The Philosophical Elements of Citizenship published in 
various forms and places between 1642 and 1651, built on the foundation of 
Elements, greatly expanding on its closing point. Like Gentili, Hobbes used De 
Cive to develop an account of natural law and the law of nations in which the two 
overlapped.185 At the outset, Hobbes promised to outline three kinds of duties for 
men: ‘first as men, then as citizens and lastly as Christians’, where those duties 
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‘constitute the elements of the law of nature and of nations, the origin and force of 
justice, and the essence of the Christian Religion’;186 that is, a series of different 
spheres of duties, which need to be arranged within and by the polity.  
De Cive modified the Elements account of domestic sovereigns, moving away 
from conquest to a family reproduction account, where civil law may modify a 
natural right of mothers over children. After laying out the now familiar Hobbesian 
transition from nature to government, Hobbes expanded on the contrast between 
paternal and artificial government raised in Elements, now terming the first 
‘natural commonwealths’ as ‘Paternal or Despotic’.187 Despite dropping the 
‘domestic’ here, in a later chapter Hobbes explained the natural commonwealth 
through household analogies, and grounded ‘paternal dominion’ on the generation 
of offspring by parents.188 In this account, Hobbes initially gave the mother the 
natural right over newborn children. But civil laws can provide for the transfer of 
that power to the father: ‘in a commonwealth, if a man and a woman make a 
contract to live together, any children born belong to the father, because in all 
commonwealths, because they are established by the Fathers not the mothers of 
the family, the power of domestic government belongs to the man’.189 Paternal 
power unites the father, children and any slaves into the civil person of the family 
which, if it grows large enough that it ‘cannot be subdued without a war of 
uncertain outcome’, is a patrimonial kingdom.190 Here, Hobbes offered a secular, 
generic mythology of monarchies based in large family groupings. 
As in the Elements, De Cive raised domestic family monarchies as the contrast for 
the more genuinely authoritative form of polity, the ‘political commonwealth’, 
which Hobbes now framed around civil law. In a political commonwealth, the 
crowd transforms into a people by union and subjection to a sovereign who makes 
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laws and decides disputes for their mutual protection, defence and advancement: 
‘These rules or measures are normally called the civil laws or laws of the 
commonwealth because they are the commands of the holder of sovereign power 
in the commonwealth … [they] are nothing other than commands about the 
citizens’ future actions from the one who is endowed with sovereign authority’.191 
The sovereign collects these wills as the basis of civil law, but is not itself bound 
by that civil law, remaining always free.192 Civil law gives shape and specificity 
to the generalities of natural law, and Hobbes acknowledged that civil laws may 
differ widely between different commonwealths.193 Like Zouche and Selden, 
Hobbes saw civil law in positive terms, as linked to and ideally expressive of 
natural laws, but taking on forms that suit the country or national temperament 
rather than abstract principles.  
In positioning the commonwealth as still bearing only natural rights vis-à-vis other 
commonwealths, Hobbes drew an analogy to individual men, albeit in the 
imagined state of nature. Whether paternal or artificial, all commonwealths took 
on the personal qualities of men in the state of nature, and the natural law rights 
and duties that applied there also apply to ‘whole commonwealths, peoples or 
nations’, and are equivalent to the ‘laws and rights of nations’.194 Each 
commonwealth was, vis-à-vis other peoples, commonwealths or nations, a huge 
aggregated person, acting with universal freedom and in the same ‘jural vacuum’ 
as individuals in the state of nature.195 Unlike Zouche and Selden’s explorations 
of expansions and alterations to the law of nations along the lines of civil law, 
Hobbes’ equivalence aimed to restrict both natural law and the law of nations. 
Rather than articulating the legal links between polities, Hobbes’s treatment of 
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internal and external law grew from the general principle the sovereign acts to 
protect the ‘safety of the people’.  
That principle is the basis of Hobbes’ linking of internal and external law in De 
Cive. All duties of all sovereigns are encapsulated in the principle that ‘the safety 
of the people is the supreme law’, where the ‘people’ is the crowd that constitutes 
the commonwealth, who are owed not just survival but a good life along the lines 
of their aims in instituting the commonwealth.196 This ‘good life’ is a question of 
internal and external law and power, delineated into four categories: defence from 
external enemies, internal peace, acquisition of wealth consistent with public 
security, and full enjoyment of ‘innocent liberty’.197 External defence is made 
necessary by the hostility of commonwealths in the state of nature, leading to 
Hobbes’ well-known passage: that commonwealths are naturally in a state of 
hostility towards each other, that an absence of war is not peace but an intermission 
of security based not on agreements but on the strengths of adversaries.198 Earlier, 
Hobbes argued agreements are impossible in the state of nature for want of the 
fear of coercive power that the civil state provides, which makes genuine 
agreements between sovereigns impossible.199 Similarly, clarifying the content of 
any natural law duties was impossible, with Hobbes resisting the usual explanation 
that it was revealed in the various laws of civilised nations, and arguing instead 
that no one, philosopher or sovereign, can ‘pass judgment on the wisdom, learning 
and morals of all the nations’.200 What needed no interpretation, however, was the 
sovereign’s natural duty of defending its constituent people against external 
enemies — forming the boundary between people and other sovereigns — read in 
De Cive in everyday terms: preparation for war by intelligence gathering, 
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fortification, the training of armies, the hoarding of money, and providing a good 
civic life.201  
The ‘good life’ aspect most relevant here was ensuring ‘internal Peace’, which 
Hobbes elaborated as sound domestic policy. The sovereign must provide both 
education and laws to promote sound civil philosophy and ‘root out’ the ‘evil 
doctrines’ that inspire men to sedition, eradicate poverty by ensuring equal 
burdens, establish a system of honours and offices to channel individual ambitions, 
and combat ‘factions’ within the polity.202 With this final point Hobbes introduced 
an important link between internal discord and the possibility of foreign 
interventions. As a possible and untenable ‘commonwealth within the 
commonwealth’, any faction vying for sovereign power is a ‘new union of 
citizens’ that is either bound to an external foreigner (either another prince, or even 
simply a foreign citizen), or else a new commonwealth, a different pact of mutual 
self-defence that is created against the legitimate one.203  
In dealing with the results of civil discord, factional contests, and foreign leagues, 
De Cive returned to bring the law of nature and nations and the civil law back into 
connection, here in considering threats to the sovereign. For Hobbes (and contra 
Gentili) treason transgressed natural rather than civil law, and traitors and rebels 
are convicted by natural right: ‘not as bad citizens, but as enemies of the 
commonwealth, and not by the right of government or dominion, but by the right 
of war’.204 But like Gentili, Hobbes saw religious tolerance as a question of civil 
law. Judging religious doctrines, including those that commanded obedience 
another sovereign prince or authority (that is, the Pope), remained a civil law 
question because the sovereign must judge whether that doctrine conflicts with 
civil obedience, and thus must be suppressed as a threat to peace.205 Beyond these 
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special cases, and in their everyday operation, civil laws aimed generally at 
securing the goods of life by detracting from a natural law of otherwise 
untrammelled liberty, limiting each citizen equally to secure the safety and 
prosperity of them all. No similar form of civil law is possible between sovereigns, 
as they retain the natural rights and duties of defending their respective 
constituents; no civil law-like mutual agreement can abrogate that natural right. 
With Leviathan, published during Cromwell’s Commonwealth, Hobbes’s 
treatment of the international and domestic turned to ‘associations’; a much more 
pronounced emphasis on peace beyond self-defence and a more prominent 
treatment of colonial expansion and empire.206 Here, there is a new role for 
analogies to the family in explaining the legal authority justifying projects of 
empire. 
Leviathan largely reiterates the view of sovereign internal and external powers in 
De Cive, but with personalised allegories. Outside a system of civil government, 
war is the natural condition, and remained so between sovereigns, reflected in 
Hobbes’ well-known passage on the sovereign as gladiator: ‘in all times, Kings, 
and Persons of Sovereign authority, because of their Independency, are in 
continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their 
weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another’, in a posture of war.207 In 
this vivid, anthropomorphic analogy, the sovereign as gladiator is ever jealous 
precisely because of their state of independence. The lesser noticed end of this 
image — ‘But because they uphold thereby, the Industry of their Subjects; there 
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does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular 
men’ — emphasises that jealousy, independence and war-readiness is what allows 
domestic prosperity and any relief from the ordinary misery of the state of nature, 
which remains always impossible between sovereigns. Hobbes now also saw the 
external rights of making war and peace with other polities as linked to the 
sovereign ‘judging when it is for the public good’ to do so,208 shifting the emphasis 
towards considerations of internal order and prudence rather than war and treaty-
making being a natural right exercisable at will.  
Hobbes’ treatment of conquest, colonisation and empire is founded on the links 
between these images of domestic and artificial authority, and the internal and 
external aspects of power and law in Hobbes’s contrast of domestic and 
international society. The first move is Hobbes’ examination of ‘leagues’. Hobbes 
returned to his enduring theme of paternal and despotic dominion, giving a still 
more refined version of the De Cive account of ‘domestic authority’, but linking it 
in Leviathan to empire. Great families are similar to little monarchies, and 
regardless of the despotism of their rule, the rights, duties and powers over 
conquered nations are the same for despots as for commonwealths.209 This 
domestic analogy then becomes important for Hobbes’ delineation of permissible 
and impermissible leagues within and beyond the state.  
In a detailed and extensive analogy between family and sovereign, Hobbes saw 
families as forms of ‘domestic government’ that are both lawful private 
associations and limited by the civil law, not requiring any formal constituting by 
the sovereign, and yet closely mimicking the sovereign’s absolute power: 
Private Bodies Regular, and Lawful, are those that are constituted without Letters, or 
other written Authority, saving the Laws common to all other Subjects. And because 
they be united in one Person Representative, they are held for Regular; such as are all 
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Families, in which the Father, or Master orders the whole Family. For he obliged his 
Children, and Servants, as far as the Law permits, though not further, because none of 
them are bound to obedience in those actions, which the Law has forbidden to be done. 
In all other actions, during the time they are under domestic government, they are 
subject to their Fathers, and Masters, as to their immediate Sovereigns. For the Father, 
and Master being before the Institution of Commonwealth, absolute Sovereigns in their 
own Families, they lose afterward no more of their Authority, than the Law of the 
Commonwealth takes from them.210 
While domestic power is private and absolute unless limited by civil law, 
connections between private citizens are not. ‘Leagues’ of private citizens, 
seemingly of any kind, ‘savour of unlawfulness’ and are like ‘factions or 
conspiracies’: each is unnecessary in the Commonwealth, because the people must 
look to the sovereign to obtain justice.211 Maintaining private armies or pursuing 
family feuds is unlawful and a mark of a lack of civilization.212  
In describing these lawful and unlawful leagues, Hobbes draws a domestic–
foreign connection. He emphatically rejects any leagues between foreign powers 
and individual citizens. Insurgent groups, whether subjects or foreigners, that ‘by 
authority from any foreign Person, unite themselves in another’s Dominion, for 
the easier propagation of Doctrines, and for making a party, against the Power of 
the Commonwealth’ are unlawful.213 Hobbes then turned immediately to alliances 
and leagues between sovereigns, reiterating that without force, they remain simply 
a loose connection of promises, similar to those permissible in the state of nature, 
and illustrated in pacts between sovereigns: 
For a League being a connection of men by Covenants, if there be no power given to 
any one him, or Assembly (as in the condition of mere Nature) to compel them to 
performance, is so long only valid, as there arises no just cause of distrust: and 
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therefore Leagues between Commonwealths, over whom there is no humane Power 
established, to keep them all in awe, are not only lawful, but also profitable for the time 
they last.214 
Hobbes’s discussion here moves swiftly from private, family rule, to private 
armies and family feuding, to insurgencies of foreign princes, to ordinary treaties 
between sovereigns, forming a series of close analogies to illustrate Hobbes’s 
ordering of the different levels of domestic and international laws and powers. 
The next, more important instance of sovereign authorisation of a league is in the 
spreading of colonies as ‘children’ of a Commonwealth. Earlier, Hobbes had used 
similar family analogies to explain the spread of Roman law and government by 
conquest. He noted that, following a conquest, a sovereign may also sell or grant 
their right to govern to a ‘stranger’, not as a form of subjection to a foreigner, but 
rather as a kind of skill or prudence, raising the example of the Romans making 
their government ‘digestible’ by granting conquered peoples Roman privileges 
and names, making them part of the family of Rome.215  
In turning to colonies, Hobbes reiterated the family analogy, and now linked 
empire to domestic government. Plantations and colonies are the ‘Procreation, or 
Children of a Commonwealth’: a body of men under the authority of a governor 
sent to inhabit a ‘Foreign Country’, either uninhabited, or ‘made void’ by war.216 
Once settled, the colony’s relationship to the Commonwealth is either of unity or 
independence, made clear in the licence under which they were sent, and the 
connection they have to the Commonwealth, which Hobbes couched in the terms 
of maternal and paternal control. Colonies that become ‘a Commonwealth of 
themselves’ are discharged of subjection to their sending Sovereign, which is 
called their ‘Metropolis, or Mother’, who ‘requires no more of them, than Fathers 
require of the Children, whom they emancipate, and make free from their domestic 
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government, which is Honour, and Friendship’.217 If they remain ‘united to their 
Metropolis’, then they are not free from domestic government but ‘Provinces’ of 
the original Commonwealth.218 Thus the ‘Right of Colonies (saving Honour, and 
League with their Metropolis,) depends wholly on their Licence, or Letters, by 
which their Sovereign authorised them to Plant’.219 The kind of league existing 
between metropolis and colony reflects the power used by the sovereign. 
Hobbes’ account of colonies sits between his extended treatment of the legal 
ordering of civil and natural laws. Hobbes opened this discussion with the 
‘nourishment’ of a Commonwealth, and used the language of ‘foreign’ and 
‘native’ to divide the commodities needed maintain the ‘body’ of the 
Commonwealth, which he understood through property.220 Again noting that 
property and inheritance are impossible in the state of nature, Hobbes emphasised 
that civil law is the basis of property, but the fairness of its distribution a part of 
the sovereign power dealing with justice.221 While subjects may exclude each 
other, they can never exclude the sovereign from their lands, as any future 
redistributions by the sovereign will be guided by the ‘common Peace and 
Security’.222 Likewise, the sovereign retains power over subjects’ foreign 
commercial endeavours.223 Having noted these powers, Hobbes distinguished 
between ‘counsel’ and ‘command’, where the latter is the basis for his definition 
of ‘civil law’: law is generally not counsel but command, and the civil law is the 
law commanded by the person of the Commonwealth.  
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This ordering exercise is significant because it is here that Hobbes conceptualised 
the civil and natural law as ‘contain[ing] each other’ and being ‘of equal extent’.224 
Laws of nature are ‘not properly laws’ but rather ‘qualities that dispose men to 
peace, and to obedience’, including ‘moral virtues’ like ‘Equity, Justice, [and] 
Gratitude’.225 With the settling of a commonwealth, civil law is established, and 
this sovereign power demands subjects obey civil laws. But because of the 
‘differences of private men’ about what equity, justice or morality require, the 
sovereign’s civil laws are needed as the ‘ordinances’ by which the law of nature 
becomes ‘part of the Civil Law in all Commonwealths of the world’, and, 
reciprocally, obedience to civil law, as justice, becomes a ‘Dictate of the Law of 
Nature’.226 Hobbes concluded that civil and natural law are not different ‘kinds’ 
but rather different ‘parts’ of law; the former written, the other unwritten. Civil 
law abridgements of natural rights are the means of achieving peace and unity in 
a commonwealth.227  
All the foregoing leads to Hobbes’s final passages in this part of the Leviathan, in 
which he turned directly to the interaction of civil law, the law of nature and the 
law of nations. Reiterating that the law of nations is equivalent to the law of nature, 
Hobbes concluded by emphasising that each sovereign has the same right to 
procure the safety of ‘his People’ as any individual person.228  
And the same Law, that dictates to men that have no Civil Government, what they 
ought to do, and what to avoid in regard of one another, dictates the same to 
Commonwealths, that is, to the Consciences of Sovereign Princes, and Sovereign 
Assemblies; there being no Court of Natural Justice, but in the Conscience only; where 
not Man, but God reigns; whose Laws, (such of them as oblige all Mankind,) in respect 
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of God, as he is the Author of Nature, are Natural; and in respect of the same God, as 
he is King of Kings, are Laws.229 
Natural law still provides directions to individuals in the state of nature, but these 
directions are not for the adjudication of anyone, but rather the conscience of each 
individual prince or assembly. These are aspects of prudence and counsel, rather 
than clear commands, and ultimately, only God can judge the sovereign’s internal 
or external actions.  
Hobbes’ works used multiple analogies and allegories of the domestic, while also 
articulating an idea of the international that, on its face, seems limited. Hobbes’s 
otherwise brief direct treatment of the international in his account of the law of 
nature and nations as equivalent, and then closely linked to the civil law, becomes, 
however, much more nuanced in his domestic comparisons. These ideas are used 
to link private family, public sovereign, and external imperial law and power. 
Hobbes’s treatment of leagues shows a more substantial account of the links 
between the spheres of familial, public and imperial sovereign power, which 
provides the foundation of his views on the relations of civil law and the law of 
nature and nations. 
E ‘Empire is of Two Kinds’: James Harrington’s Revolutionary System 
Perhaps the strongest, radical juristic account of commonwealth, empire and the 
international and domestic appeared after Hobbes, in the last years of the 
Commonwealth. James Harrington’s Oceana (1656) was a radical restatement and 
reorganisation of the internal workings of a polity; a written Constitution 
promising a utopian republican form of government.230 On some accounts, 
Harrington’s Oceana was very much a reaction to Hobbes’ Leviathan, and a rival 
account of absolute sovereignty.231 Oceana is a very thinly veiled British Isles and 
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overseas empire. Harrington’s idealised Commonwealth is not removed from 
history or Europe but rather saw Cromwell’s England as a revolutionary 
opportunity to construct a new vision of government.232 This vision rested on the 
division of ‘law’s empire’ into the foreign and domestic. The justice of his state 
was based on protection, reordered land ownership and the rotation of offices; 
opposing strict absolutism with a form of aristocratic government. Despite this 
radical moment and the burning questions of political authority, diplomacy, 
treaties and the rights of intervention and regime change that characterised 
Harrington’s day,233 Oceana only briefly mentions the terms ‘natural law’ and the 
‘law of nations’. It did not use the language of civil or common law, but was 
instead cast in what Pocock calls the ‘earlier vocabulary’ of secular republicanism 
that took people as citizens rather than subjects, ‘a creature who used intelligence 
to define himself rather than to acknowledge binding law’.234 But it still had plenty 
of resonance with these categories. With his more general use of the term ‘law’, 
Harrington made internal and external forms of it central to his schema. His 
language of law’s empire is about the exercise of sovereign power within and 
beyond the state, understood in the language of property, force, protection, and 
reason.  
Harrington’s model of government began with ‘domestic empire’ as a kind of 
dominion. Noting that whoever can provide bread for a people places them ‘under 
his empire’, Harrington announced that: 
 Empire is of two kinds, domestic and national, or foreign and provincial. 
 Domestic empire is founded upon dominion. 
Dominion is property real or personal; that is to say in lands, or in money and goods.235 
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Harrington’s division of empire and government was based on land and property. 
The proportional distribution of property and force — its ‘balance’— indicated 
the kind of state and its justice. Single landowners and force-wielders are 
monarchs and tyrants; few concentrated landholdings and armies typify nobilities, 
mixed monarchies and oligarchies; lands distributed to the whole people is a 
commonwealth, and force remaining with the people is anarchy.236  
Turning from domestic to ‘foreign empire’, Harrington argued that the balance of 
force and property appropriate to ‘foreign or provincial empire’ is the precise 
opposite of what is required in the domestic sphere. ‘National or independent 
empire’ is exercised by those that hold ‘the proper balance of dominion in the 
nation’, while ‘provincial or dependent empire’ was ‘not to be exercised’ by 
landholders, ‘because that would bring the government from provincial and 
dependent to national and independent’.237 Justice in domestic government 
required a wide spread of land-ownership and the concentration of force, while 
justice in provinces and the overseas empire required the concentration of land-
ownership and no local governmental powers. The largest colonial landholders 
must be the ‘least admitted to the government abroad’ because control of overseas 
territories necessitated denying self-government to local property holders; the 
alternative would allow them the separate independence of the state at home.238 
Harrington also emphasised the need for a similar imperial ‘balance’ between 
‘native’ and ‘foreign’ territory holdings that ought to reflect domestic property 
division; avoiding provinces and colonies that are too ‘vigorous’ and unbalance 
the metropolis.239 He noted the likelihood of eventual independence in the Indies 
through a maternal allegory: ‘For the colonies in the Indies, they are yet babes that 
cannot live without sucking the breasts of their mother-cities, but Such as I 
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mistake, if when they come of age they do not wean themselves; which causes me 
to wonder at princes that delight to be exhausted in that way.’240 
This foreign and domestic division, and the opposition of force and property, are 
central to Harrington’s wider aim of explaining the proper balance of aristocracy 
and democracy in the ideal, just and popular Commonwealth. The division of 
domestic and foreign empire provides the overlay for moving from force to legal 
authority. Concluding his points on the ‘principles of power, whether national or 
provincial, domestic or foreign’, Harrington noted that these principles are 
‘external, and founded in the goods of fortune’; the socio-economic conditions, 
and particularly the distribution of land ownership. The ‘principles of authority’, 
on the other hand, are ‘internal and founded upon the goods of the mind’; the 
constitutional design of the Commonwealth.241  
With this second division of external/fortune and internal/mind, Harrington 
framed the legislator’s task as uniting external power with internal authority. 
Because reason and law restrain and organise power to make liberty possible, law 
becomes the virtue of the commonwealth: ‘the government whose law is virtue, 
and whose virtue is law, is the same whose empire is authority, and whose 
authority is empire … if the liberty of a man consist in the empire of his reason … 
then the liberty of a commonwealth consists in the empire of her laws’.242 
Attaining this empire of laws is a matter of debating according to reason, and, in 
Harrington’s system a deliberative senate that proposes laws, combined with a 
representative body which passes judgment on their reasoning by a simple ‘yes’ 
or ‘no’ vote to enact their proposals. The true meaning of commonwealth lies in 
this combination, which Harrington phrased in patriarchal and popular terms: the 
concurrence of the ‘authority of the fathers and the power of the people’.243 In 
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what follows, Harrington laid out the details of these fundamental laws that make 
this vision of commonwealth work, namely the redistribution of agrarian property, 
decisions by ballot, and the rotation of office-holding under universal adult male 
suffrage — a system of orders that he later succinctly saw in the metaphor of a 
tree: ‘the agrarian by the balance of dominion preserving equality in the root, and 
the ballot by an equal rotation conveying it into the branch, or exercise of 
sovereign power’.244  
Harrington’s account of internal/external and reason/passion led him to explain 
the Commonwealth’s international actions in terms of reason rather than law. The 
‘debate according to reason’ is the foundation of the empire of laws, and 
corresponds to three kinds of rationality: private reason (individual interests); 
reason of state (the interest of a ruler); and the reason of mankind or the whole.245 
This tripartite taxonomy is of local, national, and international interests and 
rationalities. Relying on Grotius, Harrington articulated this final kind of reason 
as a ‘common right, law of nature, or interest of the whole, which is more 
excellent, and so acknowledged to be by the agents themselves, than the right or 
interest of the parts only’.246 This humanity-wide expression of ‘right reason’ is 
then linked back to domestic government: ‘Now compute well, for if the interest 
of the popular government come the nearest unto the interest of mankind, then the 
reason of popular government must come the nearest unto right reason’.247  
This link between local–national and humanity-wide interest, through an overlap 
of popular government and right reason, becomes clearer in Harrington’s project, 
built throughout Oceana, of making the justice of Oceana’s internal government 
the basis for the justice of its external actions. Early on, Harrington raised an 
innovative focus on equality as a means to domestic peace, in the balancing of 
people and senate, that is reflected in a taxonomy of different kinds of 
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commonwealths. The first is a basic distinction between commonwealths of single 
nations (Israel, Athens) contrasted with those formed by ‘leagues’ or alliances of 
nations (the Achaeans, the Hollanders). The second is Machiavelli’s distinction 
between commonwealths for preservation, including non-expansionist (Venice) 
and those ‘for increase’ or empire (Athens, Rome).248 The third is what Harrington 
introduces as a new division around equality that fixes on ‘domestic peace and 
tranquillity’: 
The third division (unseen hitherto) is into equal and unequal, and this is the main point 
especially as to domestic peace and tranquillity; for to make a commonwealth unequal 
is to divide it into parties, which sets them at perpetual variance, the one party 
endeavouring to preserve their eminence and inequality, and the other to attain unto 
equality… but in an equal commonwealth, there can be no more strife than there can 
be overbalance in equal weights …249 
Equality in the commonwealth erases internal strife. Taken with Harrington’s idea 
of local, national and international reason and government, this third division is 
the basis for Harrington’s concluding articulation of Oceana’s imperial, religious 
mission.  
Oceana has a providential role; a duty to expand its provinces and spread its system 
of government throughout the world.250 Harrington’s distinction between 
commonwealths for preservation and increase appears not only in the taxonomy 
above, but early in the introduction. The model commonwealth must go beyond 
mere preservation and must be ‘for increase’, aiming to form the ‘mightiest 
foundation’ that has yet been laid, and spreads its law across the seas: ‘The sea 
giveth law unto the growth of Venice, but the growth of Oceana giveth law unto 
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the sea’.251 Closing the work, Harrington returned to this theme of empire and the 
‘increase’ of the Commonwealth. He noted the commonwealth has ‘an open ear 
and a public concernment’, not ‘made for herself only’ but instead is a ‘magistrate 
of God unto mankind, for the vindication of common right and the law of 
nature’.252 Noting Cicero’s characterisation of the Romans as taking up the 
‘patronage’ rather than empire of the world, Harrington insisted the 
Commonwealth, having attained its liberty, cannot ‘sit still and fold your arms’ or 
allow others to live under tyranny.253 The model commonwealth is ‘a minister of 
God upon earth, to the end that the world may be governed with righteousness’, 
and in this pursuit ‘the orders last rehearsed’, that is, Oceana’s constitution, are 
‘buds of empire [and] with the blessing of God, may spread the arms of your 
commonwealth like an holy asylum unto the distressed world’.254  
Like Hobbes, Harrington fixed on leagues to explore the justice of empire, but here 
between empires and their provinces. Recapitulating Machiavelli’s divisions of 
commonwealths that have spread by force through ‘equal leagues’ (the Swiss and 
Dutch; quasi-federal alliances), and by ‘unequal leagues’ (Rome; involving 
conquest, subjugation, and incorporation as part of peace), Harrington argued that 
the Roman example ought to be emulated now. Rather than planting colonies, 
Rome transformed former enemies into provinces by the spread of social and 
provincial leagues — the individual rights of citizenship, and collective rights of 
appeals to Rome to ensure just civil administration — but this eventually collapsed 
because of Rome’s unjust land distribution.255 Harrington’s domestic scheme and 
its distribution of land, in contrast, would form the foundation for spreading 
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Oceana as a new patron of the world.256 This is expressed in religious, millenarian 
terms: 
Now if you add unto the propagation of civil liberty, what is so natural unto this 
commonwealth that it cannot be omitted, the propagation of the liberty of conscience, 
this empire, this patronage of the world, is the kingdom of Christ. For as the kingdom 
of God the Father was a commonwealth, so shall be the kingdom of God the Son.257 
This expansion, however, could only justly take place once Harrington’s domestic 
system of government was implemented; an expansionary republic, creating new 
dependent provinces on the basis of a properly ordered agrarian distribution, and 
thus expanding in a balanced, equal manner.258  
Harrington’s legal theology of the domestic required that an eternal 
commonwealth, properly arranged, must spread its system throughout the world. 
This is not a question of agreeing laws between nations, helping nations recognise 
their commonalities by their shared civil laws or ideas of right reason or natural 
law, but rather as the announcement and spread of Harrington’s form of domestic 
constitutional order, rational in its balance and equality. Its perfection demands 
that it be first established in Britain, and then spread throughout the world.  
Harrington’s empire of law rested on the division of foreign and domestic and the 
opposition between them around land ownership and political power. Whereas 
Zouche, Selden and Hobbes each used the more technical languages of civil law, 
natural law and the law of nations, Harrington employed more general terms of 
property, power, protection and reason and a wider concept of law that more 
readily moved from internal to external. That movement was central to 
Harrington’s description of what is perhaps the clearest imperial content yet in an 
account of the domestic, in which Harrington looked not to connections through 
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the law of nations, shared civil law traditions or the universality of natural law, but 
instead a quasi-religious mission to spread just government. 
F The ‘Force of the Public’: John Locke’s Federative Split 
Things, of course, turned out rather differently. Instead of being reformed around 
Harrington’s domestic vision, let alone expanded to pursue his international one, 
the Protectorate collapsed, Charles II was restored and his successor James II 
would be ousted by the foreign intervention of Dutch Protestant William. The 
Glorious Revolution of 1688, often presented as the origin of Britain’s ‘modern’ 
constitutional settlement, announced a clearer division of powers between the 
King and Parliament and ended the ‘pre-history’ of public law in the British 
Isles.259 As chief ideologue of 1688, John Locke (1632–1704) epitomised the new 
‘radical conservatism’ and sought to construct a political theory around the 
Revolution.260 The centrepiece of that theory, the Two Treatises, were explicitly 
written in defence of William’s claim to the throne and aimed externally: ‘to justify 
to the world the people of England’.261 With the institutional split of legislative 
and executive as one foundation of the new constitution, the competence over 
domestic law now fell clearly to Parliament alone, and external affairs to the 
monarch and ministers. It is in this context that Locke would articulate a clear 
‘federative’ split between a revived ‘municipal law’ and the laws of nations. With 
this, the domestic has finally most clearly emerged, and its legal theology 
entrenched. 
Amidst the well-known arguments of the Second Treatise, Locke drew a less-
noticed series of divisions between internal and external laws that provide the 
clearest account of a split between domestic and international laws. Locke’s 
careful treatment of ‘municipal laws’ placed them in opposition to patriarchal rule 
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to describe the origins of commonwealths and the laws of nature, tied together by 
the innovative centrality of property and especially private ownership. Whereas 
Selden’s concern was the private dominion of the monarch, Locke’s account of 
political power was in the combination of the right to make laws to regulate and 
preserve property, the enforcement of those laws, and a general power to defend 
the Commonwealth from ‘Foreign injury’, all of which can be done, as in Hobbes, 
‘only for the Public Good’.262  
This apparently extensive general power is curtailed by jurisdiction and Locke’s 
reading of the state of nature, which he used to limit jurisdiction to subjects alone. 
States cannot execute or punish ‘any alien’ because domestic laws ‘reach not a 
Stranger’: sovereigns, regardless of their ‘civilisation’, are ‘to an Indian … men 
without authority’, and hold no more power over foreign subjects as a person holds 
over another in the state of nature; that is, only their natural law powers.263 
Similarly, these municipal laws are based on and linked to natural law, regulated 
and interpreted through natural law precepts.264 Any transgression of natural law, 
within or beyond a commonwealth, can be punished by all. Far from being subject 
to disagreement or uncertainty or incapable of adjudication (as in Selden or 
Hobbes) Locke saw natural law as even ‘plainer’ than the positive laws of 
commonwealths, because reason is easier to understand than the ‘fancies and 
contrivances’ that men might put into the words of positive law.265  
Like Harrington, Locke’s concept of municipal law is grounded in his account of 
property and its distribution. Unlike Harrington, but like Selden, Locke 
emphasised private rather than communal ownership. But unlike the jurists 
examined above, Locke now used labour as the basis for understanding private 
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property rights, within or after the state of nature,266 as a form of positive 
agreement or league, which was central to Locke’s account of the divisions and 
contacts between states, the different systems of law among them, and the 
compacts between them. ‘Labour, in the Beginning, gave a Right of Property’, and 
through labour and the increase of families, land became scarce and thus valuable, 
and this led to boundaries and then differences of laws between states that became 
territorial: ‘the several Communities settled the Bounds of their distinct Territories, 
and by the Laws within themselves, regulated the Properties of the private Men of 
their Society, and so, by Compact and Agreement, settled the Property which 
Labour and Industry began’.267 That settlement and consolidation of property 
within the state led to agreements between states to mutually agree to relinquish 
any natural law claim:  
the Leagues that have been made between several States and Kingdoms, either 
expressly or tacitly disowning all Claim and Right to the Land in the others 
Possession, have, by common Consent, given up their Pretences to their natural 
common Right, which originally they had to those Countries, and so have, by 
positive agreement, settled a Property amongst themselves, in distinct parts and 
parcels of the Earth …268 
These positive agreements to solidify state property do not, however, apply to the 
‘great Tracts of Ground to be found’, where the ‘Inhabitants’ have not ‘joined 
with the rest of Mankind’ by similar ideas of labour, property or money, and thus 
still lie ‘waste’ and ‘in common’.269 Locke saw the accumulation of dominion over 
land as a form of common positive agreement or league between states to limit 
what would otherwise be claimable by natural law; to respect each other’s property 
claims specifically tied to respect for the internal laws of other states, and to give 
up any dispute over them, in favour of instead seeking out more ‘unoccupied’ land. 
 
266  On Locke and property, see especially James Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy: 
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Locke thus connected a kind of comity of respecting different municipal laws to 
an international law of imperial colonial expansion, tied through natural law 
understandings of property rights commonly agreed by European states. 
Locke turned to the ‘domestic’ as patriarchal family relations, to both build on this 
connection between municipal law and the law of nature and explore the origins 
of government. In the First Treatise, Locke had dismantled Robert Filmer’s 
Patriarcha, which sought to trace England’s kings back to Adam as the basis for 
their legitimate rule.270 Locke contended that government was not a product of 
Adam’s ‘private dominion’ or ‘paternal jurisdiction’ — a project also reminiscent 
of Selden’s genealogising back to Noah — but instead a state of freedom and 
equality among equal men who might voluntarily elect and appoint a sovereign to 
rule them, then described in the Second.271 Here Locke saw the family as a master 
with ‘subordinate Relations of Wife, Children, Servants and Slaves’ who are 
‘united under the Domestic Rule of a Family’.272 While domestic rule resembled 
an ordered commonwealth, it was distinct in its ‘Constitution, Power, and End’: 
the patriarch holds powers that are distinct and differently limited than those of a 
king, namely only over family members.273 Later, Locke offered an origins 
allegory, contending that families grew into Commonwealths, where the family 
formed a model of patriarchal government that might either lead to the unification 
of different families and a patriarch over them all, or the election of a monarch 
without any familial limits to power on the basis of trust in the monarch’s honesty 
and prudence.274 Locke’s elective monarchy is a rejection of domestic 
government, but again, keeping with his refutation of Filmer, he also rejected 
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paternal power as the basis of either dominion or government, and insisted that it 
is not divine because both origins pre-dated Christ.275  
Locke’s contrast of domestic family and state sovereignty led to an international 
problem about families that is in turn revealing of his concept of the community 
tie: issues of nationality and the treatment of foreign-born children and foreigners 
generally. Considering the nationality of a child born to English parents living in 
France, Locke insisted that the child can choose his subjecthood once he attains 
majority and is no longer under his father’s rule, because the laws of nature trump 
municipal law: ‘Since the Power that a Father has naturally over his Children is 
the same, wherever they are born; and the Ties of Natural Obligations, are not 
bounded by the positive Limits of Kingdoms and Commonwealths’.276 Likewise, 
subjecthood is not simply a question of submission to positive laws, but rather the 
uniting of both one’s self and one’s possessions to a jurisdiction.277 Submission to 
local laws is merely a natural law duty, a form of ‘protection and homage’, akin to 
submitting to the head of household in which a person stayed: 
But submitting to the Laws of any Country, living quietly, and enjoying Privileges and 
Protection under them, makes not a Man a Member of that Society: This is only a local 
Protection and Homage due to, and from all those, who, not being in a state of War, 
come within the Territories belonging to any Government, to all parts whereof the 
force of its Law extends. But this no more makes a Man a Member of that Society, a 
perpetual Subject of that Commonwealth, than it would make a Man a Subject to 
another in whose Family he found it convenient to abide for some time.278 
In this thoroughly domestic analogy between visiting a household and equal 
protection of foreigners and subjects, Locke concluded that presence is not 
sufficient for membership of a society. What is needed is some further act of 
submission. The main end of submission to government is the preservation of 
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property.279 Individuals give up the ‘Empire’ of freedom in the state of nature — 
their individual and personal ‘equality, liberty and executive power’ — to ‘the 
Legislative power’ of a society.280 This legislative power cannot go beyond the 
common good, must be through established laws interpreted by impartial judges, 
and must only support force to execute those laws at home ‘or abroad to prevent 
or redress Foreign Injuries, and secure the Community from Inroads and Invasion’, 
and each of these things guided by and directed only to the ‘Peace, Safety, and 
public good of the People’.281 Obedience to these laws cannot be overridden by 
‘any Oaths to any Foreign Power whatsoever, or any Domestic Subordinate 
Power’.282 
These linked ideas of divided states, the primacy of natural law over municipal, 
and concepts of property, family, the origins of government provide the basis for 
Locke’s federative power and his clear statement of a division between domestic 
and international. Locke’s domestic — municipal law-making through parliament 
— is entirely legal and the basis for making natural law principles real, while his 
international is prudential and quasi-legal; the navigation of leagues and compacts 
to pursue the ‘force of the public’. After exploring various forms a commonwealth 
might take,283 Locke offered a set of generalised, separate functions that are 
present in all forms of commonwealth. Legislative power is the right to direct the 
force of the commonwealth for preserving the community and its members (again, 
property), and executive power is the use of force to ensure compliance with those 
laws.284 But a commonwealth also holds a wider ‘natural power’ that reflects the 
powers held by individuals in the state of nature. Most prominent is the natural 
law right of self-defence, held by all individuals in the state of nature, and after 
the formation of states, held by states as embodiments of their subjects. Locke 
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articulated this in terms of ‘controversies’ and the possibility that injuries to 
individuals by foreigners might be relayed to the state as a whole: ‘the 
Controversies that happen between any Man of the Society with those that are out 
of it, are managed by the public; and an injury done to a Member of their Body, 
engages the whole in reparation of it … the whole Community is one Body in the 
State of Nature, in respect of all other States or Persons out of its Community’.285  
What follows is a longer list of the other powers within the general ‘natural power’, 
which Locke labelled the ‘Federative’: powers of war and peace, leagues and 
alliances, and of any ‘transactions’ with ‘Persons and Communities without 
[beyond] the Commonwealth’.286 The distinction between executive and 
federative power is between municipal and international laws: 
These two Powers, Executive and Federative, though they be really distinct in 
themselves, yet one comprehending the Execution of the Municipal Laws of the 
Society within its self, upon all that are parts of it; the other the management of the 
security and interest of the public without, with all those that it may receive benefit or 
damage from, yet they are always almost united.287 
While the powers and the spheres of law to which they relate are nominally 
distinct, Locke insisted that they are practically unified. The executive power can 
be directed by clear positive laws, but the federative power must be left to the 
‘Prudence and Wisdom’ of those exercising it, managing it for a general public 
good: laws between subjects within the Commonwealth precede them and can 
direct their actions, but in dealing with foreigners the executive must react to their 
actions and the ‘variation’ of foreign ‘designs and interests’, and thus is largely 
prudential and exercised by ‘skill’ for the advantage of the Commonwealth.288 
Finally, although these are distinct powers they are ‘hardly to be separated’ into 
the hands of different people: ‘For both of them requiring the force of the Society 
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for their exercise, it is almost impracticable to place the Force of the 
Commonwealth in distinct, and not subordinate hands’, and to do otherwise would 
risk placing the ‘force of the Public’ under different commands, which would 
likely lead to conflict between those holders, and thus ‘disorder and ruin’.289 This 
marked the emergence of a division of internal and external executive power; an 
idea that both are exercised for the public good. The internal executive is realising 
the public good of enforcing municipal law, while the external federative is 
pursuing the good within compacts and leagues with other sovereigns. These 
things are often the same public good, but the former is achieved through enforcing 
positive law and the latter is best left to prudence.  
Locke’s institutional division of legislative/domestic and executive/international 
competency and power inaugurates the foundations of the ‘modern’ constitutional 
arrangements that are recognisably similar to the questions of the interaction of 
domestic and international law at issue today. Combined with Locke’s other shifts 
— contrasting municipal laws away from patriarchal rule and towards the 
protection of private property, emphasising the connection of law to territory, and 
using patriarchal family relations as a contrast for both civil law implementations 
of natural laws and wider ideas of community membership — this new ‘force of 
the public’ in the federative split marked the clearest emergence of the domestic 
as linked to nation and territory. Locke presents the final point in these various 
legal theologies of the domestic; a rejection of biblical genealogical legitimacy, 
and the use of a range of Christian religious themes to tie property to law, to see 
civil laws as the enactment of laws of nature, and the commonwealth’s natural 
duties to pursue its security and public interests with foreigners and foreign 
sovereigns alike. 
G Conclusion 
The otherwise disparate backgrounds and projects of the jurists examined in this 
part are linked together by a common aim of articulating a domestic sphere of law 
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that is tied to nation, territory and empire, where the laws of the land might contest 
and control the intrusions of other rival legal orders. Three themes emerge from 
this general connection.  
A first foundational theme is the use of the domestic image of the family as a 
model for legal authority inside and outside the state; as an analogy, contrast, or 
as origin story, some religious (Selden) and others mythical and secular (Zouche, 
Hobbes, Locke). Zouche used Roman patriarchal authority, enshrined in civil law, 
as an analogy for state. Selden used the biblical descendance of Noah as the 
genesis of private occupation rights and the basis for national divisions. For 
Hobbes, patriarchal authority was inevitably despotic, forming the contrasting 
model for the genuine, artificial commonwealth, but it also was the model for 
imperial spread and command. Locke’s domestic images are the basis for 
submission and obedience, with the household guest forming an analogy for the 
treatment of foreigners. A second aspect of the emergence of the domestic is the 
introduction of positivism as an account of law-making that curtails and channels 
natural law. Consistently, these jurists saw a realm for changing civil law to 
channel natural law principles to render the latter unjudgeable: civil laws of 
different states may aim to implement the same natural laws, but do so in a range 
of ways that are tied to the climate, national character or history of a state, or 
simply the will of the sovereign representing the people. These thinkers fixed on 
articulating the human and artificial means of changing and reforming domestic 
law — treating it now as positive, changeable expressions of natural law ideas — 
which could be the basis for law-making between states that went well beyond 
their natural law rights and duties. In Zouche and Selden, this also formed the basis 
for a new understanding of the possibilities of laws between nations; the making 
of more complicated compacts and leagues to govern relations between states, that 
move well beyond the generalities of natural law principles. In contrast to the 
universal or pan-human senses of natural law in Gentili, the sectarian violence that 
motivated these works made doctrinal disagreements a stark reality and an urgent 
problem to be resolved by law. That necessitated carving out a stronger sense of 
national domestic law. A third and final theme is the connection of property and 
empire. Each of these jurists used analogies to property extensively, but it is with 
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Harrington and Locke that property was made central to their ordering of the state 
and its international aspects. As the next chapter will show, property and trade will 
be central to the emergence of the international. 
IV CONCLUSION: THE DOMESTIC EMERGED 
This Chapter demonstrated how the domestic emerged as a project of legal 
theology; a kind of secularisation of principles and themes in natural law thought 
which were then used to build the conceptual pre-history of international and 
domestic law that focused on sovereign and state. Through these tensions and 
attempts to understand and limit these political contests through law and legal 
ordering, to order a mass of jurisdictions, a domestic idea of law emerged. Some 
jurists (Gentili and Hobbes) saw an international in the conjoining of the law of 
nature with the law of nations. Others (Selden, Zouche, Locke) resisted 
convergence, but drew links and analogies between the law of nature, nations and 
civil law by connecting them to other ideas like universal laws, divine law, natural 
reason, or traditions specific to European states in the recently rediscovered 
Roman civil law, posed as the persistent links between divided nations. Still others 
(Zouche, Selden) also saw the laws between nations — inter-sovereign or inter-
polity agreements — as forms of positive law not dictated by nature, or looked to 
law as power, prudence and institutions acting within and beyond the state 
(Harrington).  
Gentili developed a thoroughly civil law-infused account of how the law of nations 
might develop through analogies and ordering, first following republican humanist 
restraints on sovereigns, and then absolute monarchical, imperial ideas of 
international action. With the tumults of mid-seventeenth century England, the 
domestic was articulated as a basis for a strongly nationalistic legal order that 
could be the basis for imperial claims to the sea (Selden), a system of international 
law (Zouche) or colonial expansion (Hobbes and Harrington) and — finally and 
most lastingly — as a division of legislative/domestic and executive/international 
competencies (Locke). Locke’s division reflected the new institutional basis that 
will be the focus in chapters to come for incorporations, conflicts, and tensions 
between international and domestic law. The executive, acting prudentially, might 
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bind the state to treaties or compacts which require changes to internal laws, where 
that power lies solely with the legislature. This set up the spheres of domestic and 
international as the focal point for governing a commonwealth, and an empire, 
through law.  
The next chapter shows how the quasi-religious aspects of this divide were finally 
and thoroughly secularised in Bentham’s rejection of Blackstone’s Lockean 
spheres of natural law, which formed the basis for his new term ‘international’ to 
counteract nationalism. Bentham’s coinage fitted into a wider trend around 
sentiment and political economy seen in the works of Adam Smith. Its effects ran 
to responses to the French Revolution, the foundations of legal positivism, and the 
mid-nineteenth century accounts of nationalistic independence at the cusp of the 
re-emergence of Britain’s empire in the Victorian era. 
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SENTIMENT AND REVOLUTION: POLITICAL 
ECONOMIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL, 1750–1850 
I INTRODUCTION: ENLIGHTENMENTS 
The European enlightenment story of the moves from religious to secular forms 
of law and authority is often told through the major works of continental legal 
theorists dealing with the encounters between legal systems. In his 1748 Spirit of 
the Laws, Montesquieu grounded constitutional analysis in the comparison of the 
functioning of different systems, arguing that these structures were contingent and 
open to improvement, rather than naturally emerging from or inherent in a people, 
and in doing so bridged the traditional and modern ideas of constitutional 
government.1 A decade later the Swiss jurist Emer de Vattel’s Law of Nations 
effected a similar bridge to the ‘modern’ law of nations, entrenching a view of the 
international legal system as built by and around the actions and arguments of 
independent sovereign states, the sole authors of international law, whose ‘good 
housekeeping’ of their internal orders by prudence would guarantee their enduring 
independence and stave off legitimate foreign interventions.2 Prior to these shifts, 
a broader change took place. The old language of prudence and natural law was 
‘transformed’ into secularised civic jurisprudence, most notably in the works of 
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century German jurists Samuel von 
Pufendorf and Christian Thomasius — both heavily influential upon Vattel — 
which laid the foundation for European sciences of political economy.3 
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As the previous chapter showed, British jurists had been engaged in similar 
projects of rethinking natural law as part of a legal theology of the domestic, 
eventually leading to a ‘modern’ split of legislative/domestic and 
executive/international. This chapter shows how British jurists writing in the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries turned, like their European 
contemporaries, towards sentiment, revolution and political economy, albeit 
spurred by different Enlightenment currents: utilitarian rational law reform, 
Scottish enlightenment cosmopolitanism, and British reactions to European 
revolutions. In these works, the international emerged by replacing quasi-natural 
law thought with rational reorganisation, ideas of national sentiment, and the new 
science of political economy, all of which provide the first strong links between 
internal and international laws, and projects for the reform of both.  
Part One contends that Jeremy Bentham’s term ‘international’ grew out of his 
polemical rejection of William Blackstone’s Lockean hierarchy of legal spheres. 
This grounded Bentham’s work on a system of morals and legislation that fixed 
on internal and international laws to distinguish the laws between states from those 
within them, as projects to counteract national prejudice and serve peace. 
Meanwhile, Adam Smith’s work on sentiment and trade produced a parallel 
account of the international that grew out of domestic sentiment, which was then 
reoriented towards political economy, a science of new ‘natural’ laws that, like 
Bentham’s, also urged the reorganisation of internal governments. Part Two turns 
to three legacies of Bentham and Smith’s visions of the international, which, after 
the loss of the American colonies and the French Revolution, became fixated on 
internal constitutions. First, Edmund Burke’s reactionary responses to the French 
Revolution argued that it violated the laws of nature, which he revived in a ‘law 
of civil vicinage’ based on ideas of property and neighbourhood to support 
interventions to contain revolutionary constitutionalism and its international, 
imperial ambitions. Second, Bentham’s later works, which grew out of his critique 
of the Revolution, that, mirroring Burke’s, argued that it was wrongly based on 
natural law, led him to turn away from international law to the reform and 
rationalisation of constitutional systems and culminated in his 1820s attempts to 
write a constitutional code that extended the duties of good government to all 
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nations. Third, whereas John Austin’s centring of the domestic commanding 
sovereign grounded his influential account of international law as not strictly law 
so-called, it is in Travers Twiss’s wide-ranging works that Benthamite and 
Smithian themes of political economy, sentiment and utility come together in the 
quintessential mid-nineteenth century account of an international and domestic 
built on nations and independence; a vision that laid the stage for the imperial 
expansions of the late nineteenth century. 
II  ‘OH MY COUNTRYMEN!’: THE INTERNATIONAL IN BENTHAM AND SMITH 
A Introduction 
Bentham’s international grew out of his early oppositions to Blackstone’s 
endorsement of Locke’s approach, and gave rise to his later arguments that a 
simple division of internal and international laws would allow the unification and 
rationalisation of the relations between them, and with that the improvement of 
legal systems throughout the world. But Bentham’s new term emerged amidst a 
wider change in theorising sentiment, subjectivity, cosmopolitanism and empire 
most evident in the works of Adam Smith. Smith’s parallel project applied Hume’s 
critiques of Locke to juridical ordering, leading to accounts of domesticity and 
ranking as constitutional ordering and an early idea of equality, in turn linked to 
his ideas of international trade and imperial federation; a project of cosmopolitan 
commerce and the reform of internal laws amidst the vast eighteenth century 
expansions of the British Empire.4 What joins Bentham and Smith in their parallel 
approaches to the domestic and international is their use of sentiment and rational 
reform to pursue utility, maintain the habits of obedience, and avoid revolution. 
Bentham’s exhortation in his essays on international law — ‘Oh my Countrymen! 
purge your eyes from the film of prejudice’ — is an anti-nationalist sentiment for 
internationality, just as Smith would base the duties of cosmopolitanism on a close 
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focus on domestic sentiments and laws.5 Like the jurists of the previous chapter, 
both Bentham and Smith use the family and paternal authority to understand the 
relation of sovereign and subject,6 but in the eighteenth century these allegories 
and analogies turned international. 
B Anti-Blackstone: Bentham on Sovereignty, Obedience and Natural Law 
Blackstone’s Commentaries took up Locke’s division of municipal and 
international laws, and made it still more juridical by examining recent cases and 
announcing what has been memorialised as the first clear account of the ‘doctrine 
of incorporation’, whereby the law of nations became part of the body of English 
law, automatically or by statute, albeit without Blackstone using the term 
‘incorporation’:  
In arbitrary states this law [the law of nations], wherever it contradicts or is not 
provided for by the municipal law of the country, is enforced by the royal power: 
but since in England no royal power can introduce a new law, or suspend the 
execution of the old, therefore the law of nations (wherever any question arises 
which is properly the object of its jurisdiction) is here adopted in its full extent by 
the common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land. And those acts of 
parliament, which have from time to time been made to enforce this universal law, 
or to facilitate the execution of its decisions, are not to be considered as introductive 
of any new rule, but merely as declaratory of the old fundamental constitutions of 
the kingdom; without which it must cease to be a part of the civilized world.7 
Parliament clarifies and turns to statute what is already accepted within English 
law and the constitution. For Blackstone, this is not about conflicts between 
parliamentary or crown sovereignty and the principles of the law of nations, but 
rather the clarification of individual criminal offences; he turns to the violation of 
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safe-conducts, infringements on ambassadorial rights, and crimes of piracy.8 In 
each of these settings, different kinds of laws are hierarchically ordered, and their 
interactions or conflicts are limited.  
The first foundations of Bentham’s later international were laid in his decimation 
of Blackstone’s neat ordering.9 In his first major work, the 1776 Fragment on 
Government, Bentham focused on Blackstone’s theoretical ordering of the law of 
nature and nations and municipal law as a basis for critiquing his broader account 
of sovereignty and the nature of the British Constitution. Against Blackstone, 
Bentham sought to distinguish real from ‘imaginary’ laws. Municipal laws were 
real laws; the laws of nature and nations were not.  
Bentham began by describing Blackstone’s ordering as involving law in general, 
the law of nature, revelation and nations, which Bentham called ‘branches of that 
imaginary whole’, in contrast to domestic laws, or, simply put, ‘law’: 
After treating of ‘Law in general’, of the ‘Law of Nature’, ‘Law of Revelation’, and 
‘Law of Nations’, branches of that imaginary whole, our Author comes at length to 
what he calls ‘Law municipal’: that sort of Law, to which men in their ordinary 
discourse would give the name of Law without addition; the only sort perhaps of them 
all (unless it be that of Revelation) to which the name can, with strict propriety, be 
applied: in a word, that sort which we see made in each nation, to express the will of 
that body in it which governs. On this subject of Law Municipal he sets out, as a man 
ought, with a definition of the phrase itself; an important and fundamental phrase, 
which stood highly in need of a definition, and never so much as since our Author has 
defined it.10 
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For Bentham, Blackstone confused these various meanings as equivalent, when 
they are different. Natural law and its branches are imaginary, speculative and 
refers to nothing existent in the world, whereas municipal law is real because it is 
effective and can be found in the world, most clearly in statutes. Bentham first 
articulated his account of sovereignty as obedience and subjection, which he later 
used to analyse the treaty-powers of the British Constitution and, at several points 
in the Fragment, the connection between internal and external/imperial 
government, and the issue of revolts and revolutions, which he then tied to an early 
idea of law as will and utility. In dealing with these themes, Bentham lays the 
foundations for his later international. 
First, Bentham explained sovereignty as obedience and subjection through a 
disagreement with Blackstone on the state of nature and origins of government, 
which then formed the basis for understanding the connections of quasi-
sovereignty between polities. Contra Blackstone’s view that the social contract 
originated in the aggregations of families rather than the state of nature, Bentham 
argued that families lacked the genuine habit of obedience required of a true 
polity.11 While Bentham thought the state of nature compact was probably 
fictional, it likely had an historical use in describing the rules of government in 
practice: a promise of general obedience from the people in exchange for the 
monarch’s promise to govern in a manner subservient to the people’s happiness, 
which left the people to determine if that promise was kept.12  
This laid the way for Bentham’s critique of Blackstone’s political theology in his 
account of forms of government. Against Blackstone’s view that sovereignty 
reflects the attributes of God — ‘wisdom, to discern the real interest of the 
community; goodness, to endeavour always to pursue that real interest; and 
strength or power, to carry this knowledge and intention into action’ — Bentham 
insisted that the efficacy of power is the mark of sovereignty, proportionate to the 
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real obedience of subjects, and an expression of the will of the polity.13 Against 
Blackstone’s insistence that regardless of governmental form, sovereignty must be 
supreme, irresistible and absolute, and thus requiring divine attributes of wisdom, 
goodness and power,14 Bentham argued this ignores the complexities of real world 
states, abstracting them into generalities of careful planning and full, general 
assent, rather than the caprices, violence, accidents, prejudices and passions that 
explain their actual histories and forms. Bentham illustrated this by a set of 
parodies of conquests read in Blackstone’s language of irresistible, absolute, 
uncontrolled authority: that the Mexicans were of the ‘opinion’ that Charles V had 
more goodness, wisdom and power than themselves, and so on.15  
Bentham’s later critique of Blackstone’s account of the British Constitution 
returned to this idea of power, wisdom and goodness, here raised in dealing with 
a quintessential issue of the relationship of domestic and international law: the 
legislative, executive and judicial split in the context of problems around treaties 
and prerogative powers. Blackstone saw the British Constitution as the best 
balance of power, wisdom and goodness; respectively, in monarchy/King, 
aristocrats/Lords and democracy/Commons, with sovereignty acting as the 
balancer and distributor of supreme power, which is ‘lodged throughout’ the 
branches of the system.16 Bentham contended that Blackstone introduced here a 
new distinction between executive and judicial power set apart from ordinary 
legislative power (which Blackstone had called simply ‘sovereign power’) that 
lacks clarity in itself or its application to various areas of government; the military, 
taxation, and so forth.17 Bentham then explicitly queried the place within the 
executive of prerogative powers that touch on the law of nations: do executive 
powers ‘include the right of substituting the laws of war to the laws of peace; and, 
vice versa, the laws of peace to the laws of war? Does it include the right of 
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restraining the trade of subjects by treaties with foreign powers? Does it include 
the right of delivering over, by virtue of the like treaties, large bodies of subjects 
to foreign laws?’18 Bentham insisted that Blackstone’s efforts to distinguish 
legislative and executive powers must explain which branch these powers fall 
into,19 forming the clearest statement yet of the constitutional technicalities of the 
interactions of international and domestic laws.  
These critiques led to Bentham’s own account of sovereignty as obedience and 
subjection as a wide spectrum lacking clear markers, which he applied to both 
subject–sovereign and imperial hierarchical relations. Obedience described both 
ordinary subjects under a governor, and ‘governors’ — or polities — in relations 
of obedience to each other: ‘among governors some may be in a perfect state of 
nature with respect to each other’, raising the example of France and Spain, 
emphasising the state of nature between equal, full sovereigns.20 Beneath full 
sovereignty and a state of nature lay the relations of empire. Some governors may 
be in ‘perfect subjection’; the vassalage of polities directly controlled by a higher 
sovereign. Others may be in ‘imperfect subjection’, of partial dependence, like the 
German states partly controlled by the Holy Roman Emperor. Still others lie 
somewhere between imperfect subjection and the state of nature between full 
sovereigns, with Bentham using the example of the King of Naples who partly 
depended on the Pope’s ability to enforce succession rules.21 With these 
distinctions in place, Bentham raised a domestic allegory. Obedience and 
subjection are changeable, as with infants gaining independence from their 
parents, and can be interrupted, as with the ‘American Indians’ who become 
dependent on a chief only during war and in peace return to independence. But 
Bentham lamented the difficulty of finding a ‘note of distinction — a characteristic 
mark’ that distinguishes societies with a ‘habit’ of obedience from those that do 
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not. Marks of office or titles like King or Senator may be significant within a 
society or union, but do not themselves reveal real obedience.22 
The only clear mark of obedience is revolution, raised throughout the Fragment 
as an internal (subjects–sovereign) and later external (sovereign–sovereign or 
sovereign–vassal) question. Dealing first with internal rebellions and writing of 
the fiction of the compact, Bentham saw subjects as weighing the utility of 
obedience against resistance, using the language of interest: ‘why they should obey 
in short so long as the probable mischiefs of obedience are less than the probable 
mischiefs of resistance: why, in a word, taking the whole body together, it is their 
duty to obey, just so long as it is their interest, and no longer.’23 Revolt shows the 
refusal of obedience and submission, a conscious disobedience against law and 
fact that is open and forcible rather than secret or fraudulent; but the particularities 
of when simple murder by revolutionaries becomes treason will depend on 
‘particular local jurisprudence’: the laws of the states in question.24 Contra 
Blackstone’s Hobbesian account of supreme power as the union of private wills to 
a sovereign person or assembly, Bentham contended that this account of supreme 
authority is circular: law-making power indicates supreme authority, and supreme 
authority is the power of making laws; the combination of wills already assumes 
the reduction to one will that can claim the supreme power as combiner of wills. 
Instead, Blackstone’s branches account simply makes the ‘road’ to revolutionary 
dissent and overthrow of this claimed supreme power longer: each subject under 
a sovereign simply weighs the ‘internal persuasion’ of that sovereign’s claim to 
power on a balance of utility, and it is the utility of obedience over resistance that 
marks the real limits of proper government and legislative authority.25  
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These considerations of internal government and revolution are mirrored in 
Bentham’s examination of sovereignty and secession at the external, imperial 
level. Just after articulating revolt as weighing obedience against mischief, 
Bentham noted that, at the inter-polity level, a smaller polity’s break from a larger 
one means it is no longer in a political union with that larger state but instead a 
‘state of nature’ relationship, though as with obedience, the ‘characteristic mark’ 
of this break remains difficult to clearly discern.26  
In his closing analysis on leagues, Bentham returned to this issue of relational 
sovereignties and rebellions within empires. Using the ambiguous language of 
‘convention’, Bentham raised an external/imperial meaning of convention and a 
more common domestic constitutional one. He noted that a supreme governor’s 
authority was not infinite but rather ‘unavoidably … unless where limited by 
express convention … indefinite’.27 To explain the meaning of ‘express 
convention’, Bentham posited two situations. The first was an imperial 
arrangement, where one state ‘upon terms’ submits itself to government by 
another; a form of partial dependence under the constitution of another state, that 
reduces or removes the ‘indefiniteness’ of the formerly supreme, but now 
subordinate, governor’s authority, ‘defined by that arrangement of 
constitutions’.28 The second was an international league formed through a 
constitutional instrument: ‘where the governing bodies of a number of states agree 
to take direction in certain specified cases, from some body or other that is distinct 
from all of them: consisting of members, for instance, appointed out of each’, such 
as an arbitral or judicial body that directs each member state.29  
In these imperial and international arrangements, the express legal limits on 
authority are not as important as the habit of obedience of subordinate states to the 
imperial master. Any conventions or constitutions between them can be modified 
 
26   Ibid 24. 
27   Ibid 112 (emphasis original). 
28   Ibid 112 note [g] (emphasis original). 
29   Ibid 122 (emphasis original). 
 Sentiment and Revolution: Political Economies of the International, 1750–1850 123 
or altered without departing from the spirit of the imperial constitution, and the 
imperial power can consent to it by either passing a law declaring the new 
relationship, or simply acquiescing to the subordinate’s change.30 Bentham then 
took up the example of Britain and linked it to sentiment. Any alteration of the Act 
of Union that would favour Scotland, as the minority nation, would likely need — 
for both ‘expediency’ and to preserve English ‘public faith’ and avoid ‘irritating 
the body of the nation’ — some method for making the new law ‘depend upon 
their sentiments’.31 Convention here is used to mean both the treaty–constitutional 
connection and laying the basis for an aggregation of nations into some kind of 
international government. These possibilities of conventions of imperial semi-
sovereignty refuted Blackstone’s claim that all governments must possess absolute 
authority.  
Bentham’s Fragment is usually placed as the whiggish, early germ of his later 
constitutional thought. It has been recently interpreted as a response to growing 
American revolutionary sentiment.32 But it also dealt closely with problems 
analogous to those of domestic and international law. Bentham moved freely 
between internal and external constitutional relations, was primarily occupied by 
the broader questions of the legitimacy of revolution and the rejection of 
constitutional orders, and frequently returned to imperial constitutional relations 
of subjection, obedience and the formation of will. Rather than look to a state of 
nature or original aggregation of families, Bentham articulated the possibilities of 
obedience and revolution as markers of an enduring compact, in turn expressed 
through a principle of utility, which would come to guide his ‘international’. 
C Prejudice, Publicity, Empire: Bentham’s International 
Bentham’s doubts in the Fragment about the law of nations’ status as real law, his 
emphasis on will and obedience as the genuine marker of relations between 
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subject–sovereign and sovereign–sovereign, and the use of revolution and the 
principle of utility as the marker of limits to sovereignty within or between states 
are all recognisably ‘international’ questions, without yet using that word. 
Whereas the Fragment was a polemical critique of Blackstone’s inadequate 
definitions, Bentham’s next major work, the Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislation, largely completed by 1780 and published in 1789, was a 
systematic treatise on the science of morality and jurisprudence which aimed to 
clarify and explore the branches of jurisprudence and offer precise definitions of 
its terms. Here, Bentham introduced the term ‘international’ to extend and solidify 
his analysis of the branches of domestic law, following the principle of utility. This 
new term was motivated not by developments in travel, commerce, diplomacy, 
culture, war or politics, but rather the laws that might and should exist between 
polities to regulate these things, and many other matters besides. Utility also 
formed the basis of his extended exploration of international and internal law in 
the Principles of International Law, written in several manuscripts from 1786–9, 
but only published posthumously in 1838 as fragments collated and arranged by 
Bowring. The decade of the 1780s and these texts form one major conception of 
the international that is largely fixed on avoiding further revolution by reforming 
the internal laws of legal orders across the world, joined by the principle of 
utility.33 This part emphasises that Bentham’s plan also sought to counter the 
domestic sentiments of nationalist self-interest that had also spread across the 
world. 
The Introduction began with a statement of the principle of utility: ‘[n]ature has 
placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and 
pleasure’, from which the interests of the community and ideas of morality must 
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be derived; to increase pleasure and decrease pain, in their various forms.34 
Bentham’s overall purpose — promised in a retrospective 1823 preface but not 
entirely fulfilled by the time of his death in 1832 — was to first lay out the 
principles of morality and these building blocks of pleasure and pain, as well as 
action, consciousness, motive and intention, to provide a foundation for analysing 
legislation in general, to be then explored in specific branches of law.35 In 
Bentham’s detailed taxonomy, these branches were the ‘principles of legislation’ 
in matters of ‘private distributive’ (civil), penal, procedural (both criminal and 
civil), ‘reward’ (remedies), ‘public distributive’ (constitutional), ‘political tactics’ 
(legislative/institutional procedure), the ‘principles of legislation in matters 
betwixt nation and nation, or to use a new though not inexpressive appellation, in 
matters of international law’, finance, political economy, and finally a universal 
plan of law that would bring the branches together in general concepts: ‘obligation, 
right, power, possession’ and so forth.36  
Bentham began the chapter that introduces international law with an idea of 
‘private ethics’ as the art of self-government or action according to a person’s own 
happiness, contrasting it with jurisprudence as the art or science of legislation, 
which ‘teaches how a multitude of men, composing a community, may be disposed 
to pursue that course which upon the whole is the most conducive to the happiness 
of the whole community, by means of motives to be applied by the legislator’.37 
The main branches of jurisprudence — those described in Bentham’s prefatory 
plans — arose from five ‘circumstances’: the ‘extent’ of the laws in a dominion; 
the ‘political quality’ of the persons those laws seek to regulate; the time they are 
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in force; how they are expressed; and their relation to punishment.38 The first two 
are of most importance for Bentham’s international. 
The extent of laws is a geographical and regional-cultural idea about the links 
between internal laws and the idea of universal law. Bentham used it to refer either 
to the laws of a particular nation or group of nations, as ‘local’ jurisprudence, or 
to all nations as ‘universal’ jurisprudence. Nations, in their ‘infinite variety’, never 
agree entirely on the same internal laws in either substance or form, and at the least 
their linguistic differences would lead to further substantive differences between 
otherwise translatable legal terms.39 Consequently, ‘universal’ works on 
jurisprudence can only be seen in ‘very narrow limits’.40 They cannot accurately 
describe the laws actually in force, though a work of modest comparative analysis 
that examined the laws and principles of ‘a few of the nations with which [a 
jurist’s] own is most connected’ could be called ‘universal jurisprudence’.41 
Bentham thought that the more properly universal treatise was one of censorial 
analysis, which described what ought to be the substantive law for all nations, 
marking out ‘some leading points’ around which ‘the laws of all civilised nations 
might, without inconvenience, be the same’.42 For Bentham, then, juristic writings 
that aim to draw commonalities or state close-to-universal principles existing 
between nations and within them, which might build from examining several 
jurisdictions, are aspects of examining the ‘extent’ of laws, but, contra the jurists 
of the last chapter, incapable of revealing any ‘pretended’ natural law.43 
This general idea of extent lays the ground for Bentham’s next focus on the 
‘political quality of persons whose conduct is the object of the law’, the basis for 
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Bentham’s distinction between international and internal jurisprudence.44 The 
political quality of persons subject to internal law are members of the same state, 
while those subject to ‘international jurisprudence’ are members of different 
states.45 In a note explaining the term, Bentham wrote: 
The word international, it must be acknowledged, is a new one; though, it is hoped, 
sufficiently analogous and intelligible. It is calculated to express, in a more 
significant way, the branch of law which goes commonly under the name of the law 
of nations: an appellation so uncharacteristic, that, were it not for the force of 
custom, it would seem rather to refer to internal jurisprudence …46 
While the ‘law of nations’ might literally mean some kind of comparative political 
theory, or the description of law within various nations, ‘international’ emphasises 
the laws existing between, or mutually penetrating, the legal systems of the nations 
of the world. Disputes between private foreigners, and between a citizen and a 
foreign sovereign are within internal law. The ‘properly and exclusively’ focused 
meaning of ‘international law’ is solely the ‘mutual’ transactions between 
sovereigns ‘as such’.47 Bentham illustrated this point with an example from 
Selden’s Table Talk: when several English merchants won a case against Philip 
III of Spain in the English courts, Philip’s ambassador paid the money, leading 
Bentham to conclude that ‘[t]his was internal jurisprudence: if the dispute had been 
betwixt Philip and James [I/VI] himself, it would have been international’.48 
Finally, he noted that any further clarity about whether the rules of sovereign 
conduct can be called ‘laws’ depends on the idea of a law being ‘more particularly 
unfolded’; for the moment, he stated that both internal and international 
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jurisprudence and be expository or censorial (positive or normative), and 
authoritative or ‘inauthoritative’ (accurate or inaccurate).49  
Bentham then turned to the nature of internal jurisprudence, stating that it might 
cover all members of a state, or just those in a district, noting his slight preference 
for the terms ‘local’ or ‘particular’ over the terms ‘national’ or ‘provincial’, and 
placing local/particular in opposition to the universal, and applicable when the 
universal ‘is plainly out of the question’.50 A note here returned to the point made 
at the outset of the Fragment on the language of the municipal: ‘The term 
municipal seemed to answer the purpose very well, till it was taken by an English 
author of the first eminence’, implying but not naming Blackstone, ‘to signify 
internal law in general, in contradistinction to international law, and the imaginary 
law of nature. It might still be used in this sense, without scruple, in any other 
language’.51 Bentham suggested here that Blackstone corrupted the meaning of 
municipal by pitting it against international law, and in doing so expanded 
municipal to mean national rather than local law.  
The remainder of the Introduction turned to the problem of the nature of law itself, 
raised and deferred by Bentham, and not laid out in much detail until a series of 
points were appended in the 1789 manuscript. A deeper appreciation of Bentham’s 
concept of international, and particularly its relation to constitutional law, lies in 
the Principles of International Law, arranged by Bowring in 1838 from a series of 
manuscript fragments written from 1786–9 that remained unfinished and 
unpublished in Bentham’s lifetime.52 When read with the Fragment and 
Introduction, some further clarity about Bentham’s early views of internal and 
international law emerges. Neither ‘domestic’ nor ‘municipal’ appear in the 
Principles, but rather ‘internal’ law. 
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In the first essay, Bentham defends a concept of international law that centres the 
idea of common utility as the rational basis of government and stretches it over the 
boundaries that divide nations. Bentham begins by asking ‘[i]f a citizen of the 
world had to prepare an universal international code, what would he propose to 
himself as his object?’53 While individual national legislators ought to act for the 
common utility of their nations, the ‘line of common utility’ between nations can 
be drawn by the linking of three ‘lines of least resistance’: that of individual 
citizens throughout the world, that of nations as collections of citizens, and that of 
the international community as a collection of nations.54 For sovereigns and 
hypothetical international legislators alike, their interest is ‘the most extended 
welfare of all the nations on the earth’.55 That ‘general end’ is also the best adapted 
means to furthering the ends of any single nation.56 Here, Bentham used an 
expanded principle of utility to cover the entirety of the world and each of its 
constituent polities. The ‘problem’, however, remained overcoming resistance to 
recognising this unity of utility. Bentham’s suggestion is to articulate a general 
body of law that regulates the conduct of all nations to align their national interests, 
and proposes five ‘objects’ of utility that described this new system of 
international law: increasing the nation’s well-being; doing the greatest good 
possible to other nations; avoiding harming other nations; gaining the greatest 
benefit from other nations; and, in war, producing the least evil consistent with the 
good for which the war is fought.  
Bentham then directly addressed the internal–international analogy and its limits 
for the ‘disinterested legislator upon international law’.57 Forming the ‘primitive 
principles’ of international law would occur through analogies to internal laws. 
First is to ‘prevent positive international offences’, which involves national 
‘crimes’ like seizing ports to harm another country, or closing seas and rivers (‘the 
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highways of our globe’), or preventing commerce by force.58 Second to encourage 
‘positively useful actions’, a set of international duties which were ‘negative 
offences’ of one nation refusing to help another, where the good of doing so would 
outweigh the loss.59 Nations must also prefer international procedures over wars 
to vindicate their rights.60  
But here Bentham turned to the limits of analogy. ‘The thread of analogy is now 
spun; it will be easy to follow it. There are, however, certain differences’, most 
importantly the limitation of the analogy between personhood and the nation: 
A nation has its property — its honour — and even its condition. It may be attacked in 
all these particulars, without the individuals who compose it being affected. Will it be 
said that it has its person? Let us guard against the employment of figures in matter 
[sic] of jurisprudence. Lawyers will borrow them and turn them into fictions, amidst 
which all light and common sense will disappear; then mists will rise, amidst the 
darkness of which they will reap a harvest of false and pernicious consequences.61 
National subjects are not to blame for the injustices of their ‘chiefs’, and are but 
the ‘innocent and unfortunate instruments’ of the crimes of their leaders, and so 
nations can only do restitution for their wrongs, but cannot be properly punished, 
because that punishment would fall on subjects rather than leaders.62 Bentham also 
stated there is little need to ‘insist’ on achieving the third and fourth objects of 
avoiding harm to other nations and gaining benefits from them, because ‘men, 
sovereigns as well as individuals’ follow their own interests.63  
But Bentham then rejected a common distinction between individuals and 
sovereigns. Just as individuals ‘swerve from the end which internal laws ought to 
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propose to themselves’, sovereigns may avoid the objects that international law 
ought to show them to follow.64 Individuals and sovereigns have similar 
psychologies, neither always good nor bad, not possessed of unlimited 
intelligence, and that we should neither assume all sovereigns bad nor all 
individuals good.65 Most importantly, like individuals, sovereigns may commit 
offences ‘de bonne foi’ — ‘in good faith’: wars of succession; interventions in the 
‘[i]ntestine troubles’ of neighbours, such as constitutional disputes or civil wars; 
uncertainties over the limits of their rights; uncertainties about rights of discovery; 
jealousies; disputes or wars of whatever cause; and religious hatred.66 To prevent 
these, and to articulate and achieve the five objects, Bentham looked to the 
clarification of both domestic and international laws. He proposed a program of 
codifying customary and unwritten laws — both internal and international — 
concluding new international conventions to cover points of potential confusion, 
disagreement or conflicts of interest among nations but, above all, ‘[p]erfecting 
the style of the laws of all kinds, whether internal or international’.67 This 
clarification of laws is likely to prevent conflicts: ‘How many wars have there 
been, which have had for their principal, or even their only cause, no more noble 
origin than the negligence or inability of a lawyer or a geometrician!’68  
Bentham’s final essay is a detailed plan for achieving this kind of ‘universal and 
perpetual peace’, but here through the internationalisation of sentiment along the 
lines of utility. Bentham focused first on decolonisation and disarmament, both of 
which posed major obstacles to the ideal of peace. Decolonisation is demanded by 
commercial and administrative arguments. With a broader ‘end in view’ of 
achieving ‘three grand objects, — simplicity of government, national frugality, 
and peace’, the subjugation of colonies is a needless complication to domestic 
 
64   Ibid. 
65   Ibid. 
66   Ibid. 
67   Ibid 540. 
68   Ibid. 
132 ‘Oh My Countrymen!’: The International in Bentham and Smith  
government.69 Colonies do not profit the ‘mother-country’ any more than they 
would if trading as free nations. Bentham then linked this to demilitarisation. Most 
military force was maintained for the defence of colonies, and colonies from the 
primary targets in contemporary warfare.70  
To replace colonial exploitation and warfare with arbitration and justice, Bentham 
weaved together national honour, morality, force and reason. He began with a link 
between national morality and injustice in strength based on force alone, 
addressing his exhortation not to the British state or sovereign, but rather its 
constituent men, and seeing national sentiment or prejudice as a possible lever for 
eventual peace: 
The moral feelings of men in matters of national morality are still so far short of 
perfection, that in the scale of estimation, justice has not yet gained the ascendancy 
over force. Yet this prejudice may, in a certain point of view, by accident, be rather 
favourable to this proposal than otherwise. Truth, and the object of this essay, bid me 
to say to my countrymen, it is for you to begin the reformation — it is you that have 
been the greatest sinners. But the same considerations also lead me to say to them, you 
are the strongest among nations: though justice be not on your side, force is; and it is 
your force that has been the main cause of your injustice.71 
One means of achieving this ‘pacification’ is establishing a ‘common court of 
judicature’ to decide differences between nations, even without coercive powers, 
which would remove the inevitability of wars that follow from differences of 
opinion, and would save the ‘credit’ and ‘honour’ of each nation.72 Here Bentham 
drew examples of these mechanisms from federal states: the ‘American 
confederation’, ‘German diet’ and ‘Swiss league’.73 But reducing the prejudices 
of the people would begin by a concerted reduction ‘in the contributions’ — 
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taxation — ‘of the people’ in every nation, by each preparing domestic laws to be 
‘presented to every other’ nation, ‘ready to be enacted’.74 This would be the first 
step in removing the prejudices and suspicions against foreign peoples and states, 
leading to Bentham’s exhortation:  
Oh my countrymen! purge your eyes from the film of prejudice — extirpate from your 
hearts the black specks of excessive jealousy, false ambition, selfishness, and 
insolence. The operations may be painful; but the rewards are glorious indeed! As the 
main difficulty, so will the main honour be with you.75 
Bentham’s plan, then, aimed to achieve international peace through the 
rearrangement of nationalist pride. 
In the remainder of the plan, Bentham presented a detailed consideration of the 
major mechanism for achieving this peace: removing suspicion through the 
transparency and wide publicity of all negotiations and decision-making, both at 
the international level of a proposed ‘World Congress’ and at the domestic level 
of cabinet decision-making processes in all states.76 Bentham announced this at 
the outset of the essay: ‘The globe is the field of dominion to which the author 
aspires, — the press the engine, and the only one he employs, — the cabinet of 
mankind the theatre of his intrigue.’77 Press here holds the double meaning of the 
printing and distribution of the plan itself to all mankind (‘What can be better 
suited to the preparing of men’s minds for the reception of such a proposal than 
the proposal itself?’) as well as the distribution of the debates and ‘opinions’ of 
the World Congress through its national delegates and throughout the ‘dominions 
of each state’, but also the spreading of a ‘liberty of the press’ throughout all states, 
as the least burdensome means of distributing the workings and opinions of the 
Congress.78 Bentham added to this general transparency of government, internally 
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at the cabinet level, and externally in diplomatic conferences (‘the cabinet of 
mankind’) on the basis that secrecy, especially in the English foreign office, is 
‘altogether useless, and equally repugnant to the interests of liberty and peace’.79 
A nation’s will, on display, can lead its citizens or the citizens of other countries 
to hold it up, critique it, and argue for or against it, depending on its conformity to 
the principle of utility.  
As the means of achieving the perfection of internal and international law 
suggested in the first essay, Bentham’s plan rested on the use of public opinion 
and transparency to realise greater utility within and between nations. International 
law here is far from a branch of the ‘imaginary whole’ of natural law expressed in 
the Fragment. Bentham now saw it as capable of being put into action in the same 
way as any other set of laws: by clarification and exposition, and, with the 
recognition of its logical force and congruency with the principle of utility, its 
enactment by national parliaments and their adherence through transparency and 
the force of international shame; making publicness essential to international 
law.80  
Bowring’s arrangement of Bentham’s Essay on International Law was notoriously 
poor and illogical. One later editor of Bentham’s papers noted that Bowring and 
his staff had bundled the papers designated ‘Colonies’ and ‘Navy’ separately, with 
the first dealing with political economy and the second with international law, and 
dated them arbitrarily: ‘Yet these are two aspects’ — political economy and 
international law — ‘that, for Bentham, always formed one’.81 Nonetheless, these 
were the arguments in public circulation from the 1840s onwards, and, read with 
Bentham’s published works in the Fragment and Introduction, it becomes clear 
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that at that point empire, national ideals, and publicity were all central to 
Bentham’s international, linked by a particular focus on utility and revolution. The 
next section expands on this suggestion of political economy, not directly in 
Bentham (though it reappears in his legacies examined in the next Part), but rather 
in the parallel vision of the international in the works of Adam Smith. 
D Sentiment, Monopoly, Empire: Smith’s International 
Bentham’s reaction to Blackstone was not the only transformative rejection of 
natural law from British legal thought that underpinned a new international, and 
Bentham’s neologism cannot be understood without appreciating another 
rethinking of the international that occurred around the same time in the juristic 
works emerging from the Scottish Enlightenment. This section contends that 
Adam Smith’s works just prior to Bentham developed a parallel rejection of old-
style natural law exemplified in Locke and Blackstone to ground another idea of 
the domestic and international. The parallels and incorporation of ‘Smithian 
themes’ into Bentham’s international have been noted and are considerable.82 But 
the distinctions are important too: unlike Bentham, Smith strongly rejected the 
command theory of law and approached ‘utility’ as government achieving justice 
at a local level, and not as happiness or interests in any ideal abstracted plan.83 
Smith’s account rested on a more developed idea of sentiment and public opinion 
as the basis of community and law through family allegories and stadial history. 
From this Smith developed his theory of political economy, motivated by 
problems of nationalism, monopoly, and empire to account for the laws within and 
between nations.84 
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Smith’s understanding of sentiment and its relation to law within and between 
states appeared in his first major work, the 1759 Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
Using a combination of stadial history and moral philosophising, Smith took 
communication as the foundation of understanding justice. Justice was the basis 
of ‘natural jurisprudence’, while prudence was the basis of political economy. 
Smith saw morality not as a universal ideal system but rather humanity’s 
adaptations and responses to the conditions in which it finds itself.85 Utility was 
not an abstract guide like happiness or some other outcome but a functional means 
to an end, which could change depending on local conditions.86 With this focus 
on conditions and adaptation, Smith’s moral and legal thought was spatial, with 
recurring analogies to locality and distance. Distance and intimacy are the 
metaphors for Smith’s ‘impartial spectator’, the judge we each imagine and 
internalise to guide our conduct, which Smith used to complicate and replace ideas 
of eternal natural laws: 
It is not the soft power of humanity, it is not that feeble spark of benevolence which 
Nature has lighted up in the human heart, that is thus capable of counteracting the 
strongest impulses of self-love. It is a stronger power, a more forcible motive, which 
exerts itself upon such occasions. It is reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of 
the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct.87 
Humanity clarifies a set of counterforces as the real balance to self-interest in the 
reasoned, principled conscience personified in the impartial spectator. For Smith, 
the reactions of others to our own actions provided both real and imagined judges, 
and morality emerges in encounters with others by internalising the observed, 
external effects of our actions; a ‘sympathetic’ imagining of what the impartial 
spectator would demand of us.  
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In contrasting this idea of spectator and individual morality with questions of states 
and their internal and international conflicts, Smith laid out a rough first account 
of his approach to the domestic and international. The sympathetic imagination 
leads to difficulties when the subjects are nations rather than individuals. The 
distance of neutral nations both gives them a position of impartiality, but also 
prevents them from fully understanding the dispute.88 Likewise, at the domestic 
level, the distance between subjects and sovereigns, and between national 
sentiments, also causes problems, rendering individuals unable to understand the 
sentiments of outsiders towards one’s own nation.89 Civil and international 
disputes and wars alike provide serious problems for the impartial spectator.90 In 
the next chapters, Smith proposed the ‘general rules’ of morality as the sentiments 
of mankind; general standards of human conduct that are fixed by self-reflection, 
and which are seen the means of recognising real natural laws.91 
Smith ended the first edition with a promise that a later work would examine the 
general principles of law and government, their development, and questions of 
justice, police, revenue, arms and ‘whatever else is the object of law’; to return to 
questions of sentiment and law within and beyond the state.92 The final, heavily 
revised edition of the TMS, published in 1790, retained this concluding promise 
though noting at the outset that it would never be completed.93 But the 1790 text 
also included a considerable expansion of Smith’s thoughts on sentiment, the law 
of nature and nations, and constitutional ordering in a new section on a practical 
system of morality, and further thoughts on ideal plans in a reorganised final 
section on a theoretical system of morality. That plan is based on domestic 
sentiment, which forms the basis for sentiments between nations. 
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Smith’s plan built on his revision of the earlier image of the judgments of mankind 
and the impartial spectator, which is newly rendered as a judicial, procedural 
metaphor. The divine creator made man the ‘immediate judge’ of mankind, but 
the ‘appeal to a higher tribunal’ is not to natural law, but the internalised impartial 
spectator in his own conscience.94 This is explicitly not to the imagined judgments 
of a divine being, or to a deferred idealised afterlife where justice is done, but a 
human evaluation of what justice demands that led Smith to reject the same link 
in sovereigns: ‘But what is considered as the greatest reproach even to the 
weakness of earthly sovereigns, has been ascribed, as an act of justice, to divine 
perfection’;95 for individuals and sovereigns alike, no such link can be made.  
With this rejection of divine natural law in place, Smith then offered, in the new 
sixth book, a practical system of morality built from prudence, to sentiment, to the 
development of nations. The family and household is the basis of sentiment and 
duty in this system. After regard for one’s self, the ‘objects’ of a person’s ‘warmest 
affections’ are ‘naturally’ their parents, children and siblings.96 These families 
grew into tribes then nations, with their links growing by their close proximity, 
connection to and mutual reliance on each other.97 Family sentiments lead to a 
clarification of virtues we see in other individuals, particularly office-holders, and 
from there we take this ordering of individuals to think about the ordering of 
society.98 Progress, however, can undermine sentiment. In ‘commercial countries’ 
the family sentiment is quickly dispersed: people rely not on family but on law to 
protect their interests, and this dispersal increases with the progress of 
‘civilization’.99  
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Smith turned to link national and international sentiment through this family 
allegory. Just as we prefer our own family, we and our family and friends tend to 
see our own state as the one ‘most strongly recommended to us’, and we think of 
our personal honour as connected with that of the state.100 Smith offered a subtle 
critique of patriotism and nationalism, similar to Bentham’s, that connected 
individual, national and international sentiments in the language of the law of 
nations, reminiscent (and critical) of Hobbes: 
The love of our own nation often disposes us to view, with the most malignant jealousy 
and envy, the prosperity and aggrandisement of any other neighbouring nation. 
Independent and neighbouring nations, having no common superior to decide their 
disputes, all live in continual dread and suspicion of one another. Each sovereign, 
expecting little justice from his neighbours, is disposed to treat them with as little as 
he expects from them. The regard for the laws of nations, or for those rules which 
independent states profess or pretend to think themselves bound to observe in their 
dealings with one another, is often very little more than mere pretence and profession. 
From the smallest interest, upon the slightest provocation, we see those rules every 
day, either evaded or directly violated without shame or remorse. Each nation foresees, 
or imagines it foresees, its own subjugation in the increasing power and 
aggrandisement of any of its neighbours; and the mean principle of national prejudice 
is often founded upon the noble one of the love of our own country.101 
Nationalist love did not reflect any ‘love of mankind’ but rather the prejudices 
towards neighbours.102 The British fear the French and call them their ‘natural 
enemies’, and vice versa, but bear no animosity towards the ‘prosperity of China 
or Japan’.103 Similarly, goodwill is usually only local, and any plans for alliances 
 
100  Ibid 268. 
101  Ibid 269. 
102  Ibid 270. 
103  Ibid. 
140 ‘Oh My Countrymen!’: The International in Bentham and Smith  
for defence or peace are most often motivated by the national self-interest of each 
neighbouring state.104 
Smith then returned to the link between national sentiment and constitutional 
order, as the means of guiding respect, obedience and mutual welfare, and as a 
check on the ideal systematising plans of individuals and sovereigns alike. Smith 
framed the constitution itself in terms of competing ‘orders and societies’, akin to 
classes. All states are divided ‘into many different orders and societies’, which 
each hold their ‘particular powers, privileges, and immunities’.105 As with 
families, each person is ‘naturally more attached’ to their own order, with the 
interests and vanities of everyone and their close companions connected to that 
order, meaning each aims to extend its powers and defend it against the 
‘encroachments’ of all other orders.106 But idealist plans, by citizens or sovereigns 
alike, to overthrow or impose ideal schemes on the polity, while often motivated 
by the ‘love of humanity’, are unlikely to succeed, because the constitution’s 
ordering is built from a long history of customs and sentiments; it is these that 
reformers ought to gradually change.107 
These reservations about idealistic constitutional revolutions are important 
because Smith expands them to a wider critique of the limitations of positive law 
in its domestic and international forms to conclude the 1790 text. All systems of 
positive law are ‘more or less imperfect attempts’ to enact the principles of natural 
jurisprudence. In some instances, the government or a particular order of men who 
control it will ‘warp’ positive laws away from natural justice and to their own 
interest.108 In others, the ‘rudeness and barbarism of the people hinder the natural 
sentiments of justice’ from reaching the precision of civilised nations: ‘Their laws 
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are, like their manners, gross and rude and undistinguishing’.109 But even absent 
these more serious problems, positive laws always fall short of natural justice, and 
never ‘coincide exactly, in every case’ with them.110 While systems of positive 
law ‘deserve the greatest authority’ in their states, they are merely ‘the records of 
the sentiments of mankind in different ages and nations’ and cannot ever be seen 
as accurate systems of the ‘rules of natural justice’.111 Nor can comparative 
examinations lead to a perfect system of laws or an image of the ideal laws of all 
nations. In a significant concluding passage, Smith discussed the connection 
between comparative jurisprudence and a general aim of reforming positive laws 
to mimic natural justice, raising a series of doubts about the possibility of this 
endeavour, illustrated by laws within and between nations: 
It might have been expected that the reasonings of lawyers, upon the different 
imperfections and improvements of the laws of different countries, should have given 
occasion to an inquiry into what were the natural rules of justice independent of all 
positive institution. It might have been expected that these reasonings should have led 
them to aim at establishing a system of what might properly be called natural 
jurisprudence, or a theory of the general principles which ought to run through and be 
the foundation of the laws of all nations. 
But though the reasonings of lawyers did produce something of this kind, and though 
no man has treated systematically of the laws of any particular country, without 
intermixing in his work many observations of this sort; it was very late in the world 
before any such general system was thought of, or before the philosophy of law was 
treated of by itself, and without regard to the particular institutions of any one 
nation.112 
Linking internal laws and the laws of nations with the system of natural 
jurisprudence that Smith thought was the incarnation of justice remained the great 
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project that Smith saw as unfinished by himself, and only imperfectly attempted 
by Grotius.113 In 1790, Smith reprinted his 1759 promise to attempt such a general 
account of the principles of law and government, ending the book knowing it 
would never be completely fulfilled. 
That project had, however, been partly attempted in Smith’s Wealth of Nations, 
published between the first and final TMS editions, where Smith articulated a 
system of internal laws linked to the law of nations in the new language of political 
economy and prudence. WN developed and made practical the more abstract 
sentimental account of motivation and human and social behaviour in the TMS.114 
It offered several practical implementations of Smith’s theoretical investigations 
into the interactions of domestic and international law, and placed both in service 
of the wider principles of political economy.  
The same preoccupation with space and distance that laid the foundation for the 
TMS are used to understand the development of economic activity, laws and 
restraints on trade, which Smith then linked to national sentiment. In Book III, ‘Of 
the Different Progress of Opulence in Different Nations’, Smith presented a stadial 
history of the natural progression of government, beginning with economic 
activity being directed first to domestic agriculture, then to domestic 
manufacturing, and only then to foreign trade, which coincided with the 
centralisation of legal power from aristocratic landowners to a national sovereign 
exercising effective power throughout the whole territory.115  
On the back of this stadial account, Smith turned to the problems of restraints on 
trade, arguing that internal laws ought to promote free trade. Political economy, as 
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the science of the legislator, aims to provide revenue for the people’s subsistence 
and for public services, to ‘enrich both the people and the sovereign’.116 Smith 
analysed this through a division of domestic and foreign industry and trade. 
Restraints on foreign imports encourage domestic industries, but they do not 
increase the general industry of society to its highest natural level.117 Workers and 
merchants seek their own advantage, try to work as close to home as possible, and 
try to maximise the value of that industry, and in doing so their combined private 
interests produce the greatest value and thus the largest public good, led by Smith’s 
‘invisible hand’.118 Smith then linked this to law and locality: the precise domestic 
industry that is likely to be of greatest value is to be judged by every individual, 
who ‘in his local situation’ can ‘judge much better than any statesman or lawgiver 
can do for him’.119 Statesmen and lawmakers who direct private interests by law 
arrogate this power for themselves.120 All monopolies that appear to protect 
domestic industry actually direct private people to how they should use their 
capital, which inevitably fails: if domestic produce is cheaper, the regulation is 
useless, and if the foreign import is cheaper, the regulation is harmful.121 Smith 
ended this point with an analogy from the family to the state, to apply this principle 
to international trade: ‘What is prudence in the conduct of every private family, 
can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom’, and if foreign imports are cheaper 
than domestic produce, then it is better to buy them with money made from areas 
in which domestic produce has an advantage over foreign.122 
Smith’s second major target was the other principle of mercantilism, ‘national 
prejudice and animosity’, prompted not just by national pride, as in Bentham, but 
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also ‘always by the private interest of particular traders’.123 Smith rejected the 
mercantilist view that the balance of trade between nations is a zero-sum game; 
instead, trade in all cases is always advantageous, though it might benefit one 
nation more than the other.124 National prejudice is a failure to appreciate the true 
interests of the nation, akin to individual bonds: 
By such maxims as these … nations have been taught that their interest consisted in 
beggaring all their neighbours. Each nation has been made to look with an invidious 
eye upon the prosperity of all the nations with which it trades, and to consider their 
gain as its own loss. Commerce, which ought naturally to be, among nations, as among 
individuals, a bond of union and friendship, has become the most fertile source of 
discord and animosity.125 
Nationalism is a problem of monopoly, and the misguided preference for domestic 
trade over foreign.126 While restrictions come from the jealousy caused by 
proximity to neighbouring countries, it ought to be channelled to competition and 
friendship, rather than animosity — ‘Mercantile jealousy is excited, and both 
inflames, and is itself inflamed, by the violence of national animosity’.127 But, 
Smith insisted, this is a misguided argument of merchants who, again, do not have 
the interest of the nation to mind, and instead seek rewards for foreign trade, which 
Smith examined in detail.128 Likewise, Smith denounced treaties of commerce in 
general, as a kind of monopoly granted to foreign merchants in a domestic market; 
these treaties may advantage particular merchants, but they are always to the 
detriment of the interests of both nations.129 And within this defence of the 
liberalisation of trade, Smith then likened friendship to an empire: ‘Were all 
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nations to follow the liberal system of free exportation and free importation, the 
different states into which a great continent was divided would so far resemble the 
different provinces of a great empire’.130  
Indeed, imperial government prompted the most thoroughgoing of Smith’s 
critiques of monopoly in dealing with colonial trade and imperial-constitutional 
relations. While laws like trade restrictions and treaties had been examples in 
Smith’s illustrations of domestic and foreign markets, here questions of domestic 
and international laws, in the context of trade and empire, become central.  
Throughout this lengthy analysis, Smith frequently returned to analogies with 
Greek and Roman models of colonisation, which he distinguished around internal 
self-government using the language of households. The Greek colonies were 
called apoikia, meaning, in Smith’s translation, ‘a separation of dwelling, a 
departure from home, a going out of the house’.131 As these expeditions ranged 
far away from Greece, they were independent states capable of changing their 
internal laws, and retaining a familial, maternal bond to the mother city: 
The mother city, though she considered the colony as a child, at all times entitled to 
great favour and assistance, and owing in return much gratitude and respect, yet 
considered it as an emancipated child, over whom she pretended to claim no direct 
authority or jurisdiction. The colony settled its own form of government, enacted its 
own laws, elected its own magistrates, and made peace or war with its neighbours as 
an independent state, which had no occasion to wait for the approbation or consent of 
the mother city. Nothing can be more plain and distinct than the interest which directed 
every such establishment.132 
Roman colonialism, on the contrary, was prompted at first by property 
redistribution required by the Republic’s agrarian law foundations, which divided 
public territory among the orders of free citizens, and which, as Rome’s population 
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grew, necessitated the sending of colonies, particularly into conquered territories 
to ensure their obedience.133 Unlike Greece, Roman colonies remained part of the 
Republic, where lands were granted in conquered provinces which, ‘being within 
the dominions of the republic … could never form any independent state’.134 
Instead, they could at most be a ‘sort of corporation’ that had powers to enact ‘bye-
laws for its own government’ but remained always subject to ‘the correction, 
jurisdiction, and legislative authority of the mother city’.135 Later, Smith argued 
that the success and rapid growth of Greek colonies was largely due to their easy 
displacement of ‘savage and barbarous nations’ and their independence in internal 
law-making, whereas Roman colonies were established in conquered provinces 
that were ‘fully inhabited before’, and were not independent and thus not at liberty 
to adapt to local conditions and pursue local interests.136 
Smith used this comparison of ancient centre–periphery independence to argue 
that contemporary British and European colonies succeeded according to their 
degrees of self-government. In contrast to Greek and Roman colonies, European 
colonies in the Americas and East and West Indies were not motivated by necessity 
but conquest and commerce (particularly the search for gold and silver), and thus 
their ‘utility’ had been great, but not necessarily clear or well understood.137 Their 
government and imperial relations were similar to both Greece and Rome: like 
Roman colonies, they are dependent on their mother states and their distance made 
central control difficult.138 But worse still than distance was the arbitrary and self-
interested system of ‘exclusive company government’, where the colony is run 
solely by merchants who have neither the interest of the colony nor the mother 
country in view.139 Instead, Smith argued, the English system has led to the most 
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‘rapid progress’: ‘plenty of good land’, combined with the liberty to manage their 
own affairs their own way’ (like Greek colonies) are the major explanations for 
this success, though Smith added that the ability to alienate colonised land, the 
modest rates of imperial taxation, the few costs of local government, and 
unrestricted local trade for English colonists — as opposed to European 
monopolisation that precluded trade with other colonies — all contributed to this 
progress.140  
Smith then built a dual criticism of poor European style internal government 
combined with imperial monopolies, arguing that English liberties in the 
American colonies made them far superior.141 While Smith noted they are not 
‘independent foreign countries’, the thrust of his later arguments is that they 
effectively should be, in an empire modelled on the free trade system discussed 
earlier. But current British monopolies, combined with military expenditures to 
defend the colonies, made them a loss to Britain,142 and while no nation would 
give up its dominions due to national pride, national interest and the principles of 
free trade dictate that Britain should do so.143 Smith again put this argument in the 
language of self-government and family affection; parting as ‘good friends’ would 
‘revive’ the ‘natural affection of the colonies to the mother country’, which, with 
trade and communication, might lead to a return to alliance and a ‘sort of parental 
affection on the one side, and filial respect on the other’, typical of British (and 
Greek) colonial relations.144 
The only alternative to separation was imperial-constitutional reform, in which the 
colonies would become part of domestic constitutional arrangements, sending 
representatives to the House of Commons and being taxed by the Empire.145 While 
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Smith raised concerns about distance for both colonists and British alike, this 
imperial union would perfect the constitution of the Empire: ‘there is not the least 
probability that the British constitution would be hurt by the union of Great Britain 
with her colonies. That constitution, on the contrary, would be completed by it, 
and seems to be imperfect without it. The assembly which deliberates and decides 
concerning the affairs of every part of the empire, in order to be properly informed, 
ought certainly to have representatives from every part of it’.146 While Smith noted 
the difficulties of this proposal, as he had raised earlier, the only alternative was 
the present ‘empire of shopkeepers’ who see only customers and not citizens; the 
merchants who maintain the demand for self-interest and monopolies of domestic 
and colonial trade.147  
Finally, turning to the law of nations specifically, Smith noted the possibility that, 
like the American colonists, the ‘native’ populations might grow to self-
government and a level of equal justice with European nations through force and 
communication. Noting that for ‘the natives’ the commercial benefits of 
colonialism have been ‘sunk and lost in the dreadful misfortunes which they have 
occasioned’, Smith contended that it was the superiority of European force that 
allowed them ‘to commit with impunity every sort of injustice in those remote 
countries’.148 Smith hoped here, instead, that ‘the natives’ might grow stronger 
than the Europeans, and arrive at equality by the ‘courage and force’ that inspires 
‘mutual fear’ and which ‘can alone overawe the injustice of independent nations 
into some sort of respect for the rights of one another’.149 The path to that equality 
was mutual communication and unrestricted commerce.150 Even for the colonised, 
free trade — the principles of national interest that demands the removal of internal 
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and international laws of restrictions, tariffs, and monopolies — was Smith’s fount 
of justice between nations, whatever their level of development. 
E Conclusion 
Bentham and Smith’s ideas of the international were written at roughly similar 
times but not in direct conversation with each other. What Smith still yearned to 
do at the end of his life’s work, Bentham would, in his own parallel way, pursue 
in his later works on constitutions. For Bentham and Smith different combinations 
of sentiment, political economy and stadial history that formed a bridge between 
thinking about constitution, state, and political authority and trying to understand 
systems of law beyond the state, especially around colonies and empire. This 
connection was made with new ways of thinking about human life, sociability, the 
basis of moral and legal obligation, and the ideas of will, opinion, interest, progress 
and utility. These theories, themselves heavy with law and legal theory, articulated 
new models of rational human individuality, and cast the state’s essential duty as 
providing a dependable legal framework for economic affairs, which, domestic or 
international, formed a powerful and influential image of civic life. This also 
reoriented law towards its capacity for rational reform, emphasising the need for 
domestic and international laws to reflect as well as change moral sentiments, 
rather than leave them unchangeable, as in natural law thought. This moved the 
domestic and international away from nationalism and towards political economy 
in a capitalist mode: that the laws within and between nations ought to serve the 
individual interest, happiness and wealth. With that reordering came a new 
emphasis on spatiality and geography, where sympathy and preference took on 
domestic connotations that Bentham and Smith thought could be expanded 
through trade and law. This first narrowed version of the international is not yet 
globalised, but it lays the basis for further rethinking in the wake of the French 
Revolution, and a later expansion — and entwining with the domestic — in the 
resurgence of the British Empire in the Victorian era.  
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III REACTION AND REFORM: POST-REVOLUTIONARY INTERNATIONALS 
A Introduction 
Between the American and French Revolutions, the question of the interaction of 
domestic and international laws became still more intense.151 This part examines 
the legacies of Bentham’s and Smith’s ideas of the domestic and international, 
exploring three points in the post-Revolutionary era. Part One explores Burke’s 
revival of natural law to articulate reactionary connections between the domestic 
and international in a general law of ‘civic vicinage’ under which the states of 
Europe were bound to protect the law of nature and nations — and especially laws 
of property — against constitutions that threaten that order. Part Two examines 
how Bentham’s later works turned away from plans for remaking the world 
through an international code in favour of rational reforms of domestic and 
constitutional laws, culminating in a single set of internal laws adaptable to each 
state that included, significantly, legal duties to other nations. Part Three then 
looks to two lasting legacies of Bentham and Smith’s internationals: in Austin’s 
influential account of the commanding domestic sovereign that rejected the 
lawfulness of the international, and in the works of Travers Twiss, in which the 
first modern expression of a strong account of national independence as central to 
international personality finds its expression, that set up — more so than Austin 
— the complexities of the domestic and international that came with the Victorian 
Empire.  
B Resurgent Laws of Nature: Burke’s Civil Vicinage 
If Smith developed an account of the international in parallel to Bentham’s project, 
Edmund Burke (1729–97) provided an important counterweight to it in his 
reactionary ideas about natural law’s primacy over positive laws within and 
between nations, raised by the upheavals of the French Revolution and enduring 
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problems of imperial rule and commerce.152 Writing soon after Bentham’s 
coinage, Burke does not use the term ‘international’. This is probably due to its 
novelty and limited early circulation. But even if Burke had heard it, he almost 
certainly would have preferred the ‘law of nations’: Burke retained a central place 
for divine natural law in his juridical thought and saw it as a limit to positive law, 
and would thus have rejected any suggestion that the international community 
could agree on any laws between them whatsoever, as they remain always bound 
by natural law. Indeed, this is the thrust of his thinking on the French Revolution. 
Burke does, however, use the ‘domestic’ extensively. His writings touching on the 
law of nations are almost entirely fixed on internal government. Burke provides 
perhaps the strongest defence of the continuing relevance of natural law, and a 
response to the limits of what would become the Benthamite rational reformist 
agenda, but in a subtle way that emphasises the continuing endurance of political 
structures that still recognises utility and, innovatively, equity, as the guide to 
reforming domestic law. In Burke’s writings on the French Revolution, 
domesticity plays several roles: as sentiments binding a nation, as a shared history, 
and — most importantly — as the kinds of foreign governmental forms that can 
be justifiably intervened in and changed. Domestic law is the basis for an idea of 
‘civic vicinage’, in which states might check the revolutionary, expansionist and 
absolutist designs set by the internal constitution of their neighbours. This is a new 
law of nature and nations for the post-Revolutionary era. Burke still frequently 
uses ideas of sentiment, nationalism and the binds of domestic ties; but whereas 
Bentham and Smith saw those ties in North American colonies, Burke extended 
them to Europe outside France in a plea for containing radicalism through a 
renewed international order. 
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In his 1790 Reflections on the Revolution in France, Burke saw revolutionary 
sentiment and radical change as departures from the stability and proof of older 
legal institutions, framed in the language of his own national tastes and ‘domestic 
laws’: 
The dislike I feel to revolutions, the signals for which have so often been given from 
pulpits; the spirit of change that is gone abroad; the total contempt which prevails with 
you, and may come to prevail with us, of all ancient institutions, when set in opposition 
to a present sense of convenience, or to the bent of a present inclination: all these 
considerations make it not unadvisable, in my opinion, to call back our attention to the 
true principles of our own domestic laws; that you, my French friend, should begin to 
know, and that we should continue to cherish them.153 
English resistance to French revolutionary projects should flow from a renewed 
appreciation of the ‘true principles’ of English domestic laws and constitution. 
With a mix of trade, growth and corruption metaphors, Burke insisted the English 
ought to be wary of the ‘counterfeit wares’ of British legal principles exported as 
‘raw commodities’ to France, then placed in a ‘wholly alien’ soil, and then 
‘smuggle[d] back’ into Britain with the ‘newest Paris fashion of an improved 
liberty’ attached.154 Instead, the ‘people of England’ will resist these French 
corruptions and continue to see the Crown as beneficial for their security, liberty 
and stability.155  
Burke’s wider project in Reflections is to link domestic arrangements with 
international ones. The Revolution’s constitutional changes threw the conservative 
European balance of power system into chaos. The British constitution, on the 
other hand, remained in ‘just correspondence and symmetry with the order of the 
world’, and supported and mirrored both the European order and the natural order 
itself. Burke’s explanation of this is through an allegory of family and nation, 
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arguing that the endurance of constitutions — and by extension the European and 
natural orders — lies in linking past and present families together, as a binding of 
‘our dearest domestic ties’.156 The constantly renewed body of the state and human 
race alike reflected the ‘method of nature’, where adhering to the ‘principles of 
our forefathers’ was not motivated by superstition but instead ‘the spirit of 
philosophic analogy’: ‘In this choice of inheritance we have given to our frame of 
polity the image of a relation in blood; binding up the constitution of our country 
with our dearest domestic ties; adopting our fundamental laws into the bosom of 
our family affections; keeping inseparable, and cherishing with the warmth of all 
their combined and mutually reflected charities, our state, our hearths, our 
sepulchres, and our altars.’157 
This image of domestic tie that linked family and nation formed the basis of 
Burke’s querying of the international and domestic political reality of France itself. 
Shifting to the language of municipality and the combination of will into a state, 
Burke asked whether the ‘territory of France’, split into 83 ‘independent 
municipalities’, could ‘ever be governed as one body, or can ever be set in motion 
by the impulse of one mind?’.158 This mass of independent municipalities 
contravened and dissolved the real order of the state as a structured hierarchy of 
subordination, a set of contracts that create a partnership ‘in every virtue, and in 
all perfection’ that binds citizens living, dead and to be born:159  
This law is not subject to the will of those, who by an obligation above them, and 
infinitely superior, are bound to submit their will to that law. The municipal 
corporations of that universal kingdom are not morally at liberty at their pleasure, and 
on their speculations of a contingent improvement, wholly to separate and tear asunder 
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the bands of their subordinate community, and to dissolve it into an unsocial, uncivil, 
unconnected chaos of elementary principles.160 
Burke later linked this breakdown of order and national sentiment to the 
municipalities’ claimed ‘arbitrary pleasure’ of determining whose property will be 
protected.161 There is no national ‘principle by which [the] municipalities can be 
bound to obedience; or even conscientiously obliged not to separate from the 
whole, to become independent, or to connect itself with some other state’.162 But 
Burke’s other direction for the link between family, religion and state was to create 
international limits for domestic law. Burke argued that the French National 
Assembly’s confiscation of religious estates was an unjust disregard of the rights 
of property, and a derogation from the ‘common concerns of mankind’.163 Burke 
concluded by arguing that no parliament, whatever the extent of its legislative 
authority, could contravene this fundamental law of nations by violating property 
rights or overruling prescription, or, in general terms, ‘to force a currency of their 
own fiction in the place of that which is real, and recognized by the law of nations’, 
where such absolutism would lead, inevitably, to despotism. 164 
Burke’s final work, the 1796–7 Letters on a Regicide Peace, built on the ideas of 
natural law and the restrictions on the law-making powers of states raised in the 
Reflections. Here, however, the connection of domestic and international law was 
used for the much grander project of criticising the legitimacy of the French 
Empire. France’s internal laws are not just the concern of all nations, but justify 
an intervention to change them under Burke’s innovative use of old Roman 
concepts around the ‘law of the neighbourhood’ and ‘civil vicinage’; an analogy 
between nuisance and the law of nations that formed an integral part, Burke 
argued, of the public law of Europe.  
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Burke began by emphasising Britain’s sympathetic links with humanity, arguing 
that France had repudiated the law of nations by severing those same links, and 
then explaining France’s ambition to spread its domestic law throughout the world 
by force. Early in the First Letter, ‘On the Overtures of Peace’, Burke considered 
Britain’s place in the world, critiquing apparent autarchy and the separation of any 
state from its neighbours, using the language of the domestic: ‘IF WE LOOK TO 
NOTHING but our domestic condition, the state of the nation is full even to 
plethory; but if we imagine that this country can long maintain its blood and its 
food, as disjoined from the community of mankind, such an opinion does not 
deserve refutation as absurd, but pity as insane’.165 Burke urged England to see 
herself as part of Europe, resisting ‘regicide’ France in universal terms that drew 
on sympathy with all mankind: ‘that sort of England, who, sympathetic with the 
adversity or the happiness of mankind, felt that nothing in human affairs was 
foreign to her’.166 Burke saw the war as not with an ‘ordinary community’, but 
instead against a system ‘which by its essence, is inimical to all other 
Governments’.167 
Burke then demonstrated how regicide France’s constitution had repudiated the 
system of international diplomacy. France’s insistence on bilateral agreements, 
rather than ‘treating conjointly’ with the other powers sought to split their common 
cause: ‘the Regicide power finding each of them insulated and unprotected, with 
great facility gives the law to them all.’168 By ‘gives the law to them all’, Burke 
meant that France negotiates with an unjust insistence on the constraints of its 
domestic constitutional law. Burke ventriloquised French arguments that their 
constitution does not allow the executive government to alienate any Republican 
territory, and that occupied territories not yet ‘united to France’ must be negotiated 
with in a way ‘compatible with the dignity of the Republic’.169 He then heaped 
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scorn on this argument. The occupied territories were throughout Austria, the 
Netherlands, Italy and Switzerland, well beyond the ‘integrant parts’ of the 
original republic, and not to be negotiated over at the Congress.170 For Burke, this 
lacked any legal basis. ‘Why?’, he asks, ‘Because there is a law which prevents it. 
What law? The law of nations? The acknowledged public law of Europe? Treaties 
and conventions of parties? No!’ — but rather, purportedly, French domestic law, 
which Burke contended would make France’s will the law throughout Europe:171 
their will is the law, not only at home, but as to the concerns of every nation. … Thus 
they treat all their domestic laws and constitutions, and even what they had considered 
as a Law of Nature; but whatever they have put their seal on for the purposes of their 
ambition, and the ruin of their neighbours, this alone is invulnerable, impassible [sic], 
immortal.172 
This passage expands Burke’s suggestion in the Reflections that legislatures were 
bound by the law of nations. Here, there is a much wider restriction on the ability 
of legislatures to make positive laws that are said to restrict their international 
actions, and Burke fixes on the hypocrisy of claiming full sovereign powers, using 
them to abrogate natural laws, and then invoking both sets of law as a constraint 
on international action. 
It is against this hypocritical use of domestic law to constrain the international that 
Burke invokes a new principle of European public law based on an analogy with 
Roman civil law: the law of ‘civil vicinage’. This innovation rests on Burke’s 
critique of the French constitution. Noting that France’s condition and its ‘very 
essential constitution’ involves a ‘state of hostility’ with Britain and ‘all civilized 
people’,173 Burke positioned that constitution as a government form that ‘has 
never been hitherto seen, or even imagined, in Europe’ because France’s people 
live under ‘positive, arbitrary and changeable institutions’ that are based on neither 
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morality nor general ideas of law.174 Indeed, this constitution has abolished law as 
a ‘science of methodized and artificial equity’, and ‘demolished the whole body 
of … jurisprudence which France had pretty nearly in common with other civilized 
countries’.175 Part of that ‘common civilized’ body of law was ‘the elements and 
principles of the law of nations, that great ligament of mankind’.176 Not only had 
the French annulled their treaties, but they also renounced the law of nations 
entirely, specifically its Christian, monarchical basis, the ‘great politic communion 
with the Christian world’ on whose principles all other European nations are built, 
and which was replaced with regicide, Jacobinism and atheism.177  
Having articulated this split and divergence, Burke moved to explain the juridical 
bases on which Europe can and must intervene to change France’s internal legal 
order. Using the language of moral ties and distance, Burke argued that there is no 
‘right of men’ to act ‘according to their pleasure, without any moral tie’, and that 
no people are ever in total independence of each other.178 While ‘[d]istance of 
place’ may make duties and rights difficult to exercise, it does not extinguish them, 
and it is by analogy to civil law that Burke proceeded: ‘there are situations where 
this difficulty [of distance] does not occur; and in which, therefore, these duties 
are obligatory, and these rights are to be asserted. It has ever been the method of 
public jurists, to draw a great part of the analogies on which they form the law of 
nations from the principles of law which prevail in civil community.’179 Burke’s 
invocation of civil law here is not limited only to positive laws, but also ideas of 
universal equity.180  
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Burke’s next analogy was to the ‘Law of the Neighbourhood’, which limits the 
‘perfect master[y]’ over property through the ‘right of vicinage’ that regulates and 
restrains ownership rights without destroying them.181 Against the recurring 
problem of the lack of an international adjudicator superior to states, Burke simply 
insisted that the region itself is the judge: ‘Now where there is no constituted judge, 
as between independent states there is not, the vicinage itself is the natural judge. 
It is, preventively, the assertor of its own rights; or remedially, their avenger’.182 
The vicinage gains this position because of the presumption that neighbours know 
each other’s acts. That presumption ‘is as true of nations as of individual men’, 
and it ‘has bestowed on the grand vicinage of Europe a duty to know, and a right 
to prevent, any capital innovation which may amount to the erection of a 
dangerous nuisance.’183 While he acknowledged that this assessment, and the 
move to war that is the only real remedy, requires ‘great deliberation’ and an 
identification of clear plans by the offending nation to violate it,184 Burke 
reiterated that the Republic’s form violates not only the rights on which France 
was founded, but on which all communities are founded, namely property:  
The principles on which they proceed are general principles, and are as true in England 
as in any other country. They who (though with the purest intentions) recognize the 
authority of these Regicides and robbers upon principle, justify their acts, and establish 
them as precedents. It is a question not between France and England. It is a question 
between property and force. … The property of the nation is the nation. They who 
massacre, plunder, and expel the body of the proprietary, are murderers and robbers.185 
Vicinage might raise difficult questions, but France’s violation of natural rights of 
property was straightforward.  
 
181  Ibid 135–6. 
182  Ibid 136–7. 
183  Ibid. 
184  Ibid 137. 
185  Ibid 138–9. 
 Sentiment and Revolution: Political Economies of the International, 1750–1850 159 
Burke then linked this legal violation to a wider destruction of both domestic and 
international society that threatened all nations. The Republic presents the 
‘destruction and decomposition of the whole society’, which renounced and 
destroyed the true elements of France — monarchy, nobility, gentry, clergy, 
magistracy, and property: ‘All these particular moleculae united, form the great 
mass of what is truly the body politick. They are so many deposits and receptacles 
of justice; because they can only exist by justice. Nation is a moral essence, not a 
geographical arrangement’.186 The moral essence of neighbouring nations may be 
under threat by Jacobinism. Indeed, in the Third Letter, ‘Proposals for Peace’, 
Burke explicitly saw Jacobinism as a threat to British ‘domestic government’. 
There ‘may be made by any adventurers in speculation in a small given time and 
for any Country, all the ties, which, whether of reason or prejudice, attach mankind 
to their old, habitual, domestic Governments, are not a little loosened: all 
communion, which the similarity of the basis has produced between all the 
Governments that compose what we call the Christian World and the Republic of 
Europe, would be dissolved.’187 The Republic’s threat to these ties, and to all 
forms of government, led Burke to speculate on the possible insurrections of 
‘domestic violence’ that, if unchecked, would likely spread and destroy both the 
British monarchy and Christian religion.188 
A final set of domestic–international links emerges in Burke’s considerations of 
rearranging the French Empire to prevent this expansionist threat to all domestic 
government, in his rejection of an internationalised scheme of colonial 
management. In the Fourth Letter, Burke reiterated his earlier points about 
France’s extension of its domestic constitution into new territories, now calling 
this its ‘Law of Empire’, based not on ‘principles of treaty, convention, possession, 
usage, habitude, the distinction of tribes, nations, or languages’ but instead ‘by 
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physical aptitudes’; a law of force.189 Burke argued that France must be stripped 
of its West Indies colonies, but insisted that these should not be occupied by 
Britain. In the course of this argument, Burke considered and rejected a proposal 
by Lord Auckland for a conjoined system of domestic colonial administration, 
named ‘Convention for Analogous Domestic Government’:190  
for [this] desperate case, [Auckland] has an easy remedy; but surely, in his whole shop, 
there is nothing so extraordinary. It is, that we three, France, Spain, and England, (there 
are no other of any moment) should adopt some ‘analogy in the interior systems’ of 
Government in the several Islands, which we may respectively retain after the closing 
of the War. This plainly can be done only by a Convention between the Parties, and I 
believe it would be the first war ever made to terminate in an analogy of the interior 
Government of any country, or any parts of such countries. Such a partnership in 
domestic Government is, I think, carrying Fraternity as far as it will go.191 
Burke’s objections range from racist hierarchies — ‘it immediately gives a right 
for the residence of a Consul (in all likelihood some Negro or Man of Colour) in 
every one of your Islands’ — to colonial administration — that a ‘Regicide 
Ambassador’ would attend all merchant, plantation and colonial council meetings 
— to limits on government and parliamentary powers: that no Orders in Council 
or Acts of Parliament on the West India Colonies could be debated or made 
without protests and interference from the French.192 Not only would the French 
become ‘an integrant part of the Colonial Legislature’ and, regarding colonial 
policy, of the British Parliament too, but, further, the interpenetration of imperial 
and domestic law and policy means this would be an effective ‘co-partnership’ in 
all domestic law: ‘as all our domestic affairs are interlaced, more or less intimately, 
with our external, this intermeddling must everywhere insinuate itself into all other 
interior transactions, and produce a co-partnership in our domestic concerns of 
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every description.’193 Any ‘analogy’ between colonial governments would, 
inevitably, spread to British ‘interior Governments’ proper, and they are a route 
through which Jacobin constitutional principles would inevitably flow into Britain 
and destroy it.194 Burke saw this possibility as risking a ‘total revolution in all the 
principles of reason, prudence, and moral feeling’.195 
Burke’s law of civil vicinage drew on the kinds of national and regional sentiments 
that motivated Bentham and Smith’s discussions of the domestic and international. 
Unlike those earlier writings, however, Burke was motivated by an almost 
apocalyptic sense of the kinds of upheavals that France’s constitutional changes 
might have in neighbouring countries. Seeing them as breaking and destroying the 
past juristic common heritage of Britain and Europe alike, Burke’s new 
interventionist principles of the law of nations, prompted by changes in a European 
state’s domestic law that violated natural laws, show how internally fixated 
international law could or should be. But in this and his rejection of any 
internationalised scheme of colonial management, it becomes clear that, for Burke, 
domestic ties as the basis of nation and constitution were also the building blocks 
of a just international order — as well as a useful polemical emphasis within an 
otherwise traditional juridical theory of the domestic and international. 
C Constitutionalising the International: Reform and Revolution in Later 
Bentham 
Despite their ideological differences, Burke and the post-Revolutionary Bentham 
were, on the question of the relationship of constitutional and international legal 
orders, closely aligned. Like Burke, Bentham’s response to the French Revolution 
was hostile and focused on its natural law and universalising aspects. But whereas 
Burke saw the Republic as acting contrary to natural law and the public law of 
Europe, Bentham argued that revolutionary claims were faulty precisely because 
of their invocation of natural law and natural rights, which he famously dubbed 
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‘nonsense on stilts’.196 Bentham returned briefly to his manuscripts on 
international law just before his death as part of his colonial writings.197 But 
Bentham’s post-Revolution thinking on the connection of domestic and 
international law was developed primarily in his mature writings on constitutions, 
as part of his writings on France, and in his final project of a ‘constitutional code’, 
where constitutional and international law formed one significant part. This turn 
to constitutions began to clarify some of Bentham’s earlier views on the interaction 
of domestic and international law. It lays the basis for Bentham’s near-exclusive 
focus in the 1820s and 1830s on free trade and constitution-making. Instead of 
aligning internal legal orders through treaties and agreements, Bentham thought 
writing and reforming constitutions — acknowledging some local peculiarities, 
but generally guided by the universal principle of utility — was the way towards 
internal and external peace. Bentham’s post-Revolution shift away from the 
international towards the domestic was, in a sense, constitutionalising his own 
earlier concept of the international: advancing the principles of international law 
not through schemes for perpetual peace or treaty agreements, but rather making 
them an increasingly important part of the constitutional orders of all states.198 
This shift from the international to constitutional was evident from at least 1790, 
when Bentham began writing on the French Revolution and the French Empire. 
While the term ‘international law’ is absent from these writings, concepts of world 
government and constitutional powers around foreign affairs were central to them. 
Writing in response to France’s 1789 ‘Articles de Constitution’, Bentham’s 
‘Projet of a Constitutional Code for France’ placed full sovereign powers in the 
National Assembly, and made the King’s executive powers subject to legislative 
oversight: the powers of ‘declaring war’, ‘making peace’ or ‘binding the Nation 
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by treaties’ required the Assembly’s consent.199 Bentham noted that this 
arrangement aimed to avoid the wide disagreements over whether treaty and war 
powers were part of executive power or not, arguing that, either way, these are the 
‘last of all powers that ought to be intrusted to the King’ because of the temptation 
to abuse them in service of ‘[p]ride and caprice’, and the wider despotic risks of 
coercive powers.200 Further, declaring war had major effects on everyday laws, 
suspending various rights and powers of citizens, and also removing the ordinary 
protections given to citizens of the enemy nation.201  
Bentham then conceived of general treaty-making powers as being essentially 
legislative, and unlimited, in that they might require any kind of change to internal 
laws. He also drew a connection between peace conditions and general treaties: 
‘peace can never be made as to any point besides the bare cessation of hostilities 
without producing equal changes in the effective result of the body of the laws. To 
cede a province is to demolish, to the extent of that province, the whole fabric of 
the laws.’202 Likewise, treaties are an establishment of law within territory, and 
thus involved legislative power: ‘The power of making treaties, if uncontrolled 
and unlimited, involves in it the whole of legislative power: since by inserting it 
as an article of a treaty no provision that can be imagined but [those which] might 
be made to pass into a law.’203 Bentham’s Projet thus saw a strong overlap 
between domestic legislative powers and treaty-making powers, emphasised the 
need for domestic implementation of treaty obligations, and recognised the 
importance of making these executive powers entirely subject to control by the 
legislature. 
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In the same vein, Bentham’s anti-colonial writings of the 1790s criticised France’s 
empire in terms of self-government and sentiments of humanity, rather than 
‘international law’. In Emancipate Your Colonies!, written and circulated in 1793 
but not published until 1830, Bentham exhorted Revolutionary France to grant 
self-government to its colonial possessions, drawing on their own rhetoric: ‘You 
choose your own government, why are not other people to choose theirs? Do you 
seriously mean to govern the world, and do you call that liberty? What is become 
of the rights of men? Are you the only men who have rights?’204 Against the likely 
objections that the empire must be unified and governed as a whole, or that 
provincial deputies might eventually be able to change French laws,205 Bentham 
argued for the wisdom of foreign advice in legislative assemblies as impartial 
observers: ‘Would you see your justice shine with unrivalled lustre? Call in 
commissaries from some other nation, and add them to your own. … The cool and 
unbiassed sentiments of these strangers will be a guide to the judgement, and a 
check upon the affections, of your own delegates’.206  
But most of Bentham’s arguments focused on the economics of colonies in terms 
reminiscent of Smith’s arguments for free trade. Colonies are not profitable under 
subjection, and would be profitable if they were freed and traded freely — but to 
this he added a general criticism that any profit to France would remain unjust 
because it is gained only by depriving the provincials of their property rights.207 
Finally, like Smith Bentham criticised the military power behind France’s colonial 
trading system, again using the Revolution’s own rhetoric: ‘While you take what 
suits you, keeping what does not suit you, you aspire openly to universal 
domination: with fraternity in your lips, you declare war against mankind’.208 
Bentham made here a charge of hypocrisy between domestic constitutional 
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guarantees and their refusal throughout the French Empire, which, he suggested, 
was not only unjust, but threatened the French constitution itself.209  
This domestic hypocrisy argument grew into the wider attack on the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and Citizen and the concepts of natural rights on which the 
Revolution was based that would become Bentham’s 1795 Nonsense on Stilts. In 
his notes on the motivations for writing it, Bentham stated that even if the 
Declaration were ‘nonsense’, it nonetheless demanded a response because ‘it is 
nonsense with great pretensions … of governing the world’.210 Throughout, 
Bentham argued that the French concept of natural rights either invalidates or is 
an affront to the legal arrangements within other states. The language of the 
Declaration is to ‘people’ everywhere, and it is a ‘source and model of all laws’ 
that takes as its ‘professed object … this self-consecrated oracle of all Nations’.211 
But rather than dealing with specific questions of whether one provision or other 
should be the law in France, and the underlying question of the utility of that law, 
the Declaration proclaims all its provisions as ‘fit to be made law for all men: for 
all Frenchmen, and for all Englishmen’.212 Whereas British legislative 
proceduralism channels ‘the selfish and hostile passions’ into discussion and 
voting on particular legislative changes, the Declaration’s abstraction inflames 
those passions, ‘to say to the selfish passions, there — everywhere, is your prey; 
to the angry passions, there, everywhere, is your enemy’.213  
Like Burke, Bentham saw the universalism of French domestic law as a serious 
problem, illustrated by many of the Declaration’s provisions. Article 1’s 
proclamation that all men are born equal in rights is tantamount to a duty to free 
them everywhere, requiring ‘the total subjection of every other government to 
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French government’, which is a ‘fundamental principle in the law of universal 
independence, the French law’.214 Article 3’s announcement that sovereignty 
resides in the whole nation requires popular elections, not just of the French for 
their government, but for all European nations, and in the absence of universal 
suffrage, extending to women as well as children, all acts of all European 
governments must be void.215  
Bentham then developed a wider critique around the Declaration’s natural law 
commitments for their conflicts with civil and domestic laws. Article 5’s provision 
of negative liberty, that ‘[w]hatever is not forbidden by the law cannot be 
hindered’, eliminates all powers of command and obedience — ‘domestic power, 
judicial power, power of the police, military power, power of superior officers in 
the line of civil administration over their subordinates’ — because the great range 
of context-specific commands (in the domestic power instance, in Bentham’s 
example, a father telling a son not to mount an unruly horse) cannot be found in 
the laws. These existing institutions are then ‘fundamentally repugnant to the 
rights of man’, and cannot fill the ‘gap[s]’ in the new code.216 Finally, in dealing 
with the 1795 Declaration of Rights and Duties, Bentham noted a further clash of 
civil and domestic duties. Distinguishing these terms, Article 4’s declaration that 
a good citizen must also be a good son, father, brother, friend, and husband creates 
a range of contradictions between civil and domestic duties: ‘The word civil gives 
name to one class of duties; the word domestic to another. Is it impossible to 
violate one law without violating another? Is there no distinction between duties? 
Is there no distinction between laws? does a man by beating his wife defraud the 
revenue?’.217 Declarations of natural rights and duties, for Bentham, created 
innumerable conflicts in everyday familial relationships, and problematically 
dissolved the legal boundaries between private and public life.  
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Against Revolutionary attempts at codes and declarations, and in line with his 
earlier project in the Introduction, from around 1800 onwards Bentham began 
circulating his own codes and essays on codification, and in these works started to 
clarify how he thought domestic, civil and international law ought to interact. In 
his 1802 ‘View of a General Code of Laws’, translated and published for a French 
audience, Bentham began to solidify the scheme of the Introduction for 
implementation in post-Revolutionary France. Among the parts of this general 
code was provisions on ‘Domestic and Civil States’. This title delineated the 
‘classes of persons’ who hold rights and duties by virtue of that class: ‘masters, 
servants, guardians, wards, parents, children, proxies, etc’.218 Bentham then 
distinguished these family members and workers from the powers of political 
officer holders and the duties of citizens; the classes founded on ‘political 
conditions — that is, those which are founded upon some political power, or some 
duty subordinate to it’, which is covered in the constitutional code.219 Bentham 
stated that the ‘domestic or civil state is only an ideal base about which are ranged 
rights and duties, and sometimes incapacities’, and that these are the ‘work of the 
law’, founded on, but distinguishable from, the ‘natural state’.220 All rules of civil 
law follow from various states of family or work life, and this makes the complete 
civil code comprehensible to all people.221  
Turning to the constitutional code, Bentham noted that the rights and powers of 
office holders ‘will not much differ from domestic rights and powers’, except for 
being usually divided into many different hands, which necessitated the 
concurrence of a range of wills to exercise those powers.222 Noting the lack of a 
‘universal political grammar’ — the difficulty of comparing different public 
powers or substantive offices in various nations — Bentham fixed on the aims, 
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methods and functions of public powers, dividing them into powers over persons, 
property, public things, individuals, collectives, classes, and civic remuneration 
and reward.223 Here Bentham introduced a strong connection between internal and 
external government. While the executive holds the powers of declaring war, 
making peace, and making treaties, those obligations bind the citizens and courts, 
thus turning international laws into internal ones, and making executive power 
really a ‘power of legislation’: ‘when [a sovereign] promises to another sovereign, 
that his subjects shall not navigate a certain part of the sea, he prohibits his subjects 
from navigating there. It is thus that conventions between nations become internal 
laws.’224  
This led Bentham to a delineation of codes along international and internal lines. 
The ‘international code’ would contain the duties and rights existing between 
sovereigns, divided into a ‘universal’ and ‘particular’ code. The universal code 
includes all duties and rights that a sovereign has ‘with regard to all nations’, which 
are ‘properly only the rights and duties of morality’ because states cannot or will 
not submit to adjudication.225 The particular code exists within each nation, listing 
the express and reciprocal treaty rights and duties with specific states enacted in 
internal law: ‘laws executed’, which ‘regard the two sovereignties in their 
character as legislators — when in virtue of their treaties they make conformable 
engagements in their collections of internal law. A certain sovereign engages to 
prevent his subjects from navigating a certain part of the sea; he ought then to 
make a change in his internal laws prohibiting this navigation.’226 These domestic 
obligations include abstaining from making certain internal laws, exercising or 
abstaining from certain sovereign powers (like sending or not sending military 
aid), and norms of personal conduct of the sovereign (using proper forms of 
address).227 The distribution and demarcations for internal laws should ‘guide’ the 
 
223  Ibid 196–7. 
224  Ibid 199 (emphasis original). 
225  Ibid 200. 
226  Ibid. 
227  Ibid. 
 Sentiment and Revolution: Political Economies of the International, 1750–1850 169 
arrangement of international laws. Treaty rights might be thought of as property 
rights, and war can be thought of literally as litigation, ‘a writ by which execution 
is made upon a whole people. The attacking sovereign is the plaintiff; the 
sovereign attacked is the defendant’.228 
Bentham’s early 1802 general code formed an early sketch for his final views on 
the relation of internal and international law within his incomplete project for a 
universal ‘Constitutional Code’, which occupied him from the 1820s to his death. 
Addressed to ‘all nations professing liberal opinions’, the Code would operate as 
a universal guidance in the structure of government which, if followed, would 
reduce disputes between nations and orient them all towards justice in a utilitarian 
frame. Central to this was a radical change in the relationship of domestic and 
international law, which Bentham understood through the obligations of each 
legislator to act for citizens and foreigners alike. This began with a general concept 
of the service of legislator. Explaining a legislator’s attendance requirements, 
Bentham drew a parable-like connection between domestic and legislative service: 
‘ART. 2. A domestic servant is a servant of one: a Legislator is a servant of all. 
No domestic servant absents himself at pleasure, and without leave. The masters 
of the Legislator give no such leave. From non-attendance of a domestic servant, 
the evil is upon a domestic scale: of a Legislator, on a national scale.’229 This 
service to the nation is explained in the extensive legislator’s ‘inaugural 
declaration’, which announced and entrenched government along utilitarian 
principles in a personal oath of office: ‘I acknowledge, as and for the specific and 
direct ends of Government’ the maximisation of ‘subsistence, abundance, security 
against evil in every shape’.230 This extended specifically to ‘evils’ sourced from 
both ‘internal adversaries’ and other rulers, who, ‘unless by apt arrangements 
debarred from all hope of sinister success’ will tend towards ill rule;231 an 
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objective of curtailing bad government in other states by domestic or international 
laws.  
But the most profound statement, cementing Bentham’s earlier writings on the 
connections of foreign governments and their people to the good ends of domestic 
government, appeared in the legislator’s pledge, ‘In International Dealings, Justice 
and Beneficence Promised’, which began by making this connection and 
equivalence explicit: ‘On the occasion of the dealings of this our State with any 
other States,—sincerely and constantly shall my endeavours be directed to the 
observance of the same strict justice and impartiality, as on the occasion of the 
dealings of the Legislature with its Constituents, and other its fellow-countrymen, 
of this our State.’232 Bentham’s pledge removed the usual nationalist preference, 
reframing the legislators’ duties as attempting to further the good of all states. Thus 
the legislator disclaims any attempt to add to the ‘opulence or power of this our 
State’ at the expense of the ‘opulence or power’ of another state, beyond what 
would be acceptable in fair competition between individuals.233 Demolishing the 
individual–state differentiation, Bentham declared that profits by conquest are 
robberies, that wars are crimes, that the taking of dominion without compensation 
or protection is unjust, and that the honour and dignity of a state cannot be 
increased by any of these things.234 Bentham’s creed ended with an exhortation to 
self-improvement and asylum, a promise to the citizens of all states: ‘Never, by 
force or intimidation, never by prohibition or obstruction, will I use any endeavour 
to prevent my fellow-countrymen, or any of them, from seeking to better their 
condition in any other part, inhabited or uninhabited, of this globe. In the territory 
of this State, I behold an asylum to all: a prison to none.’235 
Bentham’s late works turned from his early emphasis on utilitarian plans for laws 
between states to achieve international justice and peace to shaping their 
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constitutional laws towards the same end. The Revolution provided an early 
prompt for delving more deeply into codification that, by the 1820s, had turned to 
much more ambitious plans for complete constitutional codes that bound domestic 
legislators to also consider and serve the interests of foreigners as if they were their 
own constituents. By the time of his death, then, Bentham saw the domestic as the 
place where international obligations must be made real not by the threat of force 
but by the duties of lawmakers the world over to each other’s citizens. Bentham’s 
radical reshaping went well beyond the national fixation and acceptance of 
imperial territorial conquest and the rights of war in thinkers like Selden, Hobbes 
and Locke; it made the international central to constitutional thinking, furthering 
Bentham’s wider commitments to utility, representation, equity and publicity. 
D Two Legacies of the International: Austin and Twiss  
The first forms of the international in Bentham and Smith’s work took on two 
different directions from the 1830s onwards. The first was in John Austin’s (1790–
1859) work. Austin’s now-famous rejection of international law as not ‘real’ law 
but instead only sentiment, opinion and at best international ‘morality’, served to 
distinguish it sharply from sovereign-commanded domestic law.236 But Austin 
was deeply interested in international law. His chair at the University of London 
was not just in jurisprudence but also the law of nations. He read, discussed and 
admired Grotius and von Martens. Most importantly, his works paid careful 
attention to a range of problems of international law and the interaction of internal 
and external sovereign power and public law. While Austin is often seen as a more 
cogent successor to Bentham,237 given the importance of sentiment and anti-
nationalism in Bentham’s international Austin’s shift to a nation and sovereign-
centric account of law moved away from the spirit of Bentham’s original meaning 
and later works. If anything he is the inheritor of the early Bentham of the 
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Fragment: his ‘dismissal’ of international law and later discussions of the nature 
of sovereignty rely on examining the distinctions between domestic and 
international political society, touching on themes of dependence and 
subordination, and using examples of revolution and empire. This is partly about 
distinguishing ‘sentiment and opinion’ from law, and partly about establishing 
which ‘determinate’ bodies can make laws.  
While Bentham is remembered as a universalist legal theorist, contending that law 
might arrange public order on a global scale, most of his influential followers 
turned in the 1830s towards particularism, seeing the state and national societies 
as the only real location of legal authority, understood as sovereign command.238 
Austin’s The Province of Jurisprudence Determined was one major text of this 
particularist move, and it contained perhaps the strongest use of the idea of 
‘analogy’ between international and domestic law, albeit against Bentham’s 
vision. The domestic analogy was Austin’s means of denying the real lawfulness 
of international law, emphasising that it cannot truly bind sovereigns or national 
societies.239 Austin did not use the language of ‘municipal’ or ‘civil law’ in 
Province to refer to legal systems, and ‘domestic’ appeared briefly in relation to 
internal political disputes, imperial-sovereign relations and policies of protecting 
domestic industry, and to describe those ‘barbarous … domestic societies’ of 
families that are not ‘compacted’ by habitual obedience to a chief.240 ‘International 
law’, however, appears extensively, and analogies with internal laws are a major 
part of Austin’s wider efforts to define law, sovereignty and authority.  
Austin’s project was to begin to distinguish positive law from the ‘objects’ that 
are ‘allied or related’ to it through ‘resemblance or analogy’.241 Sorting through 
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the numerous ‘ties’ and points at which law ‘touches’ these objects would lay the 
ground for distinguishing morals and laws adequately, which was to be his major, 
unfinished next project.242 One recurring and misleading analogy was between 
international and domestic law; or rather, in Austin’s terms, between positive 
international morality and positive law. Rather than splitting these entirely, Austin 
argued that a rule set by general opinion was analogous to real law.243 Austin 
defined positive law as ‘set, directly or circuitously, by a sovereign individual or 
body, to a member or members of the independent political society where its 
author is supreme’.244 While jurisprudence examines positive laws without 
considering their moral goodness or badness, positive morality ‘might be’ part of 
‘a science closely analogous to jurisprudence’.245 Austin explained that this 
‘might’ was because one of its branches, the law of nations or international law, 
‘has been treated by writers in a scientific or systematic manner’, specifically, by 
von Marten’s positive or practical international law: ‘Had [von Martens] named 
that department of the science “positive international morality”, the name would 
have hit its import with perfect precision’.246 Austin then divided ethics into the 
science of legislation, which relates to positive laws, and the science of positive 
morality, or simply morals.247  
Expanding on morals, Austin introduced a lasting domestic–international allegory 
around the ‘club or society of men’. The internal rules of a club are simply 
indications of the general opinions of the bulk of members, and not properly laws. 
As imperatives they may be styled as laws or rules, but they are really simply rules 
of positive morality.248 Austin saw these kinds of rules as existing in all levels of 
society through general opinions of members, giving examples from professional 
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clubs to towns to nations to the international community.249 These are similar to 
‘rules of honour’ among ‘gentlemen’ or laws of fashion or, indeed, laws among 
nations: ‘there are laws which regard the conduct of sovereigns or supreme 
governments in their various relations to one another. And laws or rules of this 
species, which are imposed upon nations or sovereigns by opinions current 
amongst nations, are usually styled the law of nations or international law’.250 
Austin thus likened international law to the rules of a private members’ club; the 
‘mere opinions of beliefs’ that happen to be held by the bulk of recognised 
members. While elsewhere Austin used familiar examples of monarchs, 
counsellors and the state of nature as well, this image of the aristocratic or 
bourgeois social circle is new.  
Austin rejected any real analogy between domestic positive law and international 
law. He admitted there are very close similarities, but the difference was that 
international laws are set or imposed by general opinion and sentiments, and are 
thus not real laws, but only ‘styled a law or rule by an analogical extension of the 
term’.251 Austin’s problem with international law was not primarily about sanction 
or force but instead the lack of a clear, determinate body of authors of the relevant 
sentiments and opinions, and the lack of obedience and ability to command that 
underlies real lawfulness.252 His illustration of this was the law of nations: ‘The 
so called law of nations consists of opinions or sentiments current among nations 
generally. It therefore is not law properly so called. But one supreme government 
may doubtless command another to forbear from a kind of conduct which the law 
of nations condemns. And, though it is fashioned on law which is law improperly 
so called, this command is a law in the proper signification of the term.’253 What 
would be needed is a relationship of dependencies, illustrated by empire, 
colonisation, and international societies and families. These issues became 
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Austin’s material for more clearly defining society and sovereignty, leading to his 
ultimate inquiry into the defining characteristics of domestic sovereignty. Much 
of the difficulty of that definition comes from confederal or external interactions, 
and Austin went into extensive detail contrasting confederations in which 
members give up real internal power to a federal government by compact with 
simple alliances that could be broken at any point.254  
Austin’s emphasis on a set of clear delineations in a taxonomy of laws has strong 
Benthamite connections, and his ideas of the constitution and the international 
community as a set of classes or orders bears strong resemblances to Bentham’s 
and Smith’s accounts. But Austin’s rejection of the lawfulness of international law 
and the supposedly problematic analogies to domestic law was, unsurprisingly, 
never endorsed by later British international law writers.255 Indeed, one of 
Austin’s first rejectors, Travers Twiss, offers a second legacy of the international 
in the tradition of Bentham and Smith, rooted in political economy, Twiss’s area 
of expertise prior to international law, and focused on sentiment and opinion, albeit 
retaining a place for some forms of natural law reasoning.256 Twiss’s early works 
sought to create a juristic science of international law through a focus on 
independent political communities, and contended that sentiment and, especially, 
opinion, was the real absent judge of sovereigns. This entrenchment of sentiment 
and opinion sets the stage for the widespread debates over the domestic and 
international’s multiple manifestations in law, society and empire in the late 
nineteenth century, explored in the next chapter. 
Like Smith, of whom he was a critic and proponent, Twiss’s early works were 
concerned with morality and political economy and approached laws as both 
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universal and quasi-natural, like the ‘laws’ of population, but also changeable and 
aimed at certain valued ends. Twiss began his intellectual career as a writer and 
lecturer on political economy at Oxford. In his first lecture, after critiquing 
Thomas Malthus’s terminology and theories around populations and the growth 
of nations, Twiss argued that statesmen and positive laws must aim at stimulating 
population growth — now the only major, common problem of European states in 
the 1840s, which replaced issues of slavery, revolution and the imperial wars of 
the 1790s  — by remedying the true barriers to that growth.257 Twiss also 
examined law’s relation to domestic conditions, to explain his concept of the 
progress of civilisation. Law cannot be obeyed in wretchedness, and a people 
cannot develop their full capacities when their private home and public lives are 
marred by pollution, poor sanitation and harsh working conditions: ‘The remedies 
for such evils as these, which are internal to dwelling-houses and workshops, come 
rather within the sphere perhaps of domestic than political economy, as they 
originate in defective private arrangements.’258 Sanitation is a matter for the state 
because poor public arrangements lead to the ‘moral and physical deterioration’ 
of the population, which leads to disregard for laws, specifically peace and 
property.259 These reflections give way to a general consideration of the progress 
of civilisation in the examples of the civilised/barbarian distinction, subsistence, 
utopias and emergencies, with which Twiss concluded his lectures, arguing that 
the progress of morality and civilisation is part of the sturdiness of a population 
and a state’s ability to deal with emergencies.260 This view of progress and 
population became a central organising theme in Twiss’s thought, developed first 
through an extended critique of Smith in a series of 1847 lectures. Smith had 
ignored the distribution of wealth and thus did not recognise that population 
increase will not necessarily improve the wealth of a nation; consequently, his 
theory was unable to understand the impact of inequality, and its role in causing 
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events like the French Revolution, while a Malthusian focus on population could 
account for both.261 For Twiss, ultimately, politics and law between nations now 
focused on questions of political economy, within and between states.  
Even after Twiss moved to a chair in international law at King’s College London 
in 1852, his international law writings still held a strong sense of this earlier 
political economy work, especially in his approach to nation building and his 
Malthusian ideas about civilisation, growth and progress. With these commitments 
and interests came frequent analogies between national and international legal 
concepts. In a tract dealing with the ‘Oregon Question’, the US–British dispute 
over territorial ownership of the Pacific Northwest, Twiss provided a detailed 
survey of the geography of the territories, the legal arguments and doctrines 
deployed by the parties to the dispute, before examining the concept of territorial 
acquisition and its relation to dominium and domain. Twiss endorsed Vattel’s 
argument that possession of a country without a prior owner gives the ‘empire or 
sovereignty’ as well as the ‘domain’ over it.262 The empire and sovereignty aspect 
was, thought Twiss, a part of nation-building. Sovereignty is ‘a necessary 
consequence upon the establishment of a nation in a country’, and that national 
establishment may occur by immigration, colonisation, or the settlement of ‘vacant 
country’.263 Here Twiss approvingly quoted Vattel’s argument that the new nation 
‘though separated from the principal establishment or mother country, naturally 
becomes a part of the state, equally with its ancient possessions’.264 The domain, 
on the other hand, is a relation of property, directly analogous to an individual’s 
property rights, understood along the lines of the acquiring nation’s internal laws: 
‘The right of domain in a nation corresponds to the right of property in an 
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individual.’265 When a nation occupies ‘vacant country’, it ‘imports its sovereignty 
with it’, giving it the power not only to dispose of all property within the territory, 
but also an ‘exclusive right of command’ wherever it has taken possession.266 
Here, nations differed from individuals. A private person can settle an occupied 
country and gain his own personal independent domain over it, but to gain the 
‘exclusive right’ or the ‘empire’ over that country, he must represent a state.267 
Following that claim, the importation of municipal law was an ‘accessory of the 
right of settlement’: a coastal possession in the New World gives a nation 
‘exclusive jurisdiction over the adjoining seas to the extent of a marine league, as 
being necessary for the free execution of her own municipal laws’.268  
Twiss’s next work on international law dealt with another kind of international 
legal incursion that fixed directly on conflicts of municipal and international law 
and sovereign authority: Pope Pius XI’s attempt to establish Catholic bishoprics 
within England. Twiss contended that the Pope’s action was multiply unlawful, as 
a violation of English as well as European public law, and of the law of nations: 
‘a direct violation of the Statute Law of the land’; an intervention ‘within the 
dominions of an independent Sovereign’ without its consent; and a departure from 
long-established practice, ‘which in such matters constitutes the law’.269 Within 
this monograph of detailed argument, Twiss rejected the ‘parallelism’ raised by 
one of the Pope’s defenders which linked the acts of an English subject to acts of 
the Pope. While ‘the municipal law of England’ does not prevent English 
Catholics from becoming bishops, ‘it may be against the public law of Europe’ for 
the Pope to establish a bishop’s see without the consent of the English Crown, and 
although the Pope’s action might not affect the Crown’s supremacy in spiritual 
matters, it may still be an ‘invasion of its temporal superiority within the realm of 
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England’.270 Later, Twiss argued that Pius XI’s ‘new Hierarchy’ involving an 
‘organic bond of union’ between national bishops and an Archbishop who can 
unite and direct their conduct conflicts with the ‘genius of the constitution of the 
realm’.271 No ‘rival’ legislature can exist within the British constitution or make 
decrees that would conflict with those of the Queen and Parliament: the ‘sphere of 
what is held to be ecclesiastical action by the Roman Catholic Church embraces 
much which, by the law of the land, is considered to be within the precincts of the 
supreme legislature’.272  
By 1856, Twiss had returned to Oxford to take up the Regius Professorship of 
Civil Law, delivering an inaugural address that began by joining political economy 
and international law, and questions of domestic and international laws. ‘THE 
Science of International Law, like the science of Political Economy, is a fabric of 
comparatively modern structure’.273 Twiss then drew a sharp distinction between 
contemporary meanings of international law and their ancient antecedents, arguing 
that the ‘Law of Nations’ in its received sense, was largely unknown in antiquity 
and should not be confused with the Roman ‘jus gentium’.274 The jus gentium did 
not regulate the intercourse of nations, but rather ‘was that portion of Natural Law 
to which all mankind does homage, the least as feeling its beneficence, the greatest 
as not exempt from its control’, and as such ‘has accordingly been incorporated 
into the domestic code of every nation’.275 The formal definitions in Justinian’s 
Institutes cohered with Cicero’s view that the jus gentium was ‘common to all 
mankind as rational beings’, whereas the ‘leges populorum, or those rules of 
municipal jurisprudence which are special to each state’ are equivalent to civil 
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law.276 Thus while the jus gentium bound all states and became part of their 
domestic laws, it did not directly regulate their relations with each other.  
Twiss searched for the implications of this connection amidst the considerable 
expansion of international law in recent years. He argued that the term 
‘international law’ was more extensive and significant than ‘the law of nations’. 
The latter was a subdivision of the former, and can be contrasted with treaty law, 
which formed a separate branch of positive law, that Twiss likened to the division 
of common and statute law in the ‘municipal law of Great Britain’.277 Turning 
from British to German legal arrangements, Twiss endorsed the relatively new 
German nomenclature of ‘external Public Law as distinguished from the internal 
Public Law of states’, which indicated a ‘still wider application’ of international 
law to cover the laws governing the ‘private relations between the citizens of 
separate states’, recognised by ‘civilised nations’ and for the ‘common protection’ 
of those citizens.278 This branch of ‘the conflict of laws, foreign and domestic’ fell 
within private international law and outlined the rules ‘by which the conflict 
between the municipal law of different nations is to be appeased’.279 Nations 
ultimately still held the right of judging foreign laws on the basis of them being 
‘contrary to the policy or prejudicial to the interests of another nation’ — that is, 
according to their own constitutional, political or moral standards — but a 
presumption of respecting and applying foreign laws still formed part of the 
voluntary law of nations.280  
These detailed points on the interaction of internal and international law built 
towards Twiss’s general concept of international law and its relation to force and 
enforceability. Twiss disagreed with Austin strongly. While Austin ‘seems 
disposed to banish the term “international law”’ and replace it with international 
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morality, this approach misunderstands law as narrow superior command.281 
Twiss instead defined law as ‘the external freedom of the moral person’ that may 
gain its force from ‘self-protection’.282 The jus gentium, for example, comes from 
self-protection, founded on national self-submission to the laws common to all 
nations ‘by which its international life’ is regulated, and on the reciprocal wills of 
nations submitting to this law.283 Twiss here invoked public opinion and the 
Benthamite formulation of the ‘general happiness of mankind’, which he 
combined with a more providential account of progress in the judgment of history: 
The Law of Nations, in fact, has neither lawgiver nor supreme judge, since independent 
states acknowledge no superior human authority. Its organ and regulator is public 
opinion. Its supreme tribunal is history, which forms at once the rampart of justice, and 
the Nemesis by which injustice is avenged. Its sanction, or the obligation of all nations 
to respect it, results from the moral order of the universe, which will not suffer nations 
or individuals to be isolated from one another, but constantly tends to unite the whole 
family of mankind in one great harmonious society. Its province is to supply a secure 
foundation for building up the universal fellowship of the human race by the 
intercourse of nations and states; and its strength and efficacy is such, that no individual 
nation can lawfully prejudice it by any particular law or ordinance of its own.284 
In other words, the law of nations was not dissimilar to the rules of political 
economy; a foundation of principles to build universal sentiment, which cannot be 
affected or denigrated by the unjust internal laws of a state that seeks to act 
contrary to it.  
Twiss then related this concept of international law to the Benthamite method of 
observing laws and promoting general happiness. While ‘by observation and 
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meditation we ascertain what rules of international conduct best promote the 
general happiness of mankind, by applying those rules as opportunities for 
carrying them out present themselves, we shall make progress towards that 
admirable order wherein God has disposed all laws’.285 But unlike Bentham’s 
fixation on legislators of the world, Twiss looked to the international lawyer to 
achieve this general happiness. The ‘vocation’ of the international jurist, on which 
Twiss ended his inaugural, was to act as the ‘sentinel’ of this system, defending 
weak states against powerful ones, condemning war and conquest that went 
beyond ‘established doctrines of public law’, and constraining the conduct of war 
in general.286 Spreading the doctrines of international law will make them take 
deeper roots around the world, and ultimately prevent isolationism in nations and 
individuals alike, the note on which he ends the lecture: ‘The apprehension of 
perfect isolation may in this way operate as a counterpoise to the suggestions of 
covetousness or the promptings of ambition, and the conscience of a nation, as of 
an individual, may ultimately become a LAW UNTO ITSELF.’287 
The science promised in Twiss’s inaugural took on a more systematic form in his 
1861 treatise, which took its title and starting point from ‘independent political 
communities’, rather than states or nations.288 While Austin had used similar 
language in examining ‘independent political societies’ and ‘communities’, 
Twiss’s use of the phrase here was intended to react against Austin’s meaning, 
which was beginning to gain influence in the 1860s. In the Preface, Twiss 
‘regretted’ that, at a point of so much practical ‘progress’ in the project of 
‘establish[ing] the ascendancy of the Reason over the Will’, ‘certain eminent 
Writers, who have treated of General Jurisprudence’ — that is, Austin, though he 
is unnamed here — had adopted what Twiss dubbed a ‘primeval Notion of Law’ 
 
285  Ibid 59–60. 
286  Ibid 59–60. 
287  Ibid 60. 
288  Travers Twiss, The Law of Nations Considered as Independent Political Communities, vol 1 
(OUP, 1861). 
 Sentiment and Revolution: Political Economies of the International, 1750–1850 183 
which reduced law to the enactment of sovereign will alone.289 This was 
historically inaccurate, and failed to explain the many legal relations between 
states in the contemporary world that Twiss’s work would examine to detail.  
Instead, Twiss made the nation central. Independence was the ‘fundamental 
element’ that made a state into a nation.290 The nation was the ‘political body’ that 
could discharge the ‘obligations of Natural Society’ that it owed to other bodies, 
and work with them to regulate the ‘mode of discharging those obligations’ in their 
relations as communities or in the interactions of individuals among them.291 
Twiss emphasised that these national interactions are capacities that can operate 
‘without the consent of any political superior’:292 it is nations, not sovereigns, that 
are subjects of international law. Twiss went on to examine the ‘national state-
systems of Christendom’ and the Ottoman Empire, as the basis of the more abstract 
doctrines of the rights of nations. In dealing specifically with internal and 
international law, Twiss laid an extremely strong account of nationalist 
independence, termed the ‘Right of Empire’:  
THE Empire of a Nation Within its own territory is of Natural Right exclusive and 
absolute: it is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by the Nation itself, for any 
restriction imposed upon its exercise, deriving force from an external authority, would 
imply an impairment of a Nation’s Independence to the extent of that restriction, and 
an investment of Sovereignty to the same extent in that Power which had imposed such 
restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to the free exercise of the Right of Empire by a 
Nation within its own territory must be derived from the consent of the Nation itself.293 
What followed from this territorial focus was that the civil law of a state operated 
only within its borders. Rights over natural born subjects emerge from the personal 
obligations of subjects towards their sovereign, while the general control over all 
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persons and property within a sovereign’s territory is a ‘paramount right’ of 
empire.294 The discretion to enforce foreign laws, or extend a right over subjects 
into the territory of another, is a question of comity — what other states will 
reciprocally accept — rather than clear rules or rights.295 
E Conclusion 
This Part explored three early currents of reaction to the emergence of the 
international. Burke’s reactions to the French Revolution used a ‘law of civil 
vicinage’ to support interventions to contain the revolutionary–imperial project 
and its corruption of natural laws. Bentham’s later works similarly critiqued the 
natural law arguments of the revolution, but prompted his turn away from 
international law to the reform and rationalisation of constitutional systems that 
culminated in his 1820s attempts in the constitutional code to extend duties of 
good government to all nations. Austin’s account of international law not strictly 
being ‘law’ rested on centring the domestic commanding sovereign proved 
pivotal. But it is in the works of Twiss that the Benthamite and Smithian themes 
of political economy, sentiment and utility returned strongly. The evolution of 
Twiss’s early thought from political economy, to problems of territorial 
acquisition and papal intrusion into England, to a science of public opinion, to, 
finally, an anti-Austinian yet strongly nation-centric account of international law, 
shows an entrenchment of the main tenets of Bentham’s approach to law in its 
internal and international forms: that the examination of positive laws in each 
nation would be the basis for understanding their relations with each other; that 
law bore a strong relation to consent in a national frame; and that it was the task 
of jurists to clearly articulate and spread the correct doctrines of the law of nations 
to aim at peace between them. Yet Twiss broke with Bentham’s universalism and 
sentimental connections of humanity encapsulated in the latter’s early exhortation 
of ‘Oh My Countrymen!’ and the legislator’s oath to give credence to the 
happiness of other nations. Instead, for Twiss, the nation’s internal laws owe 
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nothing to foreigners, and any restriction by foreign or international law without 
its consent would be a breach of its independence. The question of the relationship 
of internal to international law was a constant topic of Twiss’s works. This shows 
the point at which, with the great expansion of treaties and the beginning of statutes 
as a major tool of reform, conflicts between domestic and international laws would 
soon become a central theoretical and practical dilemma for British jurists. Twiss’s 
final points on the rights of empire that took internal law as absolute sovereignty 
and national consent foreshadow the direction these debates would take. 
IV CONCLUSION: NATIONALISM, INDEPENDENCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
This Chapter examined the emergence of the international out of attempts to 
replace natural law thought with new natural laws of utility and political economy. 
Bentham’s excoriation of Blackstone’s Lockean taxonomy of the spheres of laws 
of nature, nations, and municipal law allowed Bentham to articulate a strong 
account of sovereignty as obedience and command that always had external and 
imperial dimensions. This laid the ground for his new word ‘international’ to 
describe the laws between states, which ought to be guided by principles of utility 
that should rationally reveal their shared interests to reject sovereign competition 
and national jealousies. But a rival international along similar lines appeared in 
Smith’s contemporaneous works, which used sentiment within families and 
nations as an alternative basis for understanding the common links and interests 
between them which, for Smith, undermined imperial projects of colonial 
preference and urged all nations to adopt domestic laws of free trade. In the 
aftermath of the American and French Revolutions, the domestic and international 
were put to a range of other uses. Burke seized on domestic ties to ground a law 
of civil vicinage that denied the international claims of French Revolutionary 
constitutions as contrary to the revived natural universal laws of property. 
Reacting in a different way, the later works of Bentham critiqued the Revolution’s 
revival of natural law ideas which gave way to projects of constitutional codes that 
developed Bentham’s account of the international as primarily an internal check 
on legislative power, culminating in the arguments of the unfinished constitutional 
code that legislators must approach domestic laws as owing duties to other states 
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and peoples too. In the wake of Bentham’s death, two divergent projects for 
Benthamite international law appeared: John Austin’s influential rejection of the 
international as law, and Travers Twiss’s continuation of the international as a 
project of political economy, emphasising and entrenching national independence.  
The next Chapter examines how the domestic and international became further 
entwined along these lines, spurred by the expansion of the Empire in the late 
nineteenth century, as part of projects of independence and interdependence. 
Independence is primarily associated with absolute parliamentary sovereignty, 
which made Parliament the centre of domestic implementation of new 
international rules and treaties, the focus and model for empire and the local 
parliaments in the colonies, and led to new uses of private and public law analogies 
to spread imperial government structures through the development of new rules of 
international law. Interdependence, on the other hand, became a focus for a range 
of new political projects, from racialised world order views that relied heavily on 
continuities of domestic and international law, to liberal progressive projects that 
emphasised domestic and international government as collections of represented 
men, to socialist revolutionary programs for uniting domestic working classes into 
‘the International’, to First World War plans to coordinate domestic governments 
for international peace. In all of these areas, the domestic and international, newly 
entwined, became central to projects of law, government and empire.  
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INDEPENDENCE AND INTERDEPENDENCE: ENTWINING, 
1880–1920 
I INTRODUCTION: ‘INDEPENDENCE IS RIVALLED BY INTERDEPENDENCE’ 
The engrained ‘origin point’ of modern theories of the relationship between the 
domestic and international is Germany, 1899,1 with the publication of Heinrich 
Triepel’s Völkerrecht und Landesrecht (International Law and State Law) often 
remembered as the first treatise built from the division of international and 
domestic law, and the foundation of contemporary dualist theories.2 For Triepel, 
the rules of international law occupied a separate field of application, distinct from 
the rules of internal or municipal laws, with different sources and subjects. 
International law was restricted to state–state interactions, finding its source in the 
express consent of states. Domestic law governed individual–state (public) and 
individual–individual (private) relations, but either way found its source in the 
state alone. This deeply positivist, state-centric view ignored the possibility of 
customary laws and practices of internal government or state-interactions, or of 
general principles of law evinced by the practices of ‘civilised’ nations, both of 
which were central to other juristic attempts to understand the relation of domestic 
and international.3 Like much German legal theory of the time, Triepel’s account 
was closely connected to the constitutional architecture of Germany’s unification 
in 1871, its vision of constitutions made not by writing but gradual unification of 
national will, the endurance of the Holy Roman Empire’s inter-polity imperial law, 
and Germany’s present imperial ambitions.4  
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British legal theorising on the domestic and international around the same time 
was motivated by a parallel set of changes in imperial-constitutional law and 
international institutions. Thomas Baty’s 1909 textbook began with a pithy 
statement reflecting this. ‘Since the Hague Conference of 1907’, Baty wrote, ‘it 
has become increasingly evident that the nineteenth-century conceptions of 
International Law must be revised. Independence is rivalled by Interdependence’.5 
This rivalry lay between old sovereign power and the new, tentative system of 
voluntary arbitration and the codification of various rules of international law on 
debts, warfare, and neutrality, among other things, announced at the Hague. 
Among Baty’s conclusions was the stern view that despite the new 
interdependence, territorial independence — ‘the absolute sacredness of a nation’s 
land’ — still formed the real basis of the law of nations; at least ‘until we have 
something better to put in its place’.6 The ability for nations to determine law 
within their own borders was central to that sacredness. But Baty strictly curtailed 
sovereign exercises of power beyond those borders, in terms reminiscent of 
Bentham’s critiques of colonialism, taking the public as the world tribunal of 
international law: 
When we see Britain occupying a custom-house in Nicaragua, and dispossessing 
the national troops by a show of force; when we see the United States landing 
marines at Colon or Amelia Island; when we see France coolly laying hands on 
Mitylene or Chantabin, — we are witnesses of flagrant illegality which is in its 
essence destructive of the independence of Britain, France and the States. We see 
them bartering away principle and security for the satisfaction of extorting a few 
thousand piastres, or salving a few warehouses. The fabric of society is territorial: 
if it is once admitted that one state can, without war, carry out its will by force in 
the realm of another, there is an end of all law and order. The national law is 
converted from an axiom into an hypothesis.7 
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International actions and imperial ambitions on the grounds of ‘independence’ 
could imperil national law and the fledgling international system. Actions backed 
by force beyond the confines of a sovereign’s territory were not just unsupported 
by law, but also destructive of independence. Unlawful uses of force, claims of 
territory, acquisitions of property all undermined both international and domestic 
law, throughout the world.  
Chapter Two ended with Twiss’s 1861 articulation of an almost mirror image of 
this problem. Twiss’s nation and independence-focused account of the interaction 
of domestic and international law ended with the ‘Right of Empire’; the need for 
national consent to any and all international laws, and otherwise absolute 
jurisdiction over people and property within a territory. Baty, writing almost fifty 
years later, pointed to how external rights of empire could threaten all forms of 
law. But the problems were not so distinct. This Chapter shows how the height of 
the Victorian empire prompted a turn to imperial law as a British-specific form of 
universal and universalising legal authority that began to entwine the domestic and 
international, seen in a variety of doctrinal projects tied to independence and 
interdependence. While empire has been an important connective theme in 
previous chapters, it is in the nineteenth century that it becomes central to British 
constitutional and international legal thought.8 Part One begins with empire and 
independence. With imperial expansion came new doctrines around the absolute 
sovereignty of parliament, emerging alongside a connected and expanded absolute 
executive power exercised well beyond the British Isles. This absolutist concept, 
reminiscent of the kinds of universal, natural and papal jurisdictions discussed by 
previous authors, is a form of internationalised law made stronger still; supporting 
the unlimited powers of the UK parliament within the British Isles and throughout 
the Empire to reject international limits on domestic power. Meanwhile, 
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international lawyers used a range of domestic law concepts as analogies to expand 
and build the claims of international law as the juridical face of imperial power. 
Part Two then turns to ‘interdependence’, arguing that the international and 
domestic were central to a range of political projects, and exploring their use in 
four portraits of rival theories of law and society that proliferated in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century: racial hierarchies, liberal progressivism 
and representation, socialist internationals and peace plans. 
II INDEPENDENCE: IMPERIAL PARLIAMENTS 
A Introduction 
This Part examines ideas of ‘independence’ tied to Parliament’s position as the 
focus of imperial and international law enactment, and its lasting image as an 
analogy for government and territorial control in international law writings. It first 
argues that the turn to Parliament as the institution for clarifying international 
law’s rules and doctrines gave way to a range of theories of parliamentary 
sovereignty that, far from insular in their absolutism, responded to international 
forms of law. It then shows how wider debates over the juridical nature of the 
empire and its colonies turned frequently to ideas of local self-government and 
imperial restrictions on international personality. Finally, it examines how 
international lawyers used domestic law concepts to create new analogies to spur 
the development of international law to support imperial claims in the 1890s: 
justifying territorial acquisitions, claims of protectorate government, and 
excluding a variety of non-European domestic legal systems.  
B Parliaments for Empire 
The late 1870s saw the British Parliament engage with international law in an 
unprecedented way. With the sinking of the Franconia and the landmark 1876 
decision that followed,9 Parliament began to pass statutes to replace the vague 
rules of international law with clearer principles and standards for the courts, 
which had to adjudicate questions of international law more frequently and of 
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increasing complexity. The next year, Parlement Belge cemented the requirement 
that rights derived from treaties needed enabling legislation to be clarified and 
made real in English law.10 These cases form one starting point for the theories 
examined here about the nature of the UK parliament; as a legislature for the 
British Isles, as well as an imperial legislature of global scope. With this shift, the 
domestic and international became increasingly entwined, reflected in a 
proliferation of new juristic work.  
In 1893, T E Holland gave a public lecture appraising this new statutory 
fascination with international law. Holland began by declaring that ‘[t]he whole 
question of the relation of National to International Law has been much 
misunderstood, and is indeed not free from difficulty’.11 Putting to one side issues 
of common law and customary international law, Holland fixed on the ‘points of 
contact’ between statutes and international law, dealing first with statutes that 
‘assert’ national rights — aliens, allegiance, territories — and then with those that 
‘perform’ international duties — enactments of custom or treaty obligations. 
According to Holland, these statutes ‘must be vigilantly watched’ in case they 
over-assert international rights or fail to fulfil international duties, either of which 
might justify another state going to war against Britain to vindicate them.12 In 
Holland’s detailed survey, a messy relationship between statute and international 
law emerged, leading him to conclude that statutes cannot ‘be taken as precisely 
measuring the international rights or duties’ of Britain; they rarely expressly use 
the terms ‘law of nations’ or ‘international law’; and judges presented with a 
conflict between a British law and a rule of international law would do their best 
to interpret the conflict away.13 Ultimately this relationship is fragmentary: ‘We 
may notice next, what has no doubt already become obvious, the fragmentary 
character of our legislation upon points of international interest. We have statutory 
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enactments only upon points which have happened to call to them the attention of 
Parliament; while points of equal importance, but which have not attained this 
accidental prominence, have been left to the operation of the Common Law.’14 
Holland concluded with the suggestion that his survey ‘perhaps … suggest[s] the 
necessity of some study of the limits which are imposed upon national legislation 
by the principles of International Law’.15  
Constitutional writers had been vigorously fighting against precisely this kind of 
limitation for at least the preceding decade. Holland’s close friend A V Dicey 
(1835–1922) provided probably the most extreme — and influential — refutation 
of it in his 1885 Lectures Introductory to the Law of the Constitution.16 Taking up 
Austin’s characterisation, Dicey saw international law as mere morality, incapable 
of abrogating or limiting Parliament’s absolute sovereignty, and leaving it as the 
only conduit for international law’s incorporation into domestic law, which, at 
whim, Parliament could repeal and revoke. Yet while Dicey is usually 
remembered as antagonistic to or dismissive of international law, his treatment of 
its relationship with domestic law, and particularly the doctrine of absolute 
parliamentary sovereignty, reveals a more nuanced approach. Before he took up 
the Vinerian Chair in 1882 and turned to constitutional law, Dicey had already 
published on private international law and used that book as one basis for an 
application for a chair in international law in the late 1870s.17 And although in the 
Lectures he endorsed Austin’s account of international law as morality, Dicey 
raised similar doubts about constitutional law and jurisprudence in general. Dicey 
considered whether constitutional law was not law at all but rather a mix of history 
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and custom, suggesting that it might best be studied by historians or legal experts 
familiar with custom, namely, a professor of jurisprudence, who deals with the 
‘oddities or the outlying portions of legal science’, or of international law; 
‘because he being a teacher of law which is not law, and being accustomed to 
expound those rules of public ethics, which are miscalled international law, will 
find himself at home in expounding political ethics which, on the hypothesis under 
consideration, are miscalled constitutional law’.18 Were Dicey to endorse it and 
Austin’s view, his international would be the rules of public ethics applied 
throughout the nations of the world, just as constitutional law would be those rules 
of political ethics that are acknowledged and applied within the domestic sphere.  
Instead, Dicey argued that constitutional law contained rules which ‘directly or 
indirectly affect the distribution or the exercise of the sovereign power in the state’: 
who holds power, how they exercise it, and the territory over which this 
sovereignty extends, where these ‘rules’ include both laws followed by courts and 
‘conventions, understandings, habits, or practices’ that might be termed 
‘constitutional morality’.19 Although Dicey does not return in this argument to 
international law or general jurisprudence, this capacious idea of constitutional 
law as sovereign power would include much of international law, and his idea of 
‘constitutional morality’ as conventions, understandings, habits or practices could, 
equally, describe the international morality of relations between states, or rather 
between the ministers and sovereigns that represent them. These theoretical 
foundations in the Lectures suggest the international might be more important for 
Dicey’s account of constitutional law than the apparent brash rejection. 
The importance of the international to Dicey’s articulation and defence of absolute 
parliamentary sovereignty becomes clear in his exposition of it, which proceeded 
by rejecting three alleged ‘limits to it, each of which are illustrated by legal 
problems external to the state. The first asserted limit was that neither the 
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‘principles of morality’ nor the ‘doctrines of international law’ — as ‘private or 
public morality’ — could invalidate an Act of Parliament that opposed their 
strictures.20 Rejecting this, Dicey first noted Blackstone’s argument that the laws 
of nature are superior over any human laws, ‘over all the globe, in all countries 
and at all times’, and touched on a recent case in which the judges implied that 
‘[c]ourts might refuse to enforce statutes going beyond the proper limits 
(internationally speaking) of Parliamentary authority’; namely, legislating for 
subjects or foreigners beyond its territorial jurisdiction.21 Dicey instead insisted 
that this simply meant that in interpreting a statute, judges will presume that 
Parliament did not intend to violate the principles of morality or international law, 
and will, where possible, interpret a statute consistently with both.22  
The second supposed limit was that Parliament could restrict the exercise of the 
prerogative. Dicey responded by turning to treaty-making. While prerogative 
rights like the right of making treaties lies with the Crown and is exercised by the 
government, these rights could still be regulated or abolished by Parliament, for 
example by legislating restrictions on the ‘mode in which treaties are made’ or 
making Parliament’s assent to a treaty necessary to its conclusion.23 Turning then 
to the third apparent limit, that Parliament cannot bind its successors, Dicey 
invoked the Act of Union and statues on the taxation of colonies. For Dicey, the 
domestic enactment of the international agreement between the nations of England 
and Scotland, fundamental though it is as the constitutional basis of the UK 
Parliament itself, could be repealed by that Parliament by ordinary majority at any 
point. Likewise, the Taxation of Colonies Act 1778 announced Parliament’s self-
limitation of its right to impose duties and taxes on colonies. It seemed to Dicey 
impossible that it would be repealed or its spirit violated. While ‘policy and 
prudence’ would counsel against that, there is ‘under our constitution no legal 
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difficulty’ in repealing or overriding it.24 The current parliament remains just as 
sovereign as the earlier one to repeal or override laws, and these changes would 
be legally permissible, though certainly not without severe political and prudential 
consequences that make exercising that legal power practically unthinkable. 
‘Parliamentary sovereignty is therefore an undoubted legal fact’ and no other 
constitutional power may rival or limit it.25  
Dicey only returned to international law as a legal system towards the end of the 
Introductory Lectures, in his discussion of constitutional conventions. Stating that  
constitutional conventions derive their power solely from public approval, Dicey 
noted that this is ‘very like’ contending that international law’s conventions are 
‘kept alive solely by moral force.’26 He argued that ‘[e]very one, except a few 
dreamers’ agreed that respect for ‘international morality’ was due largely not to 
its moral but physical force; the ‘armies and navies, by which the commands of 
general opinion are in many cases supported’.27 Dicey used this analogy to 
conclude that constitutional conventions derive their force not from direct public 
assent, but instead a kind of national morality. Dicey also briefly considered the 
question of treaties altering the law of the land, arguing that a treaty made by the 
Cabinet is valid without Parliament’s authority or sanction. In light of Parlement 
Belge, which he had earlier noted as a case that touched on constitutional law but 
might go unnoticed, Dicey stated: ‘it is even open to question whether the treaty-
making power of the executive might not in some cases override the law of the 
land’.28 Added to the three points above, these two points form the five mentions 
that the international received in the Law of the Constitution in both its 1885 and 
1915 forms.  
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Despite the brevity of these mentions, the international is significant for Dicey. In 
articulating his tenets of absolute domestic power, Dicey raised then dismissed 
limits that were external to Britain. While Dicey is seemingly dismissive of 
international law’s status as law, it is nonetheless necessary to raise and then deny 
its encroachment on domestic parliamentary sovereignty. These arguments could 
have used other examples, or pursued different justifications that paid no attention 
to international law (or indeed the treaty undergirding Britain), or rested solely on 
logical or definitional arguments, or a range of other means. Contrast Dicey’s 
choices with William Anson, whose influential 1886 treatise mentions neither the 
law of nations nor international law in its volume on parliament, but endorses 
Dicey’s view, subject to an insistence that legislative omnipotence requires public 
opinion in support of it.29  
But the most important point is the intensity of Dicey’s resistance to the 
international. Dicey presents the strongest and most influential account of 
Parliament’s status as the gatekeeper between treaty obligations or other general 
developments in international law, and the laws of the United Kingdom. But this 
is not simply internally-fixated or chauvinistic nationalism: Dicey was a keen 
observer and commentator on international events, and the Law of the Constitution 
is itself deeply steeped in the legal aspects of European diplomatic history. Instead, 
the international forms a kind of spectral legal language that other states and 
empires might likely appeal to in order to limit Britain’s imperial ambitions. The 
strength and absolutism of Dicey’s view of absolute domestic power, which then 
extends into empire, seems motivated by this possibility. That likelihood is further 
strengthened by his treatments of internal and external imperial action, and of 
public opinion, examined below. 
Before turning to Dicey’s treatment of the constitutional law of empire, it is 
important to note that Dicey was not alone in theorising Parliament as the focus 
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for international law in the nineteenth century, and the conduit between it and 
domestic law. In Henry Maine’s last work, his 1887 Whewell lectures on 
international law, Maine likewise focused on the legislature and international law, 
but to put forward a kind of natural-historical monism that contrasts with Dicey’s 
emphasis on domestic enactment that made his position akin to dualism.30 Maine 
asserted international law’s separateness from domestic ideas of law and criticised 
the recent focus on legislatures as the markers of international law’s true authority. 
This formed part of Maine’s wider rejection of Austinian thinking, which he found 
to be convincing enough in accounting for the general nature of contemporary law, 
but utterly incapable of grasping or illuminating the historical development or 
movement of law and legal ideas. International law might not be law in Austin’s 
view, but this rested on a misconception about what the international was and how 
it worked.  
In explaining this position, Maine took his characteristically historical approach to 
the issue of international law’s spread, authority and sanction. He drew an analogy 
between the spread of Roman Law and the recent ‘self-propagation’ of 
international law to counter criticisms of international law’s illegitimacy or less-
than-lawlike character on the basis of it not being introduced or sanctioned by a 
domestic legislature.31 Genuine legislatures were of ‘very recent appearance’ in 
Europe: most were councils to the sovereign, most laws had spread historically 
through the ‘literate classes’ of lawyers and clergy and community acceptance of 
their views, rather than positive enactment, and, most importantly, laws simply do 
not rely on these institutions for their spread or authority: ‘When then we are asked 
by what legislative authority International Law came to be adopted so as to make 
it binding on particular communities, we should rejoin that the same question must 
first be put respecting the extension of Roman law and of every other system of 
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law which, before the era of legislatures, gave proof of possessing the same power 
of self-propagation.’32  
The turning point for Maine’s anti-legislature account of international law’s 
development and relation to domestic law was the Franconia case. This 1876 
decision formed a landmark in the development of ‘modern’ international law in 
Britain, examining whether the development of international law doctrines on the 
extent of territorial waters were automatically incorporated into the law of 
England, and leading to the passage of the Territorial Waters Act 1878 to settle 
the extent of admiralty jurisdiction by statute.33 For Maine, England ‘very nearly’ 
split from the views of the ‘civilised world’, specifically those taken up by 
American jurists and the US constitutional system. Maine railed against Cockburn 
CJ’s view for the majority that assent to international law required ‘a public action 
which its Constitution recognises as legally qualified to adopt a new law or a new 
legal doctrine; that is, in Great Britain by an Act of Parliament or by the formal 
declaration of a Court of Justice’.34 Instead, the ‘historical method’ tells against 
this supposed need to legislate, or to look to the legislature as the font of all real 
binding law. Maine reiterated that systems of law have historically spread without 
legislation, again citing his earlier example of Roman civil law, and then drawing 
a further analogy with the ‘improvement’ of morality in ‘the East’ as occurring not 
through the imposition of legislation, but by organic development. International 
law was a code in precisely the same way as this progress of civilisation. It was 
founded on ‘new morality’, discovered within the ‘supposed Law of Nature’.35 
International law was characterised not by incorporation, but by its universality; 
its slow, almost autochthonous spread, that is not declared or changed at whim by 
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legislatures, but instead represents genuine moral change in the nations and 
peoples of the world. 
Other jurists steadfastly rejected the idea that there was much morality or progress 
spread by international law, and certainly not in its impact on domestic 
sovereignty. Regius Professor of Civil Law James Bryce’s treatment of 
sovereignty emphasised its popular basis and its only real domestic limitation in 
the opinions of its leading thinkers. Ending an article on the nature of sovereignty, 
Bryce concluded that contemporary states had returned to the Roman conception 
that sovereignty resides in the people: ‘[I]n the internal affairs of a State, power 
legally sovereign — even if the Constitution subjects it to no limitation — ought 
to be exercised under those moral restraints which are expected from the 
enlightened opinion of its best citizens, and which earlier thinkers recognized 
under the name of Natural Law.’36 The problem, for Bryce, was that morality had 
made very little progress in the relations of states: ‘The sphere in which no 
Sovereignty de iure exists, that of international relations, where all power is de 
facto only, is also the sphere in which morality has made least progress, and in 
which justice and honour are least regarded.’37 Bryce thus saw sovereignty, 
whether domestic or international, as legally unlimited. The difference between 
the ‘spheres’ lay in a lack of an ‘enlightened’ international opinion comparable to 
that within a state that might lead to moral progress or constrain power 
prudentially. Contrary to thinkers like Bentham or Twiss, Bryce implicitly denies 
that opinions about morality might move beyond borders to form a basis for 
condemning international wrongs or vindicating international rights. 
In this way, Bryce shared the vague autochthonic and internal-fixation of Maine 
and Dicey’s view of the constitution. Bryce’s innovation was to frame this in the 
language of flexibility and rigidity that reinforced the domestic basis of all 
constitutions. Britain’s constitution was built from British traditions, customs, 
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understandings and beliefs partly codified into statutes as ‘flexible’ — ‘they can 
be bent and altered in form while retaining their main features’ — whereas those 
constitutions that were ‘works of conscious art’ were rigid, ‘because their lines are 
hard and fixed’ and thus were incapable of responding deftly to national opinion 
as it evolves.38 These laws and customs ‘through and under which the public of a 
State goes on’ is its Constitution, and any sense of spirit or principles from them 
‘gives to this mass a character different from that of the Constitution of any other 
State; just as each great nation has what we call a National Character’.39 For Bryce 
the true constitution was confined to the British Isles, with its several nations 
represented by their parliamentary seats.  
But Bryce’s constitution was nonetheless built for international action. Dealing 
with a constitution’s ‘capacity’ for ‘territorial expansion’, Bryce emphasised that 
flexible constitutions were best suited for ‘taking in other communities’ by 
conquest or treaty, particularly those nations ‘passing through periods of change, 
whether internal or external’.40 Within the British Isles that expansion involved 
altering and admitting members to the Parliament and suppressing certain offices 
in Scotland and Ireland, but ‘[h]ere, however, England has stopped’: ‘The vast 
dominions which she possesses beyond the oceans, while legally subject to her 
Crown and Parliament, have not been brought into the constitutional scheme of 
the motherland. Indeed they could hardly be brought in without a reconstruction 
of the present frame of government, which would probably have to be effected by 
the establishment of a Rigid Constitution.’41 On this basis, Bryce’s view of the 
constitution did not provide any limits to colonial and imperial interactions, or the 
Imperial Parliament’s dealings with colonial legislatures. What remained 
fundamental was that the constitution be thought of as the laws and customs that 
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undergird and make possible the public life of a state, and that this be expressive 
of its ‘national character’.42 
C Domestic Empire 
These more theoretical expressions of the interaction of domestic and international 
that centred on the status and powers of the Parliament in its ordinary and imperial 
forms had wide effects in the many theoretical debates about law and empire. This 
section examines the ideas of domestic and international within Britain’s 
‘domestic empire’ — those settler colonies that remained linked by race and 
religion (or, in Ireland, conquest and geographical proximity) to the ‘motherland’ 
— and their use in visions of imperial legislative connections to ‘home’: the 
executive structure of empire, debates over Home Rule, the ideas of union, 
submission, imperial federation, and powers of self-government. 
Ireland presented the most limited powers of self-government among Britain’s 
settler colonies, and provoked the most extensive constitutional debate of the late 
nineteenth century. Quite literally framed in the language of domestic control, 
Home Rule was ardently opposed by the major constitutional jurists of the day: 
Dicey, Anson and Bryce were among its most prominent intellectual opponents, 
couching their objections in constitutional analysis.43 Dicey, for example, 
published a long series of articles and books that argued that various forms of 
Home Rule risked ‘dangerous if not fatal innovations’ to the British 
Constitution.44 But Home Rule also formed the basis for wider debates about the 
nature of the UK’s constitutional-imperial-international personality, namely, 
whether it was a unitary or federal state, and whether that nature changed beyond 
the British Isles.  
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In his 1890 lecture on ‘Home Rule and Imperial Sovereignty’, the Corpus 
Jurisprudence Professor Frederick Pollock sought to show that home rule was ‘not 
an ordinary question of domestic policy, nor even a domestic question of 
constitutional policy’ but instead involved wider issues and consequences: it 
would announce a new constitution for Ireland and also the British Empire, and 
would constitute ‘a revolution’ in the relations of colonies and possessions to the 
Imperial Parliament.45  
After noting that imperial rule often involved the importation of English law, or 
the partial sufferance of local law, Pollock rejected the idea that Ireland had any 
‘native form of government or political institutions’ or a kind of civilisation 
distinct from British government and institutions which might be restored.46 While 
the machinery of Gladstone’s 1886 Home Rule plan approximated that of a self-
governing colony by allowing for local legislative power combined with general 
imperial policy of non-interference, Pollock drew a sharp distinction between self-
governing colonies like Victoria or New Zealand and Ireland that made a 
relationship of habitual non-intervention impossible for the latter.47 A relation of 
colonial dependence that was ‘permanently compatible’ with non-intervention 
rested on the dependent community first, ‘frankly accept[ing] self-government 
with all its consequences’ and, secondly, being not only content to preserve its 
connection with the Empire but also show an ‘active willingness’ to ‘suffer some 
particular inconvenience on some occasions for the sake of maintaining the 
connection’.48 Without any ‘positive value’ to the ‘Imperial connection’ or a fear 
of revolution or foreign conquest, colonies would simply work towards formal 
independence.49  
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While these conditions were fulfilled in the colonies from convenience and 
security, and, Pollock thought, ‘in no small part … a matter of sentiment’, they 
were absent in Ireland. Pollock saw the only possibility for a plan of Home Rule 
would be to make the new ‘Anglo-Irish constitution as difficult to alter as the 
federal constitution of the United States or of Switzerland’, which would introduce 
a statute holding supremacy over the rest of the ordinary legislation that governs 
the rest of the Empire.50 This would ‘destroy the supremacy of the Imperial 
Parliament’ and turn the imperial English state into a federation.51 While Pollock 
admitted this might be appropriate in the future, at present it was a ‘fool’s 
paradise’; an abdication of the UK’s ‘sovereign power and responsibility in these 
realms’ not out of hopes for the ‘good to come, but in sheer weariness and 
despair’.52 Seeing sentiment as the ‘moving force of human action’,53 Pollock 
thought that the sentiments around Home Rule risked destroying Britain’s 
constitutional arrangements. 
The juridical nature of the Union formed another prominent thematic problem of 
the international and domestic in the wider empire. William Anson saw the Acts 
of Union joining Scotland and Ireland to the United Kingdom as treaties that 
absorbed two independent Parliaments into the third, guaranteeing ‘certain terms’ 
of representation, and that instead that these terms must be studied by the 
constitutional lawyer by linking them to the wider empire: ‘Our work is not done 
until we have made out the nature of the bonds which connect England with 
Scotland and Ireland, and the United Kingdom with the various parts of the Empire 
which lie scattered over the habitable surface of the earth’.54 For Anson, those 
bonds tied dominions and dependencies to the field of constitutional law, but, 
contra Dicey, he examined their unity not through the imperial parliament but 
rather the Crown. His analysis began with local offices and authorities within the 
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United Kingdom — the Home Secretary, and municipal corporations — through 
to executive controlled adjacent islands, then the colonies, then India, and finally 
protectorates, dependent states and spheres of influence, ‘where we trench on the 
subject of foreign relations’.55 Anson’s categorisation showed a continuity of these 
aspects of the Crown, emanating from Britain outwards, and moving from the 
domestic crown to its external operations. 
While much of the debate about imperial and colonial laws fixed on legislative 
capacities, some influential accounts saw many overlapping functions of internal 
and external law enforcement in new executive departments that came with the 
late nineteenth century expansion of cabinet government. Indeed, Anson’s work 
illuminated another connection of domestic and international in its treatment of 
these new offices under the Crown. His Law and Custom of the Constitution, 
published from the late 1880s to early 1890s, almost entirely ignored Parliament’s 
imperial-international roles and instead focused on the executive’s functions in 
these spheres.  
Detailing the rise of the Home Office and Colonial Office, Anson explored the 
legal powers of regulation, enforcement and notification that characterised this 
new bureaucracy. The Home Secretary’s responsibilities spread across domestic 
and international legal events: communicating between crown offices, notifying 
local officials on ‘State intelligence’ matters like declarations of war or treaties of 
peace, admitting people to citizenship, preserving the ‘amicable relations’ between 
British and foreign subjects, and overseeing extraditions, territorial waters 
complaints against foreigners, and the Foreign Jurisdiction Act 1890.56 Anson 
also emphasised the Home Secretary’s general responsibility for the ‘internal well 
being’ of the nation, and especially the relations between the central and local 
governments, and social welfare legislation.57 In parallel ways, the Colonial 
Secretary’s responsibilities for internal and external colonial legal relations led 
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Anson to insist that ‘colony’ was a ‘geographical’ rather than ‘political term’ that 
did not imply any particular form of government.58 Rather, the forms of colonial 
government depended on the relations between legislature and executive, but 
remained at all times subject to general control by the Crown through its powers 
to legislate for colonies, veto local colonial laws, control the composition of the 
executive in each colony, and its status as their representative figurehead.59 Anson 
proposed a taxonomy of these forms of self-government, with gradating powers 
of independence from the central imperial government.60 
Beyond the British Isles, this new imperial–international law formed the model for 
understanding the gradual spread of self-government in Britain’s settler colonies. 
J A Froude began his influential 1886 survey of the extent of empire, Oceana, with 
what he called Harrington’s ‘dream’ — a single commonwealth united by popular 
government — which Froude thought was impossible precisely because of this 
form of government: ‘One free people cannot govern another free people … [the 
colonist] cannot submit to an inferior position, and the alternative arises whether 
the mother country shall part with its empire or part with its own liberties’.61 But 
where Froude saw impossibility, most other jurists recognised the possibility of 
balancing empire and liberty by degrees and through gradual change. For Dicey, 
the empire formed a sub-set of the world approximating the international 
community. Reflecting on the changes in the meaning of ‘imperialism’ in 1905, 
Dicey took up Bryce’s point that while in 1865 ‘imperialism’ meant autocratic 
rather than constitutional government, exemplified in Louis Napoleon and always 
unfavourable, by 1905 it had come to a ‘positive’ meaning: ‘the wish to maintain 
the unity and increase the strength of an empire which contains within its limits 
various more or less independent States’, and which described US citizens and 
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British subjects alike.62 A set of ‘more or less independent’ states at that point 
described most of the world, largely owing to the spread of empires. 
Within the British Empire, these greater or lesser degrees of independence were 
questions about the freedoms of the executives and legislatures in each colony 
relative to their imperial master. Dicey’s view of the imperial treaty-making power 
formed the mirror image to colonial legislative freedoms. Whereas successive 
editions of Law of the Constitution did not expand much on Dicey’s 1885 points 
on international law generally, laws beyond Britain in their many forms — treaties, 
colonial and imperial (federal) arrangements, conquests, foreign policy — 
received much more in-depth treatments and an increasingly important position 
for his views on constitutional law, and a much more complicated view of his uses 
of the domestic and international.  
Colonial–imperial legislative relations provided conceptual finesse to Dicey’s 
ideas of ‘sovereign’ and ‘non-sovereign’ parliaments. Constitutional arrangements 
had a close relation to international personality. As part of his lengthy discussions 
of colonial–imperial legislature relations, Dicey drew a distinction between 
sovereign and non-sovereign legislative assemblies around whether they were 
‘constituent bodies’. Dominion parliaments ‘are not in reality sovereign 
legislatures’ because the Parliament of Great Britain, ‘which legislates for the 
whole British Empire, is visible in the background’, and because colonies lack the 
constitutional power to conduct their own foreign affairs: they ‘do not act as 
independent powers in relation to foreign states’, reflecting their degrees of 
independence within the empire.63 But Dicey also provided examples of 
seemingly sovereign legislatures, apparently representative of their states that, he 
contended, lacked this constituent nature.64 Using Bryce’s distinction, Dicey 
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argued that France’s rigid constitution meant its assembly was not truly sovereign, 
while the British Parliament’s flexible ability to alter all laws meant it was.65 
While the imperial-constitutional links between the Empire and its colonies might 
be flexible and capable of change over time, for the moment they presented an 
international restriction on the domestic powers of colonies. Dicey analysed this 
connection through the mix of treaty-powers, colonial executive law-making, 
imperial statutes, general constitutional principles, and a flexible evolutive view 
of self-government. Recognising the Imperial Parliament’s supremacy made it 
unnecessary to carefully limit colonial legislative powers: ‘the home government, 
who in effect represent [the imperial] Parliament, retain by the use of the Crown’s 
veto the power of preventing the occurrence of conflicts between colonial and 
imperial laws’.66 Treaties bind the colonies, ultimate treaty making power resides 
in the Crown, and thus in accordance with Parliament’s restrictions on that power 
the colonies could only have authority to make their own treaties if an Act 
authorised them to do so.67  
But Dicey allowed colonies a large measure of discretion in treaty implementation, 
with each legislature ‘free to determine whether or not to pass laws necessary for 
giving effect to a treaty entered into between the imperial government and a 
foreign power’, relating this to the differences in ‘sentiment’ and local opinion: 
‘there might in practice be great difficulty in enforcing within the limits of a colony 
the terms of a treaty … to which colonial sentiment was opposed.’68 While Dicey 
held on to the direct effect of imperial laws within colonies, he also noted that 
practically this has receded in recent years. ‘The tendency … of the imperial 
government is as a matter of policy to interfere less and less with the action of the 
colonies’, except, Dicey noted, ‘in the case of political treaties, such as the Hague 
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Conventions’ where the Imperial Parliament would not bind colonies directly but 
rather include treaty clauses that allowed them to adhere to the agreement if they 
wished.69 International law and federal language had other uses for describing 
semi-independence. In articulating the principle that colonial laws were invalid if 
they are repugnant to an Act of Parliament applying to the colony, Dicey called 
this a policy of ‘non-intervention in the local affairs of British dependencies’ that 
rested on a practical demarcation of competencies — the Imperial Parliament 
attempted to avoid encroaching ‘on the sphere of colonial legislation’ and the 
colonial parliaments avoided ‘the domain of imperial legislation’, rendering 
conflicts rare.70 Finally, the term ‘constituent bodies’ gives way to looking for the 
‘marks of subordination’ in a legislature: flexible systems bear no marks and 
always retain the power to change the meaning of constitutional law itself. Rigid 
constitutions — those with entrenchment, or subordination — cannot. Here, then, 
powers of foreign affairs and treaty-making were the theoretical linchpin of 
Dicey’s view of the imperial constitution and sovereignty itself.  
These marks of subordination matched the kinds of ideas international lawyers had 
looked to in marking out semi- or quasi-sovereignty that sought strong connections 
between domestic constitutions and international personality as primarily about 
independence. To develop his concept of sovereignty in his major 1894 textbook, 
the Cambridge Whewell Professor of International Law John Westlake, a close 
associate of Dicey’s, turned to independence defined through constitutional links, 
with the British Empire forming the main examples Westlake explored. Westlake 
rejected the possibility of independence existing in degrees, and conceptualised 
international independence as a lack of constitutionally-entrenched ‘dependence’: 
‘Independence, like every negative, does not admit of degrees. A group of men 
dependent in any degree on another group is not independent, but has relations 
with that other group which as between the two are constitutional relations. 
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Sovereignty is partible.’71 Full sovereignty in a ‘group of men’ means it has ‘no 
constitutional relations making it in any degree dependent on any other group’, but 
if it has any kind of constitutional relations, they determine the ‘kind or degree’ of 
‘semi-sovereignty’, and Westlake noted the constitution might ‘not call it by that 
name’.72 Calling semi-sovereignty ‘partial independence’, however, would be ‘an 
abuse of language’.73 Independence from other polities, enshrined in a 
constitution, is the requirement of proper sovereignty and international 
personality. Because many polities were not independent, Westlake turned to 
examine these kinds and of dependency, and considered the effects that these 
different sorts of constitutional links between polities have on international 
personality.  
Like Dicey, Westlake’s clearest marker of independence is freedom in foreign 
affairs. Constitutional structures between a state and its dependencies may exclude 
the dependent from ‘any public intercourse with foreign states’ or any independent 
foreign policy or diplomatic connections, or it may severely restrict them, as the 
Holy Roman Empire had. Westlake put these arrangements in conjoined terms of 
constitutional and international sovereignty. States like France and Britain are 
‘sovereign and independent constitutionally as well as internationally’, while 
states ‘nominally hampered by a weak constitutional tie’ are merely treated by 
others as though they were sovereign and independent.74 Writing of the Transvaal 
in 1899, Westlake noted that all dominions, regardless of their freedom in internal 
affairs, cannot hold foreign relations distinct from those of the UK. Breaking away 
from this involves a move from constitutional relations to international ones: 
Thus they became separate, or what in recent controversies has been called 
international, states, and not only that but sovereign international states, because the 
foreign relations allowed them were uncontrolled; they were at their sole option. There 
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were in the conventions which recognized them certain stipulations as to their conduct 
towards the natives, but these were only treaty matters. The stipulations were such as 
we might have in a treaty with any other power; they were no vestiges of supremacy.75 
Moving to full independence was, however, all a question of practice, convention 
and the opinion of full sovereigns. In Chapters, Westlake illustrated this point by 
an analogy to the British Constitution, likening the authority of the fully 
independent Great Powers to that of the House of Commons: ‘how much of real 
independence is implied by the concurrence of the crown and the house of lords 
[sic] can only be known from the history of earlier struggles: machinery is apt to 
work smoothly when the power of its different parts to resist has been tested and 
is known.’76 Westlake’s engineering metaphor — struggle and resistance as 
smoothing and clarifying real power — is striking, reflecting the broader issue of 
the operation of laws and domestic analogies in the wider, non-self governing 
Empire, where the domestic and international functioned as technologies of 
control and development. 
D Analogies for Empire 
Whereas the British Isles and self-governing colonies evoked close connections 
between constitutional and international legal ideas, the interaction of domestic 
and international played a still more diverse role in attempts to understand, 
theorise, justify and create the wider empire and its laws. The relationship appears 
in many facets of imperial juridical thinking. This section focuses on three. First, 
the combining of public and international law to constitute imperial relations in 
areas controlled by the Crown without self-government; most prominently India. 
Secondly, the use of analogies with domestic law, specifically property and 
government, to explain and justify a new international law of territorial 
acquisition. Thirdly, the wide interest in a kind of quasi-‘law and development’ 
agenda that aimed to reform the internal laws of states under British control (India 
and the African colonies) or those not under direct imperial control, but which 
 
75   John Westlake, The Transvaal War (CUP, 2nd ed, 1899) 9–10. 
76   Westlake, Chapters (n 71) 98–9. 
 Independence and Interdependence: Entwining, 1880–1920 211 
sought ‘admission’ to the European system of public law: the Ottoman Empire, 
China, Siam, and Japan. This expansion was linked to the considerable interest 
and activities of multilateral treaty making that used the ‘conference’ to solve 
‘questions’ of importance for Europe: the 1856 Paris Conference that ‘admitted’ 
the Ottoman Empire into the public law of Europe, the 1877 Berlin Conference to 
deal with the ‘Eastern Question’ of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, the 1885 
Berlin Conference that planned European colonial expansion into Africa, and the 
1899 and 1907 Hague Conferences to codify the rules of international law.77 These 
international events reflected a need not just to codify, declare and spread 
international law, but also to agree on the modes and ways in which that spread 
would take place. In all these cases, the international was a conduit for demanding 
and coordinating changes to the domestic laws of other states to support imperial 
designs.  
The first sustained examination of the interaction of international law and 
constitutional law as joined spheres of principles explaining political rule emerged 
in Westlake’s work, which built on his account of semi-sovereignty examined 
above. Westlake sought to theorise the position of India — both as a part of the 
constitutional empire, and holding some kind of international legal personality — 
as a pressing example of the overlap and affinities between the constitution and 
the international. Contrary to the experience of self-governing colonies, the Indian 
states underwent a reversal of constitutional development: gradually losing rather 
than gaining the ability to manage their own foreign affairs and thus claim genuine 
statehood. Jamaica underwent the same — albeit more rapid — shift following the 
1865 Morant Bay rebellion, moving back to Crown colony status and losing its 
self-government powers.78  
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India’s longer history of political and legal arrangements formed, for Westlake, a 
‘remarkable example’ of the way in which ‘international relations’ through law 
may ‘shift in substance while remaining unchanged in form’.79 Reading the 
Crown’s assumption of direct rule from the East India Company following the 
1857 Rebellion as really a part of constitutional rather than international history, 
Westlake likened Britain’s relations to the Indian principalities as similar to those 
between the states constituting the Holy Roman Empire. He insisted that the 
‘native states’ lost their independence ‘not through any epoch-making declaration 
of British sovereignty’, but gradually, as they ceded their foreign affairs powers to 
the Crown.80 This shifted ‘the affairs of India from an international to an imperial 
basis, although that course neither began with it nor was completed by it’.81 It 
removed a formerly international society and replaced it with an imperial one: 
‘The isolation of the native states was the negation of an international society, and 
subordinate cooperation in maintaining the pax Britannica implied that the peace 
to be maintained was the peace of the imperial state to which the cooperation was 
subordinate.’82 
Westlake endorsed a doctrine whereby the terms of these various treaties can be 
overridden by the ‘paramount power’ of the Crown whenever the ‘interests of the 
Indian people or the safety of … British power are at stake’.83 This power was 
based on same indefiniteness and limitlessness that the British parliament holds, 
which Westlake noted is ‘defined by being, wisely or not, left undefined. That to 
which no limits are set is unlimited. It is a power in India like that of the parliament 
in the United Kingdom, restrained in exercise by considerations of morality and 
expediency, but not bounded by another political power meeting it at any frontier 
line, whether of territories or of affairs.’84 With this retained, ever-present 
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paramount power, drawn from the domestic British constitution, Westlake 
ultimately saw British Rule in India as replacing the semi-independent 
international status of the Native States with an imperial-constitutional 
relationship.85  
But the connection went beyond control to an analogy with the English experience 
of the endurance of its constitution, combined with an analogy of imperial and 
domestic missions of good government, which, for Westlake, became in India a 
question of precedent and ‘constitutional tact’:  
The sense in which England understands the task which has been set to her in India is 
at least as fixed as that in which she understands the duty of the state in her own islands, 
a practice now of many years’ standing has settled with much certainty the restrictions 
which that task places on written terms, and subject to those restrictions the treaties 
and grants are sacred. If such a situation leaves much to precedent and constitutional 
tact, the princes and people of the native Indian states may reflect that England relies 
on precedent and constitutional tact for her own liberty and good government.86 
The system of ‘treaties and grants’ in India could be understood analogously to 
the settlement of the British Isles themselves, likewise by treaty and an amorphous 
sacred guarantee to rule for liberty and good government. This arrangement, 
Westlake insisted, was more ‘safe under a constitutional system than under an 
international one’ because the constitutional connection precluded internal wars 
and foreign interference, and promoted the ‘guardianship of fellow feeling’ that 
unites subjects of the Queen.87 India thus formed the specific illustration of 
Westlake’s earlier definition of independence as the absence of constitutional 
restrictions on the conduct of foreign relations through law. Constitutional 
relations, then, could eclipse international personality entirely.  
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While domestic law analogies were important for reconceiving the post-1858 
international-constitutional position of the British in India, they also became 
fundamental to understanding the 1880s expansion of empire, in new uses of ideas 
of property, territorial control, the government of ‘uncivilised peoples’ by 
European powers, and the interaction of colony and metropole. In Chapters, 
Westlake saw the link between territory and property as a ‘special point of contact’ 
between international and national law, and one worthy of close attention. That 
contact was an analogy and a ‘borrowing’, with Westlake noting that ‘certain 
international rules dealing exclusively with public interests have been borrowed 
from private law’.88 Territorial states and the idea of property shared close 
connections that became engrained in Westlake’s development of international 
law doctrines. For Westlake, a state’s rights within its territory bore a ‘great 
resemblance’ to property rights, and this connection was even clearer during 
international law’s formation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the feudal 
‘confusion’ between government and property, the state and its sovereign, as well 
as the influence of state of nature theories around the same time.89 With the state 
analogised to an individual without a common superior, and then further 
analogised to men in the state of nature, the ‘door was opened for the introduction 
into international law, under the name of the law of nature, of no small part of the 
private law of Rome on obligation as well as on property’.90 
Westlake fleshed out this special point of contact in the longest chapter of his book, 
which examined territorial sovereignty and the acquisition of ‘uncivilised regions’, 
and based its analysis on a thorough analogy from domestic property and 
constitutional ideas of protection and progress to international rights. Title to 
property in the ‘old civilised world’ of Europe and the Asiatic states of ‘different’ 
civilisation cannot be properly understood except as an ‘irreducible situation of 
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fact’; the accretion of conquest, cession, and conveyance reached too far back in 
time to be relevant to either international or national law: 
You may discuss the origin of either [civilisation] by way of philosophical or 
prehistorical speculation, but with no relevancy to international or to national law. You 
may discuss the motives for maintaining either, with some relevancy to international 
or national legislation, but with no other relevancy to law. Thus, the title to territorial 
sovereignty in old countries not being capable of discussion apart from the several 
dealings, as cession or conquest, which transfer it, we must turn to new countries.91 
These newly established colonies, in contrast, resulted from the territorial 
sovereignty and claim of the imperial state, and the treatment of any ‘uncivilised 
natives’ was not a question for international law but instead was ‘left to the 
conscience’ of the acquiring state.92  
Westlake considered native tribes to lack any form of government or sovereign 
power recognisable or communicable to European powers, focusing his 
justification on the colonisers’ supposed inability to understand the internal laws 
and legal principles of that tribe: ‘Is any territorial cession permitted by the ideas 
of the tribe? What is the authority — chief, elders, body of fighting men — if there 
is one, which those ideas point out as empowered to make the cession? With what 
formalities do they require it to be made, if they allow it to be made at all?’.93 
Absent clear answers to these questions, Westlake concluded that tribes lacked 
any real domestic laws and were simply incorporated into the acquiring power as 
subjects, though, he insisted, with a stronger claim on their new governors than 
the ‘common claim’ of ordinary British subjects: ‘they have the claim of the 
ignorant and helpless on the enlightened and strong; and that claim is the more 
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likely to receive justice, the freer is the position of the governors from insecurity 
and vexation’.94  
Moving from property acquisition to a denial of recognition, Westlake contended 
that government is the ‘international test of civilisation’, meaning not ‘mental or 
moral characters’ or ‘domestic and social habits’ but rather a standard of protective 
government that can support the ‘complex life’ of Europeans, or, at least, one that 
can ‘protect the natives in the enjoyment of a security and well-being at least not 
less than they enjoyed before the arrival of the strangers’.95 These principles were 
clearly aimed at Westlake’s central target: a discussion of the incompetence of 
particular tribes to understand or sign treaties, directed against Portuguese claims 
to acquisitions, reinforced by his contention that civilising influence still must be 
within a zone of occupation, under the direct control of ‘a civilised government … 
in operation under the direct authority of individuals of European race’.96 Property 
and government must go hand in hand with European rule for legitimate claims to 
extend an empire. 
Westlake’s third extension of international law through domestic analogies was 
the use of the concept of protection, akin to self-government in settler colonies, 
but here applied to ‘uncivilised regions’ and spheres of influence. Protectorates 
within Europe involved a state giving up its independence and, specifically, the 
management of its foreign affairs in return for defence, and retaining some form 
of international existence, albeit at most semi-sovereignty. As with India, this was 
a ‘constitutional relation’, where the protector state gains ‘authority … over the 
foreign affairs’ of the protectorate, and also determines what ‘may be allowed … 
in [its] internal affairs’.97 Protector and protectorate together ‘constitute a single 
system, possessing and exercising all the powers which belong to civilised 
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government, and not subject to the interference of any third state as to the 
distribution of those powers but regulating that distribution for themselves’.98  
Beyond Europe and in ‘uncivilised regions’, however, Westlake denied that these 
relationships involved two states, but rather merely claims by imperial powers to 
‘assume and exercise certain rights in more or less well defined districts’, which 
are called protectorates only by analogy.99 These assumed rights were held by the 
imperial power itself, and excluded all other states from exercising their authority 
within the area, meaning that the imperial state ‘represents and protects the district 
and its population, native or civilised, in everything which relates to other 
powers’.100 Effectively, the uncivilised ‘protectorate’ held the same status as the 
state’s own territory. This concept of protectorate, based on the Berlin Conference 
agreement, made the right to exclude other powers contingent on the imperial 
protector fulfilling the ‘duties’ that attached to the right of protection, namely the 
civilising mission, the pursuit of which granted full powers of sovereignty over 
the area. Exclusionary property rights and territorial sovereignty were not the only 
analogies here. Westlake ended by linking these civilising duties with a new 
‘exception’ based on a different domestic law analogy: that a protectorate was 
‘comparable to the personal relation of guardianship’, and thus ‘may not be 
alienable by cession as territorial sovereignty is’.101 The ‘uncivilised protectorate’ 
was thus held still more closely than any other territory, a limitation by analogy to 
guardianship and trustee status, limiting the usual rights to dispose of property at 
will.  
Doctrinally, protectorates raised difficult questions about the nature of domestic, 
imperial, international and foreign jurisdiction, which reflected the complex 
problems of theorising British control and the amorphousness of the Crown. When 
Westlake turned to British jurisdiction within protectorates, and questions about 
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the extent to which the Foreign Jurisdiction Act 1890 gave the Crown jurisdiction 
over foreign subjects within protectorates, he argued that this jurisdiction was 
‘necessary’ to performing the international duties that attached to (and justified) 
Britain holding those protectorates. This was not a question of international but 
rather constitutional law, specifically, the Crown’s power to make legislation by 
orders in council.102 The Foreign Jurisdiction Act provided that the Queen may 
exercise the jurisdiction she had in 1890, or any time after, that she might gain in 
a foreign country. Westlake argued this should include protectorates: they are 
foreign countries, rights in them are distinct from rights of territorial sovereignty 
‘by however thin a line’, and thus Britain held jurisdiction over all persons, of 
whatever nationality, within them, for the purpose of ‘maintaining order and 
enforcing rights’.103 This acquisition of jurisdiction involved the connection of 
constitutional and international law, which Westlake read through the analogy of 
conquest: ‘The power which the crown has in a conquered country is that which 
is conferred on the state by international law, and which is deposited in the crown 
because the constitution of the United Kingdom has made no provision for its 
being deposited elsewhere. In the same way the power which international law 
confers on the state in the case of a protectorate is deposited in the crown till 
parliament may provide for its being deposited elsewhere.’104  
Distinguishing this instance from the Franconia, Westlake argued that gaining 
authority over a protectorate under a newly developed international doctrine on 
control over them was a question distinct from whether English internal 
jurisdiction could be enlarged by changes in international law. New ideas about 
protectorates do ‘not affect the jurisdiction of an English court or anything else 
internal to the realm of England’.105 Westlake then endorsed arguments that the 
crown had actually asserted jurisdiction in protectorates, which meant it had 
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denied other states the ability to establish their own ‘foreign extraterritorial 
jurisdiction’ and, in the more closely-held protectorates, additional powers over 
internal order: ‘in the protectorates where [Great Britain] has invested herself with 
fuller powers, while refraining from any undue invasion of internal sovereignty, 
she has secured to herself sufficient authority to meet all contingencies’.106 
Questions of excluding other states and gaining internal authority were separate, 
but connected by assertions of jurisdiction.  
A final area of analogies between domestic and international law occurred in the 
examination and ‘improvement’ of domestic legal systems within the Empire and 
beyond it. For European jurists generally, the gradual acceptance of non-European 
states into European international law was predicated on internal legal reforms that 
evidenced ‘civilisation’, and for British jurists specifically, this ought to take place 
following the British example. In dealing with this theme, British jurists 
articulated an idea of the progressive development of legal systems that reflected 
the historicization of both domestic and international law, through the evaluation 
and criticism of the deficient legal histories of non-European polities. 
This tendency began with British efforts to reform internal legal systems within 
the Empire. The historicization and progressive development of legal systems was 
a central fixture of late nineteenth century British thought. For Maine, the central 
figure in this movement, understanding the spread of international law and 
understanding the progressive development of domestic laws formed connected 
concerns. Extending his analysis of the parliament’s relation to international law 
and relating it to the influential themes of his earlier works on the development of 
law in village communities,107 and as noted above Maine drew a connection 
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between ‘improving’ the morals and laws of the East and the spread of 
international law: 
In the East a body of new moral ideas is sure in time to produce a string of legal rules; 
and it is said by those who know India and its natives well that the production of what 
for want of a better name we must call a Code is a favourite occupation with learned 
and active minds, though of course in a country which nowadays follows to a great 
extent the morality (though not the faith) of Christian Europe, and receives new laws 
from a regularly constituted Legislature, the enthusiasm for new moral doctrines is 
ever growing feebler and the demand for legal rules accommodated to them is 
becoming less.108 
As noted above, Maine argued that international law was a code in precisely the 
same sense: founded on ‘new morality’, discovered within the ‘supposed Law of 
Nature’.109 This pointed to a wider importance for ideas of progress and 
development in imperial attempts to understand the East.  
Colonial possessions had long formed ‘laboratories’ for experiments in law and 
administration, and by the close of the nineteenth century, even these experiments 
came to be described in explicitly imperial terms. In two connected essays, Bryce 
drew lengthy comparisons between the Roman and British imperial attempts to 
‘incorporate’ and ‘improve’ absorbed or conquered races, arguing that the 
entrenchment of domestic law was proof of both civilizational progress for 
conquered peoples and the superiority and excellence of that law.110 Rome’s 
reform of the laws of its conquered races evidenced its superiority, just as 
England’s extension of both the common law and (limited) legislative government 
evidenced the superiority of the British empire. India was Bryce’s central example, 
where the ‘reciprocal action’ of English and Native law revealed the progress of 
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gradual adaptation to local customs, gentle instructions, and the rationalising of 
superstition. 
Beyond imperial internal law reform, British jurists frequently appraised the 
internal laws of non-European states, beginning with a focus on the Ottoman 
Empire. The 1856 Paris Peace Treaty, which ‘admitted’ the Ottoman Empire to 
the ‘privileges’ of European public law, marked one beginning of British juristic 
interest in schemes to reform the internal political and legal organisation of a range 
of difficult ‘Eastern questions’. Introducing his collection of major treaties and 
documents on these questions, Holland announced that the ‘condition’ of the 
Ottoman Empire was of concern to all of Europe, that Europeans ‘extend[ed] their 
sympathy to the subject races’ of the Ottomans, and recent treaties were the ‘title 
deeds’ by which those dependencies had been ‘wholly or partially freed by the 
European concert from the sovereignty of the Porte’.111 The 1884 edition of 
Twiss’s treatise noted that the terms of the 1878 peace between the Ottoman and 
Russian empires evinced an Ottoman willingness to ‘adjust its civil institutions to 
the general European standard’,112 which complemented his extensive 
examination of the constitutional, imperial and international legal connections 
between the Ottomans and their Balkan Christian dependencies (some now 
independent).113  
By the start of the twentieth century, this general civilizational superiority 
argument extended beyond the Empire, to other Eastern states more generally. In 
1899, Dicey argued that the British constitutional form had spread throughout 
Europe, adopted by all nations except Russia and the Ottomans, and had even 
‘invaded’ Japan.114 There, Dicey, concluded ‘the adoption of the forms of 
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constitutionalism by an Eastern race utterly devoid of Parliamentary traditions’ 
was ‘conclusive evidence that to the men of to-day representative government 
appears to be an essential characteristic of a civilized or progressive state.’115 By 
the end of the nineteenth century, the domestic constitutional form of the British 
Parliament — its representation, sovereignty and independence — was the 
international standard to which British jurists thought all nations should aspire. 
E Conclusion 
This Part showed a first phase in the entwining of the domestic and international 
around parliaments, empire and new domestic law analogies. From the 1870s 
onwards, Parliament’s imperial and international law-implement roles made it a 
focal point for ideas of absolute sovereignty. Constitutional and international 
lawyers alike then used these theories of parliamentary power to understand a 
variety of imperial–international questions raised by local self-government in 
colonial possessions. The clearest use of domestic law concepts was in the 
extensive analogies for articulating international law doctrines around imperial 
control of India, and territorial acquisition and governmental control in new 
‘uncivilised’ territories. Together these formed the main uses of the domestic and 
international as expressions of independence and absolute sovereignty. 
III INTERDEPENDENCE: NEW VISIONS OF SOCIETY THROUGH LAW 
A Introduction 
At around the same time, ‘interdependence’ emerged as a counter to independence, 
albeit one that frequently served empire too, as a parallel conviction, reminiscent 
of Bentham’s work, that examining the many internal laws that now had 
international effects, and reforming them in each of the world’s nations must be 
the focus of international law’s development. This vision acknowledged that 
insisting on absolute internal sovereignty in the way Dicey had left little to no 
room for genuine international action or cooperation, because that had to take 
place through changes to domestic laws. The previous Part examined the absolute 
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imperial sides of the international and domestic in the late nineteenth century. This 
Part turns to a more divergent set of uses for the relationship. It examines four rival 
juridical trends that re-thought domestic and international society along the lines 
of interdependence that emerged in the 1880s and carried through to the aftermath 
of the First World War. First, scientific racist visions of constitutions and 
international law used allegories and analogies to taxonomise social interactions 
as built from the hierarchies of ‘achievement’ in the legal ordering of different 
races.116 Second, British liberal progressivism and ideas of representation and 
public opinion at the domestic level spread quickly to their visions of international 
society. Third, socialist accounts of the international connections of classes within 
states heralded a radically different idea of the domestic and international as 
strongly connected, particularly in political movements aimed at taking over each 
capitalist state. Fourth, peace plans used the categories of domestic and 
international in a variety of configurations to attempt to prevent future wars. In 
each of these accounts, jurists used the interactions of domestic and international 
in service of different visions of law, society and politics, made possible by the 
tensions between the two spheres. 
B Racial Hierarchies 
While imperial constitutional and international laws used a range of analogies to 
explain and justify empire, a longer associated current of scientific racism 
underlay a set of orderings in detailed legal theories of national unity and 
international hierarchies based on racial groupings, which in turn grounded 
expansive visions of the relationship of domestic and international laws. The most 
significant jurist in this trend was James Lorimer, Regius Professor of Public Law 
and the Law of Nature and Nations at Edinburgh — a chair founded by Queen 
Anne in 1707 to mark the Union — from 1862 until his death in 1890. Basing his 
account of law on the science of ‘ethnology’, Lorimer claimed to be the first jurist 
begin his general approach to law from the standpoint of ‘interdependence’ over 
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independence, raised specifically against Twiss.117 With this combination, 
Lorimer made both race and interdependence central to his account of domestic 
and international law.  
The domestic had long been a feature of Lorimer’s work. In his 1863 inaugural 
address, Lorimer argued that the ‘minutest’ municipal laws were based on the 
same ‘great principles’ and aimed at the same ends as the law of nations — well-
being and progress in the physical, moral, intellectual senses — and were sought 
by the same general means: the ‘vindication … of the correlative principles of 
liberty and order’.118 Lorimer sought to demonstrate that domestic and 
international law were linked by these correlative principles that reflected natural 
law: ‘there is no obstacle to our reading the book of natural law in municipal as 
well as in international regulations’.119 But because the stakes were higher in 
interstate disputes than municipal ones, it seemed, to Lorimer, their principles 
must differ somehow. Conceiving of public law as having both municipal and 
international ‘departments’, Lorimer argued that where public law dealt with the 
relations of independent states (‘in which it may be said to be twice-public’) it 
encountered higher principles than municipal law.120 Public law in its international 
form ‘is occupied with interests so vast as to lend altogether a novel and even 
startling aspect to principles which are so familiar as to pass almost unheeded 
when their action is exhibited in the other departments of jurisprudence’.121  
This had a strongly sentimental, even sublime, aspect for Lorimer that could never 
be reached in municipal law disputes. With international disputes ‘our imagination 
is taken captive, and our attention is arrested, by the deep and terrible significance 
of principles which in municipal law would have led at most to a protracted 
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litigation, or the disruption of a mercantile contract, when fleets are manned and 
armies march forth for their vindication, or when states are torn asunder in 
consequence of their neglect.’122 Lorimer moved from this sublimity and terror to 
the excitement of public interest and the need for public discussions as the basis 
of the law of nations. That international disputes led to this excitement and public 
interest, and that they were not resolved technically and by courts, was actually 
valuable for developing wider understandings of international law compared to 
municipal law: ‘Being surrounded by fewer technicalities, and encumbered by less 
traditional machinery than most of the branches of municipal law, the law of 
nations is regarded as the only department of jurisprudence which is altogether on 
a level with the popular understanding.’123 Because its regulations form only a 
‘thinner coating’, the ‘vital principles’ of the law of nations are brought up much 
more quickly than in domestic law, complicating it for public discussion.124  
Lorimer insisted this discussion must take place throughout the world and was 
central to the development of the law of nations. It derived its authority as a 
‘system of positive consuetudinary law, from the general conscience of civilised 
mankind … a characteristic which is common to it with municipal laws within the 
narrower sphere of operation’.125 The law of nations must be contrasted with 
municipal laws because it ‘continues, at every moment of its existence, to be 
dependent on public sentiment for its binding force’, specifically because of the 
lack of a ‘cosmopolitan tribunal’ to judge disputes or an executive to enforce its 
decrees.126 Instead, all of ‘civilised and intelligent mankind’ are the judges of the 
law of nations, who provide the only principles on which states can ‘proceed with 
confidence to enforce its provisions’.127 For Lorimer, the basis of the law of 
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nations was public conscience,128 and while prior to the French Revolution that 
conscience could only be expressed by ‘Princes, and Cabinets, and Ministers of 
State’, by the 1860s it was that of the ‘guided and enlightened’ and ‘educated and 
cultivated portions of society’ in Britain and Europe; a slightly larger public than 
just state leaders, but nonetheless still those who Lorimer regarded as society’s 
betters.129 Lorimer then turned to the incident that had excited so much of this 
public discussion; the US Civil War.  
By the 1880s, Lorimer’s ‘basis’ for the law of nations had shifted from public 
conscience to recognition, which formed a new kind of national juridical 
consciousness. His 1884 Institutes of the Law of Nations, subtitled ‘A Treatise of 
the Jural Relations of Separate Political Communities’ began with his promise that 
the volume would ‘determine the characteristics of national existence on which 
the right to international recognition’ — membership of the international 
community — ‘depends…’, and substituted the ‘interdependence’ of states over 
their independence as a second central concept.130 What followed was a baroque 
taxonomy of the kinds of internal legal orders that could support the right of 
international recognition based on ‘ethnology’, the science of racial groups. 
Lorimer thought race science explained the different forms of internal government 
throughout the world that formed the basis of jural relations, which in turn pointed 
to which communities were capable of recognising other nations and being 
recognised by them.131 This undermined the individual–state analogy; legal theory 
ought to only deal with ‘ethnical groups’ that have ‘crystallised into political 
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bodies’; that is, with sufficient domestic legal ordering to found their international 
personality.132  
Lorimer’s ultimate purpose was to relativise the rights and duties of international 
law on the basis of internal laws, which, in turn, were based on his taxonomy of 
ethnic groupings. In two chapters examining the reciprocal recognition of ‘public 
municipal law’ and ‘private municipal law’ by separate states, Lorimer 
emphasised that a state’s ability to form and announce the will of its people 
emerged through the legislature. Recognition of a state ‘implies acceptance of the 
form of government established in the State as adequate to express its rational and 
normal will’, and that will is ultimately about legislative capacity, which shows its 
national laws are sufficient for international personality.133 This account stemmed 
from Lorimer’s earlier, lengthy argument that recognition could be divided into 
grades that reflected this capacity. Full recognition was held by civilised nations 
— including all European states and their European-peopled colonial 
dependencies, and the States of North and South America that were former 
European colonies — on the basis of their ability to completely express the will 
and power needed to recognise other full states.134 ‘Barbarous’ humanity — non-
European political groups with problematic internal laws: Turkey, Persia, China, 
Siam, Japan — sat below this with only ‘partial political’ recognition.135 ‘Savage’ 
humanity or the ‘residue of mankind’ — non-European peoples that had not 
formed into political groups with internal laws — was owed merely ‘natural, or 
mere human recognition’ and Europeans need not apply the positive law of nations 
to them.136  
Lorimer’s system of recognition depended on constitutional ordering, which he 
investigated through a somewhat arcane process of valuing and ranking different 
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kinds of internal orders. First, a range of government systems were incompatible 
with real recognition — intolerant theocracies, aggressive tyrannical monarchies, 
‘intolerant republics’ like the expansionist French Republic, and expansionist 
‘anarchic’ communist states — because they could not accept coexistence with 
other states.137 Instead, a polity must be free from external control by another state, 
and, most importantly, possess ‘internal freedom’ in that they are self-ruling and 
self-directing.138 Communities that lacked any rational will could not be self-
ruling or directing, and Lorimer drew long analogies with legal treatment of people 
who were not sui juris in the domestic sphere. The ‘undeveloped races’ were more 
like the elderly, children, imbeciles or criminals in municipal law. This turned to 
a wider family allegory. While ‘barbarous communities’ might be as old as the 
most civilised ones, there is no such thing as ‘political nonage’.139 The more 
‘capable races’ are the ‘children of the great human family’ and while this 
‘childishness cuts them off from international rights’, that exclusion is analogous 
to the restriction of a child’s status in domestic law: ‘it cuts them off as effectually 
as the childishness of a promising child cuts it off from municipal or political 
rights’.140  
In all of Lorimer’s cases, the extent of self-rule and self-direction depended on 
internal ordering. The state forms Lorimer thought most valuable were ‘simple’ 
states of a single body that claimed to represent one nation internally and 
externally, above ‘composite’ (federal) states whose internal government was 
divided between different political organisations and united only in its external 
dealings. Lorimer’s concern here was that these internal bodies would always 
strive towards their own statehood: ‘It is wonderful to how great an extent 
municipal relations affect international relations, particularly in free States. So 
long as the component parts retain a separate internal life, anything approaching 
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to a political nationality, they will always, from time to time, exhibit a tendency 
to vindicate for themselves some approach to international recognition.’141  
Equally, ‘progress’ through the spheres of recognition by those lesser ‘quality’ 
non-European states that held mere ‘partial recognition’ was largely a question of 
reforming internal laws and, more amorphously, developing the rational 
consciousness of the nation’s subjects. For Lorimer, states always retained 
differences in the values expressed in their internal laws. Even among states within 
the sphere of full recognition, not all the ‘definitions of legal relations’ in foreign 
internal laws are accepted entirely or without qualification.142 Emphatically, this 
was a question of morality and public policy, and recognising states need not 
accept morals and policies in the domestic laws of other states that were ‘at 
variance’ with their own.143 But it was also a question of the national separation 
of values and judgments, which made full recognition in an absolute sense 
impossible: ‘No free State puts either its conscience or its judgment wholly into 
the keeping of any other, and there is thus no such thing as plenary recognition in 
the absolute sense.’144 While between ‘civilised’ states different internal laws 
were largely acceptable, between civilised and ‘semi-barbarous’ states it was 
imperative that the civilised state not allow its own citizens be subjected to local 
laws.145 Advancement might come in the form of courts which ‘mixed’ foreign 
and local laws, as a ‘partial recognition of municipal law’ which Lorimer saw as 
the ‘only form in which the principle of relativity has as yet been accepted in 
international organisation’.146 With this complicated account of recognition’s 
spheres, based ultimately on internal order, Lorimer turned to the substance of the 
rights and duties of these various kinds of nations relative to each other. 
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More fundamentally than even internal ordering being the basis of recognition, 
Lorimer regarded the domestic–international link to be, as he put it, the ‘ultimate 
problem of jurisprudence’, meaning the task of finding international equivalents 
for the national law ideas of legislation, jurisdiction and execution, which he 
examined to close the second volume of Institutes.147 After considering a range of 
solutions in arbitration schemes, legalised economic ‘interdependence’, utopian 
schemes from Henry IV through Bentham, and the problems of the Great Powers, 
Lorimer outlined an organisation of international government based closely on a 
modern territorial state, with a senate, legislature, ‘bureau or ministry’, judicial, 
executive and financial departments, detailed down to its procedural rules, meeting 
times, and salaries for officials. He concluded with reflections on how to 
accommodate the expansion in the number of states. Turning from Europe to the 
British Empire and the inevitable ‘ripening’ of colonies into self-governing 
states,148 and asking whether the racial and ‘ethnical’ bond might be strengthened 
between Britain and the United States, Lorimer saw this as a ‘colonial and 
municipal’ rather than ‘international question’ that involved an inevitable and 
desirable ‘gradual substitution of ethnical for political bonds of union, both 
between these new communities themselves and between them and the mother-
country’.149 
With its racist, reactionary and heavily natural law foundations that ran against the 
liberal progressivism of most juristic writings of the era, Lorimer’s work shows an 
extremely strong meshing of questions of domestic and international law, reflected 
in the frequent analogies and connections drawn between private and public law 
in their municipal and international forms. Lorimer’s approach to law as 
interdependence perhaps explains this: that the branches of law, like the people or 
states that made them, should necessarily be in a system of interdependence with 
other sets of principles. What might seem to be Lorimer’s more esoteric positions 
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were not entirely unique to him. Lorimer’s proposal for an Anglo-Saxon juristic 
union that would link the British and American national legal systems through a 
scheme of common citizenship would be proposed in a similar form fifteen years 
hence by Dicey.150 More importantly, as the next section shows, Westlake also 
used the language of jural relations and national opinions as the basis of liberal 
progressive international law. While Lorimer’s racialised world order and peculiar 
form of naturalism has led some to regard him as somewhat aberrant,151 he was a 
significant figure who remains revealing of the place of the domestic and 
international in late nineteenth century juridical world ordering. Indeed his 
significance cannot be left in the nineteenth century: as the next chapter shows, 
Hersch Lauterpacht regarded him as the British jurist who cast the most light on 
the relationship between national and international law, and indeed formed one 
guiding light for both Lauterpacht’s naturalism and his far more well-known 
theoretical contributions on the domestic and international.152 
C Liberalism, Progress, Representation 
Like Lorimer, liberal progressive jurists also fixed on new ideas of the public. 
Their use of ideas of citizenship, political life and representation spurred 
reconceptualisations of the basis of the constitution, international personality, and 
a focus on the opinion and will of a widened constituent ‘people’, and with this 
the question of who formed part of the nation and empire. This section delves into 
that link between subjecthood and state, most clearly illustrated by new liberal 
ideas about law’s role in ordering domestic and international social life.  
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A first new vision of law’s role in domestic life appears in treatments of the 
changing nature of legislation and representation. Within his influential account 
of parliamentary sovereignty and national independence, Dicey ultimately saw 
sovereignty as resting on popular opinion and representation. After outlining his 
doctrine of absolute parliamentary sovereignty in Law of the Constitution and 
raising some doubts about Austinian conceptions of sovereignty, Dicey discussed 
the ‘external’ and ‘internal’ limits to parliamentary sovereignty’s theoretical and 
legal absoluteness. The ‘external’ limit is the possibility that subjects will disobey 
or resist the laws, while the ‘internal’ limit comes from the nature of sovereign 
power itself, that a sovereign acts in accordance with their own character and in 
the circumstances and social conditions in which they live.153 These limits are 
neither ‘definitely marked’ nor necessarily coincident, but representative 
government provides one means of trying to bridge the gap between them.154 
Dicey’s other works offered more refined accounts of the functions of parliament, 
legislation and representation, and used them to critique ‘collectivism’. The 
connection of these things to social life had, in Dicey’s view, changed dramatically 
with the turn of the century. Despite his theoretical endorsement of popular 
representation as the basis of parliamentary sovereignty, Dicey consistently made 
reactionary arguments against social reform legislation that had grown with 
expansions of the franchise. In 1884, Dicey wrote a series of articles in The Nation 
against the infiltration of ‘sentiment’ into social policy.155 In 1899, he argued that 
wide social reforms were work for which parliamentary assemblies were ‘by 
[their] nature unfit’, and that attempts for ‘constructive legislation’ to supposedly 
meet the country’s needs and ‘render happier the life of the masses’ constituted a 
shift from laissez faire individualism to ‘collectivism’.156 Collectivism had 
imposed a ‘new form of faith’ on Parliament that a large representative assembly 
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is simply ‘not well fitted to perform’.157 While a representative parliament was 
‘more or less recently invented’, it had already become essential to English 
institutions and had ‘thoroughly imbued’ the ‘whole English people’ with 
parliamentary ideas and traditions.158 The risk remained that in their new role as 
the ‘external’ limit of representativeness, the people would fail to understand 
parliament’s own internal limits to the possibilities of what it could reform.  
By the early twentieth century, Dicey saw the ‘collectivist’ turn as a problem of 
interdependence that was reshaping the concept of domestic law as primarily 
legislative. In Law and Public Opinion, published in 1905 and revised and updated 
in 1914, Dicey reflected on the impact of the new tie between law-making and 
public opinion from 1860 to the cusp of the war, arguing that collectivist 
legislation reflected the ‘interdependence’ of public and private interest in 
contemporary life.159 Likening his use of ‘interdependence’ to the ‘technical 
expression “solidarity” … an almost sacramental term’ used by French 
sociological jurist Leon Duguit, whom Dicey admired and used extensively in Law 
of the Constitution, Dicey argued that the usual individual–state connection has 
been thoroughly disrupted in the modern world.160 Mill’s cardinal ‘simple 
principle’ that laws should only limit harms to others was now impossible to apply 
easily, because individual actions now almost always affected some or all of the 
general public.161 Companies exercising public functions like the management of 
railways and unions calling for industrial action were clear illustrations, and Dicey 
also raised public health and defence as examples that both increased the sense of 
interdependence within society and suggested that, on this reasoning, ‘individual 
liberty must be curtailed when opposed to the interest of the public.’162  
 
157  Ibid. 
158  Ibid 72 and 70. 
159  Dicey, Law and Public Opinion (n 62) liii–lvi (note that while the work was published in 
1919, Dicey wrote this preface in 1914 to update the 1905 edition). 
160  Ibid liii n 2. 
161  Ibid liv. 
162  Ibid lv–lvi. 
234 Interdependence: New Visions of Society through Law  
While Dicey remained fixed on the interdependence within states, international 
lawyers were meanwhile replacing the same inadequate ‘state as individual’ 
analogy with an approach to states as aggregates of their national populations and 
representatives of their peoples, rather than mere sovereigns able to act at will. The 
first moves towards this replacement looked to the state as a unifying corporate 
entity. In the 1875 edition of his 1861 treatise, Twiss now turned to the nation’s 
ability present a ‘Unity of Will’ as the means to avoid the domestic analogy 
generally. Noting that the ‘external relations or conditions of nations, as of 
individuals, are continually undergoing changes’ that might not be covered by 
present laws, Twiss rejected the ‘narrow definition of Law’ favoured by ‘many 
writers on Municipal Institutes’ that limited to law to only one of its forms; the 
imposition of the will of a common superior.163 Twiss insisted on thinking of law 
‘in the highest sense of the term’: it ‘designate[s] the rules which guide the conduct 
of intelligent beings’ and is ‘the expression of their Unity of Will (Einheit des 
Willens)’.164 Twiss then drew a strong link between the domestic and international 
forms of this meaning of law as common conviction: ‘as the Law of any one people 
is the expression of its common conviction, so the Law of Nations is the expression 
of the common conviction of Nations’.165 The practices and treaties of nations are 
the evidence of this common conviction, just as customs, judicial decisions and 
statutes are the evidence of the laws of a people.166 While ascertaining 
international practice is somewhat more difficult than examining domestic 
sources, the principle and the resulting ‘unity of will’ between nations remained 
essentially similar.167  
Later expressions of unity of will thinking were phrased in the language of liberal, 
evolutionary, and progressive visions of law and society that were applied to 
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domestic and international law alike. Westlake presented the most influential 
account of this kind of thinking. He infused national aggregation with progressive, 
evolutionary and sentimentalist ideas that described and urged the development of 
international society through law along the same lines by which law joined 
together domestic society. Most significantly, Westlake introduced an emphasis 
on states as aggregates of their male citizens, seeing those individuals as forming 
the real subjects of international law, with states only as their nominal 
representatives.  
This began as a general evolutionary, social bonds account, first articulated in 
Westlake’s inaugural lecture in 1888. There he sought to ground international legal 
principles along the lines of the system of English law, and to analogise domestic 
and international society as based on roughly similar legal ties. Westlake defined 
the international widely, as dealing with any ‘human action not internal to a 
political body’, phrasing it like a set of hypotheses for a geometrical equation 
appropriate to a scientific approach to expanding the field: ‘Let it be the mutual 
action of political bodies, let it be action between one political body and one or 
more members of another, or let it be the action of a political body towards 
barbarians or savages not grouped in any such body — wherever such action can 
give rise to any general statement or judgment, there we have matter for 
International Law’.168  
Far wider than the exclusively state–state conception promoted by jurists like 
Holland,169 for Westlake international law encompassed state–state and state–
alien interactions, as well as any imperial encounter with political and social 
groups that are less than states. Underpinning this approach was Westlake’s focus 
on social organisation as a basis for any form of law. These ‘social bonds’ were 
not constructed or modified ‘aforethought’ according to ideal plans but rather 
through life. In a passage reminiscent of Smith, Westlake wrote that ‘[m]en did 
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not construct society, nor do they now modify it, with a preconceived idea of the 
rights they shall have under it’, but rather society and its legal order results from 
‘an inconceivable number of individual actions, performed in obedience to 
individual impulses’.170 Legal principles emerge, inevitably, from thinking about 
this mass of action, and against this sum of individual actions, human reflections 
on the ideas towards which they were ‘blindly struggling’ lead to some 
formulation of ‘jural right’.171 Whereas moral rights are felt but not enforced, and 
are part of social cohesion, jural rights are those sentiments that ‘men will 
enforce’.172  
The different strengths of sentiments and social bonds at the domestic and 
international levels correspond to a difference of strength in jural rights in each 
sphere. Westlake explained this by a close analogy of internal and international 
society and law: 
Comparing international with internal relations, there is an obvious reason why in 
the former the jural sentiment should be weaker than in the latter, and its 
embodiment in jural principle much less clearly apprehended, even with reference 
to the degree of advancement already realized in international society. Through all 
the gradations of the family, the municipality and the state, the social feeling is 
developed and strengthened by the habit of action in common for common ends. 
As soon as the boundaries of the state are passed, common action ceases, or is 
limited to rare occasions, like those of active alliances, or to matters conducted by 
officials, like international posts and telegraphs.173  
Practically the actions, duties and responsibilities of international lawyers are to 
strengthen these bonds in all areas of human action beyond the state.174 
Scientifically and theoretically, their task as jurists is to present international law 
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as the other side of internal legal ordering, to create a ‘real unity’ between external 
state actions and the ordinary jurisprudence of national laws and their reform.175  
In the 1890s, Westlake developed this social bonds account into the foundations 
of his understanding of national and international society. Westlake began his 
1894 text with a comparison between national and international society. National 
society exists through a ‘state tie’ that binds citizens to their sovereign and a social 
life of ‘general subjection’.176 The most striking difference between international 
and national society is the ‘collective character and overwhelming strength’ of the 
state sovereign, ‘and the great variety of topics’ of its legal rules.177 In contrast, 
and in the absence of an international sovereign, the ‘life’ of each member of 
international society ‘is touched by international law only at a few points’.178 
National laws, on the other hand, cover much of (national) social life, leading 
Westlake to fix on the points of contact between the national and international 
visions of law and life.  
While, as examined above, these points of contact served imperial expansions of 
international law, they also led Westlake to a comparative account of ideas of law 
and right that explained the different approaches to both national and international 
laws in English and European systems. Westlake contrasted the English emphasis 
on ‘law’ as common law and practice solidified into general principles against the 
European focus on ‘jus’ or ‘right’ as duties and inherent capacities, which he 
contended led to different images of what international law requires and where it 
comes from.179 For English jurists, it emerges from the practice of nations and 
custom, while for Europeans it proceeds from the nature of the state and its rights 
and duties. Emphasising the English view, Westlake saw international law’s 
lawfulness as not a question of enforcement, organisation or authority but rather, 
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ultimately, of opinion. Few rights and duties of international society are laid down 
in clear instruments or conventions, and thus international lawyers must look to 
the practice of states, which must be connected to the ‘study of opinion’, especially 
where practice is absent or has become superseded by new opinions.180  
This foundational emphasis on opinion was then built into Westlake’s first and 
second principles of international law, which made it essentially a question not 
merely of the opinion of states, but of the ‘men’ that ultimately make up those 
states. Westlake’s first axiom is that: ‘1. THE society of states, having European 
civilisation, or the international society, is the most comprehensive form of society 
among men, but it is among men that it exists. States are its immediate, men its 
ultimate members. The duties and rights of states are only the duties and rights of 
the men who compose them.’181 Domestic populations are the true foundation of 
international society. Westlake extended this requirement to ideas of consent 
among states, which he argued was really the ‘consent of the men who are the 
ultimate members of [international] society’.182 With a final point on international 
and internal opinions, Westlake connected them to the ‘state tie’: where the 
‘general consensus of opinion within the limits of European civilisation is in 
favour of [a] rule’, that rule will bind the ‘consciences of men in matters arising 
within the society and transcending the state tie’, but where there is no general 
European consensus on a rule, then the ‘state law is normally binding on the 
conscience within that tie’.183 International opinions might override state laws, but 
the lack of a clear consensus makes the law reflecting national conscience the 
binding one. 
With the beginning of the twentieth century, public opinion in its national and 
international forms gained a still more prominent role in theorising the relationship 
of domestic and international laws. This was most clearly solidified in the 
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influential work of Lassa Oppenheim. Oppenheim was a German jurist who 
arrived in Britain in 1895, taught at the LSE, became close with Westlake, and 
eventually succeeded him at Cambridge in 1908 on Westlake’s recommendation 
and on the strength of his influential 1905 treatise on international law.184 That 
work, however, promoted a dualist account of the relations of municipal and 
international law that owed more to Triepel than Oppenheim’s new British 
colleagues. Nonetheless, Oppenheim maintained a similar focus on public opinion 
as the conduit between international and domestic law, drawing this not from 
English jurisprudence or parliamentary traditions, but an emphasis on the need for 
common consent among nations that derived ultimately from Triepel.185 
Oppenheim’s International Law made dozens of comparisons and analogies 
between international and municipal law in service not of connections, but rather 
to show the sharp distinctions between these spheres and the specific situations in 
which they overlapped or came into contact.  
Oppenheim began with a wide definition of ‘law’, insisting that if law is found in 
every community, then it cannot be identical to ‘the law of States, the so-called 
Municipal Law’, and equally, the idea of ‘State’ is not identical to the idea of 
‘community’.186 Instead, the concept of ‘community’ was wider than that of state, 
and while every state was a community, not every community was a state.187 
Oppenheim then analogised this point to different forms of law, using the 
domestic: ‘Likewise the conception of law pure and simple is a wider one than that 
of Municipal Law. Municipal Law is law, but not every law is Municipal Law, as, 
for instance, the Canon Law is not.’188 Municipal law was but one, narrower 
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conception of the broader concept of law, into which international law may fit as 
well. Oppenheim acknowledged that in terms of strength, treated as the number of 
‘guarantees’ that a law ‘can and will be enforced’, international law will always 
remain weaker than municipal law because there ‘is not and cannot be’ an 
international government that operates to enforce international law as a national 
one enforces domestic law.189 But he also insisted that a weak law ‘is nevertheless 
still law, and the Law of Nations is by no means so weak a law as it sometimes 
seems to be’.190 Despite this supposed weakness, international law is still 
‘constantly recognised’ as law, and this occurs through the connection of official 
and public opinion at the international and national levels: ‘Governments and 
Parliaments are of the opinion that they are legally, not morally only, bound by the 
Law of Nations. Likewise, the public opinion of all civilised States considers every 
State legally bound to comply with the rules of the Law of Nations’, and both sets 
of opinion thus reject any suggestion that international law is not law.191  
Oppenheim emphasised that the mode of this acceptance of international law’s 
genuineness is in municipal law. In addition to the daily affirmations by states that 
treaties announce the laws between them, their domestic laws affirm it too: states 
‘recognise [international law] by their Municipal Laws ordering their officials, 
their civil and criminal courts, and their subjects to take up such an attitude as is 
in conformity with the duties imposed upon their Sovereign by the Law of 
Nations’.192 In this vision, international law filters through into the everyday 
operations of minor officials, reflecting an increase in the importance of 
bureaucracy, as well as the range of international law rules that might affect their 
work and decisions. Oppenheim then proceeded to carefully delineate the precise 
spheres of international and municipal law. Ideas of nationality, citizenship and 
subjecthood were essentially equivalent, but the question of who formed part of 
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the community, and what rights membership gives that person, was a question of 
municipal law onto which international law cannot intrude.  
Despite Oppenheim’s influential insistence that states were the only subjects of 
international law, like Westlake he saw nationality as providing a link between 
individuals and the ‘benefits’ of international law.193 Any rights and duties of 
individuals — including those that a state can or must grant by some obligation 
under international law — are always products of municipal law, and no individual 
human being is ever a direct subject of international law; it is through municipal 
law that those benefits are given to subjects.194 While officials were likewise not 
direct subjects of international law, their powers are derived from the sovereign 
and must therefore be exercised in conformity with the sovereign’s own promises 
and duties. Finally, Oppenheim contended that the progressive development of 
municipal and international legal systems would inevitably take place for the same 
reasons with a new emphasis on moral as well as economic development: ‘looked 
upon from a certain standpoint, International Law is, just like Municipal Law, a 
product of moral and of economic factors, and at the same time the basis for a 
favourable development of moral and economic interests … immeasurable 
progress is guaranteed to International Law, since there are eternal moral and 
economic factors working in its favour.’195 With this, Oppenheim gestured to the 
material conditions of international economic integration and the spreading of 
moral sentiments beyond nations as a growing trend. 
D The Socialist International 
Radically divergent views of international economics and sentiments provided the 
basis for the major challenge to liberalism and its focus on public opinion as the 
basis of law, giving impetus to another important conceptual innovation that linked 
domestic and international law. The coining of ‘the International’ made this 
definite version of ‘international’ synonymous with both the First International 
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Workingmen’s Association’s founding in 1864 and the socialist legal-political 
theorising around worker resistance to transnational capitalism that underpinned 
it. This new international was built largely on the writings of Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels, who wrote and agitated in Britain from the early 1850s until their 
deaths in 1883 and 1895 respectively. In a series of significant points at which 
Marx and Engels’ extensive writings touched on domestic and international law, 
they presented a strong challenge to the liberal internationalist progressivism that 
dominated mainstream juristic writings.196  
The socialist international premised the realisation of international peace on a 
destruction of the domestic entirely; flattening and transforming the nation-state, 
the family, and capitalist social reproduction, to form an international cooperative 
union of the proletariat. Marx’s thought in particular was built on his critical 
reactions to Adam Smith’s works, as well as the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century anarchist-utopians, including the British anarchist William 
Godwin, who offered radical rejections of state law and authority as majoritarian 
coercion.197 This strand rejected the kinds of claims to representativeness and 
national unity that had characterised the work of jurists like Twiss in the 1860s 
and Westlake and Oppenheim in the late nineteenth century.198 With Marx and 
Engels’ extension of this critique of law, the flattening of the domestic state and 
its external policies came to be articulated as an international socialist program.  
Workers, domestic servants and constitutions as class orderings emerged in the 
work of previous jurists, most notably Bentham and Smith. But it was with Marx’s 
inaugural speech in London to the First International that the cooperative 
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connections of working classes across national boundaries and against imperialism 
and nationalist aggression became central to a radically alternative vision of the 
domestic and international. Marx’s conclusion to that famous address built from a 
need to deal with internal laws and foreign policies within all industrialised nations 
as the means to international peace. Part of achieving the ‘fraternal concurrence’ 
of the working classes involved counteracting foreign policies that pursue 
‘criminal designs, playing upon national prejudices, and squandering in piratical 
wars the people’s blood and treasure’.199 This Address — often taken as a 
statement of the charter and agenda of the socialist labour movement — ended 
with an objective of restraining external national action:  
The shameless approval, mock sympathy, or idiotic indifference, [of] the upper classes 
of Europe … have taught the working classes the duty to master themselves the 
mysteries of international politics; to watch the diplomatic acts of their respective 
Governments; to counteract them, if necessary, by all the means in their power; when 
unable to prevent, to combine in simultaneous denunciations, and to vindicate the 
simple laws of morals and justice, which ought to govern the relations of private 
individuals, as the rules paramount of the intercourse of nations. 
The fight for such a foreign policy forms part of the general struggle for the 
emancipation of the working classes. 
 Proletarians of all countries, Unite!200 
Marx’s 1864 Address thus ended with a different articulation of the problem of 
domestic and international laws: an appeal to the ‘simple laws of morals and 
justice’ that governed personal and national and international state conduct alike, 
which formed the basis of a command to the working classes of all nations to unite 
and take control of their states. 
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The 1864 view had longer roots. In an 1846 essay, Marx argued that the internal 
organisation of states and their foreign policy are each part of the same expression 
of the division of labour: ‘Is the whole inner organisation of nations, are all their 
international relations anything else than the expression of a particular division of 
labour?’.201 Most important, however, was the 1848 Communist Manifesto’s 
conceptualisation of the proletariat’s class struggle as, not in ‘substance’ but 
‘form’, ‘at first a national struggle’, in which the ‘proletariat of each country must, 
of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie’.202 The Manifesto 
saw the role of Communists and their party as forming a common link for 
individual national struggles: ‘In the national struggles of the proletarians of the 
different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of 
the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality’, and in this way, 
Communists ‘always and everywhere represent the interest of the movement as a 
whole’.203 Marx and Engels also insisted that the theoretical program of 
Communism was not based on ‘ideas or principles’ that were ‘invented, or 
discovered, by this or that would-be universal reformer’ — reminiscent of 
Bentham, Burke or Smith — but instead sought to describe class struggle as it 
occurs in the world.204  
This idea of internationality was based on the connections of classes and their 
national political struggles, and explicitly not on universalised principles. But it 
shared with earlier liberals like Smith and universalists like Bentham the idea of a 
constitution as a set of classes and orders arranged and in political and social 
competition or antagonism. Unlike Smith and Bentham, Marx and Engels used 
this to denounce nationalism and emphasised the need to destroy this ordering by 
taking control of it: ‘The working men have no country … Since the proletariat 
must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of 
 
201  Karl Marx, ‘Society and Economy in History’ in Marx-Engels Reader (n 199) 136, 139. 
202  Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, ‘Manifesto of the Communist Party’ in Marx-Engels Reader 
(n 199) 469, 482. 
203  Ibid 484. 
204  Ibid. 
 Independence and Interdependence: Entwining, 1880–1920 245 
the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself, national, though not 
in the bourgeois sense of the word’.205 While freedom of commerce has led to the 
daily diminishing of ‘differences and antagonisms between peoples’, that world 
market is based on the spread and uniformity of the bourgeois mode of 
production.206 National control by the proletariat will cause these differences and 
antagonisms to ‘vanish still faster’, and here Marx and Engels framed this in the 
language of civilised nations destroying the hostility between them: 
United action, of the leading civilised countries at least, is one of the first conditions 
for the emancipation of the proletariat. In proportion as the exploitation of one 
individual by another is put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will 
also be put an end to. In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation 
vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end.207 
Marx’s later works expanded this nation-focus of revolutionary socialism by 
exploring the seamless connection between national and international trade and 
economics. In the first volume of Capital, dealing with the historical tendencies 
of capitalist accumulation, Marx argued that the transformation of labourers into 
proletarians, their labour into capital, and the land and other means of production 
into private control began nationally and spread internationally, ending with the 
‘entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world-market’.208 In the 1875 
Critique of the Gotha Program, a polemic against a faction of the German Social 
Democrats, Marx emphasised that Germany’s national trade is also international. 
The nation-state is ‘economically “within the framework” of the world market, 
politically “within the framework” of the system of states. Every businessman 
knows that German trade is at the same time foreign trade, and the greatness of 
Herr Bismarck consists, to be sure, precisely in his pursuing a kind of international 
 
205  Ibid 488. 
206  Ibid. 
207  Ibid 488–9. 
208  Karl Marx, Capital, A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 1: The Process of Capitalist 
Production, ed Frederick Engels, tr Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (Kerr, 1906) 836. 
246 Interdependence: New Visions of Society through Law  
policy’.209 Marx strongly rejected the Social Democrats’ endorsement of an aim 
of the ‘international brotherhood of peoples’, ‘borrowed’ Marx wrote, ‘from the 
bourgeois League of Peace and Freedom’, because it failed to sufficiently proclaim 
the international functions of all working classes, and was thus not equivalent to 
the movement’s true aim, namely the ‘international brotherhood of the working 
classes in the joint struggle against the ruling classes and their governments’.210  
Crucially, however, this was not the anarchistic view that the state itself should be 
abolished — indeed, the anarchic communist view of political organisation that 
Lorimer thought was impermissible in international law — exemplified in Marx 
and Engels’ debates with the collective anarchist Mikhail Bakunin. Engels’ 1872 
manuscript ‘Versus the Anarchists’, outlined the response to Bakunin, argued 
against his ‘social liquidation’ ideal in which all workers ‘depose all the 
authorities, abolish the state, and replace it by the organisation of the 
International’.211 Engels noted that the simplicity of this objective and its apparent 
radicality had helped Bakunin’s view find quick favour with European ‘lawyers, 
doctors and other doctrinaires’, but it failed to accurately understand the national-
centricity of the workers’ immediate, domestic concerns, and the inescapability of 
engagement in national politics: ‘But the mass of the workers will never allow 
itself to be persuaded that the public affairs of their countries are not also their 
own affairs, they are by nature political and whoever tries to make out to them that 
they should leave politics alone will in the end be left alone.’212 Finally, Bakunin’s 
approach equated the state with authority and both with an ‘absolute evil’, but that 
equation goes against the basic principle of majoritarian authority and the 
inescapability of authority in all forms of social life: ‘Every individual and every 
community is autonomous; but as to how a society, even of only two people, is 
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possible unless each gives up some of his autonomy, Bakunin again maintains 
silence’.213  
Engels’ 1884 masterwork, The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the 
State, furthered this project and attempted to radically re-evaluate the nature of 
domestic relations, albeit without much direct examination of juridical 
questions.214 But in his final major work before his death, ‘The Tactics of Social 
Democracy’, an introduction for his translation of Marx’s 1855 The Class 
Struggles in France, 1848–1850, Engels returned to these themes and the social 
democratic movement in Germany once more, linking them now to universalised 
laws. German social democrats and the unenfranchised workers behind them 
formed ‘the decisive “shock force” of the international proletarian army’, whose 
electoral power Engels conceived of as a turn to legal methods. ‘The irony of 
World History turns everything upside down’, Engels wrote, where ‘We, the 
“revolutionists”, the “overthrowers”— we are thriving far better on legal methods 
than on illegal methods and overthrow. The parties of Order, as they call 
themselves, are perishing under the legal conditions created by themselves’.215 
Against establishment tactics of attempting to force the social democrats into 
violence, Engels reminded them of the basis of constitutions in the language of 
contract: ‘do not forget that the German empire, like all small states and generally 
all modern states, is a product of contract; of the contract, first, of the princes with 
one another and, second, of the princes with the people. If one side breaks the 
contract, the whole contract falls to the ground; the other side is then also no longer 
bound’.216 Using or breaking this contract must be an international phenomenon. 
Engels ended with a parallel between Christian replacement of Roman universal 
law and contemporary socialism, calling both an international force: Christianity 
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‘undermined religion and all the foundations of the state; it flatly denied that 
Caesar’s will was the supreme law; it was without a fatherland, was international; 
it spread over all countries of the empire … and beyond [its] frontiers’.217 Anti-
Christian, like anti-socialist laws, failed to stop the complete takeover of the 
empire in a few short decades, and the same remained the promise for socialism. 
While Marx and Engels’ work touching on the connections of domestic and 
international are undoubtedly less doctrinal or detailed in their treatment of law 
and legal theory compared to the mainstream British juristic writings examined in 
this chapter, they illuminate an important and different strand in the relationship 
between the two. Against other juristic attempts to divide or align domestic and 
international laws, they insisted on a strong overlap in thinking about the 
economic, social and political problems that underly all domestic and international 
law. They provide strong theoretical contrasts to the presumption of the legitimacy 
of domestic law shared by the other jurists in this project, and yet resist other 
socialist strands that sought to abolish the domestic order entirely and replace it 
with a purely international class-based one. Finally, and most importantly, they 
show the far stronger social and political movements to which the vocabulary of 
‘the International’ — as the more important connection for classes otherwise fixed 
on their domestic orders — moved, beyond law and legal discourse and into 
revolutionary programs. 
E Peace Plans 
International peace formed the impetus for the work of a final set of jurists who 
looked to the connections of international and domestic law to resolve disputes 
and prevent wars. Unlike late nineteenth century socialists, these writings dealt 
with the destruction of the First World War and the disillusionment in liberal ideals 
of civilizational progress and the imperial and capitalist projects that followed. 
Baty’s 1909 claim that independence is rivalled by interdependence, his hopes for 
the Hague Conferences, and his critiques of empire and militarism, show, 
 
217  Ibid 572–3. 
 Independence and Interdependence: Entwining, 1880–1920 249 
however, that peace plans were a frequent fixation for jurists writing on the 
domestic and international well before the War began.  
Wartime and post-war plans began to look more closely to integration and 
interdependence, using municipal law as a cautious guide to where and how an 
international organisation might differ from internal state arrangements in its 
project of doing justice among nations. In a series of 1918 lectures examining 
plans for a League of Nations, Oppenheim emphasised that a League was not new, 
and the general idea of a league of nations dated back to early modern international 
law, which supported a foundational principle that ‘any kind of an International 
Law and some kind or other of a League of Nations are interdependent and 
correlative’, meaning international law must match international organisation, 
rather than the laws of its constituent nations.218 That organisation should grow 
from the lessons of the Hague Conferences, which Oppenheim insisted was not 
futile, even in light of the War. 
In contemporary proposals, this view of interdependence was reflected in the 
League’s first object as the location of international legislation, which, Oppenheim 
emphasised, differed from the domestic meaning of legislation. ‘International 
legislation’ is legislation in a ‘figurative sense only’.219 Its everyday domestic 
meaning is the ‘process of parliamentary activity by which Municipal Statutes are 
called into existence’, which presupposes a sovereign power prescribing rules of 
conduct to subjects.220 ‘International Statutes’, in contrast, can only contain rules 
of conduct that states have agreed between themselves, ‘created by the so-called 
Law-making Treaties of the Powers’.221 But, Oppenheim insisted, international 
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and municipal legislation resembled each other in that both intend to create law, 
making the comparison permissible.222  
While past conferences and congresses — Vienna, the Hague — were instances 
of making and announcing these kinds of international legislative rules, 
Oppenheim envisaged a permanent legislative organ for international law-making 
that could transform the ‘book law’ of customary law recorded in textbooks into 
‘firm, clear, and authoritative statutory law’.223 Oppenheim hoped that a number 
of difficulties — language, national interests, the number of endorsements needed, 
and a lack of general agreement on the interpretation and construction norms — 
might be avoided by each nation applying their own domestic rules of 
interpretation and construction.224 Disputes would be solved by a system of 
international courts with multiple benches and appellate levels that would build a 
body of case law equivalent to municipal case law.225 But just as the League 
cannot follow the model of state organisation, an international court cannot closely 
follow the model of municipal courts: its judges and procedures must be suited to 
dealing with the complexities of disputes between states, and must ensure each 
state has its ‘general legal views’ understood and represented.226 
Oppenheim’s pre-war views, written in 1911 but published posthumously in 1920 
as The Future of International Law, had a somewhat more optimistic view of both 
international society and the use of legislation to achieve peace. While as in the 
later account he agreed that international society could not be modelled simply on 
single nation states, some analogies were useful and should be taken up. Although 
international ‘quasi-legislation’ could be drafted and agreed upon, and the 
methods adopted at the Hague formed a strong model to build on, Oppenheim 
insisted that this analogy was limited because repeal or amendment would require 
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the unanimous resolution of the participant states, and, more problematically, 
cannot be easily repealed or amended: ‘Municipal legislation can at any time be 
annulled or altered by the sovereign law-maker; but international legislation, for 
want of a sovereign over sovereign states, is not open to such treatment.’227 Timed 
future withdrawals might be one ‘way out’ of this problem, but Oppenheim also 
insisted that international legislators needed to take even greater care than 
domestic ones in expressing ‘their real meaning in rigid terms’, which was 
achievable only by careful preparation and negotiations.228 
The League took up some of these analogies and ignored others. Theoretical peace 
plans nonetheless show the varied attempts to acknowledge the limitations of the 
domestic while also extending the inspiration of national law to its breaking points. 
They are one place in which a truly different sphere of the international begins to 
be recognised as real and inevitable by British jurists. Certainly, the League’s 
impact on the relationship of domestic and international would be much more far-
reaching than establishing an international court, engaging in codification to 
inspire commonality between domestic systems, and claiming some mantle of 
(almost) global representation as the forum for the discussion of significant 
internal and international issues. More than this, it was the site for the next 
revolution in thinking about the domestic and international amidst the 
transformations of Empire, to which the next chapter turns. 
F Conclusion 
Part Two examined four different uses of the relationship of domestic and 
international law in projects pursuing different ideals of interdependence; 
reordering and coordinating the disparate systems of national law. Lorimer made 
interdependence the basis of his visions of racialised ‘relative equality’ that rested 
on a strong overlap of domestic and international, and looked to domestic law as 
the basis for international legal subjectivity. Liberal imperial jurists like Dicey and 
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Westlake looked to interdependence to rethink the concerns of domestic law and 
position states, domestically and internationally, as aggregates of their ‘men’, 
leading eventually to Oppenheim’s formative account of the sharp distinction 
between domestic and international law’s sources, personality and authority, along 
Triepel’s lines. Marx and Engels’ socialist reactions sought the interdependence 
of ‘the International’ in focusing working classes of all nations on seizing and 
transforming the class orders of states to then reframe their domestic and foreign 
policies alike through solidarity. With the outbreak of the First World War the 
domestic and international became central to proposals for coordinating 
frameworks to establish peace and govern the world, a project that culminated in 
the League of Nations and the transformations of the Empire.  
IV CONCLUSION: PROBLEMS OF EMPIRE 
Imperial problems provided the impetus for new theorising, new connections, and 
new urgency for legitimating government actions at home and abroad. The 
‘improvement’ of subject populations would take place through ‘correct’ laws; in 
a common law and parliamentary mould, fitted to the relative ‘backwardness’ of 
each nation, colony or possession, and forming the basis of a legal bond that made 
these diverse polities into a British Empire. The Victorian empire, rather than 
international diplomacy, was the main place in which modern concepts of the 
international and domestic began to flourish and entwine. Debates over these legal 
connections were always also about the degree of imperial control and 
intervention, measured by independence in internal and foreign affairs. For white 
settler-colonial polities, this involved the gradually gained constitutional power 
for each dependency to write its own internal laws and use international law 
according to its own will. For non-white polities, self-determination remained 
limited, ungranted, revocable, or impossible. Jurists used the international and 
domestic to understand the changing constitutional and international legal 
systems, and to further projects of empire. 
The themes examined in Part Two presaged the major conflict areas for the 
international and domestic after the war: race and empire, liberal ideas of the rule 
of law, principles of collectivism and socialism, and the failed attempts to make 
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law ensure peace. The next and final chapter shows how some of these analogies 
and frameworks endured in the works of Ivor Jennings and Hersch Lauterpacht. It 
examines their elaboration of still more complicated juridical theories of the 
domestic and international, which they used to frame a range of projects: imperial 
transition, the expansion of international law, internal and international ideals of 
the rule of law, the compulsory adjudication of interstate disputes, and visions of 
post-war international order in commonwealths of the decolonised empire, and of 
humanity at large. 
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EMPIRE AND COMMONWEALTH: TRANSFORMATIONS, 
1920–60  
I INTRODUCTION: THE ‘INSULARITY OF ENGLISHMEN’ 
The relationship of domestic and international law provoked constant discussions 
for European jurists working in the interwar years. In the 1920s, the Italian jurist 
Dionisio Anzilotti’s new articulation of Heinrich Triepel’s dualist theory — that 
international and domestic laws formed separate systems — was endorsed and 
developed further by many jurists throughout Western Europe.1 Against this view 
the Austrians Hans Kelsen, Josef Kunz, and Alfred Verdross revived and 
rearticulated the theory of monism, arguing that international law and domestic 
legal systems were not distinct, but instead elements of a unified, universal legal 
system.2 These debates have been read in various ways: as bolstering the 
normativity of law and emphasising its ability to restrain state power;3 as an 
interwar legal project to reject the power of sovereign states by affirming the 
primacy of international law over them;4 and as the centrepiece of a wider legal 
revolution that transformed national constitutions into global laws, turned state 
sovereignty into democratic sovereignty, and made rights a concern of and for all 
human beings as part of a global legal society.5 
At the same time, British jurists seemed, at first glance, to be firmly and in a sense 
obviously dualist, with no real option for endorsing monism within their 
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constitutional orthodoxy. A purportedly international system of laws or norms 
could hold no sway over the endlessly sovereign British parliament, and the 
executive’s foreign actions of signing treaties could never alter the law of the land. 
What Europeans saw as a debate about the nature of law, state and international 
community, the British saw as, at most, a question of what English courts would 
decide to do with the possible ‘rules’ of international ‘law’. John Fischer Williams, 
a prominent UK legal adviser at the League of Nations since the 1920s, wrote in 
1939 that ‘however much it may be thought to be important for the formation of a 
true theory of international law’, the ‘problem’ of the relation of domestic and 
international law ‘is not very likely to cause embarrassment to the practitioner or 
to a court or even an arbitrator’, all of whom will know and agree on the law to be 
applied.6 When Kunz addressed the Grotius Society in London on the theories of 
monism and dualism in 1924, the discussion began with the Chair giving thanks 
for a ‘wonderful discourse’ and expressing two regrets: the small audience, and 
the ‘insularity of Englishmen’ when it came to continental theories — the latter 
probably explaining the former.7 British jurists seemed steadfastly and 
characteristically unengaged with the philosophical issues of state and law taking 
place as the League rose and fell. 
Delving deeper than this first glance, this chapter argues that far from insular 
theoretical irrelevancies or being confined to debates on monism and dualism, the 
domestic and international were central to a variety of juristic attempts to make 
sense of the enormous legal transformations at the League, throughout the Empire, 
and within the inauguration of ‘modern’ British constitutional government in the 
1920s.8 This was most apparent in the work of two eminent writers on 
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international and constitutional law, Hersch Lauterpacht and W Ivor Jennings, on 
which this chapter focuses. Writing and teaching at the LSE in the 1920s and early 
1930s, Lauterpacht and Jennings were both disruptive figures in their fields, each 
arguing against the otherwise ascendant schools of positivism and advocating for 
functionalist and sociological accounts of legal doctrine that emphasised the 
ideological, material and normative elements of law and legal systems.9 
Lauterpacht, a student of Kelsen’s and later Arnold McNair’s at the LSE, exerted 
a lasting influence on British legal thought. Like Lassa Oppenheim, he brought 
German legal training, with its emphasis on doctrine and comfort with theorising, 
to bear on British practical, pragmatic and court-focused legal scholarship to 
counteract British positivism and work the international legal system into a form 
comprehensible and amenable to domestic-fixated lawyers.10 Jennings, on the 
other hand, is usually remembered as a foundational and prolific constitutional law 
theorist who radically reshaped views of parliamentary, cabinet and local 
government and later served as an architect of decolonisation-era constitutions.11 
But his earliest works were fixed on questions of international and imperial 
constitutional law, and his later appraisals of the constitutional laws of the British 
Commonwealth and post-war plans for Europe dealt extensively with the 
interactions of domestic and international laws.  
This chapter examines Jennings’ and Lauterpacht’s uses of the domestic and 
international in parallel in three parts. Part One shows how Jennings’ earliest 
works dealt with the difficult mix of constitutional and international law in the 
rapidly changing British Empire, through arguments that imperial constitutional 
law was the proper, global limit to the international personality of Britain’s 
dominions and protectorates, while Lauterpacht developed an account of the 
foundations of legal systems that explored the limits of analogies between 
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international and domestic law, ultimately building to the opposite of Jennings’ 
positions: that international law bound Britain in its imperial-constitutional 
government. Part Two shows how these early interests in empire moved towards 
a parallel emphasis on the ‘rule of law’, as a systematic link between domestic and 
international. For Jennings, the British constitution provided a model for 
international and internal rules of law, while Lauterpacht revised his earlier works 
to articulate a more naturalist system of law that replaced the supposed division of 
domestic and international law with a ‘rule of law’ that insisted all disputes were 
capable of adjudication. Part Three examines the legacies of these theories in 
projects for building the commonwealths of the post-war world. Jennings’ plans 
for a European federation modelled its inter-state system on the Empire, while his 
decolonisation-era juristic work urged newly independent states to cleave closely 
to British parliamentary traditions to resist international socialism. Lauterpacht’s 
universal human rights projects, rested on the strong entrenchment of rights in 
national constitutions, presenting a new vision of humanity-wide commonwealth, 
presaging the tone for the interventionism in domestic legal systems that would be 
hallmarks of both blocs in the Cold War. 
II DOMINION, MUNICIPALITY, MANDATE, 1920–33 
A Introduction 
The immediate outcome of the First World War was the collapse of the Russian, 
German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires and their subsequent partitions 
into nation-states or new supervised colonial dependencies under the new Mandate 
system of the League. As the first international institution to harbour aspirations 
of global membership and influence, the League focused the attention of Western 
international lawyers and diplomats, and formed the institutional point of 
‘inclusion’ for new nations, and the place to debate pressing questions around the 
protection of minorities, the administration of former empires, the international 
economic system, and the development of international law.12 But the 1920s also 
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inaugurated the rapid legal transformation of the British Empire thorough gradual 
cessions of self-government to the dominions and the establishment of the Irish 
Free State on an equal footing with them, combined with repression and continued 
Crown ‘guidance’ in parts of India and Africa, and in the new acquisitions of 
Mandates taken from the empires of the defeated Central Powers in the Middle 
East, Africa and the Pacific. The questions about the vagaries of international 
personality and constitutional links between the polities of the British Empire that 
burned through the war were intensified by the establishment of the League. 
Which dominions could represent themselves at the League? Did they appear as 
part of the Empire or independently? Could they conduct independent foreign 
policy? These questions were gradually, partially resolved by successive imperial 
conferences in the 1920s and 1930s. This section explores how Jennings’ and 
Lauterpacht’s early examinations of the interaction of domestic and international 
dealt with these foundational questions of the wider transformations in empire, 
parliament, dominions and mandates.  
B The International Jennings 
The questions debated at the 1920s imperial conferences motivated Jennings’ first 
academic works; a series of seemingly now-forgotten articles on international 
legal aspects of the British Empire and Commonwealth, based on London lectures, 
and translated for the major French international law journal Revue Generale de 
Droit International et Legislation Comparée. These pieces explored the 
international personality of the dominions, arguing that their status was, 
ultimately, a matter of imperial constitutional law and not international law, but 
basing that argument on a subtle account of the interaction of principles from both 
of these fields. Jennings sought to explain the varieties of international personality 
throughout the Empire as stemming from its complex, various constitutional 
orderings and degrees of self-government possessed by the entities which formed 
it, and the retention of executive control over non-white possessions. Jennings 
sought to convince others that the Empire’s juridical relations overrode 
international law and, in some cases, created new categories of polity previously 
unknown to international law. In a sense, his argument reflected both an 
internationalising and localising of the British Constitution: making it relevant and 
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resistant to new international law concepts, and binding and shaping the 
constitutional and international development of the Empire’s constituent 
members. In his turn in the early 1930s to local government, Jennings saw this 
imperial rule returning to influence government at home. 
The idea of international law constraining or shaping the powers of the Crown was 
the subject of Jennings’ first published work, which built on his essay as the 
Whewell Scholar in International Law at Cambridge. Examining the right of 
angary, which related to the interaction of statutory, prerogative and international 
law rights to seize foreign property, Jennings examined two major decisions in 
which English courts held that international law doctrines on angary formed part 
of the law of England, and thus corresponded to the prerogative right to requisition 
neutral goods for the defence of the realm.13 Jennings endorsed Westlake’s view 
that English courts enforce rights in international or domestic law where they fall 
within jurisdiction, subject to the sovereign’s incapacity to, in Westlake’s words, 
‘divest or modify private rights by treaty’ and that courts cannot question acts of 
state.14 Jennings noted, however, that ‘[t]he word “rights” is here used in rather a 
peculiar sense. Rights are given by International Law only to States, whereas 
Municipal Courts usually invoke International Law in suits by an individual. What 
is meant, therefore, is that Municipal Courts must recognise a right where a rule 
of International Law gives an individual a benefit; as, for example, where an 
ambassador claims a diplomatic immunity.’15 Jennings read international law here 
in a language of private law, as a co-ordination of benefits and compensation. A 
state’s international law right to seize the property of neutrals within its territory 
rests in the Crown and executive government, and a right of compensation rests 
with the owner.16 Jennings thought that this should translate into English 
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constitutional law as international law shaping the prerogative: there ‘ought 
therefore to be a prerogative right of the Crown to seize the property in accordance 
with the rules of International Law … there is nothing in the common law 
inconsistent with such a right, nor is there any statute to prevent such rights from 
taking effect’.17 The Crown’s prerogative rights, then, are constrained or moulded 
by the rules of international law, and might be further limited by parliament. 
Jennings’ next works delved much more deeply into the relationship of Crown, 
empire and international law. The first piece examined the international status of 
the dominions after the 1926 Imperial Conference, responding to articles by the 
influential Belgian jurist Henri Rolin and the more obscure Canadian political 
scientist C D Allin. Jennings rejected Rolin’s argument that the dominions had no 
international personality, and went further than Allin’s contention that they had 
some degree of international personality, but not to the extent of full sovereign 
states. Jennings contended instead that following the 1926 Conference the 
dominions held, under international law, the same international status as the 
United Kingdom, and that this status was ‘limited by the superior law of the 
community of states conventionally called, erroneously, the British Empire’.18  
Jennings’ argument built on a disagreement with Rolin’s view of the meaning of 
‘state’. Whereas Rolin saw states as juridically distinct, supreme organs that gain 
their powers by expressing the will of a people, rather than from delegation by 
another higher body, for Jennings this did not reflect the reality of state formation, 
and would make, for example, non-revolutionary emergences of states impossible: 
‘the source of the institution is immaterial. What is important is knowing whether 
the power is exercised by the institution for itself, yet on behalf of a third party’.19 
Rolin, Jennings argued, had fallen into an error common to jurists unfamiliar with 
British juridical thought by confounding a theory of law with the facts of reality 
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and the conventions of the British constitution. Put another way, Jennings placed 
the operation of the British imperial constitution over the concepts of international 
law. 
Jennings’ own view of the dominions’ status moved between British imperial-
constitutional law and international law. While the constitutional law of the British 
Empire was developed by judicial interpretations of law from an earlier era in 
which the King exercised governmental powers and the people were merely 
consulted, the contemporary reality was that cabinet and the prime minister — not 
legal categories and ‘unknown to English law’ — possess and exercise those 
powers. Likewise, the full sovereign status of the dominions rested on their ability 
and permission to exercise those powers, most crucially for international 
personality, the ability to conduct foreign relations, which was granted to them by 
imperial constitutional law. British constitutional law theoretically made the 
dominions ‘complete dependents’ under the English government, but they are 
practically never subjected to that control.20  
Jennings emphasised that the international law analysis must not look to this 
‘theory of the Constitution’ but instead to the ‘real authority of the Dominion 
governments’.21 If they lack the ‘necessary authority to accomplish international 
acts’, they cannot be recognised as having a personality distinct from Britain, but 
if they do have ‘the capacity to maintain international relations’ then the only 
element missing from their full international personality is recognition of that fact 
by other states.22 Jennings thought that that recognition had been accorded to the 
dominions by most of the important states in Europe and America.23 Moreover, 
this was the position of the Empire, evidenced by the report adopted by the 1926 
Conference, which ‘first established the general principle of independence’ among 
the dominions, and ‘then acknowledged that theories of law and forms of 
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government (but not practice) do not conform to this principle’ and ‘finally 
suggest[ed] means of attenuating this divergence’.24 Jennings’ emphasis, then, 
was on the practical operation of domestic and imperial law, over the theory-
fixation of other international law jurists. 
The remainder of Jennings’ argument explored those practical operations in detail, 
though with some examination of the conceptual changes announced by the 
Conference. While, in keeping with British tradition, the Conference refused to 
countenance a written constitution for the Empire, it did seek to define the 
relationship of the UK and the dominions by a general proposition: ‘There are 
autonomous communities within the Empire, equal in their status, no one 
subordinate to another from the particular point of view of their internal affairs, 
although united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associating as 
members of the British community of nations’.25 Jennings saw no contradiction in 
independence and membership of the Empire, insisting that the empire was ‘in 
fact’ a society of free nations, linked by common places and shared history, and ‘a 
loyalism towards a shared sovereign and a tradition of liberty and democratic 
government, transmitted from generation to generation’.26  
While dominion parliaments remained theoretically subject to the laws of the 
British Parliament, in practice that was of little importance: contemporary British 
legislation did not apply generally to the dominions, and they made their own 
laws.27 This independence followed into their international lives and was the basis 
of their juridical equality with Britain itself. After examining the international 
relations of the various dominions — their negotiation of treaties with foreign 
states outside the Empire, their modes of representation, their domestic 
ratifications, and their position in relation to wider conventions (as Jennings put 
it, those ‘international acts between governments that generally do not necessitate 
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legislative intervention, but have a purely political objective’)28 — Jennings 
concluded that the dominions and the UK held the same status in international law. 
But the particulars of that international status was still limited and shaped by the 
presence of imperial constitutional ties: ‘the rights of different parts of the Empire 
are limited by the personality of the Empire, because from the point of view of 
questions of interest to a part of the empire, there is a unity’.29 This unity meant 
treaties relevant to more than one part of the Empire bound the entirety, and that 
questions about the relations between parts of the Empire — ‘conventions, 
disputes, etc’ — ‘are not regulated by international law, but by the constitutional 
laws and customs of the Empire’.30 
In his 1928 piece ‘International Personality in the British Empire’, Jennings 
broadened his analysis to argue that the British arrangements had now reshaped 
international law, conceptualising Dominion–Imperial relations as a new upheaval 
and challenge to old outdated notions of international personality. Historically, all 
international legal persons were ‘homogeneous States’, and the nature of 
international personality was not a complicated question, with new states admitted 
not only by satisfying ‘certain philosophical principles’ but also because they 
appeared to be similar to current members.31 When international organisation and 
the state form became more complex, fundamental ideas about the nature of states 
became relevant to international personality.  
As applied to the British Empire, Jennings argued that it was ‘an organisation of a 
character so complex that it is impossible to examine the personality of its different 
parts’ without first establishing the principles of international personality.32 
Jennings now saw the British Empire as a formerly unitary state ‘in transition’, 
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owing to the partial, somewhat unclear, international capacities of the 
dominions.33 But the international implications of this transition was not a 
question of international law but imperial constitutional law: ‘We are now in a 
state of transition. But the principle is clear. No part of the Empire can be 
recognised as having an international capacity greater than that which it possesses 
constitutionally. To admit a British community to a power that it does not have 
constitutionally is to intervene in the internal government of the British Empire, 
and this is contrary to international law’.34 Here Jennings raised the international 
law principle of non-intervention in internal affairs to place imperial constitutional 
law over the other ordinary principles of international law and give it an 
international and absolute effect. Jennings saw each dominion’s constitutional 
capacities as the ‘extreme limit’ on any possible recognition by other states. This 
mixed and went beyond international and constitutional ideas of personality: ‘The 
situation that has been examined here does not fit into the normal classifications 
of international law’ he noted, and concluded by stating ‘[t]he distribution of 
personality that is thus laid down does not fit within the classification seen so far 
in international law’.35 
By the mid-1930s, following the passage of the Statute of Westminster, the kinds 
of restrictions that Jennings had theorised as following from Imperial conventions, 
the practical operations of the dominions, and the statements in the Imperial 
Reports, were solidified into clearer doctrines of imperial constitutional law. 
Jennings now theorised the legal structure of the British Empire as slowly 
disintegrating, moving from the 1914 foundation of a Parliament and Crown that 
could, in principle, legislate and govern in any part of the Empire, through a severe 
weakening in the 1920s that had, by the early 1930s, given way to a stark contrast 
between the Constitution within the British Isles, and that which barely bound 
what was now the Commonwealth. While the British Constitution was ‘a complex 
 
33   Ibid 440. 
34   Ibid. 
35   Ibid 493. 
 Empire and Commonwealth: Transformations, 1920–60 265 
of institutions, laws, conventions and practices’ that made it ‘one of the most 
detailed and closely co-ordinated in the world’, the ‘Constitution of the British 
Commonwealth’ had ‘undergone a process of disintegration on the legal side 
which has not been met by any corresponding process of integration on the side of 
convention or practice. It does indeed exist, but its limbs are so weak that it seems 
that a breath would cause them to break.’36 This weakness followed from the 
Statute of Westminster’s removal of the presumption that any UK Act of 
Parliament would extend or be deemed to extend to a dominion as part of its law, 
unless expressly stated in the Act and at the dominion’s request and with its 
consent.37 Practically, Jennings thought, the connections and collaborations 
between Commonwealth nations were now questions of international cooperation 
akin to ordinary foreign affairs: ‘neither an Imperial Federation nor a Zollverein 
[customs union] is practical politics. The question is now to secure collaboration 
among six or seven autonomous nations’.38 
Beyond the Commonwealth, however, Jennings argued that British Crown powers 
over protectorates and mandates remained shaped and limited by imperial 
constitutional law alone, even though the claim to govern those mandates 
originated in international law doctrines and the League’s mandatory grants. This 
approach shows the endurance of aspects of Jennings’ late 1920s views on 
imperial control, even as the Empire had turned to Commonwealth. In the 1938 
Constitutional Laws of the Commonwealth, which relied more heavily on the 
judicial decisions compiled by his co-author C M Young39 than on William Anson 
and A B Keith’s treatises used in the earlier articles, Jennings contended that the 
earlier doctrine of incorporation from West Rand and Commercial and Estates Co 
of Egypt was now expressed too widely, an error partly stemming from changes in 
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the Empire since those cases were decided. While there is a presumption that 
international law and English law are not incompatible, the jurisdiction of English 
Courts to decide any dispute about which law applies flows from the jurisdiction 
of the Crown: ‘The jurisdiction of the Crown, in which is included the jurisdiction 
of the Queen’s Courts, has thus to be decided by English law. A jurisdiction may 
be lawful according to English law and yet unlawful according to international 
law’.40 These recent decisions had confirmed that jurisdiction was ultimately up 
to the Crown, subject to any statutory limits on that power, and this extended to 
international status and the government of protectorates.41 
This had effects for the status of mandate territories. Contra Hall and Jenkyns, who 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century saw protectorate government as 
a question of international law, Jennings insisted it was one of constitutional law. 
Whereas they had begun with international law doctrines on when a state might 
exercise its powers within the territory of another state, for the ‘English lawyer’, 
the starting question is ‘to determine what powers the Crown possesses by English 
law outside British territory’: this was solely about constitutional law, and the 
Crown ‘is not bound even by the treaty by which the jurisdiction is first acquired 
in the international sense’.42 Governance of mandates was the same as the position 
over protectorates. The Crown’s acceptance of the League’s mandate was a grant 
of jurisdiction, and while British obligations to the League were ‘international 
obligations’ and the Crown’s Orders in Council provided that the terms of the 
mandate should not be broken, this only reflected the Crown being ‘anxious’ that 
Britain’s international obligations be kept.43 As a matter of constitutional law the 
mandate did not bind the Crown.  
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This supremacy of imperial constitutional law over international obligations 
followed, for Jennings, from the absolute nature of the Crown’s powers. Jennings 
was quick to clarify that this did not allow the Crown or governor to act as an 
‘uncontrolled despot’: administration by the Colonial Office still took place 
through law, according to the local constitution and legal system, subject to 
appeals to the Privy Council,44 and the Crown remained ‘a legal abstraction’, with 
government was essentially ‘that provided by the local constitution’, though 
certainly still ‘subject to the control of the Government of the United Kingdom’.45 
Imperial government was theoretically local, practically still subject to the control 
of Britain, and, either way, entirely freed of the international law that was the 
original basis of that claim to govern. In the parts of the world where it continued, 
British imperial government was legitimated by international law, but only 
constrained by British constitutional law.  
C Lauterpacht’s Analogies 
Whereas Jennings saw the British Constitution and its interwar changes as both a 
guiding model for the development of international law doctrine and a legal order 
to whose ‘facts’ of control international legal concepts would need to bend, many 
British jurists saw international law’s development in the 1920s as a process of its 
own fledgling constitutionalization that was most clearly evident in its 
connections, analogies and attempts to coordinate with municipal laws. The new 
realities they saw as driving this development were in the League itself, illustrated 
in the new system of international adjudication for legal disputes at the Permanent 
Court of International Justice, and the efforts to turn custom and general principles 
of law into clear, codified international instruments. Typical of these views was 
McNair’s evaluation of the 1920s as a decade of building an ‘international 
constitutional law’ to govern the post-First World War society of states, which, for 
McNair, was an evolving constitution in a specifically English rather than 
European or American sense. McNair thought this process would eventually lead 
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to a crystallised international constitution, and though progress might be hampered 
by war, the histories of individual nations suggested that great leaps could be made 
in constitutional development in the wake of civil strife or revolution, with English 
history as one example.46 
As a doctoral pupil and collaborator of McNair and later his successor at 
Cambridge, Lauterpacht had long recognised that theories of the domestic state 
were the foundation of international lawyers’ systems.47 Lauterpacht also 
appreciated that this view cut against the prevailing English reluctance to think 
theoretically about the state, itself rooted in the image of the unwritten constitution 
emerging from politics and its everyday life, and not some ideal, schematic system 
of norms.48 Lauterpacht spent much of his juristic career attempting to inject some 
basic principles about system, state, and law into British legal thought. Most 
important among these was his view that the state could not act without or beyond 
law. These apparently ‘political’ ‘gaps’ were simply indicators of hard cases, 
resolvable by the application of general principles, reasoning, and appeals to social 
purposes and ideas of community.49  
Lauterpacht’s project was primarily about drawing the domestic and international 
together; re-orienting the systems and principles of municipal and international 
law so that they interact and operate in concert, properly, and in service of the 
wider principles of justice and order; of anchoring the state and its power, in all 
cases, ultimately to the law. It involved reviving a form of natural law against the 
heresies of positivism, English and German alike, in a new set of general legal 
principles. Lauterpacht sourced these principles not in Burkean declarations of 
eternal laws of nature or the racial anthropology of Lorimer, but rather municipal 
legal orders, and the general principles they used to order the relations of 
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individuals to each other and to the state. Doing this involved urging municipal 
courts to use and interpret international law, and urging the international legal 
community to accept the justiciability of all disputes between them. This was a 
riposte to British international law orthodoxies which brought and adapted 
continental discussions over monism and dualism into a new, influential vision of 
international law. Whereas earlier readings of his works focused on systems50 or 
individuals,51 this part emphasises the importance of the domestic and 
international in connecting Lauterpacht’s thought. 
Lauterpacht’s doctoral thesis and first monograph fixed on the issue of domestic–
international analogy; specifically, between private law ideas found in the 
domestic systems of various states and their use by those states in international 
legal argument. The prevailing view in the 1920s, Lauterpacht suggested, was that 
while domestic analogies were ‘perhaps … justified in the formative period of 
international law owing to the then prevalent patrimonial conception of State’, 
they have now ‘impeded the growth of international law, and ought to be 
discouraged’.52 Recourse to analogies was mere imitation, ignored the ‘special 
structure’ of law in international affairs, and ultimately risked stifling any ‘fruitful 
and creative scientific activity in the domain of international law’.53  
Lauterpacht argued that private law had spurred the development of international 
law at all stages. Domestic analogies are constantly used, and without much 
concern for the possibility, newly de rigeur, that international law had some 
special character; indeed, what seemed like new and peculiarly international legal 
problems were usually given private law ‘solutions’.54 Most significant, though, 
was what Lauterpacht saw as the ‘revolutionary’ transformation in article 38(3) of 
 
50   Koskenniemi, ‘Lauterpacht’ (n 48). 
51   Philippe Sands, ‘Introduction’ in Hersch Lauterpacht, An International Bill of the Rights of 
Man (OUP, 2013). 
52   Hersch Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (Longmans, 
1927) vii. Note that Lauterpacht does not use ‘domestic’ but rather ‘municipal’ throughout. 
53   Ibid. 
54   Ibid vii–viii. 
270 Dominion, Municipality, Mandate, 1920–33  
the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, which made the 
‘general principles of law recognised by civilised States’ a binding source of law 
for the new system of international legal adjudication.55 These general principles 
were gleaned from the bulk of similar municipal laws of Europe, Britain and the 
United States, and for Lauterpacht they were now a proper, legitimate source for 
filling gaps in current international law that would inevitably arise during 
international adjudication. 
Lauterpacht saw the ideas of domestic and international as ultimately a problem 
about sovereignty and positivism. Modern positivism was the ‘true offspring’ of 
the doctrine of sovereignty, in that it insisted on all notions and principles being 
directly derived from state will.56 This insistence on the ‘eternal and inalienable 
interests protected by the State and of their public and absolute character’ would 
always reject any turn to private law, because private law dealt with merely 
economic interests of a ‘lower order’ than those of the state.57 But rather than 
rejecting this doctrine of sovereignty altogether, Lauterpacht instead sought to 
examine whether ideas of sovereignty fitted the practice of states and the ‘rational 
system’ of international law developed by jurists.58 Sovereignty would not be 
‘shattered’ by those who saw it as outdated or ‘mischievous’, but rather would 
only ‘disappear’ when its meanings were ‘shown to be inconsistent both with the 
practice of States and with the science of international law’.59  
Ultimately, however, Lauterpacht’s investigation into the ‘dangers of analogy’ and 
the difference between the ‘two spheres of law’ still saw in domestic private law 
the ‘principles of legal justice’ and thus progress in international law through 
‘creative juristic activity’.60 He sought to guide that development by charting 
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where and where not to use the domestic. Yet this project was circumscribed to 
focus purely on developing the public international law side. It was, Lauterpacht 
insisted, ‘in no way connected’ with questions of the ‘relation between 
international and municipal law’.61 Lauterpacht here was explicitly not concerned 
with the narrow doctrine of incorporation, but rather the more general question of 
the interactions and links between these spheres — namely, the drawing of 
analogies — in trying to theorise the problem of internal and world legal order, 
covering a wide range of places in which rules and wider principles of internal and 
international laws met and clashed.  
Lauterpacht began that discussion with a history of juristic debates stretching back 
to Gentili, though he insisted the nature of their analogy problems was different. 
It was not whether different systems of law, with different subjects and objects, 
might permit of analogies between them, but rather whether ‘the law of one ancient 
Empire may, by reason of its comprehensiveness and its universally recognised 
conformity with right and justice, be resorted to as a source of international law’.62 
The Roman Empire formed this single, unified internal jurisdiction from which so 
many jurists had drawn their training and inspiration; today’s problem was a 
plurality of fractured, different systems of civil law. Lauterpacht first read Gentili 
as recognising this fractured set of separate jurisdictions, but argued that Gentili 
approached Roman law not as a question of imitation but of principle and scientific 
conviction, with the view that Roman law was not a particular law, but indeed the 
law of nations.63 In Lauterpacht’s reading, Grotius’s use of ‘civil law’ was still 
more expansive, meaning all municipal laws, public or private, which aimed at the 
‘tranquillity of one community’, which rendered them irrelevant for laws 
governing the intercourse between sovereigns.64 Lauterpacht endorsed Textor’s 
1680 reading of Grotius that the law of nations ‘embraces law common to all or 
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many nations, both public and private … and that it is not exclusively public law, 
although it is akin to public law and politics, “some of its special topics being 
matters of the prerogative, like war, peace, treaties”’.65 These were early 
recognitions of the problems of defining the scope of which domestic laws would 
be models or analogies for their international counterparts. 
Lauterpacht’s main theoretical engagement with the domestic and international 
took place in refuting the argument that international law holds some ‘special 
character’, distinct from domestic law, because of the political aspects of 
sovereignty. Channelling Westlake, Lauterpacht contended that the acts of states 
are ultimately the actions of ‘men’, which ‘for ordinary human purposes’ are 
‘governed by standards of justice and morality accepted by States and their people 
within their territories’; namely, their internal understandings of morality, justice 
and law.66 Characterising state interests as only different ‘in degree’ from the 
interests protected by other collectives, and the interests of individuals, 
Lauterpacht linked this to the similarities in laws governing individuals and those 
governing states, contending that both were just questions of degree: ‘there is 
nothing in the interests protected by international law which is fundamentally 
different from those protected by municipal and private law’.67  
This lack of difference between municipal and international held for a range of 
conceptions of ‘interest’. In a nod to materiality, and contra Oppenheim, 
Lauterpacht rejected the suggestion that individual interests tended to be 
‘economic’ while states had ‘political interests’, and even granting that 
terminology, the ‘political interests’ of states are ‘primarily devoted to 
safeguarding collective economic interests, no matter under what disguise they 
happen to appear’.68 This was simply the desire of states to try to avoid the kinds 
of strictures they impose on their citizens. The ‘mysterious aspect of absolute 
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heterogeneity and supremacy’ of state sovereignty rested on a deep conviction in 
some ‘special sanctity’ that meant ‘those common standards of law and right 
which govern the relations of individuals under the sway of municipal law’ could 
never apply to states.69 Against this, Lauterpacht contended that the ‘necessities 
of international intercourse’ and public opinion should force governments to give 
up that independence and, in doing so, develop international law, alongside the 
conviction that individuals, groups and states are legally different in ‘degree 
only’.70 What Lauterpacht sought here was to reject any different standards of 
morality said to apply to collectives or individuals by insisting on all collectives 
being held to the standards of their constituent individuals: ‘The moral 
responsibility of States is co-extensive with the moral responsibility of their 
citizens, or of those elected by them’.71 
With this theory of ‘degrees’ rather than ‘speciality’ in place, Lauterpacht turned 
directly to the nature of this difference, seeing this as an aspect of incorporation. 
Fundamental difference came from the ‘cherished dogma’ of the positivists: ‘The 
exceptional, one might say metaphysical, character of the persons of international 
law makes it plausible and natural that also their interests and rights are of a higher 
nature. The interests and rights are made to partake of the glory of their bearer, i.e. 
the State, the only subject of international law. It is this theory which is, to a 
considerable extent, the fons et origo mali’.72 This view was an ‘arbitrary dogma 
somehow connected with the doctrine of sovereignty’ that failed to deal with 
present practice — ‘What is, for instance, the position of insurgents recognised as 
belligerents, of pirates, of blockade-runners, of war criminals … of international 
unions, bureaus, and commissions, of the British Dominions, of the Holy See, of 
the League of Nations?’ — and cannot make sense of the fact that some states 
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automatically incorporate treaties and custom without the need for municipal 
legislation.73  
In an extensive footnote, Lauterpacht pushed the point further to contend that the 
‘classical English-American’ doctrine of international law being part of the law of 
the land was a ‘powerful argument’ for individuals being directly bound by 
international law, and that Triepel went to great lengths to deny its validity to avoid 
this consequence, in turn influencing Oppenheim and spurring the latter’s theory 
against it.74 Lauterpacht contended that Triepel failed to understand the British use 
of ‘acts of transformation’ made necessary by the constitutional fact that treaty-
making powers lie with the Crown and not Parliament, quoting Anson to this 
effect: ‘“If it were not so (that is, if all treaties were directly binding upon the 
subject),” says Anson, “the King, in virtue of his prerogative, might indirectly tax 
or legislate, without the consent of Parliament”’.75 This should be read, 
Lauterpacht argued, as a ‘double function’ of ratification; the general endorsement 
of and assent to a treaty, combined with the necessary, specific changes to 
municipal legislation.76 
Ultimately, Lauterpacht saw this technical doctrinal dispute as revealing the 
weakness of the general analogy of individuals to states, and the personification 
of the state. This impeded the progress of international law by weakening the idea 
of international duty, which Lauterpacht expressed in language reminiscent of 
Westlake: ‘The State, it is said, the metaphysical and mystical State, is the subject 
of duties, if any, not men.’77 For Lauterpacht this was clear in the works of 
Westlake, Maine, and above all Bryce, who, ‘no doubt well acquainted with the 
movement which, under the influence of Dicey and Maitland, stressed the real 
personality of corporations, saw clearly that, whatever may be the merits of these 
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doctrines in the field of political theory, any exaggerated conception of the juristic 
personality of the State is disastrous for the progress of international law’.78 
Ending the discussion, Lauterpacht endorsed Lorimer’s view that similarities in 
the ‘branches’ of jurisprudence followed from a necessary law, but Lauterpacht 
insisted it was not from the ‘philosophic naturalism’ Lorimer propounded but 
rather ‘corroborated’ by ‘a theoretical investigation in the principles of positivist 
doctrine’, and by the practice of states.79 
Having concluded his discussion of the histories and theories of analogies, 
Lauterpacht turned to state practice in various topics in international law: 
territorial and maritime sovereignty, succession and responsibility, and treaties as 
contracts. The final of these was an issue of ‘paramount importance’: sovereignty 
over mandates, and the analogy of the League as sovereign. Lauterpacht dubbed 
this an unfortunate ‘political problem’ that tested the possibilities of the League 
and its new international order.80 Lauterpacht argued that the League held ultimate 
sovereignty over the mandates, which was delegated to the mandatory powers not 
through any public law idea of authority, but by general ideas of trust, guardianship 
and principal–agent relationships. This view began with the internal powers of 
sovereignty. Territorial sovereignty was reflected in inhabitants taking the 
nationality of the sovereign, the sovereign’s rights to dispose of the territory, use 
its produce and revenue, levy troops from its population, institute any desired 
fiscal policy, and that other states are generally excluded in interfering in the 
‘internal administration’ of the territory’.81 While one or two of these rights might 
be absent without affecting a claim of sovereignty, without any of them the 
administering power is not sovereign.82 
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Examining the many limits to these powers within the various mandate classes, 
Lauterpacht insisted that their cumulative effect showed the mandatories were not 
sovereigns over these territories. Instead, ‘mandatory’ implied a corresponding 
‘mandant’ who is the principal, regardless of ‘how nominal the authority of the 
mandant may be’: here, the League’s ‘ultimate sovereignty’ was a ‘necessary 
inference’.83 The general principles derived from private law provided this link. 
All systems of domestic law placed ultimate authority in the mandant, including 
in different branches: ‘Commercial law may adapt the conception of mandate to 
special requirements of business and commercial intercourse. So, also, 
constitutional law may adapt it for its special purposes’.84 But none of these 
changes collapsed ‘the basic relation of derivation of authority’: the mandatory 
can never move its legal relationship with the mandant from agent–principal to a 
mere instrument of the mandatory’s policy.85 That the League had not initiated the 
mandates, and did not hold distinct juridical personality provided no bar to 
Lauterpacht’s view. The Council’s approval of the mandates established the 
relationship, placing legal sovereignty with the League, and its exercise with the 
mandatory powers.86 But this relationship gained its content not by the specific 
rules of trust or guardianship in one or other national legal systems, but by the 
aggregate rules from European domestic laws, which became Lauterpacht’s 
general guiding principle throughout his treatment of treaties. Only the rules of 
private law that have universal or near-universal recognition apply to mandates, 
and these rules are ‘few and simple’, such that the Roman ideas of mandate and 
rules from the English law of trusts lead to the same broad outline in the legal 
construction of mandates and guardianships: ‘These general and fundamental 
principles are the relation of derivation of powers or delegation on the one hand, 
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and of trust, duty, and confidence on the other’, and the technicalities of these 
systems of private law are not relevant to interpreting mandates.87 
Lauterpacht concluded Analogies with reflections on the structural commonalities 
between international and internal legal communities. He urged a ‘vigilant attitude 
of criticism’ against those suggesting the differences of psychological, economic 
and social structures between international and internal communities that made 
analogy superficial.88 More broadly, law must recognise and be based on 
sociological and historical facts, ‘[b]ut it can never be a mere reflection of them’.89 
In every legal community the ‘constant conflict’ between right and justice and ‘the 
immediate powerful interests shaping the law’ necessitated caution about the 
tension between stability and change, especially ‘where every predominant 
interest asserts itself as law’.90 Internal legal orders can provide one way of 
creating, maintaining and developing the international legal community to prevent 
‘discretionary’, ‘wanton and repugnant’ assertions of lawfulness.91 In this pursuit, 
Lauterpacht placed himself within an ‘ever-growing’ tradition from Westlake and 
Lorimer to Kelsen and Duguit, to convince the world — ‘the student and 
statesman’ — that like domestic law, international law is properly and justly 
addressed to the individuals that make up states, and that this was the future for 
the classical and Grotian view that nations were moral individuals ‘respectu totius 
generis humani’; related to the whole human race.92  
D Conclusion 
Jennings’ first works consistently argued that the international status of dominions 
was a question of imperial not international law, and maintained the absolute 
powers of the Crown over colonies and mandates, even where those grants 
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stemmed from the League. Meanwhile, Lauterpacht analysed the 
constitutionalization of the international legal community that he initially saw as 
demonstrating the misguidedness of analogising domestic and international law, 
which maintained the errors of personified states that stood in the way of real, 
genuine international community. Lauterpacht then developed an account of the 
foundations of legal systems that explored the limits of analogies between 
international and domestic law that ultimately built to the opposite conclusion of 
Jennings’ positions: international law bound Britain in its imperial-constitutional 
government, just as it bound all states and their peoples. 
III RULES OF LAW, 1933–45 
A Introduction 
This Part examines how Jennings’ and Lauterpacht’s early interests shifted 
towards a parallel examination of various forms of the ‘rule of law’. For Jennings, 
it involved analysing the impact of imperial government on constitutional 
arrangements in the British Isles, and his acknowledgment that Parliament was 
practically constrained by international laws. These early points led him to use the 
British imperial constitution of the mid-1930s as a model for liberal international 
order, arguing during the Second World War that re-establishing international law 
and the domestic laws of occupied nations meant more than a simple vision of law 
and order, and instead a rule of law ‘based on something like the principles of 
British liberalism’. At the same time, Lauterpacht began revising his 1920s 
account of municipal law to expound a more naturalist, systematic analysis of law 
generally, which was central to his more radical project of arguing that law 
suffused all aspects of state policy, internal or external. Lauterpacht came to 
articulate this in the appealingly British language of the international ‘rule of law’, 
with the conclusion that all disputes, private, public, or international, must be 
capable of adjudication. 
B ‘Something Like the Principles of British Liberalism’: Jennings’ Internal and 
International Rules of Law 
Jennings’ late 1920s works on the difficulties of imperial-international law formed 
an early foundation for his later, wider rebuke to the gaps and inadequacies of 
 Empire and Commonwealth: Transformations, 1920–60 279 
Dicey’s late nineteenth century vision of the British constitution. This was partly 
about a change in the municipal. By the 1920s, these problems had become so 
glaring as to make Dicey’s work, in Jennings’ view, of little contemporary use, 
despite Dicey’s thorough enduring influence.93 As Jennings wrote in the preface 
to the 1959 edition of Law and the Constitution, if there were any heretics in 1930s 
English constitutional thought, ‘they were to be found among those who regarded 
themselves as “orthodox”’.94 That orthodoxy took Dicey as essentially correct but 
in need of qualification and updating. To Jennings, teaching and writing in the late 
1920s, local government, cabinet conventions and the relations between the UK 
and the Commonwealth simply ‘could not satisfactorily be fitted’ within the 
Diceyan orthodoxy.95  
Jennings’ other 1930s interest was in placing local government law within the 
ambit of public law teaching, scholarship and practice that reflected the new 
importance of the ‘municipal’. What is significant about this shift in both policy 
and theory is that for Jennings it reflected turning inward of both Parliament and 
the Executive, away from their imperial functions and toward a domestic sphere 
now characterised by the provision of social services and the implementation of 
economic reform that reflected the new idea of ‘administration’ previously and 
famously rejected by Dicey as inapposite to the British system. His own 
autobiographical writings insist that it was the importance of local government to 
the practice of his students at Leeds — rather than the influence of Harold Laski 
and left-wing politics — that set him on the path against Dicey and towards writing 
The Law and the Constitution.96 Jennings saw the municipality as the place where 
urban life is regulated. Local government law was, as he put it in 1939, ‘the means 
 
93   See the both laudatory and critical W Ivor Jennings, ‘In Praise of Dicey, 1885-1935’ (1935) 
13 Public Administration 123. 
94   Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (University of London Press, 5th ed, 1959) vi. 
95   Ibid v. 
96   Bradley, ‘Sir William Ivor Jennings’ (n 11) 721–22. 
280 Rules of Law, 1933–45  
by which urban life becomes possible’.97 The rapid expansion of the legal powers 
of authorities responsible for delivering socially progressive policy and services 
was the ‘municipal revolution’, seeded in the 1835 establishment of the first 
municipal corporations.98 Jennings saw this as a shift from an old nineteenth 
century imperial executive to a wider use of discretion in policy implementation 
at home. The nineteenth century executive was tasked with domestic policing, 
government of the colonies, control of the armed forces, and levying small taxes: 
‘“Executive” was, indeed, the correct word. For the internal functions of the State 
were largely ministerial’, and discretion was mostly afforded to judges, while 
executive officers had limited discretionary power, except for foreign relations and 
the military. The rise of public services — health, education, employment 
exchanges, housing, public transport — had expanded the administrative 
‘machinery’ since the 1870s.99 Jennings incorporated them into an account of the 
constitution not by their functions, which he saw as an unclear mix of policing, 
regulation, and the ‘general external functions of the old “executive”’ — that is, 
its colonial role — but instead by their new institutional locations: the central 
government, independent statutory authorities, and local governments.100  
Parliament was also changing. By the late 1930s, Jennings agreed that Parliament 
was constrained ‘in practice’ by the rules of international law, but that the 
incorporation of international law into British law — as ‘part of the law of 
England’ — meant only that British law is ‘presumed not to be contrary to 
international law’.101 Jennings expressed this as a series of assumptions about the 
territorial extent of laws, jurisdiction over the seas, and the powers of the crown 
— as including those held by a government under international law, and not 
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including powers which would be contrary to international law.102 This amounted 
to the doctrine that English courts will give English law the meaning ‘most 
consistent’ with international law.103 In a lengthy note, Jennings disagreed with 
Lauterpacht’s 1935 view that customary law was part of the common law. While 
Jennings agreed that courts would not presume a contradiction between custom 
and the common law, ‘if it means that whatever is accepted customary 
international law is per se part of the common law, so that a modern rule of 
international law overrides principles already established by decisions of the 
courts, it cannot, in my opinion, be accepted’, and, moreover, the cases quoted by 
Lauterpacht did not support his apparent view.104 Instead, Jennings emphasised 
that the common law provided a superior source of protection for foreigners. In 
the absence of legislation and even if international law allowed it, the Crown could 
not abrogate common law rights of foreigners like assembly or due process.105  
Jennings conceptualised the constitutional position of international law, however, 
as a constitutional convention rather than firm law, and one that allowed 
parliament to legislate itself into actions or internal laws that might constitute 
breaches of international obligations, though practically and normatively 
constraining it from doing so: 
[A]ny breach of international law by the United Kingdom will give to the country 
injured a claim against this country which may be enforced by any means available by 
international law for the time being (such as consideration of the matter by the Council 
or Assembly of the League of Nations or by the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, or even, subject to the Kellogg Pact, war). This means that the United 
Kingdom, through legislation enacted by Parliament, may be liable to give redress to 
a foreign Power. This does not impose any legal obligation upon Parliament. But it 
means in fact that Parliament will not deliberately, and ought not to, pass any 
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legislation which will result in a breach of international law. Consequently 
international law limits the power of Parliament through the operation of constitutional 
convention.106 
A second set of international-imperial conventions grew out of the constitutional 
relations with the dominions and the mandate territories. Regarding the mandates, 
however, Jennings maintained his earlier view that, as a matter of constitutional 
law, their government was ‘within the entire discretion of the Crown’, and while 
the UK was bound by the terms of the mandates concluded and approved by the 
League Council, ‘[t]he fact that the obligations arise out of international law makes 
no difference’ to this absolute constitutional discretion.107 
Jennings’ account of international law and imperial and mandate relations rested 
on a view of the rule of law that, innovatively for his time, held both internal and 
international forms. Beginning the chapter on English constitutional law with the 
rule of law, Jennings started not with England’s constitutional history or the major 
principles, but instead with ideas of law and order in the context of instability at 
the international level. Jennings stated that the idea that it is ‘necessary to establish 
“the rule of law” in international relations’ is a recurring suggestion in 
contemporary discussions; that international law exists but is not obeyed, that 
diplomacy is based on force rather than law, and that establishing the ‘rule of law’ 
would lead to order, peace and the settlement of international disputes according 
to law.108 For Jennings, this appeal ‘expressly or impliedly draws a parallel 
between international society and the internal society of a modern State’.109 
International society today, however, resembled feudalism, where ‘lawless and 
law-abiding barons alike felt that their security rested primarily upon the number 
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of their retainers and the impregnability of their castles’.110 The difference is that 
the ‘natural solution’ to this problem, stemming from Roman imperial traditions, 
was to recognise ‘the authority of an overlord, a king or an emperor’.111 Jennings 
went on to contend that the rule of law was largely established internally, despite 
civil unrest, in the simple sense of ‘the existence of public order’, which depended 
on the existence of a superior power to use force to stop lawlessness: ‘One lawless 
man, like one lawless State, can destroy the peace of a substantial part of his world. 
Force is necessary only for the lawless and can be used only if the lawless are the 
exceptions’.112 While this basic sense of ‘law and order’ has been established in 
most states and is a ‘universally recognised principle’, in Britain, Jennings 
insisted, this experience had been one of liberalism or liberal-democracy that is 
not necessarily shared by other nations.  
In Jennings’ final analysis, the rule of law in the simple sense of law and order is 
present in ‘all civilised States’ and encompasses a range of governmental forms, 
including non-democratic and aggressively expansionist states.113 If it means 
something more than that, it must rest on a more comprehensive theory of 
government which usually ‘includes notions which are essentially imprecise’ — 
control of the executive, limited legislative powers, and so on — but which are 
besides the central requirement that it be based on the ‘active and willing consent 
and cooperation of the people’; an anti-formalist, substantive account of 
democracy.114 
During the Second World War, Jennings revisited this vision of the rule of law and 
re-drew it as holding an essentially British — rather than generically democratic 
— substance that emphasised parliamentary control of the executive. He drew 
close parallels between domestic and international versions of the rule of law, 
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contending that, at either level, its conceptual content was fundamentally British, 
contained in British constitutional and parliamentary history ‘and the works of 
publicists who consciously or unconsciously provide ammunition for political 
artillery’.115 Moving beyond the contemporary view that Dicey’s popularisation 
expressed its essence, Jennings instead traced its history through Aristotle, Occam 
and the Revolutionary Settlement to the contemporary discretionary government 
most clearly seen in the expansion of social services, which required ‘a new 
technique of government and a new alignment of governmental powers’.116 
Arbitrariness, and not discretion as such, was where Jennings found the 
breakdown of the rule of law, and Dicey’s failure was in missing the ‘most 
fundamental element’ in British controls of discretion, namely the control of 
government by parliament, and the control of parliament by the people.117 Seeing 
the rule of law as generally controls ‘exercised by one governmental authority 
upon another’118 — neither necessarily by a court, nor necessarily total119 — 
Jennings ultimately concluded that executive wartime powers, while ‘as vast as 
those of any dictator’, remained subject to parliamentary oversight and control, 
which he insisted would prevent any abuses.120  
Earlier in the piece, and more striking, was Jennings’ treatment of the international 
aspects of the rule of law. Noting again that the phrase ‘rule of law’ has ‘mainly’ 
been used in the context of international affairs to mark its absence between states, 
the lack of recourse through the League, and the outbreak of the war to ‘re-
establish the rule of law’, Jennings saw it as holding here ‘much the same meaning 
as “law and order”’, implying that diplomacy should be regulated by international 
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law not force.121 But Jennings insisted on a more capacious meaning that linked 
international and internal concepts of the rule of law: 
Yet, the rule of law has always meant more than order. International law should be re-
established, not because it is law, but because it is good law. The Germans have re-
established law and order throughout western Europe, but no British politician outside 
the internment camps has yet praised Hitler for establishing the rule of law. On the 
contrary, it is asserted that the law is the rule of the despot and the order the tyranny of 
the tyrant. In truth, it is the immediate aim of British strategy to create disorder in the 
occupied territories in order that the oppressed peoples may re-establish the rule of 
law. The rule of law means, therefore, not merely public order, but public order based 
on something like the principles of British liberalism.122 
This formulation, reminiscent of his 1938 account but applied to the realities of 
the war itself, saw Jennings unsurprisingly denying tyranny the character of the 
rule of law; as merely public order that lacks the substance of ‘something like’ 
British liberalism. In doing so he mixed international and domestic conceptions 
without much clarity about the content or basis of the international version. It 
seems to need not just law and order, but also to be based — at the very least — 
on whatever principles the ‘comity of nations’ has given to it, though ideally 
moving closer to British liberal conceptions. Adherence to this British content 
seem, then, to be Jennings’ real prerequisite to ‘re-establishing’ the ‘good law’ of 
international law. 
C Lauterpacht’s System 
Lauterpacht’s concern throughout the 1930s was to establish this kind of ‘good’ 
law, at both the international and domestic levels, in the first place. He looked to 
the connections between international and municipal legal systems to articulate 
this, and, like Jennings, used the British language of the ‘rule of law’, albeit with 
a more universalist and naturalist meaning. 
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Lauterpacht’s Function of Law in the International Community was originally 
conceived in the late 1920s as a demolition of the idea of ‘political’ issues in 
international law, that states might claim their ‘vital interests and honour’ (or, in 
the more modern language, their ‘essential’ or ‘security’ interests) preclude the 
arbitration of their disputes with others.123 Not only did Function deal in detail 
with technical legal problems around international jurisdiction, but it also provided 
an influential idea of ‘legalistic cosmopolitanism’, or, an internationalised ‘rule of 
law’.124 Its lasting importance as arguably the most significant twentieth century 
text of Anglophone international law came from its careful sensitivity to the way 
in which institutional choices could distribute spiritual, philosophical and material 
values in national and international legal systems.125 
As he worked on the technical doctrinal arguments, Lauterpacht came to recognise 
the fundamental questions of all legal systems at stake: ‘[a]s in any other system 
of law, so also in that which governs the relations of States inter se, the question 
of the limits of the rule of law is the central problem of jurisprudence’.126 Both 
juristic debate and the tumults of the late 1920s and early 1930s — the stalled 
projects of the League of Nations, economic collapse in the Depression, and the 
collective security challenges from Japan, Italy and Germany — had fixed once 
more on the perennial problem of national and international links and tensions, 
here, specifically, the presence of national legislatures and the absence of an 
international one, which created difficulties for articulating compromises between 
‘legal stability’ and ‘social change’, and arguably created problems for classifying 
international disputes or ‘urging any limitation of the rule of law among States’.127 
These central issues of the relations of law to morality, and law reform’s task of 
reflecting changing social conditions while ensuring legal stability, and the 
adjudication of disputes to create both security and justice were dealt with 
 
123  Koskenniemi, ‘Introduction’ (n 48) xxix–xxx. 
124  Ibid xxxi. 
125  Koskenniemi, ‘Function of Law’ (n 49) 366. 
126  Lauterpacht, Function (n 48) vii. 
127  Ibid vii–viii. 
 Empire and Commonwealth: Transformations, 1920–60 287 
effectively within European states, but remained unrealised internationally. To 
understand the specifically international character of these problems, Lauterpacht 
looked in several instances, with caution, to analogies with municipal law. 
Ultimately, these explorations would build to a general conception of law which 
treated international and municipal law as its two constituent elements.128 
Lauterpacht’s system emerged from several points of connection between them. 
The first point of connection was in Lauterpacht’s concept of justiciability and the 
issue of gaps and the completeness of a legal system. Lauterpacht began Function 
with the internal/external divide, here fundamental to the source of norms: 
The function of law is to regulate the conduct of men by reference to rules whose 
formal — as distinguished from their historical — source of validity lies, in the last 
resort, in a precept imposed from outside. Within the community of nations this 
essential feature of the rule of law is constantly put in jeopardy by the conception 
of the sovereignty of States which deduces the binding force of international law 
from the will of each individual member of the international community.129 
At the international level, sovereignty forms the basis of a state’s rights to 
determine the rules of international law by which it will be bound, leading to states 
requiring unanimity for changes to international law, and retaining the right to 
adjudicate whether and which rules of law actually apply to them.130 Lauterpacht 
conceived of these absolute doctrines of sovereignty as ‘carefully built’ by 
international lawyers, which in turn formed the basis for newer doctrines to limit 
the reach of international adjudication that contended that political or non-legal 
disputes and the fundamental interests of states always remained outside 
international law.131  
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Against these supposed gaps, Lauterpacht raised a concept of justiciability derived 
from municipal law. Within the state, all conflicts between citizens are justiciable, 
whereas, in the positivist, gap-endorsing argument, disputes between states are 
only justiciable if those states have consented to a court’s jurisdiction.132 For 
Lauterpacht this shows international law’s ‘slow progress’: ‘solutions, long 
accepted in national jurisprudence as being dictated by the very existence of legal 
order, have failed to secure acceptance by international lawyers for almost two 
generations’.133 Lauterpacht contended that positivist theories focusing on 
national legal systems had long grappled with questions of the limits of judicial 
function — the ability of judges to decide a case in the possible absence of an 
applicable rule — and these theorists concluded that ‘the very fact of the 
establishment of a community under the reign of law’ meant judges could not 
refuse to decide a case.134 This was clear in England, and the basis of the common 
law itself, but Lauterpacht argued it also followed a priori from the existence of a 
legal community at all, and its necessary prohibition on violence. While there may 
be gaps in statute laws and customary laws, there can be no gaps in the ‘legal 
system taken as a whole’; any purported gaps are filled by the functions of legal 
organisation, the ‘first function’ of which is to preserve peace by stating the 
foundational precept that ‘“there shall be no violence”’.135 Where law declines to 
adjudicate, force becomes the only means of resolving disputes, which violates 
law’s ‘primordial duty’ itself to stop violence.136 What Lauterpacht saw here was 
a contradiction of positivist thinking, expressed in the language of ‘spheres’. At 
the municipal level positivism denied justiciability gaps, but at the international it 
began from that assertion.137 This rejection of the rule of law at the international 
level made international law positivism both an unsound doctrine, misidentified 
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with domestic legal positivism, and, ultimately, ‘the very negation of its prototype 
in the sphere of municipal jurisprudence’.138 
Lauterpacht’s second connection between the domestic and international built on 
the first: the development of international law, contrasted with stability and change 
in municipal legal systems. The international legal system clearly imperfectly 
organised the international community. While improvements to the shortcomings 
of municipal law’s organisation of the national community are built into those 
systems, in international law these gaps are much more significant ‘not only in 
bulk, but also in intensity’, and filling them may affect fundamental parts of 
international law.139 As with Analogies, Lauterpacht in Functions contended that 
general principles of law, including both private and public law, as worked out in 
national systems, could be used to fill these gaps and develop and change 
international law.140  
Turning to the question of change in legal systems, a central problem for legal 
philosophy generally, Lauterpacht stressed that the issue of legal change at the 
international level could be easily overstated. It is not a problem peculiar to 
international society, but of all societies, and one main factor limiting the problem 
is its present restriction to only regulating states externally.141 International law is 
largely confined to regulating matters around the external relations of states: ‘It 
does not and cannot aim at regulating the lives of the members of the international 
community in the same intensive and pervading manner as municipal law does. It 
is mainly adjective law. It is, more than any other kind of law, a regulation of 
competencies.’142  
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What is needed is a change in the political organisation of the international 
community to make its law have internal effects. Only when it ‘regulates in detail 
the life of its individual members in its internal aspects’ will it be able to address 
the ‘constant flux of changes’ that make legislation necessary.143 Instead, 
international law remained more ‘static’ than domestic law not because there is no 
international legislature, but because it only regulates relations that are ‘not in 
themselves liable to be affected in a decisive manner by economic and other 
changes’.144 While internal state law provides a machinery to formally recognise 
changes in power and influence, international legal institutions have not yet 
developed a similar machinery. But Lauterpacht also insisted that a state’s 
‘internal growth’ — an increase in its power — need not lead to an external 
expression of that power: removing the legal admissibility of force and 
entrenching the duty of judicial settlement in international organisation should 
break the fallacious relation between these things, principally through an 
international legislature and judge-adapted law.145 
The third and final connection between domestic and international law appeared 
in Lauterpacht’s ultimate aim in the final chapters of Function: the comparison 
and differentiation between internal and international forms of the rule of law. 
Lauterpacht offered a detailed rejection of earlier visions of international law that 
saw it as deficient, arguing that these were based on a misguided comparison with 
municipal law and its concepts of the rule of law.146 International law serves the 
higher interests of the international community. Jurists who saw international law 
as non-existent (Hobbes, Spinoza), not law (Austin), or weak law (Oppenheim, 
Holland) all laid the foundations for contemporary visions of ‘denying’ 
international law by labelling it a ‘specific’ law.147 For Lauterpacht, this amounted 
only to arguing that it is defective when ‘viewed from the narrow perspective of 
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municipal law’.148 In fact, these supposed ‘defects’ are just reminders that 
municipal law is not the only conception of law, but rather ‘only an historical 
category’ amidst a ‘wider conception’.149 Lauterpacht endorsed Westlake’s point 
that the controversy can be solved by refusing to think of ‘the law of the land’ as 
the ‘only proper kind of jural law’ and thus refusing to require that international 
law follow characteristics appropriate to municipal law.150 Finally, he endorsed 
the arguments of German jurists that the ‘the orthodox concept of law is not 
sacrosanct’, that law must be adapted to the requirements of ‘actual life’, and that 
this is a question about the ‘delicate problem’ of law’s creation and 
development.151 
With these points made, Lauterpacht arrived at his ‘central problem’ of the legal 
nature of international law, formulated as a series of questions about its relation to 
states, municipal law, and law in general: 
To what conception of law must international law conform in order that it can 
accurately be described as law? Is it a conception of law deduced from the positive 
legal order within the State, i.e. a conception of general jurisprudence in modern 
society? Or is it a conception of law made so elastic as to embrace the body of rules 
regulating at present the mutual relations of modern States? Shall international law be 
guided, while admitting its own shortcomings, by the generally accepted notion of law 
which few would venture to deny but for the necessity of defending the legal nature of 
international law? Or shall it broaden it and impart to it some of its elasticity? Shall 
international law aim at improvement by trying to bring its rules within the compass 
of the generally accepted notion of law, or shall it disintegrate it and thus deprive itself 
of a concrete ideal of perfection? 152 
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Lauterpacht then rejected the answers of the dualist jurists who saw municipal law 
as a law of subordination of subjects to superior legal will and international law as 
merely a law of coordination between equal states: Jellinek emphasised self-
limitation and saw sovereignty as determining one’s own competence; Kaufmann 
emphasised subordination as only truly possible within the state; Triepel thought 
self-limitation impossible and instead located international law’s obligatory force 
in the common will of states; and Cavaglieri and Anzilotti, finally, abandoned 
coordination by contract to see it as objective: pacta sunt servanda — that 
agreements will be kept — is a constitutional, a priori rule that cannot be 
‘proven’.153 Lauterpacht rejected this division of coordination and subordination 
as based on an incoherent command theory. Law can command without that 
command coming from an ‘organized political authority’, and arguments against 
that fall back on the antiquated idea that law is the psychological will of a real 
group.154 Without this command view, Lauterpacht saw the idea of a state being 
objectively bound by an obligation that led, logically, to courts, which do not 
impose new obligations but rather ‘ascertain existing law’, giving effect to state 
will by articulating its obligations under international law.155 
Whereas the ‘initial hypothesis’ of municipal law is that state will, through the 
constitution or the will of the monarch, must be obeyed, international law should 
take the original hypothesis that the will of the international community, rather 
than its states, must be obeyed. Lauterpacht called this ‘voluntas civitatis maximae 
est servanda’, seeing this international will expressed in treaties, customs, general 
principles of law, where the civitas maxima was not the state but rather the ‘super-
State of law … existing over and above national sovereignties’.156 Pacta sunt 
servanda was a ‘beneficent transition’ between international law as the collective 
will of states to being based on ‘law’s impersonal sovereignty’.157 Lauterpacht’s 
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new hypothesis was a functional one, which ‘courageously breaking with the 
traditions of a past period, incorporates the rational and ethical postulate, which is 
gradually becoming a fact, of an international community of interests and 
functions’.158  
More than just a ‘matter of wording’, Lauterpacht insisted that this different 
starting point expressed the real nature of the international legal system, and lay 
the ground for his view of the necessity of compulsory adjudication.159 
International law’s ‘specific character’ had made jurists ‘insensible to the juristic 
heresy’ of insisting on rules of international law without also requiring compulsory 
adjudication of disputes.160 State refusal to submit to adjudication simply reflects 
the reality that international law is not a ‘coherent and harmonious’ system 
‘governed by an all-pervading unity of the reign of law’ but instead generalised 
and conflicting practices that try to bind together ‘political entities each inclined 
on being a law unto itself’.161 Municipal law makes the state’s interest the supreme 
law. The state is bound by its will and, ‘subject to certain constitutional 
requirements of form’, changes its will by changing the law.162 But the state can 
also use ‘general provisions of the utmost flexibility’ to change law while still 
remaining ‘within the orbit of the law’, like invoking political considerations of 
the safety of the republic.163  
Lauterpacht linked this thinking not just to German jurists like Jhering who 
promoted a view of state constitutions as ‘political law’, but also, intriguingly, 
English constitutional lawyers in the mode of Dicey. Dicey’s contention that 
constitutional ‘[c]onventions, understandings, habits and practices’ employed by 
ministers and officials are ‘not in reality laws at all since they are not enforced by 
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the Courts’, reflected, thought Lauterpacht, ‘the existence within the State of rules, 
the non-observance of which by the highest legislative or executive organs of the 
State, far from amounting to a breech [sic] of law, will be constitutive of new law 
expressive of the changed political necessities of the State’.164  
While Lauterpacht allowed each state to remain ‘a law unto itself’ internally, that 
internal ordering and the interests it reflected did not apply to its capacity as a 
subject of international law, which does not ‘disregard’ these important interests, 
but instead ‘recognize[s], measure[s], and adjust[s]’ them against the equal 
interests of other states and the international community.165 This meant that 
membership of the international community necessitated rejecting absolute visions 
of the state: ‘[t]he sanctity and supremacy which metaphysical theories attach to 
the State must be rejected’.166  
The ultimate tasks for making this theory real were abandoning the legal/political 
dispute distinction and submitting to compulsory adjudication, and insisting that 
law is no panacea to force, but instead a necessary condition of peace and the basis 
of ‘international solidarity’. This required that states become reluctant to ‘rely 
rigidly’ on rights over justice or peace, and, ultimately, to take up peace and 
pacifism in general as a guiding structural idea: ‘peace is not only a moral idea. In 
a sense [it] is morally indifferent, inasmuch as it may involve the sacrifice of 
justice on the altar of stability and security. Peace is pre-eminently a legal 
postulate. Juridically it is a metaphor for the postulate of the unity of the legal 
system.’167 Peace, ultimately, was the aim of all law and the link between 
Lauterpacht’s domestic and international. 
On the cusp of the dissolution of peace and the Second World War, Lauterpacht 
would look to municipal courts as places to make these theoretical shifts real. In 
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May 1939, Lauterpacht explored the question of whether international law formed 
part of the law of England. Taking his title from Westlake’s earlier article, 
Lauterpacht ruminated on Westlake’s first principle, which connected 
international law to national populations, and linking it to his own rejection of 
individual–state analogies. Westlake’s principle was ‘progressive’ in that it 
‘signifie[d] the abandonment of what has been the greatest evil of modern 
International Law and relations, namely, the dualism of moral and legal standards 
applicable to individuals acting singly and to individuals grouped in collective 
units in the form of States.’168 The doctrine of incorporation was a reminder that 
the position of the state in international law is not absolute but relative, and 
powerfully clarified by the true position of the individual within both national and 
international law. ‘[T]here is a sphere’, Lauterpacht argued, ‘in which the law, 
both international and municipal, recognises individual rights independently of the 
direct and specific approval of the State’, and this is the basis of its ‘progressive 
and beneficent quality’.169  
Ultimately, Lauterpacht urged readers to recognise that a monistic doctrine of 
automatic ‘adoption’ of international law into domestic ought to be seen not as 
‘subordinating’ one system to the other but instead adding to the authority of each 
sphere:  
In periods of crisis in the international sphere, whenever there reveal themselves 
tendencies to substitute for the authority of the law of nations an uneasy and precarious 
balance of physical forces, the task of municipal tribunals in administering and 
upholding at least some portions of International Law, forming part of the municipal 
system and rendered real by the sanction of the State behind it, acquires special 
significance.170  
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Lauterpacht concluded with a vision of the future in which legislative supremacy 
might give way to written constitutions that ‘deprive’ their legislatures of any 
power to legislate contrary to a ‘fundamental provision making International Law 
an integral part of their system’, which could not be modified without ‘common 
consent’.171 That kind of self-subordination would be enforced by courts ‘national 
or international’, both with the competence to review and invalidate any legislation 
contrary to international law.172 
D Conclusion 
This Part examined Jennings’ and Lauterpacht’s joint turn towards the rule of law 
in the 1930s and 1940s. Jennings argued that imperial administration had changed 
domestic public law, and that Parliament was practically constrained by the system 
of international law, giving rise to his account of the rule of law in its internal and 
international forms, the latter of which demanded re-establishing the post-war 
world along the lines of British liberalism. Lauterpacht expanded his idea of the 
functions of international law to reject its supposed inadequacy and insist that 
domestic and international laws must both serve the same purposes that limited 
the absolutism and of the state and made adjudication necessary and peace its 
function. Their final projects in the post-war era would each build into more 
ambitious schemes for commonwealths that could make these systematic 
commitments real. 
IV NEW COMMONWEALTHS, 1941–60 
A Introduction 
This Part turns to how Jennings and Lauterpacht used their visions of the domestic 
and international in projects for the commonwealths of the post-war world. 
Jennings’ wartime plans for a European federation modelled its laws on the British 
Empire, though his post-war theorising around the constitutions for decolonising 
states aimed to fit them into a renewed Commonwealth, and instead of ruminating 
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on their new international legal personality or freedom in domestic law-making, 
Jennings urged them to stay with British parliamentary traditions and resist the 
scourge of international socialism. Lauterpacht’s post-war scheme of human rights 
argued for their entrenchment in all national constitutions using a new emphasis 
on British constitutional history, and presaging the interventionism in domestic 
legal systems that would become central to ideas of liberal internationalism in the 
Cold War. This is a return to the themes of Chapter One, commonwealth and 
empire: Jennings’ commonwealth of Europe and the decolonising world, and 
Lauterpacht’s commonwealth of all humanity. 
B Jennings at the End of Empire 
In 1941, Jennings sketched a plan for a federation of Western Europe, including a 
draft of its constitution. This ‘federal union’ would improve on the failures of the 
League, but against those who thought international government only meant 
replacing sovereign states with a world order — an ideal of ‘insuperable’ 
difficulties — Jennings insisted that a Western European federation of democratic 
governments was the only true solution to many of the world’s problems.173 Its 
practicability depended on persuading nations to send representatives to an 
international conference to draft a constitution, which meant persuading public 
opinion in these nations that this was both urgent and essential, that, in turn, 
depended on aiming at a constitution that would work to solve these problems 
without calling for ‘too great a sacrifice’ in the sovereignty of federating states.174 
For practical reasons, some flexibility in national forms of internal government 
would be allowed within the Federation, but in broad terms its constituent parts 
had to be democratic. Jennings insisted that centralising control over defence and 
foreign affairs for a single Western European bloc, which would attend the League 
of Nations in unity, was fundamental to peace.175 Some form of coordinated 
control over colonial possessions and economic relations within and beyond the 
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Federation was central to avoid repeating the financial and military disasters of the 
interwar years.176 These formed the pillars of Jennings view. But he also insisted 
that it was not a utopian project. The ‘empty sentiments’ and ‘vague Utopianism’ 
that reflected a poor understanding of the practical and theoretical problems 
involved in such a union were a serious danger.177 To clarify these practicalities, 
and outline how powers over foreign affairs, defence, and some controls on 
economic relations and colonies might operate, Jennings turned back to the only 
other international organisation he thought effective and guiding: the British 
Empire’s interwar experience of global order. 
Analogies with the Empire and illustrations from its successes and failures form 
much of the arguments that followed. Pleading for the practicality of the scheme 
and exhorting the Anglophone world to advocate for it, Jennings argued that just 
as the ‘systems’ from the ‘Mediterranean to the Arctic’ are ‘copies’ of the British 
system adapted to national characters and ‘conditions of national life’, his plan 
was ‘based essentially on the British tradition’ as it was ‘adapted by British people’ 
to the conditions of North American and Australia, and thus the ‘initiative’ for the 
scheme must come from those peoples.178 But the Commonwealth would also 
endure and be accommodated into the Federation. He insisted that nothing in the 
plan would formally detract from the King’s powers or interfere with imperial–
dominion relations — ‘The Statute of Westminster of 1931 would not be amended 
even by the omission of a comma’ — but practically it would significantly change 
Commonwealth intergovernmental relations: the UK could not defend the 
dominions except through the Federation’s processes, and citizenship and 
immigration status would change, though this would not follow if the dominions 
were to join the Federation themselves.179  
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Following this imperial guide, Jennings’ vision for the interaction of domestic and 
international in his European Federation strongly resembled the Imperial–
Dominion arrangements in their 1920s forms, albeit here solidified in a written 
international constitution, rather than the policy preferences of the Empire and its 
areas of disengagement with dominion governments. Major foreign policy 
decisions would be for a Council of Ministers and President, to the exclusion of 
any ‘direct political relations’ between individual federated states and outsiders.180 
But plenty of international questions would be reserved to the internal systems of 
these states. There are ‘many subjects of international discussion’ that would 
remain ‘entirely within the jurisdiction of the federated States’: public health, 
extradition, mutual enforcement of foreign judgments, bankruptcy, patents, 
trademark, copyright, and communications.181 Balancing this internal jurisdiction 
with the problems usually solved in single-nation federations by delegating all 
international powers to the Federation prompted Jennings to draft a ‘limited treaty-
making power’, granted to the constituent states, but subject to the Federation’s 
control.182 The Federation would also hold a legislative power to implement major 
treaties it signed, and Jennings contemplated a convention for the unification of 
laws between the constituent states.183  
But it is in the coda of Jennings’ final works that his views on the international 
and domestic shift at the end of empire. They focused primarily on the kinds of 
domestic orders that the former colonies should aspire to adapt to their local 
conditions, mostly along the lines of the British Constitution, though offering little 
guidance on their newly acquired rights and duties under international law. 
Jennings was extensively and personally involved in decolonisation as a 
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constitutional architect.184 His last theory works turned to vast statements of 
legislative authority and executive power — now asserted by newly decolonised 
states — but seeing new roots for them in the history of British colonial law-
making.  
In the 1961 second edition of Parliament, Jennings began now with Coke’s early 
seventeenth century vision of parliament’s authority as ‘transcendent and 
absolute’, not exactly rejecting it, but pointing to its clear functional limits while 
giving it theoretically global reach: ‘The legislative authority of Parliament 
extends to all persons, to all places and to all events; but the only legal systems 
which it can amend are those which recognize its authority’.185 Parliament is not 
subject to any ‘physical’ limitation, only those limits recognised by law. Law here 
meant simply the authority that peoples would practically accept and consent to; 
‘convenient general propositions’ not entirely removed from social and political 
realities, but ‘not necessarily bear[ing] any very close’ relation to them.186 
Jennings noted that, regardless of the claims of statutes still on the books that 
purported to bind ‘subjects of the Crown in America’, this evidently could not 
include former colonial possessions over which the UK once exercised 
jurisdiction.187  
As part of this view, Jennings once more contested Dicey’s arguments that the rule 
of law prohibited wide discretionary authority and was not well served by 
delegated legislation. Jennings contended that this ignored the vast history of 
extra-Parliamentary law-making outside the British Isles,188 which was, amidst 
decolonisation, in the process of being dismantled and transferred to new states. 
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Jennings listed the range of Crown rights to legislate in conquered or ceded 
territories where no local legislature had been set up or the right to legislate 
reserved, the Crown’s wide powers to ‘act as [it] pleases outside British territory 
and against foreigners follows from principles of the common law’, orders binding 
even British subjects in protectorates, trust territories, and Crown rights to legislate 
for certain settled colonies.189 Those powers, formerly exercised for Empire, 
which excluded international law’s application in favour of imperial constitutional 
law, were now to be held by these new sovereigns. Jennings’ vision, then, was still 
for a world order that based its international on both ‘something like the principles 
of British liberalism’ as well as something like the principles — to him, practised 
and proven — of the British Empire.  
As both of these foundational orthodoxies began to slip away in the 1960s, 
Jennings’ focus turned to delivering lectures that buttressed and explained his 
work drafting new constitutions for decolonising states.190 Amidst wide 
discussions of diversities in local populations, educational programs, responsible 
government, the difficulties of constitution-making removed from local 
conditions, and the constitutional documents themselves, Jennings almost entirely 
eschewed any discussion of international law for these new states. Instead 
Jennings’ reflections on late 1940s Asian decolonisation concluded with an 
examination of Commonwealth (rather than international) relations, and the 
suggestion that the historical and economic ties of the Commonwealth ought to 
guide newly independent India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, alongside the likely 
benefits of a general alignment with British views of the ‘power politics’ of the 
early 1950s Cold War.191  
By the 1960s and the era of African decolonisation, Jennings’ concluding 
suggestions would briefly note that new African states ‘have a part to play in the 
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international scene’.192 But Jennings also thought that African leaders should treat 
their new international powers as carefully as their fledgling domestic 
governmental forms, given that control over external affairs had until 
independence been ‘matters for the Government of the United Kingdom’.193 The 
Commonwealth, Jennings suggested, might be a source of friendly advice, 
information and diplomatic connections.194 The danger, however, was of African 
alignment with communist bloc states, determined to undermine democratic 
systems, and importing their ideologies alongside international aid and advice.195 
More abstractly, Jennings argued that the very existence of independent states 
necessarily led to international ‘competition’, and each state tends to press their 
internal political organisation and culture as the mark of the ideal.196 But despite 
all these international challenges, Jennings concluded that the greater ones 
remained internal. Constitutions could provide some solutions for self-
government, but their success remained for the men — and, Jennings added, 
women — in public service.197 
C Lauterpacht’s Commonwealth 
Shortly after Jennings published his constitution for a federation of Western 
Europe, Lauterpacht finished his own ideal plan to ensure peace through the 
domestic enactment, throughout the world, of an ‘International Bill of the Rights 
of Man’ that would alter the constitutions of all states to fit liberal democratic 
protections of individual rights. In October 1944, Lauterpacht came to call the 
War’s frequently stated purpose of the ‘enthronement of the rights of man’ the 
most difficult problem for international organisation because it touched 
‘intimately upon the relations of the State and the individual’, which, ‘even in the 
domestic sphere is still a disputed province of jurisprudence and of the science of 
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government’.198 Individual rights involved a still ‘more drastic interference’ with 
state sovereignty than the renunciation of war or establishing compulsory 
international adjudication; Lauterpacht’s other major interwar projects.199 To 
succeed, this new project would require ‘concrete proposals’, as much as a clear 
recognition of an international ‘spiritual authority’ — natural rights so-called 
‘without embarrassment or apologies’.200 But Lauterpacht described the result as 
not so much the sovereignty of international law over the domestic laws of states, 
but rather the ‘indestructible sovereignty of “man”’ against both levels of legal 
ordering.201 
One major intellectual pillar for Lauterpacht’s conception of internationalised 
natural rights was British constitutional law and political theory. The British 
contribution to ideas of individual rights were relevant to the country’s ‘attitude’ 
to proposals to make the International Bill of the Rights of Man part of both 
international law and the constitutional law of England. Britain’s position ‘outside 
the orbit of the almost universal trend of safeguarding the fundamental rights of 
the individual in a written constitution’ was not because of the lack of a written 
constitution but because of British adherence to a flexible rather than rigid 
constitution.202 Lauterpacht insisted that despite English detractors against natural 
rights — Burke, Bentham, and the analytic school with its ‘negative and 
complacent attitude’ to them, all of which had now ‘become the common heritage 
of the world’ — the ‘long list’ of Charters of liberty and the works of Milton, 
Locke and Blackstone, among others, all enthroned natural rights and influenced 
the various American declarations of rights.203 But the constitutional theory that 
Lauterpacht pushed back on here was the absolute supremacy of parliament. 
Without mentioning Dicey by name, Lauterpacht contended that this theory of the 
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legislature ‘unrestricted by higher law’ was ‘of comparatively recent origin’, and 
that it needed to be understood in and confined by its historical context; namely as 
replacing the arbitrary power of the king with a right of subjects to be governed 
by their representatives.204  
Lauterpacht also saw this connection between English contributions to natural 
rights and liberty as central to allaying British resistance to the very idea of an 
international bill of rights on domestic constitutional grounds. He argued that an 
international treaty could conform to the constitution and traditions of each state, 
indeed here by denying the absolutism of any law-making organ throughout the 
world. While Britain’s parliamentary supremacy and lack of judicial review of 
legislation might be a ‘factor’ connected with the International Bill forming part 
of the ‘law of States’, there was no reason why the Bill could not be implemented 
according to each state’s constitutional forms and traditions.205 Indeed, 
Lauterpacht thought it was ‘possible’ that parliamentary supremacy might be 
‘deliberately made to yield to the significant innovation implied in an International 
Bill of the Rights of Man’: the Bill would express natural and inalienable human 
rights, which do deny the ‘absolute supremacy of any earthly legislative power’.206 
Lauterpacht concluded the plan by making municipal law and national courts 
central to its success. The Bill could not introduce a ‘world law’, but instead 
needed to look to states for its enforcement. Their laws must be adapted to the 
Bill’s ‘fundamental requirements’, but also be used to adapt the Bill to local 
conditions. The ‘municipal law of States cannot be administered by international 
courts possessing no requisite knowledge of the law, of the legal tradition, and of 
the social and economic problems of individual States’.207 International appeals 
faced objections that were ‘so overwhelming’ that even considering the 
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possibilities of ‘softening the radicalism’ of that suggestion was not worth 
considering in detail.208 Instead, Lauterpacht saw municipal law as the first place 
in which the Bill’s rights must be enforced: by being ‘made part of [states’] 
municipal law and partak[ing] of the character of a constitutional entrenchment’, 
matched with a ‘general’ international guarantee by a supervisory authority backed 
by the possibility of ‘intervention by the political international authority’ which 
would hold ‘ultimate and effective power’ to enforce the Bill’s observance.209 
While the central rights like liberty, free trials, and the prohibition on slavery must 
be observed by states and enforced by their national courts, Lauterpacht 
acknowledged that wider political and social aspirational rights must simply be 
left to states to observe without international enforcement. Lauterpacht’s list of 
these rights reflected some interwar and post-war problems more than others: 
religious and minority protections were strong and multiple, while workers’, 
women’s and colonial rights far weaker and incidental. What Lauterpacht had 
elaborated was a commonwealth of all humanity — or rather, parts of it — built 
on the adaptation of English constitutional law, and premising its effectiveness on 
global domestic implementation. 
Lauterpacht’s plan presaged and influenced many of the major elements of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the later twin Covenants, just as 
Jennings’ federation would come to mirror many of the major elements of the 
European Union’s settlement with Britain from the 1970s onwards. Lauterpacht’s 
selective intervention scheme also presaged Cold War discussions and uses of 
these rights to justify interventions. But in the meantime the British Empire that 
had shaped their theories of domestic and international law collapsed. With the 
end of the War came the gradual independence of most of Britain’s dominions, 
protectorates, and colonies in the process of decolonisation. Dying in 1960, 
Lauterpacht would not see this process in full swing. His last academic works 
largely examined the new United Nations and its innovations. In the mid-1950s, 
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however, in one of his final pieces, Lauterpacht noted that the ‘dogma’ that 
international and municipal law were ‘fundamentally different and disparate’ had 
been thoroughly undermined, both by the wide extension of the scope of 
international law, and the reality that most constitutions around the world now 
formally incorporated international law into domestic law: ‘[i]n these — as in 
some other — respects what in 1924 was iconoclastic has become almost 
orthodox.’210 This new orthodoxy was, as Lauterpacht hoped in his International 
Bill, to be put in service of a commonwealth of all humanity. 
D Conclusion 
Part Three considered the new commonwealths of Jennings and Lauterpacht and 
their post-war uses of the domestic and international to articulate new legal 
schemes for peace, decolonised government, and human rights. British imperial-
constitutional law remained a strong guidance for Jennings’ plan for a European 
federation in its dealings with inter-state disagreements, and strong models of 
parliamentary sovereignty with little attention to executive international functions 
characterised his thoughts on newly independent states. In Lauterpacht’s proposal 
for an International Bill of the Rights of Man, the British constitutional tradition 
proved pivotal in reorganising the domestic laws of all nations to require their 
obedience to the standards of human rights, just as these very forms of government 
and rights would themselves soon become the focus of the Cold War ideological 
conflict that would feed on and eclipse the collapse of the British Empire.  
V CONCLUSION: DISSOLUTIONS 
This Chapter has shown how the transformations and fall of the Empire motivated 
Jennings’ and Lauterpacht’s radical rethinking of the domestic and international 
in a range of projects around empire, administration and international community. 
What began as a focus on the interaction of imperial-constitutional law with the 
new international legal system, turned to the uses of the ‘rule of law’ to guide the 
development of international laws, and, finally, post-war projects of European 
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federation, decolonised independence and human rights. At that point, the 
dissolution of the British Empire in the 1950s and 1960s, its replacement with the 
Commonwealth, and the shift in Western hegemonic power from Britain to 
America had turned the Empire’s global connections of power and law into ones 
of imposed culture and inescapable history; the real power and law having gone 
elsewhere to the conflicts of Cold War.211 British visions of the international and 
domestic did not cease so much as turn to a different field: general jurisprudence. 
Shortly after Lauterpacht’s death and while Jennings drafted new constitutions for 
the decolonising world, H L A Hart’s analytic legal positivist ‘revival’ of Austin’s 
perspective influentially contended once more that international law lacked the 
status of law, for lack of sovereign or command, and could not be analogised to 
domestic law, where these elements were central.212 Hart’s vision seemed aimed 
at the failures of the League, the internationalism of the decolonising world, and 
the apparent ‘deadlock’ of current international institutions that, in the midst of 
Cold War, could neither lawfully command nor protect in service of any ideology, 
but instead operated only through force, if at all.213 The complexities of the debates 
over the relationship of international and domestic law now came to be dominated 
more by the intricacies of linguistic usage. This dissolved into an analytic project 
that tried abstract itself from the world events and the rise of public and 
international law and power that had made Jennings’ and Lauterpacht’s attempts 
to understand and link or distinguish them so urgent and important, and which 
burned through the Cold War unabated.  
  
 
211  On law and the end of (British) Empire, see Charlotte Peevers, The Politics of Justifying 
Force: The Suez Crisis, the Iraq War, and International Law (OUP, 2013) ch 3 (‘The Suez 
Crisis’); Adom Getachew, Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-
Determination (Princeton UP, 2019). 
212  HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (OUP, 3rd ed, 1961) ch x. 
213  On Hart, primitive law and decolonisation, see Coel Kirkby, ‘Law Evolves: The Uses of 
Primitive Law in Anglo-American Concepts of Modern Law, 1861–1961’ (2018) 58 AJLH 
535. On Cold War, see further Luis Eslava et al (eds), Bandung, Global History and 
International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures (CUP, 2017); Matt Craven et al 
(eds), International Law and the Cold War (CUP, 2019). 
CONCLUSION: REIMAGININGS 
What did these men believe together? What did they pick, sort, and deny to build 
their histories, identities, and polities in the languages of domestic and 
international law? Which territories did they stake for these ideas, and what did 
they expel to do so?  
Chapter One contended that the domestic emerged as part of attempts to expel 
various forms of natural law connected to commonwealth and empire. This was a 
project of legal theology; a kind of secularisation of principles and themes in 
natural law thought to present early sketches of the international and domestic that 
focused on sovereign and state. Writing from the end of Elizabeth’s reign to the 
early reign of James I/VI, Alberico Gentili began to offer the first account of the 
interaction of the domestic and international by exploring the problems and mutual 
constraints that might shape or restrict the operation of each, partly achieved by 
unifying the law of nations with the law of nature. In his first major work on 
ambassadors, Gentili saw the international as a set of constraints on domestic 
sovereign power in the service of a humanist commonwealth. In his later works 
on war and empire, Gentili articulated a much stronger account of absolute 
domestic sovereignty, analogising disputes between private citizens and 
sovereigns, examining imperial changes to internal laws, and ending with 
laudatory ideas of empire as protective jurisdiction that extended the domestic well 
into international legal spaces. Around the English Civil Wars and Cromwell’s 
Commonwealth, the domestic was put to a set of very different uses, albeit with 
similar analogies and allegories. Richard Zouche’s idea of laws between peoples 
emphasised the connections between internal civil law and a proclaimed system 
of the law of nations, using a set of detailed analogies between these two levels to 
articulate an idea of positive laws changeable by sovereigns in both spheres. John 
Selden likewise emphasised the laws between peoples, theorising a taxonomy of 
levels of legal ordering that included the ‘domestic civil law’, all of which were 
drawn from genealogies of nations dating back to biblical families that supported 
British imperial rights to the seas. Thomas Hobbes’ well-known account of 
international and domestic politics included an overlooked but significant 
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emphasis on analogies between different kinds of leagues within and between 
families and nations that Hobbes used to articulate spheres of private absolute 
power within the household, public power within the state, and the ties of nation 
and family that justified the spread of colonies as the children of the 
Commonwealth. James Harrington’s vision saw this empire as split into ‘foreign 
and domestic’, the justice and ordering of each resting on an opposition of control 
over land and laws that was ultimately used to articulate a messianic imperial 
mission for Britain to spread its laws throughout the world. But it was with John 
Locke’s post-1688 work that the basis of the ‘modern’ account of the domestic 
and international finally emerged, with parliament responsible for the laws of the 
land, the executive responsible for exercising the powers of the law of nations, and 
any conflicts or differences between domestic and international law to be resolved 
by convention and prudence.  
Chapter Two then argued the international emerged out of attempts to replace the 
last vestiges of natural law thought with new emphases on sentiment, utility, anti-
nationalism and a new natural law of political economy. Jeremy Bentham’s 
excoriation of William Blackstone’s Lockean taxonomy of the spheres of the laws 
of nature, nations, and municipal law allowed Bentham to articulate a strong 
account of sovereignty as obedience and command that always had external and 
imperial dimensions. This laid the ground for his new word ‘international’ to 
describe the laws between states, which ought to be guided by principles of utility 
that should rationally reveal their shared interests to reject sovereign competition 
and national jealousies. But a parallel international along similar lines appeared in 
Adam Smith’s contemporaneous works, which grounded the sentiment within 
families and nations as an alternative basis for understanding the common links 
and interests between them which, for Smith, undermined imperial projects of 
colonial preference and urged all nations to adopt domestic laws of free trade. In 
the aftermath of the America and French Revolutions, the domestic and 
international were put to a range of other uses. Edmund Burke seized on domestic 
ties to ground a law of civil vicinage that denied the international claims of French 
Revolutionary constitutions as contrary to the revived natural laws of property. 
Reacting in a different way, the later works of Bentham critiqued the Revolution’s 
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revival of natural law ideas which gave way to projects of constitutional codes that 
developed Bentham’s account of the international as primarily an internal check 
on legislative power, culminating in the arguments of the unfinished constitutional 
code that legislators must approach domestic laws as owing duties to other states 
and peoples too. In the wake of Bentham’s death, two divergent projects for his 
and Smith’s internationals: John Austin’s influential rejection of the international 
as law along Benthamite lines of command and utility, and Travers Twiss’s 
continuation of the international as a project of political economy that concluded 
with nation and empire. 
Chapter Three argued that with the expansion of late Victorian empire, the 
domestic and international became thoroughly entwined in a range of areas of 
national and imperial law. A first phase was the apotheosis of independence tied 
to empire. Parliament became the focus of imperial and international law 
enactment, and theories of absolute parliamentary sovereignty most closely 
associated with A V Dicey were significantly inflected by international concerns. 
Wide debates over the juridical nature of the empire in its domestic, British Isles 
form, and its international reach turned frequently to limited powers of local self-
government and imperial restrictions on full international personality. But the 
domestic was also used, particularly by John Westlake, as a source of analogies 
for expanding the reach of international law to support the imperial claims of the 
1890s, which also turned on undermining or rejecting the reality of non-European 
domestic laws. Alongside the fixation on independence came a set of rival claims 
around the problems of interdependence; the use of international law to reorder 
and coordinate systems of domestic law throughout the world. James Lorimer 
fixed on interdependence as the basis for a racial reordering of the world that 
rejected any strong distinction between domestic and international law. Liberal 
jurists approached interdependence as reorganising the concerns of domestic law 
(Dicey) and emphasising states in both their domestic and international forms as 
at base an aggregate of ‘men’ (Westlake), to be eventually and influentially used 
as the basis for sharply distinguishing the domestic from the international, and 
insisting on states as the only real subjects of international law (Oppenheim). But 
socialist reactions to liberal personification provided a vision of ‘the International’ 
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that sought to join the class orders of states across borders and critiqued the 
capitalist formations of domestic and foreign policy alike, announcing a project of 
capturing each state and reforming their relations along solidarity rather than 
competition. With the War that loomed over these projects in the early twentieth 
century came new uses of domestic and international law in peace plans, which 
would ultimately culminate in ideas of a League of Nations to develop 
international law to guide the conduct of states, and where each of these themes of 
race, liberal empire, socialism and peace would loom large. 
Chapter Four contended that the transformations and fall of the British Empire 
motivated radical rethinking of the concepts of domestic and international, 
exemplified in the work of Ivor Jennings and Hersch Lauterpacht, first in service 
of explaining changing imperial-constitutional arrangements, then as the basis for 
a wider idea of an international rule of law, and finally in post-war visions of 
commonwealth amidst the dissolving empire. 1920s questions about the 
international personality of dominions and mandate possessions used imperial-
constitutional law to limit the applicability of international law. For Jennings, 
dominion international status was a question of imperial not international law, and 
while imperial policy conventions gradually ceded genuine sovereignty to the 
dominions, the crown colonies and mandates remained under the absolute power 
of the Crown, even where those powers originated in international law in grants 
by the League. For Lauterpacht, meanwhile, the international legal community 
was undergoing a process of constitutionalization that, he contended, worked 
against the fixation on analogies between international and domestic law, which 
wrongly personified the state and undermined the possibility of stronger 
international duties and a genuine international community of laws, over which 
the League was, in the matter of mandates and other things, the real sovereign. In 
the 1930s, Jennings and Lauterpacht turned to the rule of law. Jennings argued that 
imperial administration had changed the face of domestic public law, and 
Parliament was practically constrained by the system of international law, both of 
which would ultimately lead to a fixation on the rule of law in its internal and 
international forms. The rule of law was primarily an international problem, and a 
basic account of it as law and order gave way, during the Second World War, to a 
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project of re-establishing world and state orders along the lines of British 
liberalism. Lauterpacht, on the other hand, examined the internal and international 
forms of the rule of law to reject the supposed inadequacy of international law and 
insist that domestic and international laws served the same purposes that limited 
the absolutism of the state and required the submission to adjudication. After the 
War, Jennings and Lauterpacht would each make the domestic and international 
central to their post-war projects. Jennings’ proposals for a European federation 
modelled its international connections on the imperial-constitutional law of British 
Empire, while his decolonisation era theorising saw the internationals of new 
states as mostly aligned with the emergent Commonwealth. Lauterpacht’s 
proposal for an International Bill of the Rights of Man drew on the British 
constitutional tradition to reorganise the domestic laws of all nations around 
human rights; a new commonwealth of all humanity — or rather, parts of it.  
———————— 
Britain’s entry into the European Community in the 1970s began the gradual 
process of importing supranational regional law into British domestic law. 
Between the Thatcherite project to remove and reshape municipality in Britain and 
its longer neoliberal pasts,1 and the fall of the Soviet Union, the ‘domestic’ in the 
1990s made a sharp reappearance, entirely eclipsing the now almost parochial and 
quaint term ‘municipal’. As the globalisation story goes, everything became global 
and local, with nation-states now more like individual private families in the global 
village, holding slight idiosyncrasies and shared heritages that were fundamentally 
unimportant provided they worked within the now world-dominant system of 
neoliberal global capitalism and its idealised preference for the liberal-democratic 
state form. Yet the treatment of the domestic and international in that ‘New’ World 
Order still resembled its precursors examined in this thesis; from Gentili’s pan-
humanist commonwealth that served peaceful communication and commerce 
alongside imperial expansion, through Bentham’s international as the rational 
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alignment of internal laws or Smith’s cosmopolitan commercial sentiments, to the 
imperial ambitions of Dicey and Westlake, to Lauterpacht’s vision of the 
international rights of all subjects. 
This thesis has explored the diverse roles and projects for which the domestic and 
international were used. It fills one part of the significant gap in historical 
approaches to understanding these ideas, presenting their emergence and 
development in British legal thought, and laying the ground for histories of them 
in other legal traditions. More importantly, it has revealed a much broader set of 
purposes for these ideas than is imagined in today’s theorising. The contingency 
of these past meanings and uses can form one pathway for unsettling and remaking 
the distinction between them as part of wider efforts to redress the imperial and 
extractive past with which the domestic and international are intimately bound.  
This thesis has been confined to the development of ideas in the past. One 
important pathway for future work that builds on it is to brings its insights into 
more direct conversation with present concerns. At least three areas are of special 
importance: radical transformation of the domestic and international commercial 
system to redress global inequality; the prevention of domestic civil wars and the 
international wars they constantly risk; and addressing the existential threat posed 
by the climate and environmental emergencies within states and collectively. The 
tensions of domestic and international law are central elements in each of these 
current problems. The jurists examined here also dealt constantly with the general 
categories of commerce, war, states and nature that correspond to these present 
concerns. As this thesis has demonstrated, British contributions to shaping the 
domestic and international were deeply inflected by projects of empire. New 
approaches, preferably drawing on a wider range of legal traditions, will need to 
work to undo the assumptions and structures that empire has placed into these 
categories. Projects of a better future can only be built on clear readings of projects 
of the past. New paths will need to reimagine the domestic and international. They 
may reshape it, or abolish it, or find some other means that can heal the crude split.  
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